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PREFACE  
 
I developed special interest in this topic in the late 1980s during my 
MPhil studies; though the issue of river-water sharing between India 
and Pakistan was on my mind since my childhood. 
In late 1950s military government of President Muhammad Ayub 
Khan launched a border-belt scheme to put under cultivation the land 
which was vacated because of complete diversion of Sutlej River by India 
under the Indus Waters Treaty (IWT) of 1960 between India and Pakistan. 
At that time a number of retired army-men were allotted that land and they 
settled in the area; my father was one of the beneficiaries. 
In 1962 when they planned to cultivate that land there was no facility 
of canal water for irrigation. They tried to manage the problem by other 
means, but during the rainy season flood waters, released by India, 
destroyed their crops. My father was one of the victims too. 
In late 1960s, when I was a school boy, our Headmaster arranged a 
visit to show us the construction of a link canal about five kilometres from 
my school and briefed us about the huge Indus Development Project 
undertaken under the IWT: the huge cranes which I saw at that time 
digging the canal never have seen again in Pakistan. 
In early 70s with the completion of the Indus Development Project, 
when there was hope for the supply of irrigation water, India started 
construction of Salal Dam thus endangering the supply from the river 
Chenab.  
 
Later, when I came across the land owners and farmers I observed 
that there were apprehensions among them that this grand project would be 
useless if India keeps on flooding their lands and withholding supplies from 
the western rivers on its will and the questions were being asked about the 
benefits of the IWT. 
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In 1985 and again in 1988, during rainy seasons, India opened the 
gates  at the river  headworks  which  flooded  the Ravi  and  the Sutlej and 
caused huge destruction of life and property in Lahore and destroyed greatly 
the mature crop of cotton—the major export product of Pakistan—and all other 
valuable crops in Punjab. In 1985 India created  the  Wullar  Barrage  issue  
and  started  construction  of  a barrage at river Jhelum Main. 
All this was sufficient motivating me to dig out the facts causing tension 
in India-Pakistan relations. 
I have read a dispassionate and comprehensive account of pre- partition 
scenario which ultimately led to the Partition of the Subcontinent; 
consequently, it dissected one of the world’s biggest river systems in total 
disregard to the dictates of natural geography and intrinsic ecology. Rightly 
or wrongly, it seems to me that all concerned were in the grip of 
developments which were beyond the wit of man to control. Man had released 
the whirlwind and men had to live with the resulting disasters. Wonder is not 
that mistakes have been done  but  it  was  due  to  the  utter  neglect  of  
riparian  rights  and intentional exploitation of vulnerabilities and weaknesses 
of the other party. 
 
Water flows immutable laws of nature. Man makes own laws and 
practice them until they serve his interests otherwise breaks them. All the 
laws, assurances, guarantees, understanding and even treaties could be 
honoured, not as a matter of obligation only, but as the condescending sweet 
will of the parties. 
Governments are always liable to change but a river/canal endures 
for centuries, if not for ever, and preserves the natural ecology to the benefit   
of   all.   Every   state   should   take   equal   interest   in   its maintenance;  
which  is  possible  only  in  the  absence  of  hostilities. 
Unfortunately, India and Pakistan could not succeed in ending their 
mutual animosity therefore facing the self-created whirlwind. My first 
attempt to comprehend the problem was during my MPhil 
(Masters/Magister) studies when I produced a thesis entitled Wullar 
Barrage Issue: An Analysis at the Pakistan’s premier institute, Quaid-i-
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Azam University Islamabad, in the subject of International Relations. Main 
section of the study was published as Wular Barrage by a Pakistani premier 
think-tank, Pakistan Horizon, Vol. 47, No. 1 (Jan. 1994). 
The completion of this D o c t o r a l  project owes profound thanks and 
gratitude to numerous peoples and institutions that eagerly cooperated with me 
during my field work. My special thanks are due for those anonymous referees, 
appointed by Routledge who strongly recommended the manuscript for 
publication. Their expert   comments   and   critique   enormously enhanced the 
quality of this manuscript. 
 
Muhammad Nasrullah Mirza 
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 Introduction 1
INTRODUCTION 
Conflict is a fact of international relations. Its causes range from disputed territories or 
un-demarcated boundaries associated with vital resources (realpolitik or geopolitics) to 
political or ideological incompatibilities (idealpolitik). Existing or perceived incompatibilities can 
lead to formation of hostile actors who aggravate conflict behaviour; conflict behaviour can 
become armed, and, thus, social relations become militarised. Wars have their genesis in 
such a state of affairs. Several factors relating to both schools of thought can be identified in 
the Indo-Pakistan conflict. From a neo-realistic perspective, 1  this study examines their 
conflicting interests, as they are bound to the irredentist territory of Kashmir, and argues that 
conflict over Kashmir is not exclusively ideological but also fundamentally connected to the 
control of the Indus water resource. There exists, to date, neither significant research 
focussing predominantly on this aspect of Indo-Pakistan relations nor studies have 
undertaken from the perspective of (neo)realism. In fact, the existing literature would appear 
conceiving Indo-Pakistan conflict as an ideological, emotional and political tangle. This theory-
driven study formulates a model with which to address the question of ‘water, war, and peace 
linkages’ using a rational choice approach substantiated with extensive empirical data. 
Objectives 
The prime objective of this study is to formulate a model which explains the role of 
international rivers in inter-state relations in general, and the intertwined nature of the 
disputes over Kashmir and the Indus rivers in particular. The focus lies on uncovering those 
factors of conflict in the Indus Basin which are not related to identity and investigating their 
linkage with political ideology, strategic planning, and warfare between India and Pakistan on 
the one hand and comprehending the circumstances under which enduring rivals prefer 
accommodation over vital concerns and postpone political issues on the other. The main 
concern is one of explaining how Indo-Pakistan conflict over the Indus waters has been 
managed in such a way that, despite being one of the major root-causes of the Kashmir 
conflict, it has been overshadowed by other concerns in the analyses of Indo-Pakistan 
relations. 
Historical Overview 
The roots of the conflict between India and Pakistan can be traced to the bitter and 
bloody circumstances under which the two South Asian nations emerged onto the global 
stage in 1947.  The intertwined nature of the Kashmir and Indus disputes have direct linkage 
to the Radcliffe boundary award, according to which the British Punjab was divided between 
India and Pakistan at the time of Partition of the Subcontinent, and under which India gained 
                                                          
1 Michael T. Klare, Resource Wars: The New Landscape of Global Conflict (New York: Henry Holt 
and Company, 2002), p. 187; Stanley Waterman, “Partition—A Problem in Political Geography,” in 
Taylor, P. and J. House, eds., Political Geography (London: Croom Helm, 1984); Scott Burchill,  
“Realism and Neo-realism” in Scott Burchill and Andrew Linklater, (eds.), Theories of International 
Relations (Basingstoke: Macmillan Press, 1996), pp. 67-92. 
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control of the headworks2 of two rivers providing irrigation in West Punjab (Pakistan) and the 
only land-link (from Indian territory) to the princely state of Kashmir, through a road over 
Madhopur headworks.3 Consequently, by capturing parts of Kashmir, India gained access to 
the catchment areas4 of the whole of the Indus river system,5 where its five tributaries—the 
Jhelum, Chenab, Ravi, Sutlej, and Beas—originate (see Map-1).  
Kashmir has continued to be the bone of contention in their relations.6 Maharaja Hari 
Singh, the ruler of the ‘princely state’ of Kashmir, sought the continuation of independent 
status and offered a ‘standstill agreement’ to both India and Pakistan. The offer was accepted 
by the latter but rejected by the former. The Muslims of Kashmir revolted against the 
Maharaja, allegedly demanding accession of the state to Pakistan. India launched a military 
offensive on 26 October 1947, claiming that the Maharaja had signed an instrument of 
accession with its leaders. On 1st April 1948, India cut off the irrigation water from the rivers 
flowing into Pakistan. Then, in May 1948, Pakistan also mobilised its troops. Both sides 
captured parts of Kashmir territory. Posturing for a peaceful resolution, India referred the 
issue to the United Nations Security Council (UNSC) and both countries accepted the UN-
supervised ceasefire, agreeing to its resolution of instituting a plebiscite under its supervision, 
which has not been implemented so far.7 Since then the only projected ongoing cause of the 
Kashmir conflict centres around the idea of conflicting ideologies: on the one hand India is 
seeking to maintain its ‘secular outlook’ and negate the very rationale behind the creation of 
Pakistan, the ‘two-nation theory’, by retaining control over a Muslim majority state, Jammu 
and Kashmir, while on the other hand Pakistan is struggling for the region’s ‘liberation’ from 
the Indian ‘yoke’, aiming for its integration with it. 
                                                          
2 The term “headworks” generally refers to a structure erected on a river which can control and regulate 
its flow. 
3 Gurdaspur was recognized as a Muslim-majority district in the June 3 Plan “as preliminary step until 
the report of the Boundary Commission has been put into effect.” See Aloys Arthur Michel, The Indus 
Rivers: A Study of the Effects of Partition (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1967), pp. 157, 192; 
Mosely recounts the story of the “rough sketch map” which was taken down over the telephone on 
August 8, 1947, and forwarded to Sir Evan Jenkins, showing not only the headworks but the towns of 
Ferozepur and Zira on the Pakistani side. See Mosley, Leonard, The Last Days of the British Raj (New 
York: Harcourt, Brace & World, and London, Widenfeld and Nicolson Limited, 1962), p. 230. 
4  The term “catchment area” refers to the upland territory which receives a high proportion of 
precipitation and the areas which collect this water in streams to form rivers. 
5 The Indus River has five major tributaries: the Jhelum, the Chenab, the Ravi the Beas and the Sutlej. 
These in turn have inspired the name Punjab (punj = five & ab = water/river), the land of the Five 
Waters/Rivers. The Indus rises from Mount Kailas in Tibet and traverses many miles through the 
Himalayas before it is joined by its tributaries in the Punjab. The River Kabul is excluded, for most of 
the purposes of this study, because it neither crosses the Indus Plains nor was it a subject of the Indus 
Waters Dispute. It is not beyond the realm of possibility that a dispute may someday arise between 
Pakistan and Afghanistan over the waters of the Kabul and its major affluent, the Chitral-Kunar. 
Thereafter it passes into Sindh (Pakistan) to pass out into the Arabian Sea (see Map-1). See Michel, 
Indus Rivers, op. cit., p. 41. 
6 Dr. Riaz Ali Shah (Jinnah’s personal doctor) states in his Diary (Publishing House, Bull Road 
publication 1950) that Quaid-i-Azam was quoted to have said: "Kashmir is the Jugular vein of Pakistan 
and no nation or country would tolerate its Jugular vein remains under the sword of the enemy". 
http://www.klc.org.pk/klc/pumphlet/index.htm 
7 UNSC resolution adopted on 5 January 1949, (Document No. S/1196, dated the 10th January, 1949), 
see the full text at: http://www.a-r-k.org/treaties.htm# 
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The realpolitik dimension of the Kashmir conflict surfaced when India withheld the 
river water supply to Pakistan on 1st April 1948, but was overshadowed mainly because of 
the anticipated policies of ideational and identity politics on both sides, and partly due to its 
disassociation from the Kashmir issue, which India demanded as a precondition of accepting 
mediation on the Indus rivers dispute.8  
The water issue became a question of survival for Pakistan and soon attracted 
attention of the international community. India claimed exclusive rights over the waters of all 
international rivers originating from its territory. Following twelve years of negotiations and 
mediation, away from public scrutiny and under the auspices of the World Bank, the issue 
was resolved in the form of the Indus Waters Treaty (IWT) in 1960. It was hailed 
internationally as a model of conflict resolution, however, there were some who questioned its 
legitimacy and effigies of both the leaders were burnt in their respective state capitals. 
The IWT allocated unrestricted use of three eastern rivers of the Indus system—the 
Ravi, Beas and Sutlej—to India, and three western rivers—the Indus, Jhelum and Chenab—
to Pakistan, barring some ‘specified uses’ in Indian-held Kashmir. Although the IWT ensured 
supplying the waters of all three of the western rivers to Pakistan, it has not eliminated the 
root-cause of the conflict over the Kashmir territory inherent in its geography. Kashmir is 
bounded by snow-covered peaks and valleys at the foothills of the Himalayas (see Map-1). 
The fact that melting snows and heavy summer precipitation in the valleys constitute the only 
source of fresh water feeding the entire Indus river system has enhanced its strategic 
importance. The Indus river system serves as a life-line to the predominantly arid lower 
riparian, Pakistan, and if India ever gave up control of Jammu and Kashmir—whether to 
Pakistan or an independent regime of some sort—it would lose its status as an upstream 
riparian and, therefore, much of its clout in determining the politics and fate of the region.9 For 
Pakistan, an unrestricted flow of the Indus river system is a question of ‘life and death’ and, 
for India, maintaining control of it is a ‘real political tool’ with which to exercise power over 
Pakistan by controlling its vital water resources. 
Relevance of Existing Literature 
The existing literature provides a wealth of insights into the role of international rivers 
in generating conflict and the achievement of settlements between riparian states, yet 
remains silent on the contribution of such settlements to the promotion of cooperation and 
peace between them. An analysis of incidents of accommodation amid enduring rivalries and 
their impact on the wider relationship is thus absent in the literature. In fact, the focus instead 
lies on two divergent and extreme viewpoints: that “water is a resource of war” and “water is a 
catalyst for peace”—a continued debate between so-called Alarmists and the Optimists, 
respectively. History presents numerous instances where rival riparian states, despite having 
                                                          
8 The Indian PM, Jawaharlal Nehru, at the time of accepting mediation offer, in a letter to World 
Bank’s President Mr. Black, dated 25 September 1951. 
9 Michael T. Klare, Resource Wars: The New Landscape of Global Conflict (New York: Henry Holt 
and Company, 2002), p. 187. 
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resorted to the use of force, finally reach accommodation over cross-boundary rivers. On the 
whole, however, such settlements have seldom promoted cooperation and peace between 
them, and their rivalries have generally remained intact. The instance of Indo-Pakistan 
accommodation over the Indus rivers, coupled with protracted conflict and number of wars 
over the Kashmir territory, provides a conspicuous example of this phenomenon.  
Secondly, water conflicts have been intimately connected with other issues of a 
political, ethnic, identity-related or religious nature, and as a result, no single war in the past 
has been exclusively acknowledged as a water war. Moreover, water has been frequently 
dismissed as a developmental issue and thus categorised as an issue of “low-politics”.  
Thirdly, water conflicts have often been infused with environmental issues, with water 
scarcity generally viewed as a form of environmental scarcity. This issue forms the crux of an 
unending debate between the Alarmists and the Optimists over whether water can be an 
exclusive cause of conflict. Though both sides agree that water is a major cause of domestic 
conflict and also a contributory factor in international conflicts, they disagree on the question 
of whether it can be the sole cause of inter-state wars and conflicts. Some authors also 
challenge the idea of population growth as a key factor in environmental conflicts and contend 
that the uneven development and unequal distribution of resources at the national level (i.e. 
structural scarcity) is the main cause of domestic violence.10 However, the acuteness of 
scarcity and its role in international or inter-state war and conflict in the future (as advocated 
by Klare11) is yet to be firmly established. Thus, conducting the study on the conceptual basis 
of water scarcity and environmental conflicts would make it speculative, controversial and 
purely futuristic in nature. In Gleditsch’s words, such an assertion amounts to “using the future 
as evidence.”12  The only relevance of the question of future water scarcity and conflict to the 
case under study is the likely rise of competition over the Jammu and Kashmir territory, a 
natural source of vital fresh water. Some correlations with this assertion are established in 
chapters six and seven. 
International law on international rivers and water-ways advocates the beneficial 
exploitation of cross-boundary water resources, where it does not result in detrimental effects 
to the lower riparian, and the upholding of the principles of equitable river apportionment,13 
but lacks the ‘commercial arm’ or military might to enforce these ‘high principles’. Although the 
principles have generally been upheld by the majority of nations in achieving settlement on 
cross-boundary water resources, in the case under study, international law has been totally 
                                                          
10 Miriam R. Lowi, “Water and Conflict in the Middle East and South Asia: Are Environmental Issues 
and Security Issues Linked?”, Journal of Environment and Development, Vol. 8, No. 4 (1999), pp. 376-
396. 
11 Michael T. Klare, Resource Wars, op. cit., p. 182. 
12 Nils Petter Gleditsch, “Armed Conflict and the Environment,” in Paul F. Diehl and Nils Petter 
Gleditsch, eds., Environmental Conflict (Boulder, Colorado: Westview Press, 2001), p. 266. 
13 Declaration of Madrid, Yearbook of the Institute of International Law, Vol. 24, p. 365; Final Act of 
the 7th Conference of American States LXXII, International Conferences of American States (1st Supp. 
1933-1940), pp. 88-89; Brierly, Law of Nations, (1942), p. 159; and Oppenheim, International Law 
(6th Ed., Lauterpacht, 1947), Vol. I, p. 430. 
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disregarded. Thus it has no direct relevance to Indo-Pakistan accommodation over the Indus 
dispute. In other words, international law assisted the adversaries in contesting but not in 
resolving their dispute. It may become relevant if either party abrogates the Indus Waters 
Treaty in the future or refers the case to the International Court of Justice for adjudication. 
The only relevance of international law to the case under study is that both India and Pakistan 
had contested their claims on the basis of riparian rights before signing of the Indus Waters 
Treaty in 1960 and it is highly likely that the issue may be referred to the International Court of 
Justice in future. This aspect is analysed in more detail in chapter four. 
The role of the geographical attributes of a boundary or a territory, where these 
constitute vital resources, in inducing conflict is well documented in the literature. Boundaries 
are lines of opportunity for both conflict and cooperation since they can impact greatly on 
human physical, social and economic well-being.14 If the demarcation of boundaries does not 
facilitate the realisation of these goals for the states on both sides of the boundary, the 
boundaries themselves can become a cause of conflict. As Waterman points out, the 
hardships of the peoples of Ireland and Palestine have their roots in superimposed 
boundaries which insufficiently take into account geographical realities. 15  Similarly, the 
boundary drawn in Punjab provided India with an opportunity to use cross-boundary water 
resources as military weapon on the one hand and a motivation to capture Kashmir territory 
on the other (the aspect is explained in chapter 3). This resulted in the Indus water dispute 
                                                          
14 Hartshorne and Stephen Jones, “A Unified Field Theory of Political Geography," Annals of the 
Association of American Geographers, Vol. 64, 1954; J. Douglass, "Conflict Between States," in 
Pacione, M. ed. Progress in Political Geography, (London: Croom Helm, 1985); J. Prescott, Political 
Frontiers and Boundaries (London: Allen and Unwin, 1987); Stanley Waterman, "Partition--A 
Problem in Political Geography," in Taylor, P. and J. House, eds., Political Geography, (London: 
Croom Helm, 1984); Saul Cohen, The Geopolitics of Israel's Border Question (Boulder, Colorado: 
Westview, 1986); Tonkin, E., “Borderline Questions: People and Space in West Africa”, in Border 
Approaches: Anthropological Perspectives on Frontiers, H. Donnan and T. Wilson, eds., (Lanham, 
MD: University Press of America, 1994); G. A. Bingham, Wolf, and T. Wohlgenant, Resolving Water 
Disputes: Conflict and Cooperation in the U.S., Asia, and the Near East (Washington, DC: US Agency 
for International Development, 1994); Julian Minghi, "Boundary Studies in Political Geography," 
Annals of the Association of American Geographers, Vol. 53, 1963. Reproduced in Kasperson, Roger 
and Julian Minghi, eds. The Structure of Political Geography, (Chicago: Aldine, 1969); J. Prescott, The 
Geography of Frontiers and Boundaries (Chicago: Aldine, 1965), p. 13. Prescott makes the important 
point that Curzon differentiated between "natural" and what Ratzel and, later, Kjellen mislabelled as 
the geopolitically "Natural" frontiers, to which nations ought to strive. To avoid such confusion, Broek 
(1940, 9) argues for the term "physiographic" boundary. For details please see the web site: 
http://www.pnl.gov/ces/academic/mideast2.htm; Thomas Holdich, "Political Boundaries," The Scottish 
Geographical Magazine, Vol. 32, (1916), p. 502. Holdich also suggests that annexation of any territory 
against the will of its inhabitants is "a political blunder." 
http://www.pnl.gov/ces/academic/mideast2.htm; Thomas Holdich, "Political Boundaries," The Scottish 
Geographical Magazine, Vol. 32, (1916); Douglas Johnson, "The Role of Political Boundaries," The 
Geographical Review. Vol. 4, No. 3 (September 1917), pp. 208-213; Jan Broek, et al., "The Problem of 
'Natural Frontiers,"' Frontiers of the Future (Berkeley: University of California, 1941); Committee on 
International Relations 1940; Spykman 1942, cited in Minghi, eds., The Structure of Political 
Geography (Chicago: Aldine, 1969); Stephen Jones, Boundary-Making: A Handbook for Statesmen in 
Treaty Editors and Boundary Commissioners (Washington, DC: Carnegie Endowment for International 
Peace, 1945). 
15 Stanley Waterman, “Partition—A Problem in Political Geography,” in Taylor, P. and J. House, eds., 
Political Geography (London: Croom Helm, 1984). 
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which culminated in an international war between India and Pakistan in 1948. Moreover, the 
armistice boundary in Kashmir, established under the UNSC ceasefire of 1948/1949, created 
an enduring situation of suspense which has instilled an enormous sense of insecurity in both 
the Pakistani state and public, who perceive themselves vulnerable as the Jammu and 
Kashmir territory remains under Indian control (the aspect is explained in detail in chapter 2 
and 3).  
This fact draws additional support from the observation of Michael Klare, who views 
the Indian intransigence in retaining control over the Jammu and Kashmir territory linked with 
water-politics of India not to relinquish upper riparian status and was overshadowed by 
ideological, political and military dimensions. Klare argues that Indian upper riparian status in 
Kashmir possesses enormous political implications for the future use of the Indus rivers and 
the fate of regional politics.16 It also establishes the status of Kashmir as a hydro-strategic 
territory on the one hand, and the Kashmir dispute as a conflict of realistic interests, based on 
the vital Indus water resource, on the other. The argument also draws strength from the 
findings of Lipschutz that scarcity is an outcome of resource control and not of the given 
attributes of nature.17 If we consider the perception of water scarcity to be a product of the 
control of a critical resource, then the territory of Jammu and Kashmir qualifies as a vital water 
resource whose control is a real geo-political and geo-strategic tool for the upper riparian and 
a question of national security and survival for the lower riparian. This fact directs us to 
explore the hydro-strategic (i.e. economic and security) dimensions of the Kashmir dispute 
and its linkage with conflict between India and Pakistan, based on the concept of ‘resource 
wars’. The objective would be one of determining whether the first war over Kashmir (1948-
49) between India and Pakistan was aimed at capturing river catchment areas and achieving 
control over river structures. If this was indeed the case, then it can be termed a ‘resource 
war’. Two aspects of international river resource are thus central to this study: firstly, that 
water is a resource of war, and secondly, that water is a catalyst for accommodation between 
enduring rivals. The first aspect provides the main focus of chapter three and second aspect 
is analysed in chapter five.  
The main challenge posed by the literature is that the concept of accommodation 
remains acutely underdeveloped. The focus of the existing literature is either on adversarial or 
cooperative strategies. There is not only an omission of the concept of accommodation, but 
peace initiatives have often been defined as “sharp reversals of foreign policy from a 
conflictual to a cooperative strategy.”18 In fact, most of the work on accommodation has been 
carried out in the context of the US-Soviet rapprochement of the late 1980s and the Arab-
Israel peace initiatives of the late 1970s and 1990s. Ironically the greatest cause for concern 
                                                          
16 Michael T. Klare, Resource Wars, op. cit., p. 187. 
17 Ronnie D. Lipschutz, “Damming Troubled Waters: Conflict over the Danube: 1950-2000,” paper 
presented at Environment and Security Conference, Institute of War and Peace Studies, Columbia 
University, New York, Oct. 24, 1997. 
18 Ben D. Mor, “Peace Initiatives and Public Opinion: The Domestic Context of Conflict Resolution,” 
Journal of Peace Research, Vol. 34, No. 2 (1997), p. 198. 
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is the tendency to mislabel ‘accommodation’ as ‘cooperation’ or ‘peace’. This has resulted 
because the sub-field of accommodation has primarily emerged from the fields of cooperation 
and conflict. Surprisingly, the signing of the Indus Waters Treaty between India and Pakistan 
is generally viewed as a model of conflict resolution and cooperation. In fact, the lower 
riparian is often forced to accept the terms of the upper riparian and it accepts these 
conditions in an effort to manage the conflict minimising consequent losses. The Indus 
Waters Treaty certainly serves as a fine example of conflict management, but can it be 
termed a model of cooperation or peace between India and Pakistan? This so far unanswered 
question demands rigorous academic inquiry. 
General Assumptions 
International politics, like politics anywhere or at any level, is driven by interests. The 
topmost singular national interest of any state is maximisation of power by controlling more 
and more vital resources and maximisation of security by safeguarding whatever it 
possesses. Fresh water resource in an arid region is a vital national concern and a question 
of survival for an agrarian economy of riparian states. The key assumptions, in this study, are 
that water is a source of conflict and a potential trigger of wars between riparians; the 
geographical location of the territory in question enhances the likelihood of conflict; a 
negotiated settlement is sought when the enduring rival riparians reach a “mutually hurting 
stalemate” 19 ; accommodation is possible when the lower riparian is militarily weak and 
committed to cutting its economic losses; third party mediation can play decisive role for a 
settlement when the mediator also possesses the resources required to lessen the stalemate. 
But such solutions may not promote peace between the riparian states since the upper 
riparian remains in a position to create new disputes. In other words, water is a source of 
conflict and most often compels the lower riparian (on account of its disadvantageous 
geographic location) to initiate accommodation in an effort to minimize its losses. Such 
settlements rarely, however, become a catalyst for peace between the riparian states and in 
fact often limit the process of accommodation in a long-run. A durable settlement is possible 
when the envisaged solution is politically acceptable, economically feasible and 
environmentally sustainable. 
Case Selection 
The study focuses on two aspects of the role of international rivers in the relations of 
enduring rival riparians: 1) water as a source of conflict or war, and 2) accommodation over 
cross-boundary water as a preferred security strategy between enduring rivals. Many such 
inter-state conflicts are active amongst the users of international river basins in different parts 
of the world. Some of the widely discussed major conflicts are: the Jordan, Litani, Orontes 
and Yarmuk Rivers (Israel and Arab nations), the Nile (Egypt, Sudan and Ethiopia), the 
Euphrates (Turkey, Syria and Iraq), the Danube (Hungary and Slovakia), the Han (North and 
                                                          
19 William Zartman, Ripe for Resolution and Intervention in Africa (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 
1985). 
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South Korea), the Amu and Syre Darya (Central Asian States), the Ganges (India, 
Bangladesh and Nepal), and the Indus (India and Pakistan and in future may involve China 
and Afghanistan). However, the criterion of enduring rival riparian states highlights two 
prominent cases: India and Pakistan, and the Arab nations and Israel. This study focuses 
exclusively on the role of the Indus river system in the Indo-Pakistan conflict. In order to 
investigate the first of the two abovementioned aspects, the Indo-Pakistan War of 1948 is 
analysed comprehensively in chapter 3.  
With regard to the second aspect, a number of cases can be observed in which 
Pakistan initiated accommodation, according to the definition of the phenomenon selected for 
this study, and India reciprocated, or vice versa. Examples include the Inter-Dominion 
Agreement (see Appendix 1) between the East and West Punjab Governments on 4 May 
1948 during the first Kashmir war, which culminated into the signing of the Indus Waters 
Treaty (1960); the Tashkent Declaration (1966), following the 1965 Indo-Pakistan war; the 
Simla Accord (1972), following the 1971 war and the emergence of East Pakistan as the 
separate state of  Bangladesh; the Salal Dam issue, which erupted in 1974 and was settled in 
1978 (three more major water issues later emerged: that of the Wullar Barrage in 1984; the 
Baglihar Dam in 1994, and more recently the Kishenganga Project—all of which are still to be 
resolved); and the recent composite dialogue process initiated by Pakistan in 2004. The 
accommodation on Salal dam is discussed in chapter 5 and the issues of Wullar, Baglihar and 
Kishenganga are discussed in chapter 7.  
In fact, almost all the issues between India and Pakistan can be studied under the 
framework evolved in this study. This framework is also suitable for investigating the 
phenomenon of accommodation as a preferred security strategy, both in the relations among 
Third World states and those among the Great Powers. However, in order to highlight the role 
of international rivers as an inducer of accommodation between enduring rival riparians, 
Pakistan's initiation of accommodation vis-à-vis the upper riparian, India, has been selected 
for this study.  
This study is limited to the dynamics of conflict and accommodation between India 
and Pakistan and relates exclusively to the issues of control and the right to utilize 
international rivers—the Indus River System, and more specifically, the negotiation over and 
settlement of the dispute through mediating the Indus Waters Treaty and all other agreements 
and issues relating to river waters. 
For the selection of cases pertaining to accommodation, two main criteria were 
followed: firstly, the case should represent different time periods (i.e., different political, 
economic and security realities) in the history of Pakistan, if not different regimes. Secondly, 
the cases should represent Pakistan's accommodative initiatives towards India on issues 
related to river waters only. This second criterion was used to narrow the scope for analysis. 
Finally, constraints of scope and space are responsible for the limited selection of comparable 
cases. Thus, the study focuses on the Indus Waters Dispute, or, more specifically, the signing 
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of the Indus Waters Treaty (1960), and all post-treaty water-related disputes between 
Pakistan and India are mentioned only in brief terms. 
Data Sources 
The study aims at identifying the factors which have contributed to conflict and 
accommodation over the issue of Indus water resources in Indo-Pakistan relations. The water 
issue has been unlinked from the Kashmir issue and the process of mediation kept top-secret. 
Policy-makers remain tight-lipped on the subject as any emphasis of the matter would be 
contrary to the identity politics both states have perpetuated since their inception. Therefore, 
fresh and structured interviews with state officials are neither useful nor possible.  
Public perception is always considered a good yard-stick with which to measure the 
intensity of a social phenomenon, but in this case public perception is restricted to the scarcity 
issue only. State diplomacy remains as opaque as before. Visits to India or Indian-controlled 
Kashmir are neither considered necessary nor permissible given the security circumstances 
in the region and the sensitive nature of the issue.  
The most relevant sources of information are to be found in the official 
correspondence between India and Pakistan, and in their communications with the mediator 
(see Appendix 1-7). Moreover, the minutes of the bi-party and tripartite meetings between 
them served the main source of information. The second most important source is the 
geographical and historical literature. Some useful analyses and opinions are available as 
primary as well as secondary sources, particularly in the text of the Indus Waters Treaty and 
in debate over its interpretation which has emerged relating to post-Treaty water issues. 
Therefore, data is chosen from various sources: primary [archival] as well as secondary; 
general library collections. 
The primary data, such as regular official correspondence between the states both 
before and during the mediation process, has been collected from Pakistan National Archives 
and National Documentation Centre [renamed recently as National Documentation Wing], 
Cabinet Division, Government of Pakistan, Islamabad and Office/Library of Permanent 
Commissioner for Indus Rivers Pakistan, Lahore. Reliance has been made on the 
(auto)biographies of leaders and the interviews of stake-holders, conducted by various 
analysts across a range of time periods. Post-IWT bilateral correspondence pertaining to 
some major water issues has been collected from the official library of the Commissioner for 
Indus Waters, Lahore, Pakistan. Official reports, compiled by various inquiry commissions, 
have been sourced from the respective ministries of the Government of Pakistan, especially 
those responsible for irrigation, agriculture, and water and power. Data related to global water 
codes and bilateral and multilateral protocols, agreements and treaties have been collected 
from the UN Treaty Series available in various UN libraries and also, in some cases, on the 
internet. 
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In terms of secondary data, all possible sources have been explored: books, research 
journals, and leading international and regional newspapers available in the major libraries of 
Pakistan, a network of libraries accessible through the library of the University of Illinois, 
Urbana-Champaign, USA, and the libraries of the University of Heidelberg, Germany. 
Specifically, I would like to acknowledge pioneering works by Aloys Arthur Michel, Niranjan 
Das Gulhati, Mushtaqur Rahman, Thomas Homer-Dixon, Oscar H. K Spate, Basheer Khalil 
Nijim and Richard R. Baxter. Excellent works relating to negotiation and third-party mediation 
by Jacob Bercovitch, William Zartman and Frank R. Pfetsch were of great help. Some 
unpublished theses, written at the last quarter of 20th century, by Haroon Haider Bhatti, 
Jinping Guo, Rashid Ahmad Malik and Humaira Linda Afzal were of substantive utility 
(Extracts taken from the above-listed sources were suitably cited, however, the author 
apologises in advance for any inadvertent omission or inappropriate treatment). 
Some fundamental facts were collected from various think-tanks, working exclusively 
in the area of water and environment, such as the International Rivers Network, Berkeley, 
USA; the Stockholm Environment Institute, Sweden; and the International Water Management 
Institute, Colombo, Sri Lanka, all served as substantial sources of information. Moreover, 
some parts of earlier published (before December 2010) and unpublished works of the author 
have been incorporated in this volume with suitable revisions and updates.20 The information 
in this study is updated to as of December 2010. 
 
What is New? 
The study makes a new case for the claim that neo-realistic interests between rival 
neighbouring states are the cause of conflict and accommodation, and brings to light the 
competition for the control of vital water resources as an issue of high-politics in the field of 
international relations.  
It explains when rival nations compromise on vital concerns and why they put political 
issues on the backburner. It addresses the question of linkage between the Indus waters and 
the Kashmir dispute and highlights its role in political thinking, strategic planning and warfare 
between India and Pakistan. The research reinforces the belief of geo-politicians that 
competition over, and control of, vital resources—be they oil, strategic materials for warfare, 
                                                          
20 “Wullar  Barrage: Device to Dissolve  Kashmir  in the Name of Development”,  chapter in IPRI 
Book on Pakistan-India Peace Process: The Way Forward (Islamabad: Islamabad Policy Research 
Institute, 2010), pp. 173-193; “Water Disputes and Pak-India Relations,” Regional Perspectives, April 
2009, Institute of Policy Studies, available at: http://ips- 
pk.org/index2.php?option=com_content&do_pdf=1&id=829; “Water, War, and Peace: Linkages   and  
Scenarios   in  India-Pakistan   Relations”,   an  abridged   form  of  thesis published as Heidelberg 
Papers in Asian and Comparative Politics, Vol. 37, ISSN 1617-5069, (2008); “Salal Dam Issue,” 
Margalla Papers, National Defence College Journal, Islamabad, Pakistan (Spring 1997); “Wular 
Barrage”, Pakistan Horizon, Pakistan Institute of International Affairs, Vol. 47, No. 1, 1994. Wullar 
Barrage Issue: An Analysis (MPhil Thesis submitted to the Department of International Relations, 
Quaid-i-Azam University, Islamabad, Pakistan, 1991). 
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water and sea lanes or minerals—is the main cause of conflict between states, and adds 
substance to that belief by attributing equal significance to the territorial control of freshwater 
resources between riparian nations.  
The discovery of this new dimension of the Kashmir conflict, based on the neo-
realistic interests of riparian states in controlling vital water resources, is the hallmark of the 
study. The study also highlights the pitfalls in the field of mediation and exposes the role of 
self-interested mediators in providing unsustainable solutions. It explains how the rival nations 
pursue accommodation as a preferred strategy in order to safeguard their foremost national 
interests of security and power maximization, bilaterally as well as in the international political 
system, when the conflict “hurts” both of them. Given that the literature on the neo-realistic 
security dimensions of the Kashmir conflict is practically non-existent, the original contribution 
of this study is the formulation of a theoretical model which explains the dual phenomena of 
conflict and accommodation between rival riparian states. A further contribution of the study is 
to bridge this theoretical gap and open up new vistas for research. 
The case under study (i.e. the nature of the Kashmir conflict and its linkages with the 
control of Indus water resource) has been most often projected as a politico-ideological issue, 
overshadowing the geographical and economic dimensions inherent in its hydro-strategic 
nature and importance of the territory. Therefore, there is no significant study which focuses 
on the geo-economic, socio-ecological and security dimensions of the Kashmir conflict. It is 
usually argued that the environmental or ecological dimensions of a conflict have no direct 
linkage to the economic or power balance of the disputants and as such cannot be 
considered a cause of war. However, the case under study appears able to prove the 
contrary, since the economy and power balance between India and Pakistan may be strongly 
affected by the emerging ecological disaster in Pakistan.  
It is, according to popular perception, time to acknowledge that the emerging scenario 
has fast-approaching implications. Policy-makers have to re-evaluate their conflicting policies. 
The question is; where do they stand after around a decade of pursuing the ongoing policies? 
Would any solution to the Kashmir dispute ignoring the water factor ushers in peace between 
India and Pakistan? What type of solution to the Kashmir issue can offer durable peace 
between India and Pakistan? This study attempts to address such critical questions and 
identify emerging scenarios which may compel policy-makers to take appropriate measures. 
Hence the theoretical as well as the policy-related importance of the study cannot be 
underestimated. 
1:  Theoretical Framework 12
Chapter 1 
THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK 
This chapter defines the puzzle and formulates a theoretical framework based on two 
central concepts: water as a resource of war and accommodation as a preferred security 
strategy between enduring rival riparians. The focus lies on identifying both the factors of 
conflict and their comparative role in war over water resources, and the factors facilitating 
accommodation between states. The objective is to formulate a model which facilitates a 
deeper understanding of the linkage of water, war and peace in the relations of rival riparian 
states in general, and the India-Pakistan conflict over Kashmir in particular. 
1.1  The Puzzle 
“Water is the true wealth in a dry land; without it, land is worthless or nearly so. And if 
you control water, you control the land that depends upon it”.1  
Nations have often fought to assert or resist control over natural resources such as 
oil, materials for warfare, sea lanes, farm lands, minerals and other vital assets. “Throughout 
human history, but particularly since the system of sovereign nation states,…struggles over 
access to and control over natural resources…have been a root-cause of tension and 
conflict.”2 Hurts claims that "although there is considerable rivalry among nations over the 
possession of such things as oil, gas and uranium, the most dangerous rivalry between 
countries can be for the possession of water, one of the elements without which man cannot 
exist."3
Water is without doubt a critical resource for human survival, economic development, 
and ecological balance in nature. Hardly any other natural resource affects so many areas of 
human life, therefore scarcity of water, in particular, affects a broad spectrum of spheres, from 
health to human rights, the environment to the economy, prosperity to poverty, culture to 
politics, and conflict to war. Water can mean the difference between life and death, as “every 
living being is made from water.”4 Moreover, water defies political boundaries therefore can 
be a potential cause of war. 
Traditionally, water has been an abundant resource for development, virtually 
amounting to a free good. However, the situation is now changing rapidly. A point has been 
reached where water scarcity has become a potential threat to national stability, regional 
                                                          
1 Stegner in Peter H. Gleick, (ed.), Water in Crisis: A Guide to the World's Fresh Water Resources 
(New York: Oxford University Press, 1993a), p. 9. 
2 Michael Renner, et al., “International Conflict and Environmental Degradation,” chapter 5 in New 
Directions in Conflict Theory, Conflict Resolution and Conflict Transformation, ed., Raimo Vayrynen 
(London: Sage, 1991) p. 290.  
3 C. K. Hurst, “Water in International Affairs,” in Behind the Headlines, Vol. XVI, No. 3 (Sept. 1956), 
p. 16. 
4 Al-Quraan, Sura Al-Ambia, Aayat No. 30 and Sura Al-Noor, Aayat No. 45 also quoted by Malin 
Falkenmark in his paper on: “Living at the Mercy of the Water Cycle,” Water Resources in the Next 
Century (Stockholm Symposium, Publication No. 1 (August 12-15, 1999), p. 13.  
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peace, and international security. Experts are of the opinion that in the twenty-first century, 
wars will be waged for access to freshwater resources [rivers] and, as a consequence, will 
endanger international peace and security. A recent United Nations Security Council (UNSC) 
report has identified a number of potential flash-points for future conflicts over water, with the 
Indus Basin appearing high on the list.5
Literature on ‘water wars’ and ‘water peace,’ depicts two main currents of thought: 
one, that ‘water is a resource of conflict’ [Alarmists],6 and the other, that ‘water is a catalyst for 
peace’ [Optimists].7 Nevertheless, history of inter-state relations presents numerous instances 
where even enduring rival states were able to reach an agreement on river-sharing without 
going to war, although all such settlements hardly served as a successive catalyst for peace. 
For the most part, their ideological and political rivalries remained intact and they did not 
relinquish their irredentist territorial claims. The most pertinent example in this context is that 
of Indo-Pakistan relations. The rivalry of these two states encompasses every dimension of 
conflicting interstate relations, ranging from idealpolitik to realpolitik. Nevertheless, both states 
agreed on a rivers’ diversion formula in the shape of the Indus Waters Treaty in 1960 which, 
however, did not lead to conflict-free, mutually peaceable working relations, even for a short 
period. Above all, neither of the states relinquished their historical territorial claims over 
Kashmir. The puzzle of why, for example: Pakistan accepted the Indian demand for the 
permanent diversion of three out of the system’s six rivers in 1960, and India apparently 
agreed not to interfere with the flow of rivers in Jammu and Kashmir under its administrative 
control but why both never compromised on the issue of Jammu and Kashmir territory, 
underpins the main trajectory of this research. 
Both states remain uncomfortable with the Treaty.8 In May 2002, the Indian 
government considered abrogation of the Treaty, ‘to teach Pakistan a lesson’—a fact then 
widely published in Indian newspapers.9 Concerns have been openly expressed in Pakistan 
                                                          
5 “Water, the Looming Source of World Conflict," Agence France Presse (March 20, 2001). Quoted in 
the UNSC Global Policy Forum, NY available at: http://www.globalpolicy.org/security/index.htm  
6 Some leading Alarmists are: Beschomer (1992); Bulloch & Dawish (1993); Gleick (1994); Hillel 
(1994); Isaac & ShuvaI (1994); Kally (1993); Kelly & Homer-Dixon (1996, esp. pp. 21-22); Lowi 
(1992, esp. p. 52); Murakami (1995); Postel (1992); Starr (1991, 1995); Starr & Stoll (1988); Wolf 
(1995); Easterbrook, Gleick, Wolf, Lowi, Beschnorner, Beamount, Agnew, Anderson, Falkenmark, 
Starr, Starr & Stoll, Ismail Searageldin, Wally N’Dow; Agnew, John & Stuart Corbridge, (1995); 
Beaumont (1997); Dordrecht: Kluwer; Beschorner, Natasha (1992); Bulloch, John & Adel Dawish 
(1993); Christopher, Warren (1996); Dalby,  Simon (1990); Dalby, Simon (1995);  Starr, Joyce R. & 
Daniel C. Stoll, eds. (1988). 
7 Some leading Optimists are: Kader Asmal (2000); Peter Rogers, (1993); Abul Kalam (1996); 
Shamser Ali (1993); Philip Flood (1995). 
8 Center for International and Strategic Studies, Washington DC, “Pakistan’s Future and US Policy 
Options”, Working Group-IV: Energy and Water, September 24, 2002. The Group headed by Teresta 
Schaffer. 
9 “J&K wants Centre to annul Indus Treaty”, The Asian Age, (14 April 2002), available at: 
http://jammu-kashmir.com/archives/archives2002/kashmir20020414c.html; B.G. Verghese, “Talk of 
abrogating Indus Water Treaty: Misconceived facts, fallacious arguments,” Chandigarh Tribune, India, 
(Monday, April 29, 2002), available at: http://www.tribuneindia.com/2002/20020429/edit.htm; Adam 
Nayyar, “What Indus water treaty means,” Daily Dawn, (January 10, 2002), available at: 
http://www.dawn.com/2002/01/10/op.htm; Tara Shankar Sahay, “India to abrogate Indus Waters 
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that “it was the military regime of General Ayub Khan, which surrendered to Indian blackmail 
and World Bank and US pressures to sign away every drop of three of the five tributaries of 
the Indus [river system] to India”.10 According to historical usage, as designated by 
international law, “India was entitled to 8 per cent of the water of the Indus river system. 
Instead, the Indus Basin Treaty of 1960 allocated 20 per cent to it”.11 On 27 July 2004, 
Pakistan's legislators moved a motion in the National Assembly urging the 
government to include Indus waters’ sharing issue in the ongoing peace process 
[composite dialogue] and immediately consider buying water from India to tide over 
acute water shortages and renegotiation of the 1960 Indus Water[s] Treaty between 
the two countries to get more water from the Sutlej river.12
Speaking on a point of order, a parliamentarian remarked that “the Indus Waters 
Treaty was perhaps the only pact on the earth in which a 'nature resource' was 'sold out'”.13  
Some Indian thinkers are of the opinion that the primary objective of Pakistan’s 
interest in Kashmir is to secure its water resources. According to a recent study made by the 
Mumbai-based Strategic Foresight Group: 
The primary objective of Pakistan's interest in Kashmir is to secure its water 
resources.... A conflict over and between the people of Kashmir and the Government 
of India will soon become a thing of the past. On the other hand, a water-war between 
Kashmir and Pakistan is inevitable in the future.... If India and Pakistan take a political 
decision to restructure their relations, they will have to ensure that water serves as a 
flow to bring them together, rather than taking them further on the course of conflict. 
Water situation in Pakistan is worse. The flow of river water is dropping precipitately 
at nearly seven per cent a year. Pakistan's per capita water availability has declined 
from 5600 cubic metres at the time of independence to 1200 cubic metres in 2005. It 
is expected to reach a threshold level of 1000 cubic metres before year 2010 or 
                                                                                                                                                                      
Treaty,” refiff.com (New Delhi: December 27, 2001), 
http://www.rediff.com/news/2001/dec/26ccs1.htm; Ministry of Foreign Affairs, India, Parliament Q&A 
(Lok Sabha), Dated December 11, 2002, Question No. 3342, Shri Digvijay Singh, The Minister of 
State for Foreign Affairs, question by Charan Das Mahant, available at: 
http://meaindia.nic.in/parliament/ls/2002/12/december11-3342.htm; “Abrogation of Indus Waters 
Treaty,” Indian Lok Sabha, Q&A, dated March 3, 2002, Shri Ummar Abdullah, Minister of State for 
Foreign Affairs responded to Shri Malava Sirinivasulu, question number 2783, available at: 
http://meaindia.nic.in/parliament/ls/2002/03/mar20-2783.htm; see also, arindam-
banerji.sulekha.com/blog/post/2002/10/what-is-our-leverage-against-pakistan/comments.htm, 
links.jstor.org/sici?sici=0030-851X(192906)2%3A6%3C361%3API%3E2.0.CO%3B2-G; 
www.palit.com/2002_01_13_tkl_archive.asp; 
www.thedailystar.net/dailystarnews/200112/28/n1122808.htm, www.saag.org/papers7/paper660.html 
and www.himalmag.com/2002/june/commentary_inpk.htm, 
10 Kaiser Bengali and Haris Gazdar, “Resolving the Water Crisis, Dawn (Karachi) April 1, 2001.  
11 Ibid. 
12 Dawn (Islamabad) August 14, 2004. 
13 Speaking on the point of order, Dr. Sher Afgan (member National Assembly, Pakistan) of the PPP-
Patriots challenged the parliamentary secretary on the issue and made these remarks. For details see, 
“Treasury benches demand reclamation of Sutlej from India,” Dawn (Islamabad) July 28, 2004. 
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perhaps even 2007. About 50 percent of it is expected to be lost by 2010 making it 
difficult to support cotton sowing and wheat maturing.14
According to a report on 31st January 2005, the J&K Assembly also passed a 
resolution on 3 March 2003 asking New Delhi to reconsider the IWT so as to safeguard the 
interests of the state.15
India and Pakistan have fought two major wars over Kashmir, in 1948 and 1965, and 
there have been numerous further instances when both states reached the brink of war, 
mainly over the Kashmir issue. Why, then, the Kashmir territory is so vital to Pakistan and 
India that they adamantly refuse to show any flexibility or grant any concession to one 
another? Three broad trends in opinion prevail over the Kashmir issue.  
Firstly, it is generally believed that the Kashmir issue is an emotional one, rooted in 
the conflicting ideologies of Pakistan and India. According to this argument, Pakistan came 
into existence on the basis of the ‘two nation theory’ and it considers that the integration of the 
Muslim majority state (Kashmir) with Pakistan is an unfinished agenda of the Partition. India, 
being a secular state, has always attempted to undermine the concept of the ‘two nation 
theory’ and has never accepted even the existence of Pakistan. The reasoning continues that 
if India relinquishes its hold over Kashmir and agrees to some sort of ‘independent Kashmir’ 
the spill-over effects may strengthen a number of India’s ongoing separatist movements. As a 
result, such a move would culminate in the balkanisation of India. Thus, Kashmir serves as a 
symbolic value of national honour and integrity for Pakistan and India. 
Secondly, Kashmir is a political issue. It is a question of the right of self-determination 
for the people of Kashmir. This right was recognised and promised under the auspices of the 
United Nations Security Council (UNSC) in 1948, when India took the issue to the UN. Both 
parties (India and Pakistan) agreed on the implementation of a plebiscite under UN 
supervision but failed to create a conducive environment in which to carry it out. Following this 
disappointment, the inhabitants of Kashmir began pursuing their rights through a violent 
struggle, which has intensified since the late 1980s. Pakistan supports their right to self-
determination. Thus Kashmir is an issue relating to both human rights and the political destiny 
of its inhabitants. Indians believe that the situation has been complicated by the unqualified 
support of Pakistan. 
Thirdly, there is a strong belief that Kashmir is an issue of realpolitik. The territory of 
Kashmir is home to the catchment area of one of the world’s largest river systems. The Indus 
river system serves as a life-line to the lower riparian, Pakistan, and “if India were [sic] to give 
up control of Kashmir—whether to Pakistan or an independent regime of some sort—it would 
lose its status as an upstream riparian and, therefore, much of its clout in determining the 
                                                          
14 “Conflict over water between India-Pak ‘inevitable in future’”, Strategic Foresight Group, 
Doordarshan March 21, 2005. 
15 http://www.Jammu-Kashmir.com/insights 
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river’s future use.”16 The argument claims that for Pakistan, an unrestricted flow of the Indus 
river system is a question of ‘life and death’, and for India, control over it is a ‘real political tool’ 
with which to intimidate, economically strangulate, and undermine Pakistan’s very survival as 
and when it chooses to do so. 
Map 2: Territory of Jammu and Kashmir, as currently controlled by India, Pakistan and 
China. 
 
 
 
 
Source: http://commons.wikimedia.org/wiki/File:Kashmir_map_big.jpg
 
                                                          
16 Michael T. Klare, Resource Wars: The New Landscape of Global Conflict (New York: Henry Holt 
and Company, 2002), p. 187. 
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This study suggests that the Kashmir dispute is neither purely an emotional issue nor 
an ideological tangle but equally, if not more so, an issue of realpolitik. It is contended that 
this dimension of the Kashmir dispute was overshadowed in the wake of the Indian resolve to 
raise the Kashmir issue at the UNSC in 1948 and that realpolitik is inherent in the nature of 
the territory of Kashmir. The importance of the territory lies in its wealth of water resources, 
together comprising the Indus river system, which flow down into Pakistan. This river system 
constitutes the ‘jugular vein’ of Pakistan and as such is a matter of life or death for the state’s 
agrarian economy. India is not prepared to lose the upper-riparian status and Pakistan is 
fearful of its vulnerabilities—in economic as well as security-related terms. Thus the issue of 
Kashmir is also a question of the control of the upstream rivers which originate from the 
territory of Jammu and Kashmir, parts of which were captured by both India and Pakistan in 
1948. Later, in the 1962 Sino-India border clash, China also captured part of Kashmir and, in 
1963, Pakistan relinquished some of the area of Kashmir to China, where both states built the 
Karakurum Highway (KKH)—the only land route between the two states which might serve as 
economic corridor for Pakistan, China and the regions; South Asia, Central Asia and West 
Asia. 
1.2 Core Question 
The puzzle outlined above raises some fundamental questions. The core contention 
of the study is that the India-Pakistan conflict is not exclusively identity-related, but the issues 
based on neo-realistic interests—such as the control of freshwater resources—are equally 
vital. The following supporting questions provide a framework for argument:  
1. Have boundaries been drawn on the geographical basis of access to water resources?  
2. During wars between the rival riparians, has territory been explicitly captured because of 
its access to water sources?  
3. Has river water ever been used as a military, political or economic weapon by the upper 
riparian?  
4. Is the capturing and retaining of Kashmir territory linked to the “hydro-strategic” nature of 
its geography and can the conflict be considered resource-based?  
5. When bilateral negotiations between the rival riparians reach a deadlock, do they 
necessitate third-party mediation?  
6. Why do the disputants accept mediation and how it is conducted successfully?  
7. When do the rival states choose accommodation as a preferred security strategy on vital 
concerns and postpone political issues?  
8. What are the imperatives and implications of such accommodation?  
9. What kind of scenarios emerge and what is the likely future role of river water resources 
in Indo-Pakistan relations? 
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These are the major questions that merit rigorous academic enquiry. The study 
addresses these crucial questions and argues that although the Kashmir issue exhibits further 
dimensions, it is quintessentially a question of control of the Indus Waters—an issue very 
likely to surface again in the future and may bring both the nuclear states at the brink of war. 
1.3 THEORY: Theoretical Approach 
Generally, the behaviour of a state in international system is driven by both identity 
and non-identity issues alike. To formulate an explanatory model these issues are required to 
be placed in a theoretical perspective. For instance, with a view on typical territorial aspects in 
the prevailing international system,17 the classical realism identifies similarities in power-
politics as well as geo-politics. In this context, realists consider international structure as 
anarchic, which presumably results in conflict.18 On the other hand, liberals believe that the 
international environment is inter-dependent which enhances possibilities of cooperation.19 
This is further corroborated by constructivists, who deliberate that liberal societies thrive on 
their pledge for reciprocation, collaboration and compromise.20 Offensive and defensive 
strategies of neo-realism; however, focus on national interest with an aim to achieve 
maximum power and security respectively.21 Hence, relations with other states are formulated 
on rational choices by taking into account the likely costs vs benefits.22
                                                          
17 Hans J. Morgenthau, Politics among Nations: The Struggle for Power and Peace, revised ed.. 
Boston: McGraw-Hill 1993; Clive Agnew and Ewan W. Anderson, Water Resources in the Arid Realm 
(Routledge: London, 1992); John Agnew and Gearoid O. Tuathail, “Geopolitics and Discourse: 
Practical Geopolitical Reasoning in American Foreign Policy,” Political Geography, Vol. 11, No. 2. 
(March 1992), pp. 190-204; Simon Dalby, “Critical Geopolitics: Discourse, Difference and Dissent.” 
Environment and Planning D: Society and Space. 9 (1991), pp. 261-283. 
18 Art, Robert J. and Robert Jervis, “The Meaning of Anarchy” in Art, Robert J. and Robert Jervis, 
(eds.) International Politics: Anarchy, Force, Political Economy, and Decision-Making, 2nd Edition 
(Harper Collins, 1985) pp. 2-7; Scott Burchill,  “Realism and Neo-realism” in Burchill, Scott and 
Andrew Linklater, (eds.) in Theories of International Relations (Basingstoke: Macmillan Press, 1996) 
pp. 67-92; Robert Jervis, “Cooperation under the Security Dilemma” in Robert J. Art and Robert Jervis, 
(eds.), International Politics: Anarchy, Force, Political Economy, and Decision-Making, 2nd ed., 
(London: Harper Collins, 1985), pp. 86-101; Kenneth N. Waltz, “Anarchic Orders and Balances of 
Power” in Robert J. Art and Robert Jervis, (eds.) International Politics: Anarchy, Force, Political 
Economy, and Decision-Making. 2nd ed. (London: Harper Collins, 1985), pp. 08-28. 
19 Robert Gilpin, “Three Models of the Future” in Art, Robert J. and Robert Jervis, (eds.) International 
Politics: Anarchy, Force, Political Economy, and Decision-Making, 2nd ed. (London: Harper Collins, 
1985) pp. 375-396; Miriam R. Lowi, Water and Power: The Politics of a Scarce Resource in the 
Jordan River Basin. (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1993); Miriam R. Lowi, “Rivers of 
Conflict, Rivers of Peace.” Journal of International Affairs, Vol. 49, No. 1 (1995), pp. 123-144 
20 Michael N. Barnett and Raymond Duvall (eds.), Power and Global Governance (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 2005); Michael N. Barnett and Martha Finnemore (eds.), Rules for the 
World: International Organizations in World Politics, (Cornell University Press, 2004); Michael N. 
Barnett and Raymond Duvall, “Power in International Politics,” International Organization, Vol. 59 
(2005). 
21 Robert O. Keohane, Neorealism and Its Critics (New York: Columbia University Press 1986); 
Kenneth N. Waltz, “Structural Realism after the Cold War,” in International Security, Vol. 25, No. 1 
(Summer 2000), p. 5. 
22 Robert Jervis, “Cooperation under the Security  Dilemma”  in  Robert  J. Art  and  Robert  Jervis,  
(eds.),  International  Politics: Anarchy, Force, Political Economy, and Decision-Making, 2nd ed., 
(London: Harper Collins, 1985), p. 86. 
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Despite having comprehensive discourse on interstate relations, the aforementioned 
theories explicitly do not expound the water issue between India and Pakistan. A major 
reason could be the lack of importance of the subject at global level, where the concept of 
‘water wars’ may not have matured enough in the auguries of international politics. Despite an 
apparent lack of a consistent explanatory model on the subject, neo-realism and neo-
constructivism do tend to elucidate the issue. For instance, water dispute can be explained on 
the basis of state party’s behavior/actions as rational actor for maximizing their security in 
neo-realist perspective, while considering the notion of agreement aimed at stability and 
continuity of the system in neo-constructivism. Empirical evidences suggest that geography is 
a cause of conflict between neighbouring states, particularly, if it is overwhelmed with 
precious natural and strategic resources. In such a case, neo-realism in the context of 
resource wars befittingly describes the notion of ‘mutually hurting stalemate’ based on relative 
gains and losses; whereas, neo-constructivism offers cooperative compromise. Resultantly, 
both schools of thought present a viable theoretical approach that helps in establishing an 
explanatory model for highlighting befittingly the strategic importance of Kashmir in the 
perspective of resource wars particularly the Indus Waters Disputes between the enduring 
rivals India and Pakistan. 
1.4 Core Hypothesis 
If enduring rivals reach a mutually hurting stalemate, they prefer accommodation on 
vital concerns and postpone political issues.  
1.5 Sets of Variables 
The study utilises two sets of variables. The first set comprises those independent 
variables which cause war over water resources or generate environmental conflict and 
includes geographical imperatives, such as relative location, the nature of physical 
boundaries, surface features (e.g. the control infrastructure, both natural and man-made); 
economic constraints, such as the relative dependency of the lower riparian on resources, 
climate change, land use and water development patterns; and political factors, such as 
domestic constraints and external pressures. 
The second set of independent variables produce accommodation between enduring 
rivals over water resources. These comprise: the incidence of a mutually hurting stalemate 
(be it military, economic or socio-political), the need to minimise losses (in bilateral and 
national affairs), the level of commitment to domestic reforms (at the domestic level), and the 
involvement of a mediator (an external factor influenced by the international power context).  
The third set comprises some intervening variables which influence the 
accommodation process include: successful pre-negotiation deliberations, the culture of 
negotiation, the involvement of an influential third party, the postponement of political issue(s), 
silent or secret diplomacy, and the wording of an agreement.  
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These variables are discussed below, in detail, with a view to formulating a model 
linking concepts of water-war and water as catalyst for peace capable of explaining the role 
the Indus River waters in Pakistan-India relationship. 
1.6  WATER-WAR LINKAGES: Independent Variables 
A number of factors can be identified which may contribute to the generation of 
conflict over international rivers, however, the location of resources and the nature of state 
boundaries seem to be the major source of conflict. The geographical attributes that 
contribute to conflict generation over cross-boundary river water resources can be identified 
as relative location, the nature of physical boundaries, surface features (such as control 
infrastructures, both natural and man-made), the relative dependency of the lower riparian, 
land use and water development patterns, climate and water supply, population and 
settlement, domestic constraints, and external pressures or relations. Among these factors, 
relative location seems to be of prime importance, since location is obviously an elemental 
geographical reality, and also a fundamental geo-political attribute. Once location is 
determined, it can be conveniently correlated to some other geographic settings and geo-
political realities. Moreover, the location factor is both basic and linked to all other factors, 
especially to the nature of boundaries. Thus, keeping the nature of the case in mind, the focus 
is on the geographical attributes of boundaries and the location of water sources as central 
causative factors.23  Nevertheless, for better comprehension all the factors are precisely 
conceptualised below in the light of existing literature on the subject. 
 
1.6.1 The Relative Geographic Location 
Riparian states can occupy one of three possible locations: upper, lower, and 
middle.24  
A state with a middle location is, in a sense, simultaneously both an upper and a 
lower riparian, depending on its specific context. Should there be a dispute regarding 
the use of the river, each riparian is likely to profess those principles of customary 
international behaviour which are most beneficial for its particular location.25  
Four such positions, likely to be maintained by the riparian states, are listed below. 
Each position has been elaborated in the light of examples from the existing literature 
regarding the acquisition and use of surface waters in international law and various water 
codes pertaining to international rivers and the treaties signed between riparians. 
 
                                                          
23 The idea of conflict factors and some of their characteristics in determining their relative role in 
conflict potential in an international river basin have been taken from a study by Basheer Khalil Nijim, 
for details see Nijim, The Indus, Nile and Jordan: International Rivers and Factors in Conflict 
Potential (unpublished thesis, Indiana University, 1969).  
24 F. J. Berber, Rivers in International Law, (New York: Oceana Publications, 1959). 
25 Nijim, op. cit., p. 5. 
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1.6.1.1  The Upper Riparian and Absolute Territorial Sovereignty  
Adherence to the principle of absolute territorial sovereignty is very common with the 
upper riparians. This principle means:  
“A state is totally free, completely autonomous and entirely independent in its 
authority over its own territory. Hence, it can take any desired course of action within 
its territorial borders and its authority is thus absolute over any and all water courses 
which flow within its territory, even though they may terminate in another country.”26  
United States of America has been ardent supporter of this principle. For example, in 
1895, in connection with a dispute between the US and Mexico over the Rio Grande River, 
when the treaty was signed on 21 May 1903, the US agreed to deliver a fixed amount of 
water flow to Mexico. But the treaty stipulated that such a delivery did not constitute 
recognition of a Mexican claim to the water, and that the US did not understand it to establish 
a general principle or legal precedent.27  Same has been propagated in other parts of the 
world as a number of experts of International Law like Mackay, Hyde, Berber, Fenwich, 
Briggs, Oppenheim, and Scott are proponent of this principle.28
1.6.1.2  The Lower Riparian and Absolute Territorial Integrity 
This principle stipulates that a state may not indulge in a practice injurious to another 
state. 29 Oppenheim states that:  
Every state must allow rivers, over which it does not exercise unrestricted territorial 
sovereignty, whether in respect of their length or their breadth, to follow their natural 
course; it may not divert the water to the detriment of one or more of the other states 
with rights to the river, interrupt, artificially increase or diminish its flow.30
Obviously, a lower riparian would happily invoke this principle. Nijim argues that “this 
principle, by implication, infringes upon the sovereignty of the upper riparian and, in a sense, 
                                                          
26 Ibid., p. 6. 
27 U. S. Treaty Series, No. 455, noted in William L. Griffin, “The Use of Waters of International 
Drainage Basins Under Customary International Law,” American Journal of International Law, Vol. 
53, No. 1 (January 1959), p. 5; North American Environmental Law and Policy, Commission for 
Environmental Cooperation, Montreal, Canada, 2001, available at:  
http://www.cec.org/files/PDF/LAWPOLICY/NAELP7e.pdf
28 R. A. Mackay, “The International Joint Commission between the United States and Canada,” 
American Journal of International Law, Vol. 22, No. 2, (April, 1928), pp. 292-318; C. C. Hyde, 
International Law Chiefly as Interpreted and Applied by the United States (Boston: Little, Brown and 
Company, 1945), pp. 565; F. J. Berber, Rivers in International Law (New York: Oceania Publications, 
Inc., 1959).; C. C. Fenwick, International Law (New York: Appleton-Century Crofts, 1948), p. 391; H. 
W. Briggs, The Law of Nations (New York: Appleton-Century Crofts, 1952), p. 7274; L. Oppenheim, 
International Law: A Treatise, 8th ed., (New York: Longmans, Green & Company, 1955), Vol. I, p. 
465; and R. D. Scott, "Kansas v. Colorado Revisited," American Journal of International Law, Vol. 52, 
No. 3, (July 1958), p. 42. 
29 L. Oppenheim, International Law: A Treatise, op. cit., pp. 290-291. 
30 Quoted in F. J. Berber, Rivers in International Law, op. cit., p. 20. 
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penalizes them for having an advantageous position, since the lowermost riparian is not 
equally restricted in its pursuit of unilateral development.”31  
1.6.1.3  The Middle Riparian and Resource Community  
The dilemma for a middle riparian country would be to which principle it should 
support? If it favours of absolute territorial sovereignty vis-à-vis the lower riparian, then, by its 
own argument, it may find itself entangled in unfavourable consequences of the same 
principle, should the principle be invoked by the upper riparian. On the other hand, if the 
middle riparian advocates the principle of absolute territorial integrity, it may find that it has 
imposed limitations upon its own freedom of action vis-à-vis the lower riparian—limitations 
which may compromise some of the development schemes planned by the middle riparian.32  
Nijim believes that a middle riparian state will profess for a third principle of riparian 
regulation, namely that of a community in water resources. This principle envisages a 
maximum of cooperation amongst the riparian states in treating the whole river basin as a 
unit. Its proponents speak sometimes of ‘natural law’ and sometimes, perhaps more 
pragmatically, of the benefits accruing to all the users, whether they be the benefits of 
economy or of political comity. The principle has also been supported by non-riparians, 
especially in the case of navigable waterways.33 The principle is supported by Smith, Brierly, 
Moor, and Griffin.34  
 
1.6.1.4  Restricted Sovereignty and Restricted Integrity 
An alternative to resource communities, and, occupying place between the principles 
of absolute territorial sovereignty and integrity, is the principle of restricted sovereignty and 
restricted integrity,35 which is derived from the three and is embodied in an agreement, can 
conveniently be termed as “accommodation”. Accommodation refers to an intermediate 
approach—one neither accepting the absolute sovereignty right of the upper riparian nor 
absolute integrity in favour of the lower riparian. Moreover, being an approach which lacks a 
sense of community in the development or use of international river resources, it refers to the 
total diversion of a river (or rivers) by an upper riparian to form its designated share of a 
system of rivers. Restrictions are, however, imposed on the upper riparian, not to interfere 
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with the downstream flow of those rivers allocated to the lower riparian as its share, except 
where specified uses have been agreed upon. No joint management of water resources is 
envisaged under this principle. Instead, the independent development of water resources by 
both the upper and the lower riparian, with minimal interaction between them, is agreed upon.  
Somehow, if the riparians do not reach an agreement and yet neither wishes to press 
for the respective absolute principles, the status quo tends to be maintained and no 
development takes place until one riparian insists on a unilateral development. Logically, the 
conflict potential inherent in such a restriction occupies an intermediate position between the 
community principle on one hand and the two absolute principles of restricted sovereignty and 
restricted integrity on the other.36
1.6.1.5  Geographic Location and Conflict Potential 
No doubt the principles of absolute territorial sovereignty and integrity imply greater 
potential for conflict than the communal principle. The sovereignty principle indicates an 
overriding preoccupation with presumed rights on the part of one party and a denial of the 
similar interests for others, when these interests appear to be mutually conflicting. It carries 
an inherent, undeniable sense of power with the upper riparian to intimidate the lower 
riparian. This ability may, in turn, lead to the resentment on the part of the lower riparian, 
which can hardly retaliate in kind. In this case, the conflict potential is both a function of the 
ability of the lower riparian to enforce its claim, as well as the inclination of the upper riparian 
to respect that claim. However, mere insistence on one or the other of these two absolute 
principles is itself indicative of a reluctance to reach an accord, and thus a sign of absence of 
harmony in international relations.37  
The principle of absolute territorial sovereignty ranks higher to the principle of 
absolute territorial integrity in terms of conflict potential. If an insistence on absolute 
sovereignty of upper riparian leads to the deprivation of lower riparian from what it regards as 
essential to its national survival and welfare, then it is likely to consider the possibility of 
resorting to force. While, an insistence on absolute integrity will lead to the use of force only if 
the lower riparian feels deprived of minimum essentials. In essence, the conflict is, associated 
with an adherence to absolute sovereignty. Moreover, where extreme positions are held, an 
insistence on absolute sovereignty will give rise to an initiative in which a river project is 
executed, whereas an insistence on absolute integrity will translate into the use of force. The 
former case, involving less extreme action, is more likely than the latter; yet the breaking point 
will be approached incrementally, and the lower riparian will at some point decide that use of 
force is the only resort left. On the other hand, pursuit of community principle results in a 
minimum of conflict potential as apparently there is an agreement not to disagree on riparian 
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matters. In fact, of the three principles, this one is overwhelmingly favoured by writers on 
international riparian regulations.38
Due to great conflict potential the principle of absolute sovereignty is increasingly 
being  regarded as a historical fact, with one writer condemning it as being: “...based upon an 
individualistic, anarchical conception of international law, in which selfish interests are 
exclusively taken as the rule of conduct and no solution is offered regarding the opposite 
interests of upper and lower riparian.”39
 On the other hand the community principle finds overwhelming support in the actual 
practice of states, in settling their riparian disputes and in the decisions of arbitration tribunals, 
both of which comprise two important components of international law.40 There are over one 
hundred treaties in which co-riparians have voluntarily restricted their absolute freedom of 
action.41 Moreover not a single international judicial decision supports the principle of absolute 
sovereignty or absolute integrity.42  
The above description signifies that the geographical location of a resource must be 
predominantly considered in the assessment of the potential of conflict. An upper riparian 
position, coupled with an exercise of absolute sovereignty, possesses a high conflict potential. 
A lower riparian position may also lead to conflict, but the potential does not seem to be as 
great. In case neither party insists on the absolute stance, then in the absence of an 
agreement a non-formal restriction on unilateral development may be practiced, then the 
potential for conflict will be lower. A middle-riparian position is likely to be coupled with a 
preference for the principle of community in resources and consequently the conflict potential 
will be lowest.43
 
1.6.2 The Nature of Political Boundaries 
The origin of conflict such as water distribution between two states is most often 
rooted back to demarcation of borders between the states by colonial masters. Boggs have 
assessed the borders on the basis of their geometric or morphologic composition,44 as well as 
on their genetic nature.45  
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Nijim observes that in case of geometric delineation of borders, the potential of 
conflict remains high because of colonial intent or neglect to value any ethnic, religious and 
cultural divides. On the other hand, the probability of conflict varies in morphologic division. 
For instance, chances of conflict would be high in boundaries lying in fertile lands in 
comparison to a desert landscape. Boundaries in the context of rivers also present a varying 
possibility of conflict.  For example, river boundaries entail a relatively high conflict potential 
primarily due to a river’s facet of uniting over dividing, and its tendency to alter the course of 
ravine. Conversely, if rivers are expansive with surrounding land overwhelmed with mires, 
swamps and futile land, the probability of conflict would remain low.46
Conflicts are as natural to human nature as needs and interests are. The more 
practical approach to the question of boundary classification is the one based upon genetic 
nature. It denotes the relation of the boundary to the cultural pattern existing at the time of 
boundary delimitation. Here, three types of generic boundaries may be noted, in order of 
rising conflict potential: antecedent, subsequent, and superimposed. The first predates 
settlement, so that the evolution of cultural patterns, if any, is related to the established 
boundary. The subsequent is preceded by the settlement, and tends to take that settlement 
into account. The third is independent of the existing cultural patterns, and in fact may be 
forced upon them later, as in the case of truce and armistice lines, or super-imposed 
boundaries in the event of the political division of a territory between two independent states. 
In such a case, if any existing control structures (such as headworks, dams and barrages) 
acquired or awarded to the upper riparian make it capable of depriving the lower riparian of its 
legitimate share of water resources,  the conflict potential is  not only high but inevitable too.47
1.6.3  Surface Features 
The surface features of a region are contributory factors of conflict because utilisation 
of the valley depends on them. For instance a valley in a remote and rugged mountainous 
region will possess a minimum of conflict potential due to its relative inaccessibility and the 
unsuitability of the terrain for resource development. Moreover the factor of surface features is 
related to existing human wants, needs, and abilities. Similarly, the extensive marshy flood 
plain of a river is susceptible to flooding and is less useful for human development, hence 
constitutes low conflict potential.48
                                                                                                                                                                      
http://iser.rdsor.ro/main_page/Documents/Eurolimes/pdf/4_eurolimes.pdf, accessed on 
22 May 2016. 
45 R. Hartshorne, "Suggestions on the Terminology of Political Boundaries," Annals of the Association 
of American Geographers, Vol. 26, No. 1, (March 1936), pp. 56-57; See also See also Frank R. Pfetsch, 
“Borders: Cause of Conflict or Catalyst for Peace?”, Eurolimes, op. cit., p.14. 
46 Nijim, op. cit., p. 17. See also Frank R. Pfetsch, “Borders: Cause of Conflict or Catalyst for Peace?”, 
Eurolimes, op. cit., p.14. 
47 Nijim, Ibid., p. 18; See also Frank R. Pfetsch, “Borders: Cause of Conflict or Catalyst for Peace?”, 
Eurolimes, op. cit., p.14. 
48 Ibid., p. 15. 
1:  Theoretical Framework 26
On the other hand, a fertile valley with considerable potential for storage dams and 
hydroelectric power may possess a higher degree of conflict potential. The potential would be 
even greater in the case of a ‘mature river valley with good prospects for human settlement’ 
and development. In short, if the part of a river basin is judged by the residents or adjacent 
population as a good resource— actual or potential— that part will acquire greater potential 
for conflict.49
1.6.4 Climate and Water Supply 
Increasing aridity constitutes higher conflict potential. Rising aridity creates an 
accelerated demand contingent upon decrease in the supply. Under humid conditions, on the 
other hand, non-fluvial water sources are available for consumptive purposes, and therefore 
demand for the water supply will be less. Nijim pointed out that humid and arid river basins 
are different enough to have acquired respective functional associations. Rivers in arid 
climates have been associated with consumptive and rivers in humid climates with non-
consumptive usages. He presents examples form Roman and English laws. For instance, 
Roman law awarded water rights on the basis of chronological priority, so that once a user 
had established a pattern of consumption, it need not be concerned about interference from a 
more recent riparian, even though the latter may be located upstream. On the other hand, in 
north-western Europe, irrigation was of minimal importance while navigation interests were 
paramount. English Common Law thus assured to each riparian the undiminished continued 
flow of the river.50 Agreements, in fact, have been reached more readily in the latter type of 
basin than in the former as "the prosperity of arid regions has been [especially] sensitive to 
political conditions."51  
1.6.5 Population Density and Settlement Patterns 
A sparsely populated river basin usually bears a lower degree of conflict potential 
than the densely populated one. Similarly, an agrarian irrigation economy will be especially 
possessive of its river flow and water rights, and thus will posses a high conflict potential, 
compared to an industrial economy. This presumption is based upon the suitability of power 
generation potential of a river, given the non-consumptive nature of the water use. However, 
such an economy may also use the river for the transportation of sewage, resulting in the 
aggravation of pollution prospects, and consequently of conflict potential too. If the river 
function is predominantly for navigation or power generation, the potential will be low. For 
example the resource itself is not diminished in quantity or quality, and any compromise may 
not go beyond the matter of navigational rules.52
Nijim argues that the higher conflict potential may also be rooted into the core 
population area, because resistance to change and compromise is likely to be more 
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effectively articulated by political-administrative, historical-traditional, religious-iconographic 
cores of population. The potential will be still greater if such cores are located on either side of 
an international border. Moreover, a river basin in which the population is homogeneous is 
likely to possess a lower level of conflict potential and vice versa.53
1.6.6  Domestic Scenarios and External Relations 
A state which is vulnerable to external pressures harbours a higher probability of 
conflict potential. Such pressures may include irredentist claims or expansionist intentions. 
The conflict potential is likely to extend to parts of the river basin outside the state. A river 
basin located in a politically instable state, bears high potential for conflict. Internal weakness 
and divisiveness might reduce conflict potential if the state is pursuing defensive external 
posture but sometimes state’s preoccupation with internal affairs might lead it to an 
aggressive foreign policy in an attempt to achieve internal unity in the face of a presumed 
external danger.54  
A state may possibly experience a complementary situation between negative 
internal and negative external pressures, with one factor reinforcing the other. Such a 
situation may arise if an irredentist claim is coupled with a serious matter of dissatisfaction by 
a segment of the internal population. In such a scenario, the conflict potential will be far 
high.55
1.6.7 Summary 
It can be assumed that the conflict potential in an arid river basin would be high if the 
following circumstances exist in combination: a lower riparian confronted by an upper riparian 
claim of absolute territorial sovereignty, in which surface features provide control 
infrastructures for the upper riparian and there are no serious obstacles for further river 
development projects for the upper riparian; the region is ethnically heterogeneous with 
conflicting territorial claims; the location of the disputed territory is the major source of fresh 
water supply for the lower riparian; the boundaries are superimposed between the riparian; 
there is a high population density throughout the basin, with several urban cores and much of 
the settlement is fairly recent and the demand for water is consumptive in nature.  
The factors conceived in this section will be explained and assessed in chapter 2 and 
3, both individually and in combination in order to ascertain their relative role in conflict 
generation in the Indus Basin. The factors facilitating accommodation are identified in the 
following section. 
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1.7 ACCOMMODATION: Independent Variables 
The core question in this section of study concerns: under what conditions a lower 
riparian initiates accommodation vis-à-vis the upper riparian? Under what circumstances 
accommodation progresses and under what conditions does it regress (i.e. returns backward 
to procedural accommodation or an adversarial relationship? The second question, explored 
here, deals with the techniques that facilitate the accommodative process. 
The review of the existing literature reveals that no significant study firmly focuses on 
accommodation between developing states, barring an effort of a student in his masters’ 
thesis from which some of the variables have been incorporated in this study.56 The additional 
theoretical arguments are derived from the literature on negotiation; conflict analysis; conflict 
management and resolution and also accommodation and cooperation between the former 
Super Powers; and domestic politics and foreign policy decision-making in the developing 
world by the end of Cold War. Some explanatory variables are directly deduced by observing 
the phenomena of accommodation in the developing world, for instance, the role of the 
presence or absence of a ‘culture of negotiation’ between the disputants. The role of an 
influential third party in facilitating the peace initiative and furthering the process of 
accommodation, where the disputants lack culture of negotiation, was found to be significant 
in many cases relating to the developing world.57   
1.7.1 The “Mutually Hurting Stalemate” 
William Zartman's concept of a ‘mutually hurting stalemate’ describes the ‘ripe 
moment’ for the third party intervention and willingness of conflicting parties to negotiate. The 
concept is based on two premises: firstly, that the protracted conflict or the enduring rivalry 
has reached a stage where its continuance is mutually harmful, and will “hurt” them enough 
that a policy change becomes an attractive option, and secondly, that if nothing is done to 
resolve the present deadlock then a situation of stalemate will emerge, leading to 
"unacceptable costs of a higher magnitude.”58 In other words, the ongoing situation is not set 
to improve, but is simply expected to deteriorate if prolonged to an indefinite period. As Jacob 
Bercovitch argues that mediation is most useful in protracted conflicts, where the parties have 
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reached an impasse but still want to end their fighting and are willing to compromise to do it.59 
As a result, the desire to come out of the counterproductive stalemate and to check further 
conflict escalation motivates a given state to consider a more conciliatory policy toward its 
opponent.60
The dependent variable in this study is Pakistan's initiative for accommodation vis-à-
vis India. Two primary aspects of accommodation; initiation and the process, are analysed 
here. Accordingly, two sets of intervening variables are measured, one analysing the initiation 
of accommodation, and the other highlighting the various techniques that facilitate the 
process towards settlement. 
Several factors ranging from domestic political, economic and security to external 
political and military pressures can cause the initiation of accommodation between enduring 
rivals, but the three main aspects are analysed here: 1) urgency and need to minimise losses 
[in bilateral and domestic affairs]; 2) level of commitment to domestic reforms [national level]; 
and 3) involvement of an influential mediator [an external factor or international context]. 
These factors befittingly assist in explaining (I) who initiates accommodation, (2) at 
which stage of conflict  it is initiated and, most importantly, (3) why it is initiated. It is 
hypothesised that there are two main causes leading to the willingness of a party to initiate 
accommodation. One is related to the domestic politico-economic sphere and the other to the 
external politico-military sphere. Bhatti argues that the presence of either of these factors 
constitutes a necessary as well as a sufficient precondition for the peace initiation. However, 
when both of these factors are mutually exclusive or exist independently of one another, an 
attempt to initiate accommodation becomes highly likely. The third factor, the involvement of a 
powerful third party, plays decisive role in the 'initiation' phase, as well as in the breaking of 
deadlocks during the negotiation process.61  
The perception or realisation of a mutually hurting stalemate often becomes a turning 
point in a conflict and a sufficient cause for the initiation of accommodation, conflict 
management or conflict resolution. William Zartman termed it a ‘ripe moment’: 
The basic component of a ripe moment is a deadlock that keeps both parties from 
achieving their goals. But deadlock alone is not enough it must be a particular kind of 
stalemate that hurts both parties enough to make them feel uncomfortable and 
unable to break out by an escalation with acceptable costs. But a mutually hurting 
stalemate is not enough either; in order to be effective, it generally needs to be 
riveted to the parties' perception through a recent or looming catastrophe that acts as 
a deadline or is remembered as a warning and that threatens to impose additional 
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and unacceptable costs of higher magnitude. But even this is not enough; it is not 
helpful to be painted into a corner, even a stifling one, if there is no way out. Finally 
there must be not only a formula for a way out but an indication that the parties are 
willing in principle to choose it if it is attractive enough and that they will respond 
positively to the other's moves in that direction.62 
1.7.1.1  The Urgency and Need to Minimise Losses 
The probability of the initiation of accommodation by a lower riparian depends on the 
urgency of the issue and the extent of the need to minimise consequent losses. The incidence 
of this need is mostly expected from the weaker party i.e. the lower riparian and this factor is 
often exploited by the powerful adversary or upper riparian. If the lower riparian is a 
developing state, it is more likely to initiate accommodation with a view to minimise losses 
mainly in three areas: (I) the external politico-military sphere (2) the domestic economic 
sector, and (3) the domestic political arena.  
Bhatti observes that a war, crisis, or near-crisis scenario, bearing a potential to 
disturb the status quo between rivals or to create a conflict situation between states, brings 
with it losses in the external politico-military sphere as well. The leaders are motivated to 
initiate accommodation in order to minimise not only current losses but, more importantly, 
perceived future losses in the politico-military, diplomatic and domestic spheres. A desire to 
return to the previous status quo usually results in procedural accommodation, for example, 
an exchange of prisoners of war and the withdrawal of troops to pre-conflict positions. The 
rivals may also incline to introduce some conflict avoidance, risk reduction, or confidence 
building measures, such as the prior notification of troop movements, military exercises or 
missile testing; the establishment of hotlines; and assurances not to attack some sensitive or 
core infrastructure such as nuclear facilities. It is highly probable that such accommodative 
initiatives are restricted to the conflict management.63  
There is a likelihood that radical changes in the external politico-military sphere result 
in an initiative for substantive accommodation as opposed to the one for procedural 
accommodation. This is likely to occur either: (1) when one party is totally overwhelmed or 
defeated by the other, (2) when one party enjoys a strategically advantageous position, or (3) 
when both of them perceive a “mutually hurting stalemate”. Overwhelming defeats or 
complete annihilation of adversaries are rare in contemporary conflicts, therefore, an 
agreement reached under the first condition may not constitute "accommodation".64 However, 
the second and third conditions are quite frequent and deserve greater attention.  
The geographically disadvantageous location of lower riparian vis-à-vis its adversary 
provides the latter with freedom of action. The possession of upstream territory containing a 
river control infrastructure (such as headwork or dam) equips the upper riparian with an 
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economic, political and military advantageous tool with which to deprive the lower riparian of 
its freshwater life-line, choke its agrarian economy, or coerce it into conceding certain political 
or economic advantages. In such a situation, the lower riparian often has no other option but 
to accommodate the demands of the upper riparian in an effort to minimise its losses, 
especially where the lower riparian is simultaneously a militarily weaker state vis-à-vis the 
upper riparian. Therefore, it is essential to pay due attention to both external losses in the 
politico-military sphere at the bilateral level, and economic losses and security concerns at the 
domestic level. 
Regimes also initiate accommodation in order to minimise losses in the domestic 
political and external security spheres. Many developing states face ethno-national 
movements and actors who challenge the authority and legitimacy of the regime and/or the 
very existence of the state itself. In such situations, two main types of domestic losses could 
arise: firstly, challenges to the institutions of the state and its regime, and, secondly, 
challenges to national unity and territorial integrity. These challenges range from economic 
recession, the scarcity of resources, and ethno-national movements, to civil wars, armed 
struggles for liberation, and attempts at succession. In such a situation governments may 
choose to initiate accommodation with an external adversary to deal with internal 
"adversaries" and thereby secure the regime.65
1.7.1.2  The Level of Commitment to Domestic Reforms 
An intensity of commitment to improve domestic political and economic systems 
presumes the existence of a fragile economy with deteriorating trends. In such situation if a 
major portion of the state's resources are allocated to defence expenditure it may not permit 
the successful execution of wide-range domestic reforms. Consequently, failure to pursue 
reforms, particularly in the economic sphere, would significantly limit resources for future 
defence needs. Under such circumstances, accommodation with an adversary becomes quite 
a plausible option.66
This not only suggests the various causes for the success of accommodation but also 
refer to the party who initiates it. Naturally, the regime that wants to carry out domestic 
reforms and is also in dire need to divert resources from the external politico-military sphere 
to the domestic economic sphere would be the one to initiate an accommodation. However, it 
is observed that not all commitments to the reform of domestic political and economic 
structures are bound to result in peace initiatives abroad. One of the reasons for this may lie 
in the balance of power between the two states. Obviously, a weaker party, having an 
inherent sense of insecurity, would always be tempted to come at par militarily with the 
stronger state, particularly in a situation of enduring rivalry. The greater the asymmetry in 
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power and the stronger the commitment to domestic reforms, there would be greater chance 
of a peace initiative.67
 Moreover, initiation of accommodation also depends on the nature of regime. A newly 
formed government may bring radical changes. Sometimes the existing government may also 
introduce radical reforms as the authoritarian regimes often lack legitimacy and the public 
support to endure their rule in the land. Bhatti believes that if the reforms are well intentioned 
and comprehensive, the regime initiates accommodation to divert resources from military to 
economic sector. However, if these are "token reforms" that are intended to postpone real 
change, then accommodation may be initiated to beef up internal security and enhance the 
regime's hold on power. In such instances, resources are not easily shifted from the military to 
the economic sphere. Rather, military and security forces are shifted from border posts to 
internal security positions. Here, regime security of existing leadership is the prime cause of 
initiating a truce with the adversary.68
1.7.1.3  The Expectation to Involve a Powerful Mediator 
Jacob Bercovitch argues that though multiple motives play role while mediator has to 
make a decision to intervene in a situation but intervention most often is not for humanitarian 
interests. These motives include “the desire to affect history, to spread their own ideas, to limit 
the conflict's impact on their own (national) interests, to extend their own influence”69 abroad. 
Disputants may seek mediation to control conflict escalation as every disputant “may hope 
that the mediator will influence the other party.”70
Mediators involve in multiple roles, activities and behaviours. Bercovitch classifies the 
role of international mediators under three main strategies: 
“Communication strategies include contacting the parties, transmitting messages, 
building trust and rapport, clarifying and supplying missing information. Formulation 
strategies include arranging the mediation setting and protocols, shaping the 
agenda, controlling timing and maintaining parties' focus, suggesting concessions, 
options and settlement proposals. Manipulation strategies include keeping the 
parties in negotiation, changing their expectations, pressing them to be flexible, 
filtering information, adding incentives or threatening punishment, and thereafter to 
withdraw.”71
Bercovitch further observes that the strategic choice and behaviour of the mediator 
depends on the nature of the conflict,72 and the bargaining power of a mediator. The 
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bargaining power of mediator is further strengthened by the resources in its possession and 
the ability to offer awards and exert coercion.73  
Since the prime focus of this study falls within the developing world, the role of 
powerful third party in inducing the initiation of accommodation by intensifying the hurting 
stalemate of the conflicting parties is of import here. Mark N. Katz identifies various ways in 
which major powers can bring about or reinforce an already existing ‘hurting’ stalemate 
between antagonists in the developing world. In his opinion, major powers can employ (1) the 
mutual cessation of military assistance; (2) a joint diplomatic initiative or even diplomatic 
pressure; (3) a joint sanctioning of military intervention; or, (4) collaboration with international 
organisations.74 However, economic embargoes or trade restrictions rarely induce a state to 
seek accommodation, particularly if such moves cripple its already deteriorating economy. 
Sanctions are also proved to be counter-productive in majority of the cases.75
1.7.2  ACCOMMODATION: Intervening Variables 
The following six procedures as intervening variables are likely to have a significant 
impact on the outcome of the process of accommodation.  
1) Successful pre-negotiation deliberations 
2) The culture of negotiation 
3) The involvement of an influential third party 
4) Quiet or Secret diplomacy 
5) The postponement of political issue(s) and  
6) Wording of the agreement 
1.7.2.1  Successful Pre-Negotiation Deliberations 
 Since the negotiation process develops over time, it can be divided into three stages, 
namely the pre-, main- and post-negotiation phase. Each of the three phases focuses on 
different negotiation matters, procedural or substantive, and recognizes different modes of 
conduct and strategies.76
Within the pre-negotiation phase, three central issues arise: first, the parties must 
decide whether or not to negotiate at all; second, technical and organizational questions must 
be raised; and third, the substantive issues of negotiation must undergo selection.77
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The probability of success of negotiations significantly depends upon the extensive 
pre-negotiation deliberation. This is primarily due to the functions that pre-negotiations 
perform. For instance, pre-negotiation communications define the boundaries of the issue, 
identify the actors or participants, formulate the agenda, and assist the leaders in managing 
public opinion and political coalitions at home. Moreover, by performing many of these 
functions, pre-negotiation phase helps in establishing the degree of reciprocity. Since there is 
no public commitment to negotiation at this stage, pre-negotiation allows the leaders to exit 
the process at low cost of commitment. The exchange of valuable information helps to reduce 
risk and uncertainty in the next phase.78
1.7.2.2  The Culture of Negotiation 
Professor Pfetsch argues that the role of culture in international negotiations is 
treated as controversial in the negotiation literature. On the one hand, there is the argument, 
that cultural factors are important to influence the negotiation process and explain among 
other things the outcome of negotiations. On the other hand, there is the argument that 
national cultures do not matter very much at all where there exists a professional international 
negotiation culture that dominates and makes differences between national cultures 
obsolete.79  
Nevertheless, culture is one of the several influencing factors which affect the 
negotiation behaviour of international actors, and cross-cultural antinomies between parties 
may change the course and outcome of the negotiations. Raymond Cohen, making reference 
to Fisher, Gudykunst, Kim, and Singer, emphasises that the “relationships between cultural 
strangers involve more than an awkward encounter between contrasting languages, manners, 
and habits,” but “not all cross-cultural contacts, of course, results in dissension,” rather “a 
distinction has to be drawn between four quite different cross-cultural encounters.”80
The first kind of possible encounter is the compatible interaction between similar or 
related cultures, as for instance in the negotiations between the states bordering the Rhine 
over its utilisation as a source of fresh water. A second possible encounter involves 
complimentary interaction between dissimilar cultures, as, for example, in the US-Japanese 
relationship during the 1951 San Francisco Conference. A third possible cross-cultural 
encounter takes the form of the non-complimentary interaction of related cultures, such as the 
inability of Arab societies to cooperate over the Euphrates River. Finally, the fourth possibility 
is that of incompatible interaction occurring between dissimilar cultures which have been 
divided by history, as in the interaction between Israel and Egypt, and India and Pakistan. 
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Such cultural differences can be overcome or even transformed, through harmonization of 
mutual interests, from hindrances into positive assets for negotiation.81  
In a confrontation between collectivistic and individualistic cultures, the mediators or 
negotiators can perform vital intercultural functions to protect and, if necessary, save the face 
of the honour-conscious party. They can smooth the friction between adversarial and 
conciliatory approaches leading to a conflict resolution; they can ease the linguistic strain 
between high and low context communicators.82 Above all, they can act as cultural 
interpreters, explaining the parties to one another. Negotiators recognise diversity and 
eschew universal panaceas, both of which are ready-made recipes for success.  
Negotiators prepare their task; firstly, by achieving self-awareness of the hidden 
assumptions they themselves bring to the negotiating table. Before entering a negotiation, 
they immerse themselves in their partners’ culture and history, not just in those matters 
relating to the issue at hand. Ideally, they will have knowledge of the target language. Only 
after doing so they would be in a position to design a negotiating strategy to be adapted 
suitable for the individual cultural expectations and needs of their interlocutors.83
1.7.2.3  The Involvement of an Influential Third Party 
 Outcome of the accommodative process mainly depends on the degree of influence 
of the mediator or magnitude of force used for intervention of any other kind by a powerful 
third party. Though the degree and concentration of dependence varies from one state to 
another in the Third World, it would be reasonable to assume that the majority of developing 
states have close ties to at least one of the major powers. It is due to the interdependent 
nature of these relationships that major powers become influential players in resolving 
conflicts in the developing world.84
 A third party can act as a (l) communicator, (2) formulator and/or (3) a manipulator in 
negotiation.85  However, a major power can assume any or all of these roles, depending on 
the situation, in support of the accommodative process. Frequently, the nature of their 
relationship with states in the developing world allows the major powers to act as 
manipulators by perusing carrot and stick policy in order to save the process from a complete 
breakdown.86
1.7.2.4  Secret or Silent Diplomacy 
 Secret diplomacy is likely to have a positive impact on negotiation process than the 
open or public diplomacy. It allows negotiators a great deal of flexibility and room for 
manoeuvre. Without committing themselves to certain positions publicly, the negotiators can 
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Negotiating Across Cultures, op. cit. 
84 Frank R. Pfetsch, Negotiating Political Conflicts, pp. 35-36. 
85 Ibid., pp. 142-144, see especially Figure 10.2, “Strategies of the Mediator”. 
86 Bhatti, op. cit., p. 29. 
1:  Theoretical Framework 36
change their stance frequently and possibly for the cause of their respective national interest. 
They are also shielded from the adverse effects of public opinion. Having negotiated the 
entire deal, they can go back to their respective constituency and sell the agreement at their 
own pace and desired price.87
 
1.7.2.5  The Deferment of Political Issues 
 Negotiators always have to bargain simultaneously at two fronts; with their domestic 
constituencies and also with the adversary. If the public at home and the adversary favour 
different solutions, the negotiator is left with either of the two discourses: attempt to change 
public opinion at home or try to cause the adversary to alter its position. However, in 
situations where neither of the two sides is willing to change its position, decision-makers 
remove vexing political issue(s) from the agenda in order to reach an agreement on 
substantive issue(s).88  
1.7.2.6  Wording of the Agreement 
Wording of the agreement directly influence the process and outcome of the 
negotiation. For interim and procedural agreements, the document is tentatively worded so 
that it is flexible and open to further interpretation favouring both sides’ viewpoints. This 
procedure, in particular, has been used to win domestic support and legitimacy for the 
agreement by highlighting concessions extracted by the home side and minimising 
concessions conceded to the adversary. In some situations, contrary to the tentative wordings 
a substantive agreement is carefully articulated to check various interpretations advantageous 
to either party.89
1.7.3 Summary 
To sum-up the above discussion, one can comfortably assume that regimes attempt 
to initiate accommodation with their adversaries in order to minimise losses in both the 
external politico-military and the domestic politico-economic spheres. In a situation of mutually 
hurting stalemate a likelihood of a substantive agreement would be higher. A government’s 
commitment to domestic political and economic reforms is also likely to lead to a peace 
initiative. Sometimes, influential third parties may exacerbate the mutually hurting stalemate 
by withholding military and economic aid and coercing the disputants to come to negotiation 
table, or persuade them by offering financial and technical support or loans as incentives 
intended to improve the situation. 
The pre-negotiation deliberations facilitates the accommodation process as parties 
engage in an extensive pre-negotiation deliberation, determine the agenda, set the 
parameters and boundaries for formal talks. The presence of a potential mediator facilitates 
                                                          
87 Ibid. 
88 Ibid. 
89 Bhatti, op. cit., p. 30. 
1:  Theoretical Framework 37
the initiation of negotiation process. The mediator becomes influential when it has the 
potential to generate financial aid and assistance for riparians to develop infrastructure and 
thereby achieve the goals envisaged by the parties. Other techniques, like secret diplomacy, 
wording of agreements and postponement of political issues, further facilitate the process.  
 
1.8 MODEL: Assembling the Factors 
The model formulated below contains all the key variables mentioned above, 
including that of ‘environmental scarcities as cause of conflict’90. This study is, however, 
limited to the major contributory factors leading to conflict and accommodation over water 
resources.  
The debate of whether and how international rivers contribute to conflict or compel 
disputants towards compromise often centres on the specific causal role of the resource in 
question. There are two ways of tackling the issue: one can focus on how water resources 
influence rational actors’ behaviour or analyse the hypothesized relationship between the 
cause (i.e. the location of the vital resource) and its effect (either conflict or accommodation). 
The two approaches are compatible and not mutually exclusive.91  
The rational actor or decision making unit, which can be an individual, a group, an 
organization or a state (here, a riparian state), chooses to act in such a way as to produce an 
effect: either conflict and perhaps war, or cooperation and peace. The decision making unit 
might choose, for example, to acquire or capture the resource-base (i.e. conduct war) or 
change its resource consumption behaviour (i.e. avoid war); both parties might opt for war but 
reach a mutually hurting stalemate; the lower riparian might succumb to the demands of the 
upper riparian in order to minimise its losses or alleviate the hurting stalemate and the upper 
riparian accept the peace initiative (thereby achieving accommodation); or both sides might 
cooperate to maximize mutual benefits (i.e. achieve peace by eliminating the cause of the 
conflict).  
There are four components, each of which influences the ultimate choice that the 
decision making unit makes. Firstly, it is confronted with "opportunity structures", an external 
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and objective array of options and constraints which determine a set of feasible options. 
Secondly, the cognitive processes and circumstantial factors in the decision making unit's 
environment (its psychological milieu) will influence the perceptual salience of opportunities 
and obstacles. Thirdly, the decision making unit has certain relevant beliefs about the causal 
consequences of its possible actions (its operational milieu). Finally, it has preferences 
regarding various outcomes that it believes will arise from its specific action.92
 
Flowchart 1.8.1: Relative Geographical Location and Conflict 
 
Rational Actor 
Cause: Effect: Captures or 
Geographical Conflict/ Acquires 
 The explanatory power of geographical imperatives provides insights into the nature 
of the relation between cause and effect. Six variables can be appropriately used to analyse this 
causal relationship: advantageous geographic location, surface features (man-made and 
natural), relative dependency of the lower riparian on resources, density and diversity of the 
population, patterns of resource-use, and opportunity.  
 Firstly, the location of rivers can encourage powerful actors to deny the right of a lower 
riparian to river water originating from its territory, to capture the resource base of the rivers, or to 
increase an inequitable distribution of resources in their favour. For example, India, a powerful 
actor, captured the catchment area of the Indus river system in 1947-48, which culminated in 
international war between India and Pakistan in 1948.  
Secondly, surface features, such as natural springs, streams, rivers and man-made 
river development infrastructures (dams, barrages, headworks etc.), while on the one hand 
encouraging the upper riparian to exploit the situation, on the other hand increase ecosystem 
vulnerability. In 1948, India cut-off water supplies to Pakistan, by way of the headworks of the 
Sutlej and Beas rivers which were supplying water to pre-partition Pakistani Punjab. Similarly, 
India can potentially cut-off supplies from river Chenab and Jhelum or divert water from the 
Indus. The vulnerability of the ecosystem is often an important variable, contributing to 
environmental scarcity, and is, at least in part, an external physical factor that is not a function of 
local institutions or social behaviour. The growing land-degradation in Pakistani Punjab resulting 
from salinity and water-logging, a consequence of the implementation of Indus Development 
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Project93, is an exclusively external factor. Local authorities and institutions have failed to 
address the problem despite huge investments in the shape of four SCARPs (salinity control and 
reclamation projects), five-year plans, and an unceasing input of time and energy. When 
environmental degradation crosses the threshold of irreversibility, it becomes a continuing 
burden to society, even if enlightened social change removes the original political, economic and 
cultural causes of the degradation. In other words, if environmental degradation becomes 
irreversible it is transformed into an exogenous variable.94 The looming irreversibility of ecological 
chaos resulting from the dam and diversion canal infrastructure in Pakistani Punjab, together with 
environmental scarcities, is increasingly becoming an exogenous variable.  
Thirdly, the relative dependency of the lower riparian on resources encourages the 
upper riparian to capture resource bases. Such a situation compels the lower riparian to initiate 
accommodation in an effort to minimise its losses. Fourthly, the extent of density and diversity 
of the population is directly proportional to the dependency of the lower riparian. A diverse 
population gives rise to ethnic cleavages. It further increases the likelihood of conflict if ethnic 
diversity is accompanied by the pursuit of identity in relation to either of the riparian states. Fifthly, 
patterns of resource use also enhance the conflict potential, since there is no end to the 
development of resources according to emerging needs over time. The upper riparian nearly 
always adopts such a strategy as a means of garnering political benefits out of the conflict, 
attempting to persuade its own population that the lower riparian poses a hurdle to development, 
and that it is trying  its level best to ameliorate the problem.  
Finally, opportunity becomes a necessary cause of conflict when either one of the 
riparian states identifies an opportune moment to undertake any given military or political 
adventure. The upper riparian is nearly always in a position to exploit such occasions of 
opportunity, whereas the lower riparian will only consider such an option if it perceives the upper 
riparian to be comparatively weaker in military terms.  
Realism focuses on states as rational maximisers of security and power. In an anarchic 
system, state behaviour is mainly a function of the structure of security and power relations in the 
system.95 Yet this emphasis on states means that theorists tend to see the world as divided into 
territorially distinct, mutually exclusive entities, not broader environmental regions or systems. 
Realism thus encourages scholars to de-emphasise trans-boundary environmental problems, 
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since such problems often cannot be linked to a particular country and do not have any easily 
conceptualised impact on the structure of economic and military power relations between states. 
The case under study, however, which focuses on the capture and retention of the hydro-
strategic territory of Jammu and Kashmir and its impacts on Indo-Pakistani political thinking, 
strategic planning and warfare, exhibits very strong and crucial links with the politico-economic 
structures and military power relations between both states.  
 
 
 
It is evident from the above discussion that both the capture of territories possessing 
vital natural resources and disputes over the division of river water contributes consistently to 
the emergence of conflict. Water conflicts are manifested in increasing incompatibilities in the 
control or new usages of river water between competing parties. From 1940 to 1980, the 
global water use doubled, similarly going to double again in the following twenty years (1980-
2000). As the population increases and the amount of available water resources remains 
constant, the maximum per capita demand which can be supported by a country decreases 
correspondingly. It is a commonly acknowledged fact that with each passing day, the gap 
between the needs of growing populations and the increasing scarcity of fresh water 
resources widens. In countries possessing a very limited supply of water, especially in arid 
and tropical regions, it is not difficult to perceive the consequences.  
In sum, population growth, accompanied by massive urbanisation, intensified 
agricultural activity, the mismanagement of water resources, land degradation, and ecological 
imbalances, tends to increase the demand for water resources as well as pollute the supply. 
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The overexploitation of groundwater resources in combination with the challenges posed by 
climate change consequently result in an acute shortage (see flowchart 3). 
 
From this perspective, it will be impossible for all social actors (individuals, groups or 
states) to remain complacent about the present or future availability of fresh water resources. 
Unfortunately, these actors tend to focus myopically on their own vested interests. Increased 
competition can potentially destroy the existing social arrangements which determine water 
distribution in a given society/river basin. Either newly organised actors with conflicting 
interests could emerge, or incompatibilities between existing actors could grow in societies 
burdened by ethnic and social dichotomies.96 Incompatibility of interests can create new 
conflicting actors or groups within a state and in other cases give rise to incompatibility among 
existing administrative units or between different ethnic groups.97 When multiple countries are 
jointly dependent on the same river systems, upstream withdrawal can potentially lead to 
“upstream/downstream” conflicts (see flowchart 4). 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
96 Ashok Swain, “Water Scarcity: A Threat to Global Security,” Environment and Security, Vol. 1, No. 
1 (1996), p.160. 
97 Ibid. 
PO
PU
LA
TI
O
N
   
G
R
O
W
TH
 Urbanization 
Intensification 
of Agriculture 
Increasing Use, 
 
Mismanagement, 
 
Land Degradation 
 
Climate Change 
Acute 
Scarcity 
of River 
Water 
Supply 
Flowchart 1.8.3: Increasing Demands and Water Scarcity  
Existing Social Disharmony
Exhaustion of Organising 
Water Acute 
Scarcity of Distribution Actors of Structures  
with Fresh Water & 
Supply Conflicting Growing 
BehavioursCompetition 
Weak Administrative Structures
Flowchart 1.8.4: Water Scarcity and Organisation of Conflicting Actors 
1:  Theoretical Framework 42
It hardly requires mentioning that the origin of violent conflicts in history can be found 
in a state’s desire to capture territory and natural resources. In a situation of water scarcity, 
multilaterally-owned rivers have provided a fertile breeding ground for conflicts between 
riparian states. When one state works towards “development” by acquiring or exploiting more 
than it’s perceived or agreed share of water resources, it affects the interests of other user 
states. Subsequent actions by the affected states aimed at protecting their interests 
eventually result in conflict.98  
Such conflicts over water can be observed at all levels of society, occurring not only 
between nation-states, but also within nation-states99 and between the different units100 of the 
nation-state (see flowchart 5). 
The five flowcharts presented above highlight the interaction of various variables 
which play a role in conflict generation as well as in the promotion of the phenomena of 
accommodation between the riparian states of international river basins. These factors can be 
broadly classified in three categories: geographical, political, and economic. Each flowchart 
shows a part of the linkage between water as a resource of war and accommodation as 
preferred security strategy in conflict situations over international rivers.  
 
                                                          
98 Many such inter-state conflicts are active among the users of international river basins in different 
parts of the world. Some of widely discussed major conflicts are: the Jordan, Litani, Orontes and 
Yarmuk Rivers (Israel and Arab nations), the Nile (Egypt, Sudan and Ethiopia), the Colorado (US and 
Mexico), the Euphrates (Turkey, Syria and Iraq), the Danube (Hungary and Slovakia), the Han (North 
and South Korea), the Amu and Syre Darya (Central Asian States), the Ganges (India, Bangladesh and 
Nepal) and the Indus (India and Pakistan). 
99 The major conflicts within nation-states include: Sanmenxia and Three Gorges in China; Madur Oya 
and Mahavali Project in Sri Lanka; Kalabagh, Mangla, Bhasha and Chashma in Pakistan; Kaptai in 
Bangladesh; Arun in Nepal; Akasombo in Ghana; Kossou in Ivory Coast; Tana and Athi in Kenya; 
Itaparica and Tucurui in Brazil; Kainji and Niger Dams in Nigeria; Ataturk and Keban in Turkey; Lam 
Pao and Nam Pong in Thailand; Kedong Ombo and Batang Ai in Indonesia; Upper Pampanga in the 
Philippines; Manantali in Mali; Savajina in Colombia; Brokopondo in Suriname; Caracol and 
Netzahualcoyotl in Mexico; Nam Ngum in Laos and India, having sites of more than half of the 
world’s existing large-scale dams, deserves a separate list of its own. In India some of the major hydro-
projects that have recently led to protest movements by the displaced people are: Narmada Dam, Lower 
Manair Dam, Tehri Dam, Pong Dam, Subarnarekha Project, Nagarjunsager Project, Srisailam Project, 
Upper Krishna Project and Ukai Reservoir Project. Similarly a number of water sharing issues in 
Pakistan are playing a critical role in provincial disharmony. The province of Punjab is being accused 
of having “sold out” its three rivers—the Ravi, Sutlej and Beas—to India under the Indus Waters 
Treaty of 1960. Under the Indus development plan Punjab diverted waters from western rivers—
Jhelum and Chenab, tributaries to the Indus River—to irrigate its fertile lands, which were originally 
irrigated by the three eastern rivers, exclusively given to India under the Treaty. The province of 
NWFP and Sindh claim exclusive rights over the Indus River and also on its tributaries—the Jhelum 
and Chenab. Thus the Punjab province—being bigger in terms of population and powerful politically—
has been accused of taking undue advantage of its upstream location and consuming most of the waters 
of the Indus River system through the help of barrages and dams without any concern for the 
downstream Sindh province. 
100 Conflicting groups in society emerge to protect their water share or to acquire that of others. The 
activation of groups takes place in accordance with existing religious, caste, class, linguistic, regional 
or other lines. Sometimes, local politicians or elites of a locality use water as a tool to instil group 
feelings, which introduces an “us/them” dichotomy into society. This inter-group conflict can evolve 
into a conflict with the state, when one party rightly or wrongly perceives the state as a collaborator 
with another, subsequently leading to secessionist movements. 
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The model depicted below attempts to transform the above flowcharts into a cohesive 
form, bearing in mind the case under study: the linkage of water with war and peace. It 
presents an overall picture of the interaction between the independent and dependent 
variables identified in the framework. 
 
1.9 Methodology 
The qualitative interpretive methodology of explanation and pair comparison, outlined 
in detail below, is considered useful in identifying variables or factors that signify relationships 
between explanatory factors, and in investigating causal patterns that may not be found 
through quantitative analysis. It goes without saying that the identification of causal 
mechanisms does not preclude the investigation of causal effect, where the data and the 
existing theoretical framework allow. As Bennett has noted, the establishment of causal 
inferences should operate, to as great an extent as possible, by establishing both causal 
mechanisms and causal effect. The two methods are not mutually exclusive but should rather 
be viewed as complimentary.  
The main challenge to the present research problem is the large number of possible 
causal or, in statistical terms, independent variables. Chapter two identifies more than half a 
dozen such factors, pertaining exclusively to international rivers. The limitation of the study to 
the non-identity dimension of conflict and a distinct geographical area—namely that resulting 
from the boundary award which divided British Punjab between India and Pakistan and its 
land-link to the hydro-strategic territory of Kashmir or the catchment areas of whole of the 
Indus basin—was instrumental in further reducing the number of conflict factors. 
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Estimating the explanatory value of one factor among others is, by necessity, a 
methodologically intricate matter. Particularly in the study of complex social phenomena such 
as war and accommodation among enduring rival riparians, the researcher is inevitably 
confronted by the problematic complexity of reality. Some researchers have attempted to 
simplify reality by claiming that “any social system is as complex as the theory developed to 
study it thereby denying any intrinsic complexity to social phenomena outside the control of 
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the researcher”.101 As it is likely that events take place whether or not a researcher has 
designed a model to study them, and indeed that the researcher’s theory may be flawed and 
unable to grasp the full context of the social phenomenon under study, one is forced to 
acknowledge that social phenomena have a number of possible causes that interrelate with 
one another in ways that are nearly always difficult to explain or grasp in their entirety.  
The research methods used in the various case studies normally find their origin in 
the notion of agreement and difference as expounded by John Stuart Mill over a century and 
a half ago. These methods are weakened by intrinsic liabilities, which Mill himself was very 
aware of. The method of agreement is the most problematic: it assumes that if several factors 
show a similar outcome on a dependent variable, they are responsible for the outcome. In 
some social contexts, however, mono-causal explanations are satisfactory, though a specific 
outcome is seldom generated by one single factor irrespective of others. The method of 
agreement is incapable of accounting for multiple or conjectural causality. The method of 
difference goes further, being “a double application of the method of agreement.”102 It focuses 
on different outcomes in a dependent variable in multiple cases, and seeks to find 
corresponding variance in an independent variable. The logic is that if two cases have 
different outcomes in terms of the dependent variable, but demonstrate identical values for a 
given independent variable, then the independent variable in question cannot be a sufficient 
cause of the outcome. However, as Mill himself noted, this method requires unrealistic 
assumptions in order to provide non-spurious inferences.103 Also, as Bennett has noted, in the 
method of difference, “the causal relations being investigated must be deterministic 
regularities, involving conditions that are either necessary or sufficient for a specified 
outcome.”104 Such conditions are not always present: in the case of water conflicts, the 
multiple causal factors appear, individually, to be neither sufficient nor necessary to produce 
the outcome of conflict.  
This raises the issue of multiple and conjectural causality. Conflicts seldom or never 
emerge as a result of one single easily identifiable causal factor. Rather, there is usually a 
complex of causes responsible for the occurrence of conflict. As has been shown in chapter 
three, theory assists in the quest to achieve some level of understanding of the relationship 
between various factors thought to be accountable for water conflict and chapter six explains 
the factors responsible for accommodation between rival riparians. In particular, the 
differentiation between background and catalyzing factors, and between factors relating either 
                                                          
101 Nils Petter Gleditsch, “Armed Conflict and the Environment,” in Paul F. Diehl and Nils Petter 
Gleditsch, eds.., Environmental Conflict (Boulder, Colorado: Westview Press, 2001), p. 392. 
102 Charles Ragin, The Comparative Method: Moving Beyond Qualitative and Quantitative Strategies, 
(Berkeley: University of California, 1987), p. 39. 
103 Andrew Bennett, “Causal Inference in Case Studies: From Mill’s Method to Causal Mechanisms,” 
paper Presented at the American Political Science Association Conference, Atlanta, Georgia, 1999, p. 
17. 
104 Andrew Bennett and Alexander L. George, “Process Tracing in Case Study Research,” paper 
presented at the Macarthur Workshop for Case Study Methods, Harvard University, Oct. 17-19, 1997, 
p. 11. 
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to capacity or incentives, are important in identifying the various factors which trigger conflict. 
Yet the problem remains of how the causal impact of one factor should be assessed in 
relation to others.  
Individual case studies involving process-tracing is one possible solution, facilitating 
the detailed study of the causal mechanisms at work in each case. Following Mill’s method of 
agreement, it is possible to outline a factor-driven or ‘variable-oriented’ study. Mill’s method of 
difference identifies an independent variable thought to have causal effect on the dependent 
variable – that is, an explanatory factor thought to have produced a certain outcome. The next 
step is to identify cases of presence of the outcome (in this case conflict or accommodation), 
and match this with the concomitant presence of the explanatory factor thought to have 
caused this effect (location of water resource or mutually hurting stalemate).  
The presence of a certain explanatory factor in cases of non-conflict should not be 
taken as evidence that this factor is of no consequence whatsoever in terms of the likelihood 
of conflict. It may nonetheless be a factor which increases the likelihood of conflict; in fact, it 
may theoretically even be a sufficient factor for conflict, not a necessary one.  
The absence of a certain explanatory factor in cases of conflict is also possible, but 
should inspire greater doubt as to its explanatory value. Admittedly, there are different types 
of conflicts, discussion in chapter three about the role of geographical attributes (such as 
security and economic dimensions) highlights the fact that conflicts occur in both 
economically dependent (i.e. the dependency of an agrarian economy state on the upstream 
river resources) and security dependent areas (i.e. where the upper riparian captures the 
catchment areas of a river system and river corridors are open flanks for troop movement). As 
a whole, however, in a given universe of cases, one would expect to be able to discriminate 
between explanatory factors based on their ‘correlation’ with the outcome or lack of outcome, 
i.e. conflict. The word correlation is deliberately written in inverted commas, given that a small 
number of cases would question the statistical significance of the evidence in the study, and 
hence provide a basis on which to dismiss or confirm the explanatory power of a given 
explanatory factor. Nonetheless, studying each independent variable and its relationship with 
the outcome gives a good indication as to the explanatory value of the given factor.  
Such an operation as the one undertaken in the study is expected to provide valuable 
insights into the most significant factor leading to water conflict and accommodation over 
water resources between enduring rivals. The exercise provides an opportunity to judge the 
explanatory value of geographical location (in terms of economic value and security 
imperatives) as compared to other factors. In order to deepen the understanding of the 
processes leading to conflict or accommodation, the chosen method, i.e. that of tracing and 
comparing these processes, is not entirely inductive but rather guided by the explanatory 
factors outlined in chapter one, and cognizant of the findings in chapter two and three 
concerning water-related war or conflict, and chapters four and five relating to 
accommodation.  
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1.10 Format of the Thesis 
Taken as a whole, the study comprises seven chapters. Following an introduction, the 
first chapter evolves a conceptual framework culminating in the formation of a model to be 
followed in the study; based on the key concepts of water war, water peace, and 
accommodation between enduring rival riparians. The second chapter analyses the factors of 
conflict in the Indus Basin, ranks them as per their role in conflict generation in an effort to 
highlight the nature of the Kashmir territory. The third chapter establishes linkages between 
water and war in the context of Pakistan-India relations, especially in the initial years of their 
independence. In this regard, the inter-twined nature of the Indus River system and the 
Kashmir dispute is highlighted in order to demonstrate its impacts on political thinking, 
strategic planning and warfare between India and Pakistan. The fourth chapter provides a 
detailed description of the conflicting claims over water resources by precisely 
comprehending the pre-mediation negotiation and the nine-year long mediation process, 
focusing on the role of the World Bank as a ‘self-interested’ but successful mediator. The fifth 
chapter encompasses the dynamics of accommodation in the context of the signing of the 
Indus Waters Treaty and assesses the applicability of the concept of accommodation as a 
preferred security strategy between the rival riparian states. In this context accommodation 
over the Salal Dam, a post-treaty issue; is discussed in detail. The sixth chapter evaluates the 
losses and gains for the riparian states in the context of the Indus Waters Treaty, including 
the implications of accommodation in the context of the India-Pakistan conflict over Kashmir. 
The final chapter describes the other unsettled post-treaty water disputes, envisages possible 
emerging scenarios, examines the sustainability of the Indus Waters Treaty, and finally 
presents overall conclusions which test the hypothesis raised in the study. The study also 
provides fully practicable policy recommendations. 
In order to implement the model formulated in this chapter the next logical step would 
be identifying the factors responsible for generating conflict over the Indus river resource and 
investigating the circumstances under which accommodation between the enduring rival 
riparians (India and Pakistan) became their preferred security strategy. The next section, tries 
to perform the first of these two tasks. 
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Chapter 2 
CONFLICT FACTORS IN THE INDUS RIVER BASIN 
This chapter is an illustration of characteristics of geographic factors which have 
played a role in conflict formation in the Indus Basin and also possess potential for a future 
conflict. Several other factors also contributed towards aggravation and continuation of the 
conflict. These factors included varied economic interests of the parties, domestic political 
apprehensions (specifically in Pakistan), ethnic ground realities, socio-psychological fabric of 
public and leadership alike and ideological and identity-related differences,  However, the 
focused preference of this study lies in the role of factors not related to ideological or identity 
politics as a reference factor rather to the  geo-politics, in the conflict formation and their effect 
on the economic security of the stake-holders in the Indus Basin region. It is argued that it 
was primarily the factor of conflicting perceptions of India and Pakistan based upon perceived 
respective economic and physical security concerns of the parties embedded in the realities 
of geo-politics of the Indus Basin region. It is argued that this equation of clashed interests 
which has roots in an incomplete chapter of the Partition agenda led to the Indus waters’ 
dispute and the first Kashmir war in 1948 between India and Pakistan.  
The geo-political and geo-economic factors of the Indus waters conflict can be 
grouped together in pairs as follows: relative locations and riparian claims, the unnatural 
patchwork pattern of political boundaries and surface features for agriculture and water 
availability, climate change and water supply, population density and patterns of settlement 
for the land utilisation, and internal pressures and foreign relations of the parties. During the 
early years of the Indus waters dispute, from 1947-51, these factors invariably played a role in 
conflict generation, whereas later, from 1952-60, some of these elements also contributed 
towards conflict transformation ultimately leading to an accommodation. Most particular 
among those was the changing domestic political and economic situation and nature of 
external relations. Each of these factors is connected to the economic and security interests 
of the riparians bounded in the control of the Kashmir territory. The relative conflict potential of 
these factors in generating an inter-state dispute over the control of the Indus rivers system 
has been assessed by using the pair comparison method. The question whether the 
boundaries in the Indus basin were drawn on the basis of the location of water resource 
access or not, is also dealt with in detail. 
2.1 Geographical Location and Riparian Rights 
The Indus is a multinational basin, shared by four nation states; China, India, 
Pakistan and Afghanistan (see Map 3). The Chinese territory of Tibet contains the origin of 
the Indus and the Sutlej rivers characterizing China as the upper-most riparian of the Indus 
basin. Afghanistan contributes the Kabul River, a tributary to the Indus River.1 The other five 
                                                 
1 The River Kabul is excluded, for most of the purposes of this study, because it neither crosses the 
Indus Plains nor was it a subject of the Indus Waters Dispute. It is not beyond the realm of possibility 
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tributaries to the Indus river system are the Jhelum, Chenab, Ravi, Sutlej and Beas which 
originate in Indian and Pakistani parts of Kashmir and the Himachel Pradesh of India. A major 
area of the basin is shared by the modern states of Pakistan and India and as a result, these 
two countries have been getting engaged in large-scale development programmes and, 
consequently, indulging into conflict of interest. India's portion of the basin, including the 
disputed territory of Jammu and Kashmir, contains the headwaters of all five rivers of the 
Punjab. The conflicts between the upper and lower riparian of the basin and the agreements 
that emerged from them have centred on the Punjab [East and West Punjab or Indian and 
Pakistani Punjab] and the territory of Jammu and Kashmir. It is largely this area that is under 
focus in this chapter. 
The relative location of the riparian may be examined in the context of the principles 
stated in the previous chapter. If all the riparians are considered in a wholesome picture, India 
is the middle riparian and is supposed to adhere to the principle of ‘community in resource 
utilisation’ of international rivers. If exclusively India and Pakistan are considered, India enjoys 
an obvious advantage of being an upper riparian and is expected to invoke ‘absolute territorial 
sovereignty’ and Pakistan would favour ‘absolute territorial integrity’ principle. 
2.2  Surface Characteristics 
The Indus river system which originates in Tibet constitutes its headwaters in the 
western Himalayas. Excluding the uppermost portions and its longest tributary (the Sutlej 
River), the Indus River flows through mountainous and difficult terrain until it emerges on to 
the Punjab plains. Given the nature of the terrain and the scant population in that region, the 
area contains a number of hydro-strategic sites for dam construction. Such projects would 
have inherent potential for the water-based conflicts. The likelihood of the conflict, however, 
depends upon the decisions made in the upper parts of the basin for resource development. 
One can thus safely say that the conflict potential is at best latent, and that its activation is 
contingent upon developments in the catchment areas (Indian-held Kashmir and the 
mountainous parts of the Indian Punjab) of the basin.2 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                                                                                                            
that a dispute may someday arise between Pakistan and Afghanistan over the waters of the Kabul and 
its major affluent, the Chitral-Kunar. Thereafter it passes into Sindh (Pakistan) to pass out into the 
Arabian Sea.  For the role of the Kabul River within Afghanistan, see Aloys Arthur Michel, The Kabul, 
Kunduz, and Helmand Valleys and the National Economy of Afghanistan (Washington, DC: National 
Academy of Sciences-National Research Council, 1959). 
2 Basheer Khalil Nijim, The Indus, Nile and Jordan: International Rivers and Factors in Conflict 
Potential (Thesis submitted to Indiana University, 1969), p. 25. 
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Map-3: The Indus Basin: Geographic Zone (Source: Mohammad Ayub Khan, Friends Not 
Masters: A Political Autobiography (Lahore, Karachi, Dacca: Oxford University Press, 1967). 
 
 
Another aspect of the Indus system which is necessary to be mentioned here is the 
peculiar geographic nature of the Kashmiri territory. This beautiful landscape consists of high 
mountain ranges, snow-covered peaks and dense forests with heavy snow falls in winters and 
high precipitations in the rainy season. The enchanting scenery of the valley is bestowed with 
a number of streams, lakes and rivers which latterly join Indus River to formulate a gigantic 
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system with massive flow of waters. The melting of snows on the sky-scrapping peaks in the 
summer season and the showering of the rains in the valleys during Monsoon provide a 
permanent natural source of waters flowing from Kashmiri terrain into the banks of Indus 
River. This system of six rivers gives life to the predominantly arid, agrarian economy of 
Pakistan and part of the Indian Punjab. The socio-economic life cycle of the agricultural 
civilization on the both sides of the border had flourished along the banks of river Indus. 
Having a glance over the map of Kashmir its geographic importance and hydro-strategic 
nature becomes obvious (see Map-4).  
Map-4: Territory showing catchment areas of the Indus River system in princely state 
of Kashmir (Source Kashmir Tomorrow, a quarterly magazine Chanar International 
(August-October 1998), Switzerland. 
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Kashmir shares its borders with China, India, Afghanistan and Pakistan. The 
topography of the Kashmir territory can be divided into following mountain ranges, which 
enfold a number of valleys, lakes and rivers. 
Karakorum Range: This snow-covered mountain range is situated to the north of the 
main Himalaya and Ladakh ranges leaving Aksai Chin and Depsang plains along Chinese 
border. Twelve peaks with an elevation above 7,000 meters, including the famous K2 (28,250 
feet) and Rakaposhi (25,550 feet) are the hallmark of this range. The other peaks are: Saser 
Kangri (25,170 feet), Slataro Kangri (25,400 feet), Sia Kangri (24,480 feet), Masherbroom 
(25,660 feet), Gasherbroom (26,470 feet), Kunjat Sar (25,459 feet), Dastagil Sar (25,868 
feet), Haramosh (24,270 feet), Kampiri Diwar (23,434 feet) and Ishkuman (18,467 feet). The 
Karakorum-range forms a part of trans-Himalaya. Its average elevation is over 3,000 meters.  
The Karakorum-range has some of the biggest glaciers of the world, outside the polar 
region. Most prominent among them is the Siachen glacier which has a length of 72 and 
breadth of 10 kilometres. 
Ladakh Range: The Ladakh range lies to the south of Karakorum and north of the 
main Himalaya ranges. It has an average elevation of over 3,500 meters. There are a number 
of prominent rivers in eastern Ladakh that drain into the Indus River and into the famous Salt 
Lake. Drainage of the Karakorum and Ladakh ranges forms the major source of water of the 
main Indus River originating in Tibet. 
Great Himalaya: The great Himalaya—roof of the earth—passes through Bhutan, 
Sikkam, Nepal, Tibet, Himachal Pradesh, Jammu and Kashmir and touches its lower peak, 
Nunkun (23,410 feet). the mountain range of great Himalaya branches off at the Nanga 
Parbat massif (26,660 feet) and runs along an arc passing to the south of the Kashmir valley 
to Murree and Margalla hills encircling Islamabad valley (Pakistan’s capital) from its north, 
west and south sides. The great Himalaya drains in Tibet and gives birth to the mighty Indus 
River which flows down towards west, passing through Kashmir territory along with Ladakh 
range. The river then turns to south near Gilgit and passing through the whole of Pakistan 
drains in Arabian Sea at Karachi.  
The Jammu and Kashmir valley bears origins of three out of five Punjab’s rivers—
Jhelum, Chenab and Ravi. While Beas and Sutlej collect drainage of the Indian territory of 
Himachal Pradesh (see Map-5) but both rivers were main source of irrigation in Pakistan’s 
province Punjab, well before partition of the Subcontinent to the signing of the Indus Waters 
Treaty in September 1960 between India and Pakistan.  
The Indus River System commands total area of 364,700 square miles (approx. 
584,000 square kilometres).3 Of the total basin, some 160,400 square miles (264,660 sq km) 
                                                 
3 Hazara Report, “A Programme for Water and Power Development in West Pakistan, 1963-1975 
(Lahore: Hazara Engineering Company International, 1963), p. 1-7; Water Taylor, “History, and Indus 
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lie in the highlands of Tibet, Kashmir, Northern Areas of Pakistan and Afghanistan. The rest 
comprises the Indus Plains, one of the most homogeneous physiographic regions on earth, 
mostly situated in Pakistan.4 
Map-5: The Indus Basin at the time of the partition of the Subcontinent in 1947. (Source: 
Aloys Arthur Michel) 
 
 
                                                                                                                                            
Plains,” Natural History, Vol. 74, No. 40 (April 1965), refers total drainage area of 350,000 square 
miles. 
4 Aloys Arthur Michel, The Indus Rivers: A Study of the Effects of Partition (New Haven: Yale 
University Press, 1967), p. 29. 
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The data about elevation and flow of the Indus River provides interesting factual 
information. Michel states that the Indus river is found at an elevation of over 15,000 feet in 
the shadow of Kailas. Where it receives the Gartang, and turns northwest in the “structural 
trough” mentioned above, it has fallen less than 2,000 feet. Near Leh in Ladakh it crosses the 
12,000-foot contour. Southwest of K2, it receives the Shyok and then, at Skardu, the Shigar 
rivers. Here the Indus is still 1,400 miles from its origin and 7,500 feet above the sea level. 
Twenty-five miles below Skardu, the River enters its 300-mile gorge, in the course of which it 
falls 6,000 feet for an average gradient of 20 feet per mile. In making this decent, the Indus 
reaches its northernmost point (virtually same latitude as of K2) at an elevation of about 4,500 
feet. After receiving the Gilgit and Astor rivers in the vicinity of Bunji, the Indus turns west just 
north of Nanga Parbat and continues this trend up to Chilas and Sazin.5 
At Tarbela, the Indus flows at a level of 1,300 feet above sea level, but it is still 1,100 
miles from its origin. Although the river has now finished with the Himalayas, it still has the 
outliers of the Hindukush, represented by the Kuh-e-Safed (The White Mountain), the 
Suleiman Mountain and Salt ranges to contend with. These are met and breached in the 100 
miles between Attock and Kalabagh.  
At Attock Indus receives the Kabul River from the right, and between Attock and 
Kalabagh it meets the first barrage (Jinnah Barrage). The old minimum recorded level at the 
Kalabagh gauge (before the barrage covered it) was about 680 feet above sea level. Since 
the distance from the Jinnah Barrage to the Arabian Sea is about 950 miles, the average 
gradient of the Indus for approximately the lower half of its entire length is less than 9 inches 
per mile. From Mithankot, where the Panjnad (combined streams of the Punjab’s five rivers) 
joins the Indus, the latter has an average gradient of less than 6 inches per mile.6 
The geography of the Sutlej river is less complicated than that of the Indus. The Sutlej 
acts as a transverse Himalayan stream, apparently exploiting an ancient fault-line in its gorge 
below Shipki La. This course brings it to Inner Siwaliks at the Bhakra site (see Map-6) about 
1,200 feet above the sea level. But the rim-station on the Sutlej is at Rupar, where it cuts 
through the last foothills and emerges onto the plains. From Rupar to Mithankot, Sutlej falls 
only 560 feet over a distance of almost 550 river miles, making an average gradient of one 
foot per mile.7 
 
 
 
                                                 
5 Ibid., p. 31 
6 Ibid., pp. 31-32. 
7 Ibid. 
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Map-6: The Bhakra-Beas-Rajisthan Project in Indian Punjab 1966. (Source: Aloys Arthur 
Michel) 
The Sutlej River collects the drainage of the Beas between Rupar and Ferozepur. 
The Beas which is the shortest of the Punjnad Rivers (only 247 miles long) makes a 
substantial contribution in the Indus river system (see Table-1 below). Its headwaters are 
closely located to those of the Sutlej to the south and east and of the Ravi and the Chandra 
tributary of the Chenab to the west and north. The Beas draws, from relatively small 
catchment areas practically limited to the Lesser Himalayas and Siwaliks, but its runoff is 
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equivalent to Sutlej as it collects all the way from Lake Manasarowar.8 
          The Ravi does not penetrate the Main Himalayas like the Beas. Its catchment area is 
limited to the south-western slopes of the Pir Panjal Range (Lesser Himalayas), and it is also 
closely circumscribed by the Chandra-Chenab.9  
Michel in his book, The Indus Rivers, makes reference to two dam sites on River 
Chenab and Jhelum: “The Chenab and the Jhelum each offers a dam site within Jammu-
Kashmir.”10 The Chenab site is at Dhaingarh to the north of Riasi, where India has 
constructed Salal dam in the late 1970s.11  The dam is approximately 50 kilometres upstream 
from Pakistan’s Maralla headworks. The second site on the River Jhelum where it leaves 
Lake Wullar and cuts through the Pir Panjal Rang12 is an ongoing issue between India and 
Pakistan.13 Pakistan has constructed dam on the course of the Jhelum where the Salt Range 
meets the Siwaliks near Mangla. The Mangla Dam is built under the Indus Basin Project, after 
signing the Indus Waters Treaty with India in 1960. The dam, located at the rim-station, 
includes the Kishanganga and Kunhar tributaries of the Jhelum in its storage. 
 -----------------------------------------------Table-1-------------------------------------------------- 
 Catchment Areas and Runoff of the Indus Rivers 
River Gauging Station      Catchment Area (Sq. Miles)       40-YearAverageRunoff (MAF) 
Indus  Attock   102,000 (Kashmir & Northern Areas of Pakistan) 93.0 
Kabul  Warsak  026,000 (Afghanistan and Pakistan)  17.4 
Jhelum  Mangla  012,900 (Kashmir)    23.0 
Chenab  Marala   011,400 (Kashmir)    26.0 
Ravi  Madhopur 003,100 (Indian Punjab and Kashmir)  07.0 
Beas  Mandi Plain 006,500 (Indian Punjab)    13.0 
Sutlej  Rupar    018,550 (Himachal Pradesh, India)  14.0 
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
Total          193.4 
Sources: Hazara Report, pp. 1-12; S.S. Kirmani, “Sediment Problems in the Indus Basin, Part I: Sedimentation in 
Reservoirs,” Proceedings of the West Pakistan Engineering Congress 43, Paper No. 336 (Lahore: West Pakistan 
Engineering Congress, 1959), p. 9. 
The Kabul River is another major effluent of Indus River aside from the five rivers of 
the Punjab. It rises in the 10,000-foot Unai Pass of the southern Hindukush and drains 
eastern Afghanistan into the Indus at Attock. Where it crosses the Pak-Afghan boundary, just 
north of the Khyber Pass, the Kabul River has catchments area of some 26,000 square 
                                                 
8 Michel, op. cit., pp. 33-34. 
9 Ibid. 
10 Ibid., p. 35. 
11 The issue is discussed in detail in ch. 5.  
12 Aloys Arthur Michel, op. cit., p. 35. 
13 For details see Muhammad Nasrullah Mirza, “Wullar Barrage,” Pakistan Horizon, Vol. 47, No.1 
(Spring 1994).  
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miles.14 Kabul’s contribution is as great to the Indus basin as that of the Jhelum, and is far 
greater than that of any other Indus tributary except the Chenab (see Table-1 above). 
 The above mentioned geographic details emphasize a remarkable feature of the 
Indus river system i.e., catchments area of the entire river system is found in the disputed 
territory of Jammu and Kashmir. Where water fall is above 20 feet per mile and when it leaves 
the Kashmir territory, at various rim-stations of its tributaries, the water fall reduces to one foot 
to only six inches per mile in the rest of the basin. These two amazing characteristics signify 
the hydro-strategic importance of the Kashmir territory for the riparians as the Kashmir is the 
only territory suitable to develop water resources for the benefit of the inhabitants of the entire 
Indus basin  
2.3 The Nature of Political Boundaries 
The administrative setup in the Subcontinent, during the British rule, substantially 
contributed to the formation of dispute over the Indus rivers between the newly-born states of 
India and Pakistan at the time of Partition of the Subcontinent. Some provinces were under 
direct administrative control of the United Kingdom (see Map-7: un-shaded area represents 
territories under direct British rule). The remaining states, ruled by numerous indigenous 
princes, were subject to the British advisors representing the Government of India. By the 
beginning of the twentieth century, the people of the Subcontinent had started organising 
themselves politically for the establishment of self-rule. Their movement culminated into All-
India Congress Party and later All-India Muslim League too. 
The demand for partition of the Subcontinent was based on the rationale of Two 
Nation Theory: Muslim Pakistan and Hindu India. The Muslims in the northwest and northeast 
of British India were strongly against to the possible Hindu rule in the wake of decolonization 
of the region. Thus the issue of delimitation of new boundaries emerged as a challenging task 
for the British rulers. Further complications arose as Pakistan was to be composed of two 
non-contiguous parts, East and West Pakistan, almost 1000 miles apart (this study is 
concerned only with the boundary between West Pakistan and India and more specifically 
division of Punjab).  
At the time of Partition, a Boundary Commission, headed by Radcliffe, was assigned 
to decide the actual limits of the two states in the province of Punjab, called after division as 
East Punjab (India) and West Punjab (Pakistan). The division was based on majority equation 
of the districts. The province of Punjab was situated along the Beas and Sutlej rivers, except 
for an intrusion of East Punjab into the Bari Doab to include Amritsar. The district of Amritsar 
had a 53.5% non-Muslim majority in addition to being, the sacred city of the Sikhs. The Sikhs 
had sided with the Hindus and Amritsar acceded to India.15 
                                                 
14 Hazara Report, op. cit., pp. 1-12. 
15 Oscar Spate, "The Boundary Award in the Punjab," The Asiatic Review, Vol. XLIV, No. 157 (Jan., 
1948) p. 2.  
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Map-7:  Princely  States  and  Territories  under  Direct  British  Control  before 
Partition (courtesy Prof. Richard Bonney); See also Mushtaqur Rahman, Divided 
Kashmir: Old Problems, New Opportunities for India, Pakistan and the Kashmiri People, 
(Boulder, London: Lynne Reinner Publishers, 1996), p. 50). 
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Radcliffe had worked out such a boundary in Punjab, which gave birth to a series of 
problems for Pakistan. Most crucial among those was the river waters’ division. Although, 
Pakistan got fifteen and India twelve districts of Punjab, Radcliffe awarded those districts to 
India which had provided it control over the three out of the five rivers of the Indus system. 
More crucial was to render such territory to it which eventually enabled it to control all the five 
rivers, simply by annexing Kashmir.16 The expected happened, giving India a grip on 
Pakistani's jugular vein. “...which it keeps tightening as often as its politics requires, 
regardless of ethics, international norms, and unmindful of the misery to which millions of 
people will be subjected, if their smiling fields turn into deserts.”17  
Another ‘wise’ act of redrawing the boundaries was that Radcliffe cancelled the 
allocation of Gurdaspur and parts of Ferozepur districts to Pakistan at the eleventh hour 
because “...it would have secured Kashmir for Pakistan.”18 Christopher Beaumont claimed 
that he had originally done so with regard to Ferozepur and Zira, but that the award was 
changed under Mountbatten’s influence – though  this  accusation  remains  contentious.19 
The immediate concern at the time was communal separation, coupled with the rivals' desire 
for maximum territorial gains. There was also an understandable tendency, notably in the 
Indian Congress, to demand more than could be reasonably expected, largely for bargaining 
purposes (see Map-8).20 
Michel notes that from the standpoint of the irrigation system, the boundary award 
was not the best line. The boundary, which was actually delimited, gave India control of the 
Ferozepur headworks which cuts across the Bari Doab, almost at right angles to the Ravi and 
Sutlej. Consequently India was placed in the bargaining position of being an upper riparian 
with respect to the Upper Bari Doab Canal (UBDC) and the canal systems originating from 
the Sutlej. This, though relatively short, stretch of some fifty miles contributed towards the 
creation of subsequent severe tensions which almost brought the two states into an armed 
conflict. It could not be termed surprising as the boundary was clearly a superimposed and 
was drawn by a person who knew least about the complex socio-economic ground-realities of 
the region. It traversed a region in which there already existed a population with a high 
density, and a settlement pattern of long standing.21 
                                                 
16 Zahur-ul-Haq, “Solution in Search of a Problem,” The Pakistan Times, October 1, 1986. 
17 Ibid. 
18 Ibid. 
19 Prof. Richard Bonney, while referring to Beaumont’s criticism on Radcliffe and Mountbatten, 
provides some documentary evidence stating that Radcliffe’s claim about the decision to ‘eliminate the 
salient’ (that is, to alter the boundary with regard to Ferozepore) was the ‘result of his own unfettered 
judgement’ and not the result of Mountbatten’s influence. The Maharaja of Bikaner had telegraphed 
Mountbatten that if the canal headworks at Ferozepore went to Pakistan, he would have to accede to 
Pakistan and not India. It seems probable that Mountbatten informed Radcliffe of this argument. For 
details please see Richard Bonney, Three Giants of South Asia: Gandhi, Ambedkar and Jinnah on Self-
Determination (Leicester, 2003), doc. 46, 308–311. Reprinted (Delhi: Media House, 2004), 276–9. 
20 Ibid. 
21 Aloys Arthur Michel, op. cit., pp. 176-194, esp. p. 193. 
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Map-8: Boundary Claimed by India and Pakistan and the Radcliffe Award. 
Source: Courtesy Prof. Richard Bonney; See also Mushtaqur Rahman, Divided Kashmir, op. 
cit. 
 
 
 The Sikhs community was asking for a diagonal partition line running from the north-
east to south-west of Punjab. Such borders would have given them possession of most of the 
canal colonies to which their fathers and grandfathers had moved at the invitation of the 
British colonisation officers after 1890. In their final calculus, they had written off the Chaj 
Doab and the Sidhnai Project in the Multan District (currently a part of Khanewal district), but 
they still wanted to keep most of the lower Chenab Project especially the prosperous Lyallpur 
District (renamed as Faisalabad in 1980s), as well as most of the areas served by the Triple 
Canals Project, including the Montgomery District (renamed as Sahiwal in 1960s).22 
                                                 
22 Ibid., p. 171. 
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 The Sikh legislators presented the 1941 census data, instead of the 1931, on the Sikh 
percentage of population in the districts that lay, wholly or in part, south and east of the 
Chenab. It surprised Michel as they had attacked the reliability of the 1941 census. However, 
they did so probably because the proportion of Sikhs was higher in these districts than it had 
been in 1931, with only three significant exceptions: Sahiwal (Montgomery), Ludhiana, and 
Ambala.23  
----------------------------------------------------------Table 2------------------------------------------------------ 
Percentage of the Muslims & Sikhs in Divisions and Districts of the British Punjab 
according to the Censuses of 1931, 1941        S i k h s   M u s l i m s 
  1931 1941   1931 1941 
Lahore Division 18.86 19.98   58.01 58.18 
Lahore District 17.72 18.29   59.18 60.69 
Gujranwala District  9.73 10.87   70.82 70.39 
Sheikhupura Distt.  17.15 18.85   64.01 63.62 
Sialkot District  9.69 11.70   62.23 62.10 
Amritsar District 35.80 36.14   46.96 46.50 
Gurdaspur District 18.30 19.18   50.80 50.23 
 
Multan Division 08.10 08.15   76.23 75.43 
Multan District 03.36 04.15   80.26 77.96 
Muzaffargarh Dist. 00.90 00.83   86.79 86.52 
Jhang District 01.28 01.49   83.16 82.58 
Dera Ghazi Khan Dist. 00.15 00.17   88.80 88.90 
Lyallpur District 18.36 18.81   66.62 62.82 
 
Rawalpindi Division 04.76 04.98   85.88 85.52 
Rawalpindi District 06.50 08.16   82.76 80.00 
Gujrat District 06.42 06.35   85.24 85.60 
Jhelum District 04.07 03.92   89.10 89.51 
Mianwali District 01.03 01.36   86.77 86.17 
Attock District 03.34 02.97   91.07 90.52 
Shahpur District 04.88 04.81   82.72 83.67 
 
Jullundur Division 24.45 24.32   33.41 34.53 
Jullundar District 26.45 26.44   44.46 45.17 
Ferozepur District 33.55 33.68   44.56 45.08 
Hoshiarpur District 16.78 19.92   31.79 32.48 
Karngna District 00.30 00.57   05.05 05.09 
Ludhiana District 46.52 41.69   35.03 36.92 
 
Ambala Division 05.63 05.12   27.72 28.07 
Ambala Dist 20.94 18.44   31.07 31.64 
Simla District 02.07 02.67   15.79 18.20 
Hissar District 06.13 06.03   28.21 28.33 
Gurgoan District 00.07 00.07   32.74 33.49 
Karnal District 01.99 02.00   30.46 30.58 
Rohtak District 00.07 00.15   17.11 17.22 
---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
Sources: Census of India, 1931, Vol. 17, Punjab (Lahore: Civil and Military Gazette Press), pp. 278-279; and Census 
of India, 1941, Vol. 6, Punjab (Delhi: The Manager of Publications, 1941), pp. 41-45, also cited by Michel, op. cit., p. 
172. 
The figures given in the last column of the Table-2, 3 reflect the population strength of 
the Muslim community in 1941. The Sikhs were so “diluted” that under the terms of reference 
of the Boundary Commission, they could not rely even on the total non-Muslim population. 
                                                 
23 Ibid. 
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Michel observes that non-Muslim communities (Christians plus Parsees) were not significant 
to affect matters one way or another. In all of the British Punjab, there was only one district, 
Gurdaspur, where either the Muslims or the non-Muslim majority was less than 3.5 percent 
above or below 50 percent.24 On any calculus their argument was weak. Although their 
minimum demand—partition along the Chenab excluding the Multan and Jhang Districts—
would have brought 95 percent of the 3,767,401 Sikhs of the British Punjab into India, but it 
would have placed  63.89 percent of the 10,360,454 Muslim population there too. Keeping 
these demographic realities in mind, a strict communal demarcation of the boundaries would 
obviously have gone against the Sikh interests. Realizing their weak argument the Sikh 
legislators urged for “other factors.” 25 
The meaning and logic of “other factors” was explained nowhere. Although Baldev 
Singh had requested this,26 but no parameters were determined about the weight, separately 
or combined, was to be given to the “other factors” relative to the communal majority factor. In 
fact, Radcliffe was advised to draw partition line on the basis of “contiguous majority areas of 
Muslims and non-Muslims,” although the general term “areas” rather than the specific term 
“districts” or “tehsils” left enough room for the adjustment to the satisfaction of the 
stakeholders.27 
----------------------------------------------------------------Table-3-------------------------------------------------- 
Muslims and the Sikhs Percentages in Certain Districts & Tehsils of the British Punjab: 
1931, 1941 Censuses  S i k h s  M u s l i m s 
  1931  1941 1931  1941 
Jullundur District 26.45  26.44 44.46  45.17 
Jullundur Tehsil 20.91  19.64 49.62  51.16 
Nawan Shahar Tehsil  31.19  18.05 31.61  31.54 
Phillaur Tehsil l25.83  36.35 33.13  33.19 
Nakodar Tehsil 22.48  22.75 58.72  59.41 
 
Ferozepur District 33.55   33.68 44.56  45.08 
 
Amritsar District  35.80  36.14 46.97  46.50 
Amritsar Tehsil 30.82  30.83 46.40  45.49 
Tarn Taran Tehsil 50.01  51.48 40.55  40.69 
Ajnala Tehsil 27.73  28.68 58.95  59.46 
 
Gurdaspur District 18.38  19.18 50.80  50.23 
Gurdaspur Tehsil 23.67  23.32 52.62  52.16 
Batala Tehsil 29.75  30.62 54.07  55.07 
Pathankot Tehsil 03.59  04.95 39.72  38.89 
Shakargarh Tehsil 06.36  07.06 50.87  51.32 
 
Kapurthala State 22.79  25.93 56.59  56.35 
 
Source: Census of India, 1941, Vol. 6, Punjab, pp. 48-49, 52-55, 57-63, also cited by Michel, op. cit., p. 187. 
 
                                                 
24 Aloys Arthur Michel, op. cit., pp. 173-174. 
25 Ibid. 
26 V.P. Menon, The Transfer of Power in India, (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1957), pp. 376-
377.  
27 Aloys Arthur Michel, op. cit., pp. 165-166. 
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 Michel argues that taking the Sikhs’ economic interests into consideration and owing 
to their contribution to the economy of the Lahore and Jullundur divisions and the 
Montgomery [Sahiwal] and Lyallpur [Faisalabad] districts, ‘the Sikhs were on unassailable 
ground.’ But partition along the lines proposed by the Sikh legislators would have been most 
disastrous for irrigation system and regional economy of the Punjab. The effects on the Triple 
Canals Project would have been worst. The integrated operation of the whole project was 
dependent upon the five headworks. Owing to the supposed adherence to the Sikh proposals, 
two headworks (Mangla and Rasul) would have gone to Pakistan, one (Balloki) to India, and 
two (Marala and Khanki) would have been split through the middle. Since, as has been 
explained, the entire Triple Canals Project operation ultimately depends on Mangla, the Sikh 
proposal would have left the key to the irrigation of their lands in Faisalabad and Sahiwal 
Districts under Pakistan’s control.28 
 Michel argues further that in the light of its effects on the irrigation system, the Sikh 
proposal would have created a far worse situation than that which actually resulted from the 
Partition. One should appreciate the bold step by Radcliffe: despite his rebuff by Nehru and 
Jinnah when he raised the question of irrigation in the Punjab, his Award did preserve intact 
its single most important system, the Triple Canals Project, but Ferozepur and Gurdaspur 
districts represented a test of whether the “contiguous majority area” principle or “other 
factors” were to prevail. Although the Ferozepur district as a whole was predominantly non-
Muslim,29
 
but the two northern tehsils, Ferozepur itself and Zira were clearly Muslim majority 
areas.30 Thus the question arose, whether a district should be partitioned? Similar were the 
situation with respect to the Gurdaspur district north of Amritsar. Under the terms of the 
Boundary Commission, Radcliffe clearly had authority to partition Ferozepur district and to 
award the two Muslim majority tehsils to Pakistan on the “contiguous majority area” principle, 
as he done with Gurdaspur district. Awarding the Ferozepur tehsil to Pakistan would definitely 
have preserved the unity of the Sutlej Valley Project as far as headworks were concerned.31  
 But here “other factors” acquired importance in the calculus for accession. First, 
Ferozepur city was a majority cantonment area. Second, it was a major junction point where 
four railway lines and three highways met to cross on the barrage-cum-bridge towards Kasur 
and Lahore. The award of this area, south of the Sutlej, to Pakistan would have conferred a 
strategic advantage providing waters along with headworks and the Muslim-majority tehsils 
containing cantonment areas. 32 
                                                 
28 Aloys Arthur Michel, op. cit., p. 176. 
29 The Ferozepur District as a whole had 44.56 and 45.08 per cent Muslims in 1931 and 1941 
respectively (see Table 3). 
30 The Tehsil Ferozepur had 52.20 and 55.25 per cent Muslim in 1931 and 1941, respectively. Zira 
Tehsil had 65.03 and 65.26 Muslim in 1931 and 1941 respectively. Figures for tehsils in 1941 
calculated from the Census of India, 1941, Vol. 6 Punjab, Provincial Table II, pp. 58-63. For 1931 
figures calculated from the respective District Gazettes Part-B, Table-16 issued in the mid-1930s. 
31 Aloys Arthur Michel, op. cit., p. 179. 
32 Aloys Arthur Michel, op. cit., p. 180. 
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 Michel argues that in the context of post-partition developments, one may logically 
ask whether it would not have been preferable to have made the course of the Sutlej River as 
boundary at Ferozepur. In fact, this would have exchanged the Ferozepur district bridgehead 
north of the Sutlej for the Lahore district bridgehead south of it. Certainly, such an 
arrangement would have placed the boundary in the middle of the Ferozepur barrage. On the 
other hand Radcliffe was confident that the arguments regarding sharing of the water would 
be respected by the successor states, as he hoped: 
I have taken the view that an interest of this sort cannot weigh directly in the question 
before us as to the division of the Punjab between the Indian Union and Pakistan 
since the territorial division of the province does not effect rights of private property, 
and I think I am entitled to assume with confidence that any agreement that either of 
those states has made with the Provincial Government as to the sharing of water 
from those canals or otherwise will be respected by whatever Government hereafter 
assumes jurisdiction over the headworks concerned.33 
 Michel questions his argument on the basis of not providing this visible evidence of 
such trust? Since a headwork has to be run as a unit, would it not have been preferable to 
persuade the parties to cooperate by giving each of them half of it rather than to place one of 
them, that too the upper riparian, in a position to cut off supplies to the other? The counter 
argument is that Radcliffe lost trust after Jinnah's reaction to his suggestion of a counter 
Hindu-Muslim bulwark that, “I would rather have Pakistan deserts than fertile fields watered 
by courtesy of Hindus.”34 Jinnah’s suspicions proved true when India cut off supplies to the 
Dipalpur canal as well as to the Lahore and main branches of the UBDC, on 1st April 1948. If 
Radcliffe would have suspected what actually happened in the spring of 1948, would it not be 
preferable to give the entire Ferozepur headworks to Pakistan to balance the award of the 
Madhopur headworks (of the UBDC in the Gurdaspur) to India? Thus each country would 
have held a position to counter-balance the unilateral closure by the other party.35 
 According to Michel a logical solution has been to run the boundary between Lahore 
and Amritsar, but here the complication was that the contiguous majority principle could not 
be applied on a tehsil level. Muslim-majority tehsils plus the Muslim majority state of 
Kapurthala completely encircled the two non-Muslim tehsils of the Amritsar district (Amritsar 
and Tarn Taran) and one non-Muslim tehsil (Pathankot) of Gurdaspur district while other 
tehsils of districts Gurdaspur, and Amritsar were Muslim-majority areas. Across the Sutlej and 
between Sutlej and Beas rivers, Ferozepur district had two contiguous Muslim-majority tehsils 
and two tehsils of Jullundur district again contiguous to Muslim majority areas were Muslim-
majority tehsils. If Radcliffe would have interpreted the “contiguous majority” principle to apply 
only to whole district level, then he could have awarded the entire Jullundur district to India, 
                                                 
33 Gazette of India, Extraordinary, August 17, 1947, Annexure A, Section 5, p. 1,067.  
34 Aloys Arthur Michel, op. cit., p.164 (Michel’s personal talk with Lord Radcliffe, March 28, 1965). 
35 Ibid., p. 181. 
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as he did with Ferozepur. But then logical consistency would have demanded that he 
awarded the Gurdaspur district in total to Pakistan.36 
 If irrigation consideration were taken in combination with communal population, 
Radcliffe would have been amply justified in awarding both the Gurdaspur and Lahore 
districts to Pakistan. In essence one can argue that the irrigation standpoint would appear to 
have reinforced the population standpoint, and the principle of “contiguous majorities”, 
because if the same had been applied to district as a whole, then it would have been quite 
logical and quite consistent to award Ferozepur, Amritsar, and Jullundur to India, and 
Gurdaspur and Lahore to Pakistan.37 
        The Radcliffe Award has been accused by majority of analysts on the charges that 
the Award was an exercise of double-standards between the Sutlej and the Ravi by 
partitioning of districts, which he had avoided in Ferozepur. The Gurdaspur district had three 
clear contiguous Muslim majority tehsils—Batala, Shakargarh and Tehsil Gurdaspur itself with 
55.07, 51.322 and 52.16 percent Muslim population respectively (see Map-9). Radcliffe had 
awarded tehsil Pathankot with Madhopur headworks, and the two contiguous Muslim majority 
tehsils, Batala and Gurdaspur itself, to India. It not only ensured the Indian hold over 
Madhopur headworks and UBDC system but also on the Gurdaspur tehsil. The Madhopur 
headworks and UBDC system served above two-third of the total land in the Muslim-majority 
areas and was crucially important for the very survival of Lahore district. Moreover, the 
Gurdaspur tehsil included the only road linking to Eastern Punjab (hence to India) with 
Jammu and Kashmir, and the only bridge—the Madhopur Barrage, over the Ravi above 
Lahore. Here Radcliffe award, secured for India the strategically vital land communication 
between India and Jammu-Kashmir.  While in the Lahore district, even a tehsil was 
partitioned: the eastern two-third of Kasur tehsil—predominantly Muslim-majority tehsil (above 
70 percent Muslim population), was awarded to India, probably to abandon the possibilities of 
Pakistani claim over the use of UBDC.38 
 Here arises a question, to which Radcliffe seems answerless, that why then the 
Gurdaspur award made as it was? In retrospect, the substance appears inconsistent. There 
does not seem any way to reconcile the Ferozepur award with that of Gurdaspur, on the basis 
either of contiguous communal majorities or the basis of irrigation considerations. 
 Michel points out that on the population basis, it was anomalous not only because the 
district as a whole had a Muslim majority but the Muslim-majority tehsil Shakargarh, awarded 
to Pakistan, was only slightly higher (1.32 per cent above 50) than in district as a whole 
(00.32) and somewhat lower than the Batala and Gurdaspur tehsils (5.07, 2.16 above 50 
percent respectively), awarded to India. The Pathankot tehsil had a lower percentage of 
Muslim population (38.89 per cent) and may partially justify its disposition, but hardly that of 
                                                 
36 Ibid., p. 187-88. 
37 Ibid., p. 189. 
38 Ibid., p. 190. 
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Batala and Gurdaspur tehsils. In Ferozepur, Radcliffe avoided the partition of the district (the 
contiguous Muslim majority tehsils Zira and Ferozepur with 65.3, 55.3 percent Muslim 
population—see Table-3), in order to award Ferozepur headworks to India.39 
  The rationality principle demands that if the irrigation factor was strong enough at 
Gurdaspur to vitiate the “contiguous majority” principle to the extent of partitioning a Muslim-
majority district and awarding not only the non-Muslim Pathankot tehsil but two clearly 
Muslim-majority tehsils to India, then logically the irrigation factor should also have prevailed 
at the  Ferozepur, at least to the extent of giving Pakistan control of the right hand portion of 
the headworks with the intake of the Dipalpur Canals. Such a step would have saved 
Pakistan from paying heavy economic and political costs. 
The Gurdaspur award assumed strategic importance for India when Kashmir’s Hindu 
Maharaja, Hari Singh, allegedly signed the instrument of accession to India at the end of 
October, 1947 and the Indian troops began moving into Kashmir through the Madhopur 
barrage-bridge via the Banihal Pass. “Possession of Gurdaspur and the Madhopur barrage-
bridge did contributed decisively to the Indian occupation of Jammu itself, and even of 
Poonch,”40 south of the Pir Panjal Range (see Map-9).  
The Indian manoeuvres, immediately after partition, towards Jammu Kashmir made it 
clear to the “well-informed” Pakistanis that the Gurdaspur award was intentionally made to 
provide India with access to Jammu-Kashmir. A possible counter-argument may term this 
linking of Gurdaspur award to the Kashmir situation as a post-facto reasoning, but the 
Pakistani belief makes strategic sense when one analyses it in the light of Realpolitik. 
Pakistani perception that Radcliffe was influenced by the Viceroy Mountbatten who himself 
was miffed at Jinnah’s refusal to invite him to serve as Governor General of Pakistan draws 
strength from the deliberate delay in the announcement of the award41, which was clearly 
Mountbatten’s responsibility. It draws considerable strength further from the “statement of 
June 3,”42 and the 8 August 1947 “Sketch-map43 story, “The Indian Independence Act of 18 
July 1947,”44 and the posting of the Muslim members of the Indian Civil Service in Gurdaspur 
prior to the Independence Day.45 
                                                 
39 Ibid., p. 190. 
40 Aloys Arthur Michel, op. cit., p. 191. 
41 The Award was made public on August 17, 1947. 
42 Gurdaspur was recognized as a Muslim-majority district in the June 3 statement “as preliminary step 
until the report of the Boundary Commission has been put into effect.” See Aloys Arthur Michel, op. 
cit., pp. 157, 192. 
43 Mosely recounts the story of the “rough sketch map” which was taken down over the telephone on 
August 8, 1947, and forwarded to Sir Evan Jenkins, showing not only the headworks but the towns of 
Ferozepur and Zira on the Pakistani side. See Mosley, Leonard, The Last Days of the British Raj (New 
York: Harcourt, Brace & World, and London, Widenfeld and Nicolson Limited, 1962), p. 230. 
44 Second schedule, “Districts-Gurdaspur & Ferozepur-provisionally included in the New Province of 
West Punjab,” quoted in Menon, V.P., The Integration of the Indian States (Calcutta: Orient 
Longmans, 1956), Appendix XI, p. 531. 
45 Aloys Arthur Michael, op. cit., p.192, states that the posting of Muslim civil servants may easily 
have been a well-intentioned administrative faux pas on the part of superior officers completely in 
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Map-9:  The Central Punjab, showing the relation of the Partition Line to the 
Muslim and Sikh population by Tehsil and to irrigation and railways 
systems (Source: Aloys Arthur Michel) 
 
 
                                                                                                                                            
ignorance of the Radcliffe Award. But this explanation will hardly assuage the feelings of those civil 
servants of Pakistan who actually ran the new Pakistan flag in Gurdaspur on August 15, proceeded to 
take over the administration, and then on August 17, with the publication of the Award, were sent 
packing and scurrying for the new border along with thousands of Muslims not only from Gurdaspur 
but from Hushiarpur, Jullundur, Kapurthala, and Amritsar as well. 
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 Michel argues that, “at any rate, under the Treaty both the Sutlej and the Ravi would 
have become Indian rivers, and the irrigation disadvantages of the Radcliffe Award, as for as 
Pakistan is concerned, will be submerged in the much larger operation of the Indus Basin 
Project.”46 He based his observation to settle Kashmir dispute by partitioning of Jammu-
Kashmir along communal lines, a reasonable solution47 also suggested by Pervaiz Iqbal 
Cheema. Michel recommends: “In that event, India will have a legitimate need for the 
connection with Jammu—areas east of the Chenab River, via Madhupur, and the Radcliffe 
Award will turnout to be logical after all.”48  
Michel’s recommendations are convincing when one considers the post-partition 
developments and the present situation in Kashmir. But pre-partition scenario was completely 
different and we can’t term the Radcliffe Award as logical in the given circumstances of 1947. 
At that time, the partition of the Kashmir State on “contiguous-majority areas” principle was 
absolutely out of question, because at that time Kashmir was a princely state and was not 
under Radcliff’s jurisdiction. Michel argues that the Gurdaspur Award inveterate to be 
“gerrymandered”, giving India access to Kashmir (Realpolitik) and one should resort to the 
“special devil” theory of the history. It draws strength further as Radcliffe himself termed it “an 
award, not a judgement,” responsible to generate a situation of permanent discord and 
confrontation in Indo-Pakistan relations.49  
The above long but precise analysis confirms that boundaries in the Indus basin were 
drawn on the basis of access to water resources and control of water infrastructures—river 
headworks.  
2.4 Population Density and Settlement Patterns 
The social fabric of pre-partition Punjab was characterised by a predominantly rural, 
highly dense in the cities, and multi-religious population.  The three major religious groups, 
namely, Muslims, Sikhs and Hindus had an ‘uneven juxtaposition’, and the farmer two had a 
life-style dependent directly upon agriculture. According to the  1941 Census of India, 
population density ranged from a low of 94 people per square mile in Mianwali district 
(northern Sindh Sagar Doab) to a high of 755 in Sialkot district (northern Rechna Doab), and 
in half the districts the density exceeded 350 people per square mile.50 The density generally 
decreased from east to west and from north to south, so that the areas with the greatest 
concentration were those closest to and most immediately affected by the partition line. About 
                                                 
46 Aloys Arthur Michel, op. cit., p. 193. 
47 Pervaiz Iqbal Cheema, “A Solution for Kashmir Dispute?” Regional Studies, Vol. IV, No. 4, 1986, 
pp. 9, 11. 
48 Aloys Arthur Michel, op. cit., p. 193. 
49 Ibid., p. 194. 
50 Census of India, The Punjab, 1941, Calcutta: Superintendent of Government Printing, cited by 
Rashid Ahmad Malik, Irrigation Development and Land Occupance in the Upper Indus Basin (Ph.D. 
thesis, Department of Geography, Indiana University, 1963), p. 144. 
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15 per cent of Punjab's population of 18,000,000 was urban and over one fourth of the latter 
or same three quarters of a million, lived in the old city of Lahore.51 
From a communal yardstick, in 1941 the majority of the Punjab population was 
comprised of Muslim community. The Muslims accounted for 53 percent of the population of 
Punjab, while the Sikhs were only 14.3 percent. The Sikh concentration was centred in and 
around Amritsar and especially in the areas southeast of that city. The majority of the rest 
were Hindus and were located in the eastern part of the province. Historically, Amritsar was 
homeland of the Sikhs, however, it is noteworthy that in no district did the Sikhs form even 
half of the population. 52 
At the time of partition, the socio-economic geography of Punjab was dominated by a 
life pattern in which priorities to water resources and irrigation system had evolved. For 
instance, the Upper Bari Doab Canal (UBDC) had first claim on the Ravi River, and the 
Sirhind Canal on the Sutlej.53 The UBDC system taps the Ravi on the Indian side of the 
cease-fire line, in the extreme southeast of Kashmir, and irrigates areas on both sides of what 
has become an international boundary. Further downstream, the Lower Bari Doab Canal 
(LBDC) also uses Ravi water for areas, now included in Pakistan. The river Sutlej is tapped 
by the Sirhind Canal in East Punjab and is used entirely in India, to its downstream the 
Dipalpur and other canals carry Sutlej water to Pakistan.54  
2.5 Climate and Water Supply 
The Indus basin is classified as arid or semi arid, except for its upper most area (see 
Map-10).55  The per annum precipitation may exceed sixty inches along the south-facing 
slopes of the Himalaya, but it decreases rapidly south-westwards, so that Lahore, some 25 
miles from the foothills, receives about twenty inches. The rainfall in the region of Pakistani 
Punjab is characteristically torrential and unreliable and this trend increases south-
westwards.56 
The Climatic condition of the region does not provide any uniform delineation 
between the plains of upper and lower Indus basin. There are climatic changes over this vast 
region but the variation over the 63 miles from Karachi to Thatta, indicates beginning of the 
change from coastal to an inland station. This is despite the fact that the climatic change 
which still receives some maritime modification, is much greater than that over the 61 miles 
from Thatta to Sukkur or over the 251 miles from Thatta to Hyderabad. In fact, in any given 
season, differences in temperature between Hyderabad and Lahore (693 miles apart) are 
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smaller than those between Thatta and Karachi.57 
Map-10: The Indus Basin: Prevalence of Aridity (Source: Michel, op. cit.) 
In any monsoonal region, differences in elevation are more significant than latitude 
especially within the first 20 miles from the sea .The plains of Indus are pretty much a climatic 
unit except in the coastal and sub-mountainous zones, because the gradient of the Indus 
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plains is less than one foot per mile. Of the Indus plains meteorological stations, Jacobabad, 
northwest of Sukkur, experiences the highest temperatures and the lowest average annual 
rainfall. But on an afternoon in June, when it may be 120F in Jacobabad, it is likely to be 110F 
or even 115F in both Hyderabad and Multan, and not much cooler in Faisalabad or Lahore. 
On the other hand, the winter differentials are greater and are reflected to some degree in the 
natural vegetation and cropping patterns. Light frosts are experienced in Lahore and 
occasionally even in Multan, though never in Hyderabad or Karachi. Winter rainfall is not 
unknown in Jacobabad, though it gets at least 3 of its 4 inches in the months of June, July 
and August.58 
Concerning the water supply system in the Indus basin, the British rulers, soon 
after colonizing the Subcontinent in 1857, started a study of the possibilities to irrigate arid 
land of the Indus Plains through the ‘Indus Rivers.’59
 
They conducted a detailed survey to 
explore the possibilities for the construction of dams, barrages, weirs, link-canals, perennial 
and non-perennial canals, across the rivers, in order to divert water towards arid lands of 
Punjab—‘British Punjab.’ The first British canal on the Indus Rivers (the Upper Bari Doab 
Canal—UBDC henceforth), started irrigation in 1861. The UBDC proved to be a good initiative 
to demonstrate the interest and capability of new rulers to do a lot for the welfare of the 
Punjabis. Michel describes that the British were aiming at, to “do something for irrigation” in 
order to improve the agricultural value, and thus the revenue-generating capacity of the lands. 
They also aimed at proving the excellence of European science above everything done 
earlier. Though, neither of these motives appears to have been the decisive influence upon 
the development of irrigation system, rather, there were two other motives that took 
precedence: “One of these was the fear of famine.”60 The economic motive was to pre-empt 
famine like that of 1837-38 which compelled the British to improve the Western Jumna Canal, 
and its memory was fresh in the Punjab even ten years later. The political motive, “...no doubt 
decisive one, was to give employment to the Sikh army Veterans.”61 This visible proof of the 
welfare of the Sikhs by the British, along with the relative ease of military movements along 
the new canal banks, undoubtedly contributed to the quiescence of the Punjab, especially of 
Sikhs during the war of independence 1857.62 
 The Western Jumna Canal was producing severe water-logging and salinity. On the 
other, the UBDC was eroding its bed, so a proper distribution system became inevitable. To 
solve these problems Sirhind Canal was constructed and opened in 1882. 
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 In the meantime resulting from the improvements in living conditions, average rate of 
growth in population of the Punjab province had gone to 8.2 per cent.63 Under these 
conditions, each passing year it increased the danger of famine unless the agricultural 
production could be increased at least as rapidly as growing rate of population. Thus the 
British had to develop the irrigation system of the fertile province of Punjab on priority basis, 
to pre-empt any adverse law and order situation. They installed Upper Sutlej Canal-USC, 
including Lower Sohag and Para Canals; Lower Chenab Canal-LCC; Sidhnai Canal and 
Lower Jhelum Canal-LJC, as Principal Productive Irrigation Works to the end of March 
1903.64 In this way, the British had achieved all the political, economic and the engineering 
breakthroughs. 
 The Mangla headworks did involve compromising any idea of complete British control 
because the intake and first 24 kms of the canal had to be placed in a princely-sate Jammu-
Kashmir. But the advantages of the Triple Canals Project [Upper Jhelum Canal (UJC), Upper 
Chenab Canal (UCC) and LBDC] were so great that the problem of political control was 
overlooked. The Triple Canal Project (TCP) was sanctioned in 1905 and the construction of 
UJC, UCC and LBDC was accomplished during 1907-14. 65 
In the meantime, many personnel of the Irrigation Branch were called to serve in the 
wake of World War-I between the completion of the Triple Canal Project and the 
commencement of the next integrated project in the Indus Basin, on the Sutlej. Thus after the 
war a long discussions—among the Government of India (the Punjab Government), the state 
of Bikaner and Bahawalpur—led to an agreement at Delhi in 1919 generally known as 
”Tripartite Agreement.”66 The Sutlej Valley Project (SVP) was sanctioned under this 
agreement in 1921 which called for the construction of four barrages (headworks) namely 
Ferozepur, Suleimanki, Islam and Panjnad along with eleven canals.  
 The Sutlej Valley Project was the last huge engineering work done by the British 
Government in India before Partition of the Subcontinent. 
 Michel describes that the years 1933-35 marked another turning point in the irrigation 
of the Indus Basin, as the extension of irrigation in the Doabs between the Punjab Rivers, or 
in the land south of the Sutlej, would require either upstream storage or diversion from the 
Indus across the Sindh Sagar (Thal) Doab. Conversion from the Indus required the consent of 
Sindh Government. Sindh authorities in 1932 had just opened the first barrage—the Lloyd 
Barrage at Sukkur and its first perennial canal system. It was not in a mood to make any new 
commitment. Thus, Sindh, whose interests, at that time, were still represented by the Bombay 
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Government, took strong exception to any withdrawals, or any changes in the river regimes, 
that might affect its inundation canals above or below the Sukkur command.67 
 Compelled by the adverse political developments in the subcontinent, the government 
of India was not interested to indulge in such a problem.68 Michel explains that the 
Government of India Act of 1935, which took effect in 1937, made Sindh a separate province 
and greatly increased provincial autonomy. The departments of irrigation and electricity had 
come under provincial jurisdiction. The interference of the central Government was subject to 
the formal complaint by a province against any other province regarding interference with 
their water supplies.69  
 The Punjab Government realised that the flowing water in the rivers goes unused as 
it flows down into the Arabian Sea before the maturing season of Rabi crops and the sowing 
season of Kharif crops. While shortage of water, on the other hand, was adversely affecting 
the agricultural production. The canals network was useless without proper upstream storage. 
The Punjab Government formally requested the Centre to locate sites for dams to store water 
for irrigation during lean months and to produce electricity as well. The British Government 
started locating probable dam sites on the river Indus and all its tributaries.70 
 Under Mr. Foy, the first project circle was opened in Punjab which later was 
expanded to a High Dam Authority, with Chief Engineer Mr. Khosla as its Chairman. The 
project circle located a number of dam sites from the river Sutlej to the Indus, wherever the 
rivers crossed through narrow gorges and had a vast storage capacity upstream of the 
ravine.71  
 The first proposed dam had to be on the convergence of the rivers Indus and Soan. 
The High Dam Authority called it Makhed Dam—now famous as Kalabagh Dam, with a 
storage capacity of 15 MAF.72 The second dam on the Indus was proposed at Tarbela. It 
offered 9.3 MAF storage along with an off-channel storage capacity of 30 MAF.73 
 Two more dam sites were located on the river Jhelum; first on the mouth of Wullar 
Lake; and second at Mangla near Mirpur. While on the river Chenab, the proposed dam site 
was located at Dhiangarh.74 On the Sutlej a gorge had already been under study since 1907 
at Rupar. The second dam site at Sutlej was proposed at Bhakra with 8 MAF storage 
capacities.75 It was further decided to connect the waters of the Chenab and Ravi by 
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constructing a tunnel under Marhu Pass, from where it could be distributed to Sutlej Valley 
Canals through the construction of Madhapur-Beas link.76 
 It was at this juncture of the history that Indian subcontinent was partitioned resulting 
in the splitting of Punjab into West and East Punjab. The proposals to meet the deficiency of 
Sutlej Valley Canals were being framed. The West Punjab was given to Pakistan while East 
Punjab was awarded to India. Kashmir was held by India. Almost all the catchment areas of 
the Indus Rivers were gone under the Indian control which threatened the Pakistan’s 
interests. 
The conflict factor related to climatic variation is shown in Figure-1 highlighting the 
seasonal variability of the discharges of the Punjab rivers as they leave the foothills, that is, 
before the withdrawal of water for irrigation. The marked seasonality reflects the monsoon 
precipitation pattern. In the case of the Jhelum the maximum monthly flow is ten times the 
minimum monthly flow, and the equivalent ratios for the other rivers are even larger: Ravi 12, 
Sutlej 13, Beas 15, and Chenab 16.  
Figure-1: Punjab Rivers Discharges: Monthly Averages, average of 40 year before 1947 
(Source: Fowler, op. cit.) 
 
Melting of snow is the main source of water between the months of March and June, 
just prior to the first monsoon rains. The Figure-2 compares the annual and seasonal 
discharges, and the preponderance of summer flow is again evident. It should be noted that 
very large quantities of water are involved as annual discharge of the five rivers combined 
was about 97 billion cubic meters (bcm). 
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Figure-2:  Indus Rivers Discharges: Annual and Seasonal Averages (data adopted from 
Fowler) 
 
Malik points out that the major drawback faced by the Punjab regimes was the 
adverse timings of need and availability of the waters. The need for water was greatest from 
late August to early December because of the maturing of the Kharif (autumn-harvested) 
crops and the sowing of Rabi (spring-harvested) crops. Whereas the rivers were rapidly falling 
during this season and thus making the Rabi demand especially hard to meet. Towards the 
end of April the demand for water starts decreasing, while the rivers now start rising. Before 
partition, weirs and canals partially equalized supply and demand, but not entirely, since no 
reservoir canals existed at the time. There was a mounting need for the large-scale storage 
projects, and this need also accentuated the riparian conflict between India and Pakistan. 
Since the water conflict arose immediately following partition, a summary of the pre-partition 
canal system will be necessary before the other factors are considered. During the almost 
ninety years of the British government's presence in Punjab (1859-1947), some twelve million 
acres of previously unproductive land was brought under cultivation and was actively 
settled.77 
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Map-11: Canal Network in Punjab at the time of Partition, 1947 
Source: Mushtaqur Rahman, Divided Kashmir, op. cit. 
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 The main canals at the time of partition are shown in Map-11 above and may be 
conveniently categorized as follows.78 
1. The Sirhind Canal takes water from the Sutlej at Rupar and irrigates lands to the 
southeast of the river. 
2. The Upper Bari Doab Canal takes water from the Ravi at Madhopur and irrigates the 
northern part of the Bari Doab. 
3. The Lower Chenab Canal takes water from the Chenab at Khanki and irrigates the 
southern part of the Rechna Doab. 
4. The Lower Jhelum Canal takes water from the Jhelum at Rasul and irrigates the 
southern part of the Jech Doab. 
5. The Triple Canals Project involves the waters of three rivers. The Upper Chenab 
Canal takes water from the Chenab at Merala [sic] to parts of northern Rechna Doab. 
The main canal crosses the Ravi by an aqueduct at Balloki and becomes the Lower 
Bari Doab Canal. This was done because previous canals had virtually exhausted the 
Ravi and Sutlej waters, leaving the lower Bari Doab un-reclaimed. However, the 
Upper Chenab Canal would take so much water from the Chenab River that the 
supply of the already existing lower Chenab Canal would be seriously diminished. 
Hence the Upper Jhelum Canal was conceived to bring water from the Jhelum at 
Mangla to the Chenab at Khanki and thus replenish the Lower Chenab Canal. At the 
same time the Upper Jhelum Canal provides water for irrigating the upper Jech Doab. 
6. Other canals including Headworks at Ferozepur, Sulaimanki, and Islam, all on the 
Sutlej, irrigate lands on both sides of that river. A barrage at Trimmu, just below the 
confluence of the Jhelum and Chenab, irrigates part of the south-eastern Sindh Sagar 
Doab to the west via Ranpur Canal plus the extreme southern portion of the Rechna 
Doab. The main function is performed by the Haveli Canal, which also carries water 
to the Sidhnai Barrage on the lower Ravi to help supply the Sidhnai Canal in south-
western Bari Doab. There is also a barrage on the Panjnad, just below the Trimmu-
Sutlej confluence, which irrigates a narrow strip along the Panjnad's eastern bank. 
2.6 Domestic Scenario and External Relations 
According to the Indian Independence Act 1947, legal understanding was that the 
treaty obligations relating to territories contained in the Dominion of India and Pakistan would 
be obligatory only in relation to a third state and did not include bilateral Indo-Pakistani 
relations. The question was whether two states which formerly were part of the same legal 
entity have obligations to each other? Nijim notes that Pakistan’s membership to the UN was 
also a similar question. India’s membership was kept continuing while Pakistan had to apply 
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for the consideration.79 Consequently, India invoked the principle of absolute territorial 
sovereignty relating to its claims over the international rivers flowing through its land. A new 
status quo had emerged. The relevant matter was the question of state succession.  
Since the Indian Independence Act included nothing about the status of the rivers and 
canals, a standstill agreement was concluded between provincial governments of Indian and 
Pakistani Punjab on 18 December 1947, to be terminated on 31 March 1948 with the end of 
the fiscal year in both countries, subject to further extension. Meanwhile, bilateral relations 
were further strained as the ongoing conflict over Jammu and Kashmir took a new turn since 
India airlifted its troops there (detailed description is given in the next chapter) on 26 October 
1947, in an effort to capture the princely state .80 
Consequently, no negotiations regarding water conflict were held or even attempted. 
India on 1 April 1948, cut-off the flow of water to Pakistan from the Upper Bari Doab and 
Dipalpur canals systems (see Map-11 above). The intended effect of this action was to 1) 
deprive the West Punjab of irrigation water at the critical time of sowing of the Kharif crops; 2) 
deny Lahore of its prime source of municipal water, and 3) assert propriety rights over the 
power supply from a hydroelectric plant on the upper Beas.81  
The apparent reason attached to the termination of water flow was Indian urge to 
bring more lands, in East Punjab, under cultivation but at the same time it feared that if the 
status quo was maintained a precedent would be established which Pakistan might later 
invoke as a right. Another possible Indian intention might have been forcing Pakistan to 
withdraw its claims over Kashmir territory. 
India's action brought quick results. On 24 April the Prime Minister of Pakistan 
proposed a conference to his Indian counterpart in order to address the issue and asked him 
to restore the flow of water which was accepted by the latter. On 1st May the Pakistani 
premier telegraphed his Indian counterpart: "...meanwhile thank you for all trouble you took in 
getting water supply restarted."82 Three days later, on 4 May 1948, an interim Agreement (see 
Appendix 1) was signed in New Delhi, which immediately became controversial as it was 
sufficiently ambiguous. 
In the first paragraph, each side had interpreted the Arbitral Award to favour its 
respective argument. It was an understandable divergence since the Award was not specific 
in this respect. Somewhat vaguely but Pakistan cited “international law and equity" to 
strengthen its case. Even though Pakistan disputed India's "right to the levy of seigniorage 
charges for water" (transportation changes for the maintenance of canals, see paragraph 2), 
but implicitly gave sanction to this right by signing the Agreement. Similarly, Pakistan also 
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agreed that India's rights in the matter "were not to be prejudiced by India's assurance not to 
terminate suddenly the flow of water” (paragraph 3). In the same paragraph, Pakistan 
recognized India's ‘anxiety’ to further develop East Punjab.  
It is noteworthy that India's assurance of not interrupting the water flow without giving 
Pakistan time to tap ‘alternative sources’ did not specify a deadline by which Pakistan could 
do so. The paragraph 4 conspicuously ignored the legal aspect, here Pakistan conceded, "in 
a practical spirit," that India might eventually utilise all the waters in the canals, since neither a 
time limit nor a schedule was provided for the "progressively diminishing its supply." One 
could also query the meaning of a "reasonable time." It would be possible to understand by 
this paragraph that Pakistan might in the future raise "the question of law." By "immediately" 
paying East Punjab for the water, as described in paragraph 6, Pakistan permitted the 
interpretation it acknowledged that India's upper riparian position imposed no obligation on 
India towards Pakistan. This was of course an "ad hoc" arrangement which Pakistan might 
revoke in the future, though once more the time factor was indefinite. Paragraph 6 suggests 
that the Agreement was intended to mark time, with details, including legal implications, to be 
worked out later (for further details see Appendix 1). 83 
In sum, there was hardly any declaration of riparian rights in favour of Pakistan 
notwithstanding later writings by Pakistani sympathizers. The Agreement needs to be 
evaluated in the context of prevailing conditions of that time. Being the lower riparian, 
Pakistan was forced to request for the restoration of water. Short of war declaration, Pakistan 
held an unfavourable bargaining position. This accounts for the haste with which the 
Agreement was signed and turned to be totally unfavourable for Pakistan. From Pakistan's 
point of view, there was no specific provision as to when negotiations should be resumed or 
for how long the Agreement was to be binding. 
At this critical juncture, Pakistan also mobilised its forces in Kashmir and a formal 
India-Pakistan war started in May 1948. A detailed description has been provided in the next 
chapter while highlighting the linkages between water and war in India-Pakistan relations. 
2.7 Summary: The Ranking of Factors by Pair Comparison 
The Indus waters dispute arose from a combination of factors, which contributed 
invariably to the conflict potential. Table-4 below shows a ranking of the factors in relation to 
their contribution to the conflict. It is important to note that the variables are measured 
qualitatively as most of them are difficult to measure quantitatively. 
The geographical factor of the superimposed boundary in Punjab, coupled with 
surface features, ranks as the highest. If India had not been awarded the Muslim-majority 
areas of Punjab, containing the Madhopur and Ferozepur headworks, a water dispute of such 
intensity would never have arisen between India and Pakistan. 
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The relative location and surface characteristics of the Kashmir territory, containing 
the crucial catchment areas of all the rivers of the Indus system, coupled with the absolute 
dependence of Pakistan on the water resources, rank highly on the conflict potential scale, 
since they encouraged India to take control of the headwaters. In capturing the specific parts 
of the Kashmir territory (discussed in detail in the next chapter) India gained both upper 
riparian status, and a permanent means of conflict generation to browbeat Pakistan.  
The domestic scenario is related, in part, to the factor of population density, and, in 
the case of Pakistan, ranks high as a conflict factor, since the settlement of Muslim migrants 
from East Punjab was an uphill task. The Indian action of cutting off the irrigation waters to 
Pakistan created a famine situation and disrupted the already fragile bilateral relations.  
Land use patterns in the Indus Basin solely depend upon river water, owing to the 
predominantly arid nature of this agrarian region. Any development plans involving upstream 
water resources possess a high potential for conflict. The factor of climate and water supply 
does not rank particularly highly, since, at the time the dispute began in 1947, an extensive 
irrigation system had already been in place for a long and the river water supply was not 
deemed inadequate. However, this situation has changed over the time as water scarcity has 
increased in the system. The surface features in the Kashmir territory certainly provide an 
ease of use, thus one would expect this factor to rank far more highly.  
External Pressures are low on this list; in fact, in this case, they may be regarded as a 
positive contributory factor towards conflict resolution / management continuum. 
 
-----------------------------------------------Table 4------------------------------------------------- 
The Indus Basin: Conflict Factor Ranking 
1. Superimposed Boundaries and Surface Features   
2. Relative Location and Land Use Patterns 
3. Population Density/Settlement and Domestic Scenarios 
4. Climate and Water Supply 
5. External Relations 
 
In conjunction with the ceasefire line, the surface features and location of the Kashmir 
territory, bounded in the catchment areas of the Indus River System, constitute a ‘jugular vein’ 
and ‘life-line’ to Pakistan. The jugular vein signifies the physical security of the state and the 
life-line alludes to the economic supply-line to the agrarian economy of Pakistan. In other 
words, the Kashmir and Indus waters disputes were/are closely interrelated due to the 
geographical characteristics of the Kashmir territory. Thus possess very clear linkages with 
political thinking, strategic planning and warfare between India and Pakistan. The next 
chapter focuses exclusively on this aspect of India-Pakistan conflict. 
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Chapter 3 
WATER-WAR LINKAGES 
IN THE INDUS BASIN 
 
This chapter highlights the historical role of the Indus waters in political thinking, strategic 
planning, and warfare between India and Pakistan. The role of both superimposed boundaries and 
the surface features of the territory under dispute are analysed. 
While emphasising the inter-twined nature of the Kashmir and Indus disputes and to highlight 
their role in the first war between India and Pakistan the following questions are addressed: (1) Have 
river waters ever been used as a military, political, or economic weapon by the upper riparian? (2) 
During wars between the rival riparian states, has territory been explicitly captured because of its 
access to water sources? (3) Is the occupation and retaining of Kashmir territory by India and 
Pakistan linked to the “hydro-strategic” nature of its geography and can the conflict be considered 
resource-based?  
3.1 The Pre-Partition Planning of the Indian Leadership 
The profound influence of Kautilya Chanakya on the Indian political thought has gained 
widespread recognition. There is a long list of works on Kautilya Chanakya1 where he has been 
declared as Machiavelli of India. Jawaharlal Nehru, one of the founding fathers of India, in his 
autobiography “Discovery of India” states:  
Chanakya has been called the Indian Machiavelli, and to some extent the comparison is 
justified. But he was a much bigger person in every way, greater in intellect and action…. 
Bold and scheming, proud and revengeful, never forgetting a slight, never forgetting his 
purpose, availing himself of every device in his hands…and accomplished his 
purpose…Brahmin-like, to a life of contemplation….There was hardly anything Chanakya 
would have refrained from doing to achieve his purpose; he was unscrupulous enough yet 
he was wise enough….Long before Clausewitz, he is reported to have said that war is only a 
continuation of state policy by other means. But, he adds, war must always serve the larger 
ends of policy and not become an end in itself; the statesman’s objective must always be the 
betterment of the state as a result of war.2  
Nehru’s love for Kautilya was best stated by himself when he became president of the Indian 
National Congress, in an article published in Modern Review Calcutta he used his name as 
Chanakya.3   
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Appadorai, in his book, Indian Political Thinking: Through the Ages, highlights in particular 
the impact of Kautiliyan geopolitical guidelines on Indian political thinking. According to Kautilya, the 
following geopolitical aspects are of particular import to a state:  
…strong positions in the centre and at the frontiers, capable of sustaining itself…easy to 
protect, providing excellent [means of] livelihood, malevolent towards enemies…endowed 
with agricultural land…not depending on rain water, provided with water-routes [rivers] and 
land-routes [rail, roads]…are the excellences of a country.4 (emphasis in original, italics mine). 
 The India’s first prime minister, Jawaharlal Nehru, following the Kautiliyan geopolitical thinking 
pursued the strategies to secure for his country those river headworks and the catchment territories of 
the Indus river system that were located in predominantly Muslim majority areas and were believed to 
be part of newly emerging Pakistan.  
 Penderel Moon in his book Divide and Quit narrates an eye witness account highlighting 
intentions of the Indian leadership to acquire control of river headworks in the British Punjab. 
Referring to a meeting at the end of June 1947 at Lahore, he states: 
The line of the river Beas was then discussed as a possible boundary. I pointed out that this 
would give Pakistan the whole of the Amritsar district, which was quite unjustified on a 
population basis. Moreover, it was hardly credible that the city of Amritsar, the main centre of 
Sikh pilgrimage, would be handed over to Pakistan. I suggested that our best course was to 
press for a boundary based on Muslim and non-Muslim majority areas with such minor 
adjustments as might be to our advantage and which we could reasonably claim. I mentioned 
particularly the importance of getting control of the Ferozepur headworks and the headworks 
at Madhopur near Pathankot…. I believe a decision was ultimately taken more or less on 
these lines.5 
 Nehru’s biographer, M. J. Akbar, in his book, Nehru: The Making of India, describes, in the 
context of the first Pakistan-India war over Kashmir, Nehru’s attachment to Kashmir’s hills, valleys, 
glaciers, lakes and rivers and the political strategies and tactics he pursued to acquire control of them. 
Referring to his first visit to Kashmir in 1917, and the descriptions of Nehru’s second stay as a guest of 
Sheikh Abdullah accompanying the Frontier Gandhi, Khan Abdul Ghaffar Khan, in the first fortnight of 
June 1940, the following passage was published in the National Herald in July 1940: 
I wandered about like one possessed and drunk with beauty, and the intoxication of it filled my 
mind. Like some supremely beautiful woman, whose beauty is almost impersonal and above 
human desire, such was Kashmir in all its feminine beauty of river and valley and lake and 
graceful trees. And then another aspect of this magic beauty would come to view, a masculine 
one, of hard mountains and precipices, and snow-capped peaks and glaciers, and cruel and 
fierce torrents rushing down [life-giving Indus rivers flowing down-stream] to the valleys 
                                            
4
  Appadorai, A., Indian Political Thinking: Through the Ages (New Delhi: Khama Publishers, 1992), pp. 52-53. 
5
 Penderel Moon, Divide and Quit: An Eyewitness Account of the Partition of India (Oxford: Oxford University 
Press, reprint 1998), pp. 90-91. 
3: Water-War Linkages in the Indus Basin 
 
83 
below,6 (emphasis added). 
 M. J. Akbar relates how, as part of his political strategy, Jawaharlal Nehru further 
consolidated his friendship with an incumbent Kashmiri leader Sheikh Abdullah. Nehru took care to 
cultivate the relationship, since the Sheikh “had burst into prominence during a popular insurrection 
against the oppressive rule of Hari Sigh, the Dogra Maharaja of Kashmir, in July 1931 and was soon 
the dominant leader of the major local political party, the Muslim Conference.”7 Akbar claims further 
that the Sheikh’s main qualification was not that “…he stood up to this tyranny, but that he did so on a 
nationalist platform….when Muslim leaders began to edge towards the temptations of separatists 
politics….Nehru was most impressed by this and befriended the younger man, inviting him over to stay 
at Anand Bhavan.”8  
Nehru publicly supported the Sheikh’s politics. In June 1936, for instance, he sent a message 
to the Sheikh (published in the Hindustan Times of 30 June 1936) saying that:  
“I am very glad that you and other friends are trying to bring about unity amongst the Hindus 
and Mussalmans of Kashmir and spreading nationalistic ideas among them as well as the 
message of political, economic and social reform…. I wish your success in the work you are 
doing and through you I wish to convey my hearty greetings to the people of my homeland.”9  
M. J. Akbar argues that Sheikh Abdullah’s decision to change the name of his party from the 
Muslim Conference to the All-India Jammu and Kashmir National Conference was a consequence of 
this support. Nehru noted this in his articles written for the Herald, following his Kashmir visit:  
Sheikh Muhammad Abdullah was a real leader of the people, beloved of them, and with vision 
which looked ahead and did not lose itself in the petty conflicts of the moment. He was the 
founder and initiator of the movement. At first it began on communal lines and became 
entangled in many unfortunate occurrences. But Sheikh Abdullah pulled it out of these ruts 
and had the courage and statesmanship to steer it out of the narrow waters of communalism 
into the broad sea of nationalism …. It was a remarkable feat for any person to have brought 
about this political awakening among the poverty-stricken and helpless people of Kashmir.10  
 M.J. Akbar explains how Nehru was prescient enough to achieve his cherished goals. On 17 
May 1947, when the final touches were being added to the draft announcement on the transfer of 
power, the founding father of Pakistan, Mohammad Ali Jinnah, repeated the well-known Rahmat Ali 
anagram to the Viceroy. The ‘K’ in PAKISTAN stood for Kashmir, he explained. Both Gandhi and 
Nehru were unwilling to surrender Kashmir to the Muslim League so easily. They believed that the 
accession of an overwhelmingly Muslim state to India would destroy the politics of the Muslim League 
and bring the Subcontinent back to the politics of secularism. In Nehru’s opinion, accession to India 
was technically possible if the Hindu Maharaja of Kashmir signed an agreement in India’s favour. 
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However, Gandhi firmly believed it was up to the ryot [peasant] to decide the future of the state, not 
the ruler. The key, then, was in the Sheikh’s hands. While the Maharaja dithered and attempted to 
hold onto his rule in a post-British future, the man who dreamed of bringing Kashmir to India, Sheikh 
Abdullah, lay rotting in Hari Singh’s gaol. “It was this more than anything else which frustrated Nehru in 
the critical months of June, July, August and September, 1947 “11 (italics added). 
M.J. Akbar believes that “not only Nehru’s mind was extremely clear about Kashmir but he 
had the foresight to plan far ahead. This foresight was to keep strategic part of Kashmir in India. 
During the discussions in Simla in May 1947, Nehru insisted (and got his way) that whatever the 
eventual nature of the post-partition boundaries might be, the road link to the Kashmir valley through 
Gurdaspur [land link to Kashmir by a metalled road over the bridge of the Gurdaspur headworks] 
would have been kept in Delhi’s control (emphasis in original, italics mine).”12 According to M. J. 
Akbar, “Gurdaspur was a district with overwhelmingly Muslim population which could easily have 
been awarded to Pakistan, in doing so India would have no land-link to Kashmir Valley, which was 
meant giving Kashmir to Pakistan.”13 Nehru was also worried that the Maharaja might make a pre-
emptive announcement and declare independence. He was in close contact with Abdullah and knew 
that the Sheikh would declare himself for accession to India if given the necessary concessions, and 
thus feared a rash move by the Maharaja might undermine this possibility. As a result, “on Nehru’s 
and Gandhi’s urging, Mountbatten sent instructions to the British Resident in Kashmir on 9 June 1947 
to use his ‘verbal influence’ to ensure that Hari Singh did not say or do anything until Mountbatten 
had met him.”14 Under the pretext of a long-standing personal invitation, the Mountbattens (Mr. and 
Mrs.) reached Srinagar on 18 June for a working holiday, scheduled to last until the morning of 23 
June. Mountbatten’s advice to Hari Singh was: “say nothing, sign the standstill agreement with both 
India and Pakistan and then join one of the two at least for the purpose of defence, communications 
and external affairs, basing this final choice on the will of the people.“15 
On 27 June, in his personal report to London, Mountbatten conveyed that Nehru was 
‘pathological’ on the subject and demanded the immediate release of Sheikh Abdullah so that he 
could put a stop to the popular uprising in Kashmir. Sheikh Abdullah was freed and “Hari Singh kept 
his word given to Mountbatten”.16 “Two days before Paramountcy lapsed the ruler of J&K [Jammu 
and Kashmir] sought a ‘Standstill Agreement’ with both India and Pakistan. Pakistan agreed while 
India sought this to be discussed before any commitment.”17 
 Nehru wrote to Patel: 
It is obvious to me the approach of winter is going to cut off Kashmir from the rest of India. The 
only normal route then is via the Jhelum valley. The Jammu route can hardly be used during 
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winter and air traffic is also suspended. Therefore, it is important that something should be 
done before these winter conditions set in. This means practically by the end of October or, at 
the latest, the beginning of November. Indeed, air traffic will be difficult even before that. I 
understand that the Pakistan strategy is to infiltrate into Kashmir now and to take some big 
action as soon as Kashmir is more or less isolated because of the coming winter. Whether this 
strategy succeeds or not depends upon the forces opposed to it. I rather doubt if the Maharaja 
and his state forces can meet the situation by themselves and without popular help. Obviously 
the only major group that can side with them is the National Conference under Sheikh 
Abdullah’s leadership. If by any chance that is hostile or even passive, then the Maharaja and 
his Government become isolated and the Pakistani people will have a relatively free field.18  
 Nehru convinced Patel to pressurise Hari Singh into releasing Abdullah. M. J. Akbar quotes 
Nehru as saying:  
I hope you will be able to take some action in this matter to force the pace and to turn events 
in the right direction. We have definitely a great asset in the National Conference provided it is 
properly handled. It would be a pity to lose this. Sheikh Abdullah has repeatedly given 
assurances of wishing to co-operate and of being opposed to Pakistan; also to abide by my 
advice. I would again add that time is [of] the essence of the business and things must be 
done in a way so as to bring about the accession of Kashmir to the Indian Union as rapidly as 
possible with the co-operation of Sheikh Abdullah.19  
3.2 The Kashmir War and the Use of Water as a Weapon 
The popular mass movement for the accession of Kashmir to Pakistan began in the Poonch 
and Mirpur areas immediately after the Partition Plan of 3 June 1947, and engulfed the whole of the 
Kashmir state within weeks. Maharaja Hari Singh let loose atrocities against the Muslims, resulting in 
a widespread loss of lives. On learning the details of the atrocities committed by the Maharaja forces 
against Muslims in the Poonch area, the tribal religious leaders of the NWFP (North West Frontier 
Province of Pakistan) proclaimed a holy war, and a lashkar (a war party) of roughly 2,000 men, 
consisting mainly of Afridis and Mahsuds tribes, set off for Kashmir on 19 October 1947.20 
Sir George Cunningham, then Governor of the NWFP, communicated in a private letter to the 
chief of the Indian Army General R. M. M. Lockhart that “some people up here have been acting very 
foolishly. You will know what I mean by the time this letter reaches you.”21  
M. J. Akbar confirms that “Nehru got news of this ‘invasion’ before Mountbatten. He was 
hosting a dinner for the Governor-General and Foreign Minister of Siam (now Thailand) on the 
evening of Friday 24 October when he took Mountbatten aside for a moment and told him. 
Consequently, Mountbatten summoned a meeting of the Defence Committee for eleven o’clock the 
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next morning.”22 
M. J. Akbar provides details of the emergency meeting which also gives an overview of the 
situation as: 
Two historic decisions were taken that day. First, orders were issued to prepare an immediate 
airlift of Indian troops to Srinagar….On the political side, Nehru said, the immediate 
requirement was cooperation between Hari Singh and Abdullah and creation of a common 
resistance. Mountbatten suggested an immediate temporary accession to India to legitimize 
the presence of the army in Kashmir; would be ratified later by ascertaining the will of the 
people. Nehru and Patel both were firm that they would send the army into Kashmir whether 
the dithering Hari Singh formally requested it or not. No final decision on accession was 
taken, but V. P. Menon was directed to fly to Kashmir and talk to Hari Singh….When Menon 
reached the palace he found a panic-stricken Hari Singh preparing to flee. Hari Singh told 
Menon he would now do anything Delhi asked to save his family and throne.  
On Sunday morning [25 Oct.] the Defence Committee took stock of the military and political 
situation. The commanders were worried about the price the troops would have to pay if the 
local population, which was Muslims, proved to be hostile. Nehru guaranteed that the troops 
would find them on their side, because the Sheikh was on their side. 
At first light on the morning of Monday 27 October, Operation JAK commenced. One after 
another, more than a hundred aeroplanes, both civilian and of the Royal Indian Air Force, 
droned out of the Delhi airport, ferrying equipment, six days of rations and troops of the 1st 
Battalion of the Sikh regiment,  which had been posted near Delhi at Gurgaon. By nightfall 
329 men were in Srinagar under the command of Lieutenant Colonel Ranjit Rai. When the 
troops landed, the tardy and sated raiders were about two hours away. Two companies, led 
by Lieutenant-Colonel Rai himself, set off immediately towards Baramulla to hold them. While 
the rest set up the defences at the airport. The Indians established a bridgehead on the road 
about seventeen miles from the city, which halted the raiders and eventually saved Srinagar. 
In the meantime, a force of armoured car raced up through the Gurdaspur road, crossed the 
Ravi by a pontoon bridge, sped through the Banihal pass and linked up with Rai’s units in 
remarkable time. By the end of October three more battalions had reached Srinagar. The 
initiative shifted; the raiders were now falling back.23 
By 8 November 1947 Baramulla was captured by the Indian troops and small pockets of 
tribals were pushed back to Muzaffarabad.24  
On the second front, near the Poonch, Mirpur and Jammu regions, the fighting continued for 
months. The Indian forces exerted great force in order to capture the Mangla Headworks in the 
Mirpur district over the Jhelum river and the Marala Headworks over the Chenab river. The tribal 
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warriors contained them and stopped their march towards Mirpur. On failing to capture the 
headworks in the early hours of 1 April 1948, India cut off the river water supply to Pakistan from the 
Ferozepor and Madhopur headworks. In April 1948, Pakistan realised that India was planning to 
capture the headwaters of all crucial rivers flowing into Pakistan from Jammu and Kashmir, Himachal 
Pradesh, and the territory of East Punjab, and acknowledged its extreme vulnerability vis-à-vis India 
in terms of its irrigation life-line. As a result, Pakistan’s trust in India evaporated once and for all, 
since April 1948 saw a time when Pakistan was already facing an acute shortage of food with millions 
of Muslim migrants streaming into Pakistan and food was growing acutely deficient. Moreover, the 
timing of the Indian action proved devastating, since the crops maturing in the fields were in dire need 
of a last round of watering, while irrigation water was also required for the sowing of the next crop. 
This loss of two crops in a year had enormous implications. The cutting-off of the river waters, which 
was never an issue at the time of Partition, thus left a traumatic legacy to the people of Pakistan. 
In May 1948, Pakistan also mobilised its forces for defence and strengthened the positions of 
the tribals who were keeping the Indian troops at bay. India took the issue to the UN and both parties 
accepted the UNSC resolution to institute a plebiscite in Kashmir which would allow the people to 
decide their own destiny and join either India or Pakistan. The acceptance of the UNSC plebiscite 
portrayed the Kashmir issue to be purely political and a question of self-determination of the people 
of Kashmir. Obviously, the princely state of Kashmir was/is a Muslim majority state and the people of 
Kashmir were/are agitating against the Indian occupation and the atrocities being committed at that 
time by Indian troops.  
Pervaiz Iqbal Cheema confirms in his book, Pakistan’s Defence Policy, that although troubles 
had been going on in Kashmir ever since the Maharaja initiated a systematic campaign of Muslim 
persecution in 1947, Pakistani forces did not enter Kashmir territory until early May in 1948.25 The 
decision to despatch Pakistani troops to Kashmir was necessitated by three major considerations. 
Firstly, the then Indian defence minister openly declared his intention to the Constituent Assembly 
that India would soon begin its spring offensive in clearing out what he referred to as ‘raiders’ from 
Kashmir.26 Secondly, General Douglas Gracey, the Commander-in-Chief of the Pakistani forces 
(1947-49), submitted a report on 20 April 1948, in which he emphasised the urgent need to contain 
the Indian forces along the general line of Uri-Poonch-Noshera, for security reasons.27 Thirdly, the 
Pakistani government also seriously considered the threats India’s military offensive could pose to 
the Mangla Headworks which controlled and supplied water from the river through the Upper Jhelum 
Canal.28 Since India had already shut off the water from the headworks on Sutlej and Ravi on 1 April 
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1948, the perceived threat from the Mangla acquired alarming proportions29.  
Michel, in his book, The Indus Rivers, also revealed the same fact saying: 
“Pakistan must have realised this from the start and, it may not be entirely a coincidence that 
the formal commitment of Pakistani forces to the Kashmir struggle came in May 1948, one 
month after India had cut off supplies from Madhopur and Ferozepur [headworks]. Of course, 
many other factors played a part, but the timing is suggestive of the degree to which the 
Kashmir Dispute and the Indus Waters Dispute were intertwined.”30 
Mushtaqur Rahman, referring to David E. Lilienthal’s (former head of the Tennessee Valley 
Authority of the United States and the US Atomic Energy Commission) visit to India in February 1951, 
has stated that: “To prepare for his trip, Lilienthal consulted a number of people, including the US 
Secretary of State, Dean Acheson, Nehru’s sister, India’s ambassador to the United States, Vijay 
Laxmi Pandit, and a friend, Walter Lippman. Walter Lippman advised Lilienthal to visit Pakistan as 
well. In Lippman’s opinion, the core of the Kashmir dispute was the struggle for the control of rivers 
flowing from the state [Kashmir] into Pakistan.”31  
The Indian strategic thinker, Jasjit Singh in his recent book Kargil 1999, while referring to 
First Kashmir War between India and Pakistan, rightly pointed out that the mobilisation of the 
Pakistani army in Kashmir in May 1948 was more of a geo-economic necessity than out of ideological 
or communal logic.32 It is pertinent to quote Jasjit here in extenso: 
According to Jasjit, Pakistan and its leadership, at the highest levels, have been stating that 
Kashmir is the “unfinished agenda of Partition” of the Indian Subcontinent in 1947. The argument 
claims that the Subcontinent was divided along communal lines into two independent sovereign 
states, and Pakistan was created out of what constituted the Muslim majority areas of India. Jammu 
and Kashmir (J&K) was a Muslim majority state. According to this logic, therefore, the state should 
have formed part of Pakistan. But, the argument continues, Indian perfidy resulted in the forcible 
occupation of the state, and India refused to honour the UN Resolution, which required a plebiscite to 
be held in the state. On the face of it, the argument seems plausible enough, leaving a large number 
of people across the world bewildered, and in Pakistan, many resentful. This is the basic 
rationalisation of Pakistan’s claim to both J&K and international support. Yet this also inevitably wards 
off any inquiries into the legitimacy of Pakistan’s aggression and the de facto annexation of nearly 
one-third of J&K.33 
Jasjit argues that this was not the only logic that dictated Pakistan’s attempts to acquire J&K 
immediately after the partition of the Subcontinent. The core rationale that emerges repeatedly from 
both the literature and articulation by responsible Pakistanis is that the accession of J&K to Pakistan 
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was a critical need from a geo-economic or strategic point of view. This was perceived to be 
necessary because four out of the five [actually six] rivers in West Pakistan, that is, the Indus, 
Jhelum, Chenab and Ravi, originate from across or within the mountain reaches of J&K, and the fifth 
(the Sutlej and Beas combined) flow through the state of Himachal Pradesh, which borders J&K on 
its southern flank. It should be recalled that the primary economic activity was agriculture in West 
Pakistan in 1947.34 The British had begun the construction of an extensive canal system in Punjab in 
the early 20th century. The process began in the north-western part of Punjab and progressively 
shifted south-eastwards. By the late 1940s, it had reached the region that now generally constitutes 
the border region between India and Pakistan. The newly created state of Pakistan had a natural 
stake in what they believed to be a new vulnerability. At the same time, it was clear that Kashmir’s 
economy was also dependent on Pakistan, since the primary route of access into the Valley now 
would be from the new country.35  
 Jasjit further argues that the importance of the geo-economic logic of the situation is perhaps 
best understood from the writings of man (Major General Akbar Khan) who claims to have planned 
the invasion of Kashmir in 1947. Jasjit quotes Akbar Khan as:  
“From the economic point of view the position was equally clear. Our agricultural economy 
was dependent particularly upon rivers coming out of Kashmir. The Mangla headworks were 
actually in Kashmir and the Marala headworks were within a mile or so of the border. What 
then would be our position if Kashmir was to be in Indian hands?”36  
In Jasjit’s opinion this view was also articulated by a British army officer, the military assistant 
to General Douglas Gracey, who saw events from the top of the military command structure and with 
a more objective approach than many Pakistanis. He believed that among the reasons for 
Mohammad Ali Jinnah, the Governor General of Pakistan, giving orders for the regular Pakistan Army 
to move troops into Kashmir on 26 October 1947, was the fact that “the mainly Muslim area of 
Kashmir, with Poonch at its centre, contained the headwaters of the rivers running into West Punjab, 
Pakistan’s main agricultural province, and which was greatly dependent on irrigation for its 
prosperity,”37 
Similarly, this military-strategic logic was also built upon perceived geo-strategic compulsion. 
The 300km lines of road and rail communications between the key cities of Lahore and Rawalpindi 
(which also connected the intermediate cities of Sialkot, Jhelum, etc.) would be within a few miles of 
a hypothetical India-Pakistan border, if it were to lie along Kashmir’s western border. Once again, the 
writings of Akbar Khan provide a clear indication of the situation: “One glance at the map was enough 
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to show that Pakistan’s military security would be seriously jeopardised if Indian troops came to be 
stationed along Kashmir’s western borders.”38 
Jasjit clearly states that he is not suggesting that the issue of religion was insignificant in 
deciding Pakistan’s attitude towards Kashmir, since Pakistan was, after all, came into being on the 
basis of the two-nation theory claiming Muslims majority areas of the Subcontinent to constitute a 
separate nation, require a separate state, and, as a result, include the princely state of Kashmir.39  
3.3 The Movement of Troops and the Indus Rivers 
Pervaiz Iqbal Cheema quoting Prithvi N. K. Bamzi states that, the Indian military offensive 
began on 8 April 1948 almost simultaneously in both the Jammu and Kashmir areas. In Jammu, the 
initial objective was to capture Rajauri and get as close to the Pakistan border as possible, and in the 
Kashmir area the main objective was to recapture Muzaffarabad.40 At the time of the spring offensive, 
India had already moved two divisions of the Regular Indian Army to Jammu and another two 
divisions were already in Kashmir.41 With such a large force, the Indian army began to push the 
tribesmen and Azad Kashmir (AK) forces towards Pakistan’s border. The advance of Indian troops 
threatening Muzafferabad, Uri, Titwal and Poonch areas compelled the Pakistanis to send their 
combat troops into Kashmir. Consequently, in May 1948, Pakistan sent a full division of its army to 
back up the tribesmen and AK forces in their efforts to halt the Indian advance. Thus began the first 
limited war over Kashmir between the two new nations.  
The Indian forces launched a three-pronged offensive against the tribesmen and AK forces in 
the spring of 1948. Prior to the offensive, India utilised the winter of 1947-48 to improve existing 
tracks and to build new roads for logistic purposes, especially land routes approaching the Jammu 
area.42 The Indian offensive began with a vigorous drive towards Mirpur but confronted tough 
resistance, mainly from the AK forces.  
The second prong of the offensive was directed towards Poonch, via Uri, along the Jhelum 
River.43 Stiff opposition from the tribesmen, now organised and led by Pakistani army officers, 
deprived the Indians of their quick gains.44 This meant that India was divested of these gains mainly 
because of the harassing tactics employed by the tribesmen and Azad Kashmir Forces. Such tactics 
compelled the Indians to divert some of their forces away from the road.45  
The third prong of the Indian offensive was towards Titwal along the Kishenganga River 
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(called Neelum River on Pakistani side of Kashmir). Here the Indians achieved rapid successes. 
Compared to one Indian brigade consisting of four battalions, the resisting forces were no more than 
one rifle company.46 However, the organised tribesmen and Azad forces, backed by the Pakistani 
army, were later able to not only block their advances but also to dislodge them from some strategic 
positions. Initially, Pakistan sent one division of its regular troops, but as they spread, the Pakistanis 
realised that such a small force could not cater to such a long front, from the Bhimber Sector all the 
way to Baltistan, and consequently another division was ordered to move to Abbottabad and 
allocated the specific responsibility of looking after the Titwal, Uri and Bagh Sectors.47 Since 
Pakistani troops were sent primarily for defensive purposes, the officers refrained from undertaking 
any major offensive activities. Occasional tactical actions aimed at dislodging the Indians from some 
strategic positions were undertaken with the utmost of caution. While the number of Pakistani troops 
was small compared to the Indian regular forces, the number of Azad forces gradually swelled during 
the war to an impressive level.48 The Indian troops were, of course, backed by the state troops. One 
of the major advantages the Indians enjoyed was the high level of organisation and discipline of their 
entire forces, both in terms of their state troops as well as the Indian army. On the Pakistani side, the 
most problematic group of fighters were the disorganised and independently-minded tribesmen. 
By the end of December 1948, the military situation was such that the Indian troops had 
managed to relieve the long beleaguered Poonch town and strengthen their positions around Zoji La 
in the North, which at one time was seriously threatened by the Gilgit Scouts. In addition, they had 
already pushed the tribesmen out of Baramula. However, they were unable to push them beyond the 
Uri-Titwal line. Pakistani forces were able to consolidate their position in the areas that now form 
Azad Kashmir.  
In many ways, the First Kashmir War was an interesting war. The UN Security Council, in its 
resolution of 21 April 1948, had specifically asked both Pakistan and India to do their utmost to bring 
about a cessation of all fighting. Implicitly, the Resolution emphasised that the belligerents must 
refrain from aggravating the situation any further, while the UN was engaged in securing a peaceful 
solution to the dispute. Yet neither India nor Pakistan took any serious note of the underlying spirit of 
the Resolution. Ignoring the efforts of the UN to resolve the dispute, India carried on with its spring 
offensive as originally planned. Pakistan’s decision to commit its forces in May 1948 was in many 
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ways a reactionary move.49  
Another aspect of the war that adds to its uniqueness was that the Pakistani troops were 
given express orders to avoid, as far as possible, direct contact with the Indians. A war in which one 
side is specifically subjected to orders of avoiding direct engagement certainly engenders an aura of 
peculiarity. Perhaps because of these rather strange orders, the Pakistanis decided to opt for a 
strategy described as ‘plugging the holes’, and employed guerrilla tactics. The Pakistani troops 
deployed Azad forces for direct contact and meticulously avoided taking on the Indian forces directly, 
with few exceptions. This equally seems to be true of the Indian troops, who refrained from provoking 
the unlimited war.50  
During the war, both sides made sufficient political capital out of the atrocities committed by 
the opposite side. Propaganda based on the other side’s atrocities was perhaps required as a means 
to cope with the morale problem. The Indians repeatedly publicised atrocities committed by the 
tribesmen, particularly in areas such as Baramula and Rajauri, whereas the Pakistanis highlighted 
atrocities committed by State troops in areas such as Poonch and Mirpur. However, it should be 
mentioned here that apart from the Sikh battalions, who demonstrated communalism, most Indian 
and the Pakistani soldiers refrained from committing atrocities.51  
Another interesting aspect of the first Kashmir War was that both the Pakistani and Indian 
armies were commanded by British generals. Throughout the war, the two British commanders-in-
chief maintained almost daily contact by telephone in an effort to avoid a deterioration of the situation, 
and both continued to press their respective governments into accepting a ceasefire. General Gracey 
attempted to convince General Boucher to use the old-boy network in order to prevent the fighting 
from becoming too harsh.52 
As mentioned in the previous chapter that the Indus and Kashmir disputes proved to be 
intertwined in nature (see note 31 above), the question of whether or not the Pakistani leadership 
committed a blunder by not sending the troops along with tribesmen when the initial thrust (26 Oct. 
1947) took place requires examination here. Some believe it was a major mistake on the part of the 
Pakistanis not to send regular troops at a time when the tribesmen were making rapid advances.53 
According to a senior officer who visited various fronts in Kashmir immediately after the tribal 
invasion, the tribesmen were held at the fourth milestone from Srinagar by a road block with machine 
guns and the road block could have been overcome if Pakistan had agreed to supply a few armoured 
cars.54 Despite the efforts of the senior officers involved, and the willingness of some officers to enter 
into Kashmir with three armoured cars as volunteers in plain clothes, the requisite permission to use 
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the Pakistan Army’s armoured cars was not granted by the Pakistani authorities.55 Unable to 
overcome the road block, the tribesmen decided to withdraw after approximately two weeks. 
This meant that the cautious approach of the Pakistani cabinet was the product of three 
major factors. Firstly, there was a general fear that the despatch of regular Pakistani forces at this 
early stage would have provoked a general war with India.56 Secondly, the Pakistani armed forces 
were still in the process of regrouping and reorganizing and not many extra units were available to be 
sent to Kashmir. The third factor was Pakistan’s strong belief in the ability of the UN to resolve the 
dispute. A strong man of the Pakistani cabinet, Mr. Ghulam Mohammad, categorically told Sardar 
lbrahim Khan (the President of the Azad Kashmir government) that Pakistan would certainly acquire 
Kashmir through a plebiscite.57 Pakistani decision-makers strongly believed in the ability of the UN to 
hold the desired plebiscite.  
What is even more intriguing is that despite the above-mentioned persuasive and operative 
factors that caused the cabinet’s cautious line, the same cabinet, a few months later, took the bold 
step of not only sending out a full division to Kashmir but also of withdrawing a large number of 
troops out of Lahore, leaving it virtually undefended. These were positioned ‘at a point just West of 
Jammu city within easy distance of the improved road to Poonch.’58 The troops remained at this 
location, poised for an attack which could have easily trapped two Indian divisions.59 On the one 
hand, the attack never took place, and on the other, Lahore remained exposed during this period. 
Since Pakistan had taken a bold decision in withdrawing troops from Lahore, the logical course of 
action should have been to launch an attack on Jammu that would have surrounded the Indian 
troops. The lack of a clear-cut policy direction and strategy, coupled with the difficult days following 
Partition, produced a policy of ad hocism which, in turn, was responsible for such ostensible 
vicissitudes in policy direction.   
Based on the above facts, one can conveniently argue that the first Pakistan-India war over 
Kashmir, in 1948, qualifies as a resource war on the following grounds: 
Pundit Jawaharlal Nehru had planned, much before the partition of the Subcontinent, to 
control the “cruel and fierce torrents rushing down [life-giving rivers flowing down-stream into Indus 
plains] to the valleys below (emphasis added).”60 Partition was not acceptable to Nehru if the 
Gurdaspur and Ferozepur districts, possessing both river headworks and a land-link to Kashmir, were 
to be awarded to Pakistan. Efforts to acquire Ferozepur district testifies the fact that it was not only a 
question of having a land-link with Kashmir through Madhopur district, but control of the rivers was 
also a prime objective, a fact obvious from Michel’s questioning of the Radcliff award, whereby he 
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asked: “…would it not be preferable to give the entire Ferozepur headworks to Pakistan to balance 
the award of the Madhopur headworks (of the UBDC in the Gurdaspur) to India? Thus each country 
would have held position to counter-balance the unilateral closure by the other party”.61 This would 
have been in accordance with both the principles of Partition and the geographical reality.  
Quaid-i-Azam Mohammad Ali Jinnah unwillingly accepted the award, saying, as cited by 
Michel in a personal communication to Mountbatten, “I would rather have barren Pakistan than fertile 
fields watered on the curtsy of Hindus.”62 This testifies that the water factor was not even in the back 
of Mr. Jinnah’s mind. On the other hand, the seizure of all the catchment areas and man-made 
infrastructures across the Indus river system proved to be a strategy well thought out by the Indian 
leadership. 
Quaid-i-Azam Mohammad Ali Jinnah never imposed any condition on Maharaja Hari Singh to 
accede to Pakistan. Pakistan’s acceptance of the “Standstill Agreement” with the Maharaja of 
Kashmir on 14 December 1947 and its refusal by India testifies that an independent or autonomous 
Kashmir was acceptable to Pakistan but not to India. It was the people of Kashmir who stood against 
the Maharaja’s oppressive rule and attempted to counter Indian aggression in Kashmir. 
India invaded Kashmir on 26 Oct. 1947, but Pakistan mobilised its forces in May 1948 after 
realising the Indian intention of capturing all the river headworks, and thereby the life-line to the 
agrarian economy of Pakistan. The direction of the movement of Indian troops in Kashmir testifies its 
intention to capture the hydro-strategic territory of Kashmir as a means of exerting pressure on 
Pakistan through the erosion of its agrarian base simply by withholding water supplies. Pakistan’s 
defensive mobilisation of its forces is suggestive of the “geo-economic logic” of Kashmir propounded 
by Jasjit Singh and General Akbar. It does not mean that the factor of religion or the Muslim 
population of Kashmir were not important in determining Pakistan’s policy towards Kashmir. In fact, 
the accepted principles of the partition of the Indian Subcontinent, on the basis of contiguous Muslim 
majority areas, underpinned Pakistan’s claims over Kashmir and the districts of Punjab containing the 
Gurdaspur and Ferozepur river headworks. Pakistan, at the time of Partition, desired a political 
solution to the Kashmir issue. It was Indian military intervention which necessitated the defensive 
deployment of troops by Pakistan in Kashmir in order to safeguard the river headworks, which are 
extremely vital to its survival.  
With the occupation of south eastern Jammu-Kashmir, India obtained control of both sides of 
the Ravi river in the reaches where it formed the boundary between the pre-Partition Punjab Province 
and the Punjab Hill states to the south, and Jammu and Kashmir to the north.63 Through Jammu-
Kashmir, up to the cease-fire line above the Marala headworks, “India also attained the control of the 
Chenab river”.64 Since the Jhelum river originates inside Kashmir, “India’s occupation of the Vale 
gave her control of the Jhelum’s headwaters and its course through Lake Wullar down to a point 
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beyond Uri.”65 Finally, in Ladakh, “India acquired the head-reaches of the Indus River itself from the 
point where it crosses the Tibetan border (between China and India) to a point near Kargil, where it 
flows into Azad Kashmir.”66  
Pakistan, however, by occupying Azad Kashmir (i.e. the Muzaffarabad and Neelum valleys) 
and the Gilgit Agency, secured both the remainder of the Indus course and the vital reaches of the 
Jhelum,-Neelum and Kunhar rivers, leading to the Mangla Dam. 
If India had captured the Mangla and Marala headworks in 1948, the only option for Pakistan 
would have been either to perish in the face of a militarily powerful opponent or to merge into the 
Indian union. The UN intervention, although on the Indian initiative, saved the situation by bringing 
about a stalemate. 
 Moreover, the first Kashmir war was a peculiar war in which the armies attempted to avoid 
facing one another while consolidating their positions along the river infrastructure. The geographical 
location of the territory and its surface features, constituting the catchment area of the mighty Indus 
river system, played an important role in military adventurism aimed at capturing the vital water 
resources bound in Kashmir. The war also qualifies as a resource war. Pandit Jawaharlal Nehru’s 
claim that the annexation of the Muslim majority state of Jammu and Kashmir to India would destroy 
the very rationale of the creation of Pakistan and the basis of the two-nation theory, proved to be an 
ideal ploy to keep control of the vital resources. The prime objective of India’s military manoeuvres 
was to capture the control-structures and catchment areas of all major rivers flowing into Pakistan.  
 The mobilisation of troops by Pakistan in May 1948, a month after India cut off the water 
supply, was not a coincidence rather a defensive attempt at securing its river headworks and 
preventing them from falling under Indian control.67 This act of aggression by India left an indelible 
imprint on the hearts and minds of the peoples and the leadership of Pakistan and they lost their 
capacity for trust in their neighbour who created an issue of extreme insecurity for them which they 
never thought of. 
3.4 SUMMARY  
 India used river water as an economic and military weapon against Pakistan in an effort to 
obtain maximum control over river resources. Thus the combination of the partition boundary and the 
Kashmir cease-fire line (i.e. the superimposed or armistice border), one de jure and the other de 
facto, provided India with the control of the head-reaches of the entire Indus river system, including 
five of its tributaries, plus the complete course of the Beas river. “This situation produced by the 
partition line, demarcated by Radcliffe, in itself was enough to cause trouble, for Pakistan.”68 In 
addition, the capture of “Jammu-Kashmir by India enormously complicated the problem by giving 
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India control over the Chenab and Jhelum rivers, which provide no irrigation in India, and very little in 
Jammu-Kashmir, but upon which the West Punjab [Punjab henceforth] the largest fertile province of 
Pakistan, and indeed all of West Pakistan [present Pakistan] are heavily dependent.”69  
 Both Indian and Pakistani manoeuvres in Kashmir verify the model underpinning this study, 
by testifying how states, in their capacity as rational actors, maximise power and security vis-à-vis 
their adversaries: India attempted to capture and control more and more resources in a quest for 
power maximisation, and Pakistan responded by securing its vital resources as a means of security 
maximisation. The Indian policy to acquire control over Muslim majority state of Jammu and Kashmir 
(catchment area feeding entire Indus river system), apparently in an attempt to consolidate its secular 
national outlook and to undermine Pakistan’s two nations theory, is an ideal ploy to keep control over 
the real resource on the one hand and keep alive the conflict as a justification to attract international 
support on the other hand. On the contrary the same is true for Pakistan too. Keeping the issue of 
Kashmir alive both are pursuing their rational policy objectives to maximise their security and power 
vis-à-vis each other and in the international system. 
 Moreover, the occupation and retaining of Kashmir territory by India is strongly linked to its 
hydro-strategic nature. India is reluctant to relinquish its control, since in doing so it would lose upper 
riparian status and much of its political clout in determining the politics and future of the Indus basin 
region. Thus, the capture and retaining of vital water resources located in the territory of Kashmir by 
India and Pakistan has very strong linkages with political thinking, strategic planning and warfare in 
the region. The conflict over Kashmir is not merely ideological but is also a question of the control of 
vital water resources. 
 The UN intervention in the Kashmir dispute brought about a situation of stalemate in 
December 1948. Yet it was the Indian measure of cutting off irrigation water to Pakistan which 
became an issue of survival for the latter, making it realise its vulnerabilities and helplessness that it 
immediately requested negotiation with India.  
 The next chapter discusses the water dispute in detail, highlighting the conflicting claims of 
the two states, in terms of relative location and riparian rights, and attempts by the upper-riparian to 
exploit the weaknesses—resource-dependency of the lower-riparian, disadvantageous relative 
location due to superimposed or armistice boundaries and favourable surface features for the upper 
riparian. 
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Chapter 4 
THE WATER DISPUTE:  
EVOLUTION AND THE MEDIATION PROCESS 
This chapter provides a short but comprehensive description of the Indus waters’ 
dispute. Notwithstanding the excessive details of the dynamics of the dispute, chapter refers 
to the role of the mediator in facilitating accommodation.1 It has been divided into two 
sections.  
First section explores the origin of the dispute embedded in the partition of the British 
Punjab and the initiation of the bilateral negotiations which reached a deadlock in 1951. This 
duly underscored the need for involving a third party to break the impasse. The question, 
when do adversaries decide to negotiate and who starts peace initiative, is dealt with 
reference to Indus waters dispute. The purpose is to comprehend the scenario which 
compels the lower riparian to initiate peace process and to understand the response of an 
upper riparian state.  
Second section answers the question, when and why the disputants accept 
mediation, how it is conducted and made successful. The chapter also highlights the role of 
a mediator, in context of an interested third party, to engage disputants in prolonged 
negotiations. It also dilates upon the aspect of third party’s influential control over the 
mediation process. It answers the question: What was the proper political timing when the 
World Bank intervened into the Indus dispute and how did it remove the impasse between 
the disputants? The assumption here is that the disputants welcome an influential third party 
for mediation when they reach a ‘stalemate’ and the finding of the solution becomes a 
‘necessity’. 
4.1 ORIGIN OF THE DISPUTE AND PRE-MEDIATION SCENARIO 
 During the British rule the Indus basin was developed as integrated unit “under the 
conception of a single administration”.2 Prior to the Partition of Subcontinent, the 
Government of India appointed a commission in 1941, under the chairmanship of Sir B. N. 
Rau. The Rau Commission determined the riparian rights of various states and provinces 
about all the rivers of the Indus system on the basis of universally recognised principle of 
“equitable apportionment.” According to the principle the upper riparian was barred to take 
any action that can disturb the existing irrigation in the Indus basin or impair the supplies of 
the lower riparian states and provinces. 
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 The integrated nature of the Indus river system in British Punjab, which was divided 
at the time of Partition of the Subcontinent between India (East Punjab) and Pakistan (West 
Punjab) gave birth to a number of problems. The partition line drawn by the Radcliff left both 
the headworks (Madhopur and Ferozepur) in the Indian part of the Punjab [East Punjab] and 
the canals, being fed by these headworks along with irrigated lands, in Pakistani Punjab 
[West Punjab].  Consequently, the Upper Bari Doab Canals (UBDC), upon which the Central 
Bari Doab Canals (CBDC) in West Punjab was dependent, left to the Indian control.3  
 All these canals were the sole source of transferring waters of the eastern rivers to a 
number of other canals in West Punjab. “The [eastern] rivers Sutlej, Beas and Ravi, whose 
waters flowed into these canals, originated and ran for a long distances in Indian territory 
before they entered into Pakistan.”4  
“Vast area of the irrigated lands in West Pakistan was left on the mercy of Indian 
benevolence. Moreover, India being an upper riparian claimed its sovereign right to 
use waters of all the rivers of the Indus system originating and flowing through its 
territory.”5 
 The Punjab Partition Committee (PPC), looking after the partition matters, had 
appointed a two-member sub-committee (Committee B) to determine the provision of water 
to each canal in divided Punjab. The Committee B submitted its report on 28 July 1947 
prescribing to maintain the pre-partition water supplies in Punjab. The PPC endorsed the 
decision of the Committee B. The Government of Pakistan remained content even though 
the Radcliffe Award had given control of the headworks with India. The apparent reasons 
could be the assurances of Committee B and the PPC that pre-partition supplies of water 
would continue. No instrument was signed, which could specify the sharing costs between 
the East and West Punjab.6  
 Disagreements arose over the value of the canal system and crown waste lands, 
lying in the other parts of the Punjab. It was agreed, therefore, to submit the other matters 
arising directly out of partition to the Arbitral Tribunal to be appointed under the Indian 
Independence Act.7  
 The Tribunal was set up on 12 August 1947 and it came into effect on 14th August 
1947. Disputes arising out of the partition could be presented before the Tribunal until 1 
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December 1947 or at the chairman’s discretion until 1 January 1948.8 Only five matters were 
referred to the Arbitral Tribunal by 30th November 1947. All five issues were related to 
financial adjustments needed for: (i) the crown waste lands (ii) the irrigation system (iii) 
irrigated forest plantations (iv) seigniorage charges (contribution for maintenance of canals) 
for transporting water within the Indus Basin, and (v) devising a financial adjustment 
formula.9  
 No issue relating to apportionment of water between India and Pakistan was 
submitted to the Tribunal because there had been none10 by then as maintenance of pre-
partition irrigation water supplies was agreed upon.11  
 On 20 December 1947, Chief Engineers from East and West Punjab also signed a 
Standstill Agreement under which the status quo was to be maintained on the Central and 
Upper Bari Doab Canals (CBDC/UBDC) and the Dipalpur canals. The PPC unanimously 
approved it on the same day. The West Punjab submitted its claim to Mandi Hydro-electric 
power plant on 22 December 1947.12 
  The Arbitral Tribunal decided all the matters on 17 March 1948, and its term expired 
on the midnight of 31st March 1948. In the early hours of 1 April 1948 India stopped the flow 
of water passing through the Ferozepur headworks to Dipalpur canal and Bahawalpur state 
distributary and through Madhopur headworks to the Pakistani portions of Lahore and Main 
branches of the CBDC.13 
 The closure of canal water to west Punjab perceived as open aggression by the 
upper riparian India against Pakistan. In Chaudhri Muhammad Ali’s words: 
“…the East Punjab ministers and officials were planning a deadly blow against 
Pakistan and were lulling the West Punjab government to sleep with sweet words. 
They were waiting for the day when the life of the Arbitral Tribunal would come to an 
end on March 31, 1948. On the part of East Punjab there was Machiavellian duplicity. 
On part of West Punjab there was neglect of duty, complacency, and lack of common 
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prudence—which has disastrous consequences for Pakistan.”14 
Sir Patrick Spens’, Chairman of the Arbitral Tribunal, was also perturbed on the Indian 
betrayal and reacted immediately in the following strong words: 
“I remember very well…. We were invited by both the Attorney Generals [of India and 
Pakistan] to come to our decision on the basis that there would be no interference 
whatsoever with the then existing flow of water, and the award which my colleagues 
made, in which I had no part, they made on that basis. Our awards were published at 
the end of March 1948. I am going to say nothing more about it except that I was very 
much upset that almost within a day or two there was a grave interference with the 
flow of water on the basis of which our awards had been made.”15   
 For Pakistan, the matter of prime importance was that the water flowing through 
these canals had been the lifeline for the fertile parts of the West Punjab, while India had 
many rivers to support its agriculture and much of its territory received enough rain, making it 
less dependent on the irrigation water from the Punjab rivers. Moreover, the city of Lahore 
was deprived not only of main source of municipal water rather electric supply was also cut off 
from Mandi hydroelectric power plant.16  
 Pakistan realised its helplessness and extreme vulnerability as the headwaters of all 
these rivers were in Indian territory thus the “consequences of possible aggressive intentions 
on India’s part soon loomed large before Pakistan.”17  
 Pakistan immediately requested for negotiation. A delegation led by Ghulam 
Muhammad, the then federal finance minister and two ministers from Punjab—Shoukat Hayat 
Khan and Mumtaz Doltana, was sent to Delhi in the beginning of May 1948. India insisted that 
it would not restore flow of water until Pakistan acknowledged that it had no right to the waters 
originating from the Indian territories.18 
4.1.1 The Delhi Agreement, 1948 
 On 4 May 1948, an ‘interim’ agreement known as the Inter-Dominion Agreement or 
the Delhi Agreement, temporarily restored water to the CBDC and the Dipalpur canals, 
permitting the East Punjab government to gradually reduce the supply to these canals, 
thereby giving the West Punjab government time to find alternative sources. East Punjab 
also demanded seigniorage charges to which West Punjab government agreed in principle 
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but the dispute over the calculation of these charges remained unresolved and Pakistan 
requested to refer the case to the International Court of Justice (ICJ) for arbitration.19  
 Pakistan claimed that the agreement was temporary in the first place and subject to 
further negotiation too. With India’s refusal to submit the disagreement to the ICJ, an 
impasse had arisen. Ghulam Mohammad, the then finance minister of Pakistan, had 
appealed to Lord Mountbatten, the then India’s Governor-General, who consulted Prime 
Minister Pandit Jawaharlal Nehru.20 Consequently, “a statement was then placed before 
Ghulam Mohammad, and he was asked to sign it without changing a word or a comma—a 
condition for restoring the flow of water”.21 The statement was signed by Ghulam 
Muhammad and two West Punjab ministers from Pakistani side and Pandit Jawaharlal 
Nehru and two East Punjab ministers from the Indian side. 
 The Agreement did not contain an expiry date rather it did call for further bilateral 
discussion for final settlement of the issue. Secondly, India regarded it as an ‘international 
agreement,’ and refuted Pakistan’s claim that it was temporary, invalid and signed ‘under 
compulsion’ or duress.22 Thirdly, the agreement referring to only some canals, as understood 
by Pakistan, unfortunately deprived Pakistan of its rights to international waters of three 
Eastern rivers and established India’s right to these waters.23 Obviously, the urgency of the 
situation created much confusion in the minds of Pakistani negotiators.24 They drew wrong 
interpretation of the word ‘canals’ and thought that India only demanded transportation 
charges and sharing costs for the maintenance of these canals till Pakistan searched for 
alternative sources (construct new headworks and link canals) to meet shortfall in the river 
Ravi and Sutlej. Nevertheless, the Delhi Agreement created a situation having long-term 
consequences for Pakistan.25  
4.1.2 Problems, Worries and Hopes 
 Gulhati believes that fearful of Indian intentions, in the wake of the Delhi Agreement, 
Pakistan had begun digging a channel from the right bank of the River Sutlej to circumvent 
Ferozepur headworks. The plan was to ensure water supply to Dipalpur canals in the wake 
of Indian closure, to which India protested promptly. Pakistan responded to take the issue up 
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at the state level thus wanted to reopen the Delhi Agreement.26  
 On 4 June 1948, Pakistan logged a complaint that water was not being supplied 
from India’s Eastern canals. India’s reaction was that it had made no such commitment with 
Pakistan. However, on 15 June 1948, India agreed supplying the water, subject to payment 
of transportation charges by Pakistan under the Delhi Agreement and stoppage of work on 
the channel upstream of the Ferozepur headworks. On 6 July 1948, Pakistan communicated 
to India that it had stopped the work.27 
 Since Pakistan wanted the water supply to continue for rabi 1948-49, it requested 
India to immediately provide confirmation of the interpretation drawn out of the Delhi 
Agreement and for the Indian Prime Minister to fix the seigniorage charges which the West 
Punjab had to pay for three to six months in advance to the rabi sowing season, starting 
from the month of October.28 
 Since there was no expiry date put on the Delhi Agreement Pakistan justifiably 
regarded it as temporary. India did not comment upon the interpretation but assured 
Pakistan, on 26 September 1948, that it would continue supplying the water as per 
request.29  
 Jawaharlal Nehru, in a telegram sent on 18th October 1948, demanded that the “May 
4 arrangements be interpreted as recognising the rights of the East Punjab Government to 
progressively diminish supply of water to West Punjab,” and added that “any further meeting 
between the representatives of the two governments should be on the basis of this 
recognition by West Punjab.” He warned: “If there was an unreasonable delay on the part of 
one side, it is open to the other party to put an end to the agreement by giving reasonable 
notice.”30  
 Perceiving the above stated Jawaharlal Nehru’s warning as an open threat Chaudhri 
notes that: 
 “[U]unless Pakistan accepted the Indian contention quickly, India would end the 
arrangement and once again cut-off supplies of water. For Pakistan to accept the 
Indian interpretation would have been a permanent renunciation of Pakistan’s legal 
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right. Pakistan offered to refer the legal issues in dispute to the International Court of 
Justice. India denied.”31  
 In April 1949, the Government of India linked continuation of water-supply strictly to 
the terms and conditions stipulated in the Delhi Agreement. Later, in June 1949, Pakistan 
recommended to widen the dispute and include waters of all common rivers for 
apportionment. It requested another meeting in August 1949. Pakistan further suggested 
that if agreement was not possible then the matter should be referred to the ICJ. The Indian 
officials instantaneously responded by refusing once more, the option of referring the case to 
the ICJ.32 
 Meanwhile, the Indian government set up an organisation to look into the Indus 
basin problem; aimed at collecting data for the future planning. To chair this organisation, a 
post of Deputy Secretary (Special) in the Ministry of Works, Mines and Power was created, 
to which N.D. Gulhati was duly appointed at the end of June 1949. B. R. Ambekdar and N. 
V. Gadgil, ministers of the Government of India, also participated. The organisation 
comprised some government officials from East Punjab including: Vidya Ratna, an ex-
engineer; Dr. J.K. Malhotra, Statistical Officer; and S.M. Sikri, Assistant Advocate-General. 
The first task of the organisation was to conduct homework for the forthcoming Inter-
Dominion meeting to be held in New Delhi during August 1949.33  
 No progress was made in the next meeting (August 4-6), the only “agreement 
reached” was to meet again.34 Finally both agreed to meet in Karachi on 27-29 March 
1950.35 On 1 November 1949, Pakistan’s foreign minister wrote to his Indian counterpart, 
offering not to press for prior recognition of the terms and conditions of the Delhi Agreement 
and whether it was agreed that the interim period under the Delhi Agreement had expired.36  
Gulhati claimed that it was a condition in Pakistan’s offer to withdraw its demand for prior 
recognition, and the stance it had taken over a year before in the telegram of September 
1948.37  
 Pakistan also proposed functions and powers for the joint technical committee: First, 
to negotiate new interim arrangements pending a final settlement; second, to appoint a 
commission comprising non-engineers headed by a neutral chairman; third, the commission 
would, however, retain the authority to employ technical advisers if necessary, from India, 
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Pakistan and a neutral agency; fourth, the commission’s responsibility would be limited to 
making recommendations only and not to arbitrating between the two countries; and finally, if 
agreement was not reached, then, India would be obliged to allow the dispute to be referred 
to the ICJ. Obviously, Pakistan’s intentions were to involve a neutral commission or tribunal 
in the dispute. India refused to tolerate any change in the terms of the Delhi Agreement and 
insisted that a bilateral fact-finding commission could be the first step towards resolution.38 
 The next meeting was held as per schedule on 27-29 March 1950 in Karachi. The 
focus was to explore the idea of joint development and management of the entire Indus 
basin. The six-member committee, equally representing both the parties, was made-up the 
preliminary negotiating committee. India was represented by B.K. Gokhale, Secretary in the 
Ministry of Works, Mines and Power; A.N. Khosla, Consulting Engineer to the Indian 
government and Chairman of the Central Power, Irrigation and Navigation Commission; 
M.R. Sachdev, Chief Secretary of East Punjab, who was assisted by N.D. Gulhati and Dr. 
J.K. Malhotra. Pakistan was represented by Chaudhri Mohammad Ali, Secretary-General to 
the Pakistani government who headed the delegation; H.A. Majid, Chief Secretary of West 
Punjab and Pir Muhammad Ibrahim, Chief Engineer of the West Punjab’s irrigation 
department.39 
 During the March 1950 meeting both sides somehow seriously explored options on 
a technical level. Pakistan proposed that: (i) the existing uses be met by existing sources (ii) 
new supplies be met by building storage facilities on the Sutlej, Ravi, Beas and Chenab 
rivers and (iii) the cost of construction be shared proportionate to the benefit derived and the 
waters be allocated equitably. India proposed that: (i) the Sutlej River, upon which it was 
building the Bhakra Dam, should exclusively be appropriated by India (ii) the Beas, Ravi and 
Chenab be made available for Pakistan to maintain existing uses, subject to certain 
adjustments favouring India; and (iii) a link canal from the Chenab river be built to meet any 
shortfall in Pakistan’s supply. India further proposed that (iv) if there was still a deficit, then a 
dam be constructed on river Chenab to meet this shortfall, and to supply water for the new 
irrigation developments schemes. It was agreed that the Indian and Pakistani engineers 
would study the proposals, collect relevant data and present it before the next meeting in 
May 1950.40 
 Unfortunately, by May 1950, the atmosphere was changed completely. India not 
only deviated from its agreed stance but also demanded the exclusive use of all the waters 
of the three Eastern rivers—Sutlej, Beas and Ravi—and divert 10,000 cusecs from the 
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Chenab via a tunnel at Marhu.41 The Indian demand was totally shocking and unacceptable 
to Pakistan as the waters of three rivers were irrigating millions of acres of land in West 
Punjab.42 
 Gulhati notes that after failing to convince Jawaharlal Nehru Pakistan had started 
efforts to make ‘interim’ Delhi Agreement invalid by saying that the agreement was signed 
under duress, because a shadow of national calamity threatened by the sudden stoppage of 
all supplies of water to Pakistani canals. Pakistan issued a notice of its expiry in a 
communication to the Indian government on 23 August 1950. Contrary to the facts, 
Jawaharlal Nehru replied to Liaquat Ali Khan on 12 September 1950, that India had not 
pressured Pakistan to sign, and there was no question of any compulsion or duress.43 
4.1.3 The Issue of Seigniorage Charges 
 Under the Delhi Agreement, Pakistan had agreed to pay India seigniorage charges, 
however, the amount remained disputed. Therefore, it was decided that specified money 
would be deposited in the Reserve Bank of India by Pakistan from which the undisputed 
amount would be transferred to East Punjab but the remaining money would be held until the 
final agreement was reached on this matter. Moreover, on Pakistan’s request the 
arrangement of water transfer for kharif (summer) 1948 was extended to rabi (winter) 1948-
49 and then to kharif 1949 too. Thereafter, India unilaterally arranged to transfer water for 
each crop and charged Pakistan as agreed.44 
 Meanwhile, in September 1949, the Sterling Bloc countries led by the United 
Kingdom devalued their currencies. Pakistan refused to follow the suit. Its refusal was 
interpreted by India as aggression and it imposed economic embargo against Pakistan.45 On 
1 November 1949, Pakistan informed India that although it regarded the Delhi Agreement as 
null and void but would continue to deposit money as a goodwill gesture, nevertheless, it 
reserved the right to withhold these deposits.46  
 India’s immediate and categorical response was that not only the Delhi Agreement 
was still binding upon all its signatories but also the seigniorage charges were an integral 
part of the agreement. Pakistan continued depositing money till July 1950, and later it 
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stopped paying the disputed portion of the amount.47 
 The issue of disputed seigniorage charges badly damaged the negotiation process 
thus India-Pakistan ties were reached a deadlock when the World Bank offered its Good 
Offices in 1951. Pakistan informed the World Bank of the disputed and unpaid amount kept in 
‘escrow’.48 The matter persisted throughout the mediation process and was resolved in 1960 
in the final stages of the Indus Waters Treaty.49 Interestingly enough, in the meantime, both 
countries continued to construct works that could safeguard their water supply, either existing 
or planned.50  
 Chaudhri states that India steadily increased its forcible appropriation of water at the 
expense of Pakistan at very critical times when crops were being sowed or were maturing. A 
headwork at Harike, at the confluence of the Sutlej and Beas rivers, was constructed along 
with a network of new canals. Especially, the height and storage capacity of the Bhakara 
Dam were greatly raised above the pre-partition design and its capacity was doubled from 4 
to 8 million acre-feet.51 
4.1.4 Indian River Diversion Plans and the World Bank 
 Indian engineers were assigned the task of irrigation development immediately after 
independence. In April 1949, Indian Central Government asked the East Punjab government 
to submit the proposal for the construction of the Harike barrage. Eventually, India prepared 
a plan to safeguard its supply from the Ferozepur headworks to the Eastern and Bikaner 
canals. Its plan was to confine the Sutlej River’s flow to the Indian territory and link Eastern 
and Bikaner canals from a barrage that had already been proposed at Harike.52 
 India decided to complete Harike Project, in December 1949, for twin purposes: to 
safeguard any Pakistani upstream diversions; and to utilise water that would be “set free by 
progressive diminution” to Pakistan’s supplies.53 India claimed that the latter arrangement 
was written into the Delhi Agreement of May 1948. India planned to build a tunnel at Marhu 
on the Chenab River to divert the water, and, in due course of time, wanted to take, the 
entire flow of the Beas River also into the Sutlej river and thereof to all canals off-taking 
upstream of the Ferozepur headworks.54 
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 Gulhati explains that the Harike Project envisaged construction of control 
infrastructure to regulate the Ferozepur and Sirhind feeders of 11,000 cubic feet per second 
(cusecs/cfs) capacity, and for the proposed Rajasthan canal of 15,000 cusecs. Plans were 
also made to replace an old canal, off-taking from the Sutlej river, with a new and efficient 
canal. East Punjab was also asked to prepare details for a proposed link canal between 
Madhopur on the Ravi to the Beas River with an initial capacity of 6,000 cusecs later to be 
increased to 13,000 cusecs after the Marhu Tunnel had been constructed on the Chenab 
river. In April 1950, the Rajasthan government was asked to undertake surveys the areas 
possibly can be brought under canals from Harike 55 
 In East Punjab India built some new distributaries from the UBDC and opened first 
of these channels for the kharif (summer) crop of 1950.56 Since these canals only received 
water after meeting the needs of Pakistan from CBDC, there was not enough water to fulfil 
the needs of the kharif season. Under these circumstances, East Punjab government 
expedited its efforts to build the Bhakra dam.57  
 Gulhati notes that when the project was placed before the Indian Planning 
Commission for consideration, it was conceived that if the Bhakra canal and the Nangal 
project could be completed at the same time then it would be possible to operate it without 
affecting the existing supplies off-taking from the Sutlej and Beas. The Nangal barrage and 
canal project had been started in 1946, and was expected to be completed in 1952. 
Therefore, the Bhakra-Nangal project was re-oriented to prioritise the Bhakra canal, with the 
hope of starting operation in kharif 1954. Pakistan perceived the Indian plan as an attempt to 
prolong negotiations aimed at building the Bhakra dam and the Rajasthan canal amongst 
other engineering works and deprive it of vital water supplies.58 According to Chaudhri this 
change envisaged to enhance the capacity of the dam to store entire flow of the Sutlej 
river.59 
4.1.5 Pakistan’s Efforts to Secure Supplies 
 The weakness of the Delhi Agreement propelled Pakistan to protect its uses on the 
Sutlej River upstream of the Ferozepur headworks. Pakistan was undertaking construction 
works to ensure supplies to the CBDC and Dipalpur canals from the River Chenab, and to 
ward off against any future threats to its water supply from India.60  
 Pakistan’s plans included: (i) construction of the Bambanwala-Ravi-Bedian link 
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(BRB) to supply the CBDC from the Chenab; (ii) examining the possibility of a link between 
Balloki, on the River Ravi, and Suleimanke on the River Sutlej; (iii) construction of the Kotri 
barrage capable of feeding canals in Lower Sindh; (iv) to prepare feasibility for the 
construction of two barrages, at Taunsa and Gudu, on the River Indus aimed at improving 
supplies to inundation canals off-taking from the Indus in West Punjab and Upper Sindh; and 
(v) continuation of the West Punjab’s tube-well scheme with power supply from the Rasul 
hydroelectric project, working since 1946.61 
 All the above-mentioned Pakistani plans for additional irrigation called for the 
storage facilities in the basin. Engineers were asked to explore suitable sites for dams on the 
rivers Jhelum and Indus. A site was found and work started at Mangla on river Jhelum 
without foreign aid which was withheld because of the dispute with India. On river Indus, 
initially a place was found at Darband but later was replaced by the site at Tarbela.62 
4.1.6 The Issue of ICJ Involvement 
 Prime Minister, Jawaharlal Nehru, in January 1950, wrote to his Pakistani 
counterpart, Liaquat Ali Khan, proposing a joint declaration not to wage war over any 
bilateral dispute and seek peaceful means to resolve their differences. This offer also 
contained an affirmation for the inclusion of third party intervention in the form of mediation 
by an international body recognised by both countries. Liaquat Ali Khan agreed in February 
1950 but called for a clear timetable for peaceful resolution of disputes.63  
 In February 1950 a meeting was held in Karachi in which the parties showed their 
willingness to divide the rivers: Pakistan was ready to let India use all of the waters of the 
Ravi and Beas. The proposal was acceptable to India, but it wanted the right to divert river 
Chenab through Marhu tunnel. Interestingly, India suggested construction of a storage dam 
at Dhiangarh to regulate supplies to Pakistan. But Pakistan refused India any right to build 
dam on the Chenab, and the proposal was dumped.64 
 The subsequent bilateral talks were failed and India filed the Delhi Agreement with 
the UN as Treaty No. 794 in May 1950.65 Pakistan promptly registered a ‘disclaimer’ with the 
UN in December 1950 and “explained the true nature of the statement to the UN and 
certified that it had been terminated.”66 India challenged the Pakistani claim and registered 
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another disclaimer with the UN Secretariat in November 1951.67 
 Although the UN Charter permits consideration of any international legal dispute 
amongst the members to be placed before the ICJ, but members of the British 
Commonwealth were denied such remedy and were bound to resolve mutual disputes at the 
Commonwealth forum.68 Chaudhri states that: 
“The assumption was that such disputes would be settled within the family of nations 
comprising the Commonwealth.… Although the Commonwealth had shown itself 
powerless to resolve disputes between its members, yet, by virtue of the old proviso, 
the canal waters dispute could not be referred to the International Court of Justice by 
Pakistan unless India agreed. And India, knowing that its stand was invalid in 
international law, would not agree.”69 
 The Sutlej dispute got no attention from the Commonwealth and India continued 
refusing to submit the matter to the ICJ. However, in September 1950, India proposed 
referring the case to a tribunal comprising four judges, two from each country. Pakistan 
rejected the proposal on the plea that since the tribunal did not have an impartial chairman, 
the forum could be used by India to prolong the resolution.70 “It was clear that India’s 
purpose was to prolong negotiations until the Bhakra Dam, the Rajasthan Canal, and other 
engineering works were completed, the effect of which would be to deprive Pakistan of vital 
water supplies”.71 
 Pakistan was determined to secure some form of arbitration, therefore, tried to 
involve International Court of Justice (ICJ). Meanwhile, India proposed to have some local 
judges to settle the issue.72 In Gulhati’s words: “Whatever the outcome, Pakistan would not 
be satisfied unless a third party could somehow be brought into the picture”.73  
4.1.7 The Dispute Fixed 
 In the wake of ongoing war in Kashmir, the crucial water dispute further damaged 
India-Pakistan relations. In Gulhati words these issues were paraded not only in an unending 
exchange of communications between the two Governments but also in public by both 
sides.74  
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 India was concerned about developing lands surrounding the Sutlej river in the East 
Punjab. Pakistan was worried for its existing uses from the River Sutlej to secure the food-
basket becoming increasingly crucial because of the influx of millions of Muslim immigrants 
from India. India was accused of misusing its upstream position and attempting to damage 
Pakistan’s economy by withholding water. The construction of Bhakra Dam on the River 
Sutlej by India was certainly detrimental to Pakistan’s interests. Pakistan, apparently in 
retaliation, stopped depositing the seigniorage charges in the summer of 1950.75 Moreover, 
failing to bring about a modification in the Agreement, Pakistan unilaterally declared it null 
and void. "Notice to this effect was given…on 23 August 1950."76 This statement was 
registered with the UN on 6 April 1951.77 India, in turn, registered a certified statement with
 
the UN on 1 May 1952. 
 The Indian delegate, referring to the registered statement of Pakistan, stated that the 
information contained in was "incorrect, in as much as the Government of India did not 
receive any notice prior to 19 May 1950, or even prior to 23 August 1950, that the Instrument 
of 4 May 1948, if it had ever been binding upon Pakistan, has long ceased to be effective.” 78 
Indo-Pakistan relations deteriorated further, armies were put on red alert. Although, 
other matters also intensified the discord (like the non-payment of financial assets and non-
transfer of military and industrial shares agreed before Partition for Pakistan, migration 
across the borders, disposition of evacuee properties, and occasional border incidents along 
with the Kashmir dispute) but the water dispute became acute and acquired extreme 
urgency.79  
Meanwhile, an article by David E. Lilienthal brought the IBRD [renamed in the early 
1950s as World Bank] into the picture, and this situation internationalised the issue. Lilienthal 
was former chairman of the Tennessee Valley Authority. In his article “Another ‘Korea’ in the 
Making?” he cogently emphasized Pakistan's dependence on water, two-thirds of which 
originated in Kashmir. He called the canal water dispute “pure dynamite, a Punjab powder 
keg” and warned that “peace in the Indo-Pakistan sub-continent is not insight with these 
inflammables around.”80 He continued in the following words:  
“With no water for irrigation [West Pakistan] would be desert, 20,000,000 acres would 
dry up in a week, tens of millions would starve. No army, with bombs and shellfire, 
could devastate a land as thoroughly as Pakistan could be devastated by the simple 
expedient of India's permanently shutting off the sources of water that keep the fields 
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and people of Pakistan alive.”81 
 He argued that the problem was more of a technical nature and an engineering 
solution was possible. He maintained that if the issue was not exploited as a political but 
considered as developmental both countries would benefit from it amply, especially when 
more than 80 per cent of the water of the Indus river system was flowing down into the 
Arabian Sea unutilised. In his opinion Pakistan might have won the legal battle, if ever 
referred to the International Court of Justice, but such legal judgement would not solve the 
food problems of India nor it prevent the waste of the waters. He suggested that for optimal 
utilisation of the unused water some suitable irrigation projects could be materialised with the 
help of the World Bank, since the Bank was an international financial institution, and also 
had expertise to address technical and engineering problems.82  
 Endorsing the Lilienthal's proposal the president of the World Bank, Mr. Eugene 
Black, expressed his desire to ‘recommend that the Bank lend its good offices’ to find out a 
solution of the Indus waters dispute.83 Both parties accepted the mediation of the Bank 
consecutively. However, India unlinked Kashmir and Indus disputes but agreed to supply 
Pakistan as per the then current water uses as long as talks continued. 
 
4.2 MEDIATION PROCESS: THE ROLE OF THE WORLD BANK 
 The World Bank was established in late 1940’s under the name of International 
Bank for Reconstruction and Development [IBRD]. It turned out a good omen for both India 
and Pakistan as both were separately approached to the bank for their respective water 
development projects. Fortunately, the bank was looking for such economic ventures which 
could establish and later enhance its reputation, in order to ensure that it could raise capital in 
the international financial markets 
4.2.1 The US Interests and the Lilienthal’s Proposal 
 The state of Indo-Pakistan relations and the Lilienthal Proposal attracted US 
involvement. The rationale for American interest in mediation was embedded in its urge to 
search for international cooperation to pursue its policy of containment of communism and 
was searching for allies. Its intermediary, David E. Lilienthal, projected India as offering for 
“the United States and democracy an opportunity”.84 The Indian premier, Jawaharlal Nehru, 
had already invited Lilienthal to visit India in October 1949. David Lilienthal, paid a visit to 
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India and Pakistan in February 1951.85 
 Lilienthal observed that the water dispute had to be resolved first so that relations 
may get calm for initiation of discussions on Kashmir issue. He pointed out that Pakistan may 
win legal battle against India but such judgement would not solve food problem of 
subcontinent nor it would prevent the waste of the Indus waters falling unused into the Indian 
Ocean. Nevertheless, he also warned that disputants were then close to wage a war. He 
urged that the question of water rights can be better addressed by the engineers of the two 
countries on functional grounds with the technical and most likely financial help of the World 
Bank.86  
 He urged that whole Indus rivers system must be developed as a unit like seven-
state Tennessee Valley Authority system back in the US and considered three principles 
essential to the Indus dispute's resolution: (i) the disputants should recognise that there was 
enough water in the Indus Basin for their existing and future uses; (ii) the flow of Sutlej river 
alone would not be sufficient for resolution of the dispute, therefore, the waters of all six rivers 
of the Indus system should be appropriated; (iii) functional perspective should be the best 
approach for settlement.87  
4.2.2 Indian Pre-Condition for World Bank’s Involvement 
  Though, the World Bank was initially involved in the dispute over the river Sutlej in 
1949, it adopted the Lilienthal principles in 1951, and formally offered its good offices on 6 
September the same year.88 The Pakistani premier, Liaquat Ali Khan, accepted the World 
Bank’s (WB) mediation offer on 25 September 1951.89  
 India also followed the suit but Jawaharlal Nehru specified the nature of this 
intervention and promptly disassociated the water dispute from Kashmir, saying: “I might 
make one point clear. The Canal Waters dispute between India and Pakistan has nothing to 
do with the Kashmir issue; it started with and has been confined to the irrigation systems of 
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East and West Punjab”.90  
 Though the Kashmir dispute was of prime importance, it remained secondary to the 
dispute over Indus waters. Pakistani premier also agreed saying that the parties should 
“refrain from using the negotiations in one dispute to delay progress in solving any other”.91  
4.2.3 Political Timings and Aptness of Proposal 
 Interestingly, not only the timing of intervention was suitable, but also the proposal 
put forward was appropriate to the stage of the dispute’s evolution.92  
 Two major issues were raised: 
 Riparian Rights: India proclaimed to invoke principle of absolute territorial 
sovereignty, envisaging total denial of waters of three eastern rivers to Pakistan, while 
Pakistan advocated the principle of historic uses. Interestingly, both relied upon the 
international water law to justify their demands and actions.93 
 Insufficient Water Availability: The bank recognized the inadequacy of water 
supply based on the existing storage potentialities for irrigation needs in the basin. It was 
considered as the most serious difficulty to assimilate divergent claims of India and Pakistan. 
Each side asserted its right to the available water.94  
 The Bank encouraged both parties to address the primary need for water rather than 
repeating their respective legal positions and claims. It outlined its position comprising three 
points. Firstly, the approach to dispute resolution should be engineering or technical, without 
any reference to political matters. Secondly, the Bank would only facilitate the process and 
not arbitrate. Thirdly, neither disputant would act to deteriorate the existing water supplies 
during the Bank’s involvement. The Bank’s approach established status quo and prevented 
further escalation of the conflict.95 Nasrullah observed that: 
“Though, all points were important but the third was crucially essential and urgent for 
the lower riparian Pakistan. Continuation of the existing supplies was a question of 
life and death for farmers of West Punjab and was vital for the maintenance of 
already fragile, national food supplies in the wake of millions of incoming Muslim 
immigrants from India.”96 
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4.2.4 Searching for Solutions 
 The World Bank encouraged both the disputants to workout a joint solution that 
would satisfy their needs but the ensuing differences forced it to ask the Indian and Pakistani 
delegates to draw up separate plans. However, when these separate plans also failed to 
bridge the differences, the Bank presented its own plan in 1954.97 
4.2.5 The Indian and Pakistani Plans of 1953 
India and Pakistan submitted their plans in October 1953. The Indian Plan allotted to 
India all the three eastern rivers (Ravi, Beas, Sutlej) plus 7 per cent of the three western 
rivers (Indus, Jhelum, Chenab). The Pakistani Plan allotted to Pakistan all the three western 
rivers plus 70 per cent of the eastern rivers.98 
Nasrullah observed that:  
“Despite differences, interestingly, the plans had a couple of common points too: (i) 
each party had favoured its own uses above the others; (ii) water availability 
estimates made by them were nearly similar; (iii) both rejected an integrated 
approach to share the waters between them; (iv) both appeared to recognise that 
India's use of the Indus basin could only come from the eastern rivers; and (v) 
neither side endorsed each others’ allocations for planned uses and future 
development.”99 
4.2.6 World Bank Plan of 1954 
 The Bank realised that “the problem could not be solved solely by technicians…. 
The Bank representative feels that he has the responsibility to put forward a proposal for the 
consideration of both sides to serve as the basis of the comprehensive plan.”100 Therefore, 
the Bank decided to present its own proposal on 5 February 1954 based on general principle 
that with the exception of local uses in Kashmir, the three western rivers would be reserved 
exclusively for the use and benefit of Pakistan and the three eastern rivers would be reserved 
entirely for India.101 
 The following table and subsequent figure compare the amounts allotted by the 
Bank along with the Indian and Pakistani plans.102 
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-------------------------------------------------------Table-5----------------------------------------- 
Pakistan's Plan                     India's Plan                Bank's Plan 
Total Usable 
Million acre-feet  118.00 119.00 119.00 
Billion cubic meters 145.14 146.37 146.37 
For Pakistan 
Million acre-feet  102.50 090.00 097.00 
Billion cubic meters 126.07 110.70 119.31 
Percent of total 087.00 076.00 081.00  
For India 
Million acre-feet  015.50 029.00 022.00 
Billion cubic meters 019.06 035.67 027.06 
Percent of total 013.00 024.00 019.00  
 
 
Figure-3: Indus Basin Water Allocation According to Various Plans  
(Source: F. J. Fowler, "Same Problems of Water Distribution between East and West 
Punjab," The Geographical Review, Vol. XL, No. 4 (October 1955). 
 
Nasrullah states that: 
“There were disagreements especially concerning ‘customary’ or ‘historical’ uses. 
India agreed only what was actually in use, whereas Pakistan urged for the in-
clusion of plans envisaged before Partition, especially projects for safeguarding and 
improving water supply in the Sindh province. The only convergent aspect was the 
premise that the water dispute was independent of the Kashmir issue, and that the 
current negotiations should not alter the status quo.”103 
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4.2.7 Re-engaging in Negotiations 
 The World Bank proposed division of the Indus rivers system. After a month and 
half, India was the first to accept the plan in March 1954.104  
 Pakistan did not respond promptly because it wanted secure and sustained 
alternative arrangements for the replacement of water lost to India from the three eastern 
rivers.  
“Further discussions with the Bank indicated that in reaching the engineering 
conclusion that such a diversion of the rivers would be consistent with the principles 
of the proposal, the Bank engineer had made no detailed engineering study but had 
rather compared broadly the aggregate seasonal supplies of water on the Western 
rivers ... than average year (1936-37) with the aggregate seasonal withdrawals or 
the Pakistan canals in the same year.”105 
 Pakistan was sceptical; it requested an American irrigation consultant, Mr. Royce J. 
Tipton, to make an independent appraisal of the Bank’s proposal.  
“Pakistan asked Mr. Royce J. Tipton, an eminent consultant engineer, to make an 
independent appraisal of the Bank proposal to determine whether it accomplished 
the results which it said it did. Mr. Tipton and his staff made a detailed 10-year study 
by 10-day periods. His report has been made available to the Bank and discussed 
with them.”106 
 Pakistan also arranged discussions with the Bank on the objections of the Bank’s 
proposal as to the irrigation areas in Pakistan to be met with flow supplies.  
“Under the interpretation of the bank engineer, all of Pakistan’s historic irrigation 
uses ... were to be set with flow supplies under the plan. Mr. Tipton tested the 
results f the proposal on this basis. It became clear even before the Tipton study 
was completed that the proposal did not work out the way the Banks engineer had 
said it did. The Bank engineer then modified his interpretation of the proposal so as 
to reduce certain of Pakistan’s sanctioned and planned uses to be set with flow 
supplies. This led to considerable confusion. Talks between the Pakistan Foreign 
Minister and the Bank Management in June 1954, however, resulted in a 
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considerable clarification of the Bank’s position.”107 
 Based on Tipton report representations were made to the Bank that the waters of 
western rivers was inadequate to fulfil the irrigation needs of cultivated land in Pakistan, 
without storage dams.108  
 The Bank representatives persuaded and reminded Pakistani delegates of the 
advantages implicit in its proposal. Firstly, that India would not interfere with the waters of the 
River Chenab; secondly, India would pay for the costs incurred in constructing the 
replacement works in Pakistan; and thirdly, Pakistan’s existing uses would be protected for 
the duration of the transition period.109  
 Pakistan made its concerns explicit and its foreign minister outlined the concerns 
that the existing and planned uses, at Sukkur and Gudu, should be met from the western 
rivers.110 Nasrullah observed that:  
“It [Pakistan] expressed apprehensions and also referred to the ambiguity about the 
implications of “relatively insignificant consumptive uses of western rivers by India”, 
a phrase used in the Bank’s proposal. If Pakistan had accepted it as such, the Bank 
proposal would have opened the way for India establishing future claims on Jammu 
and Kashmir waters.”111 
 The Bank gave assurances that supplies from the western rivers could compensate 
historic uses from the eastern rivers and bring most of the Sutlej Valley Canals up to an 
amount equivalent to allocation, and that this could be achieved without drawing down on the 
supplies needed to maintain historic uses depending upon the western rivers and to feed the 
projects under construction and without sacrificing waters for the planned requirements of 
Gudu and Sukkur.112 
 In January 1955, talks on the interim or ad hoc agreements started in which a series 
of agreements was signed: 1 April 1955 to 30 September 1955; 1 October 1955 to 31 March 
1956; 1 April 1956 to 30 September 1956; and 1 April 1959 to 31 March 1960. The only 
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period for which the parties were unable to agree was from 1 October 1957 to 30 September 
1958.113 
4.2.8 The 1956 Aide-Memoire 
 Throughout 1955 and 1956 Pakistan made it clear to the World Bank that its 1954 
plan had allocated insufficient water as compared to Pakistan’s irrigation needs, during critical 
times in late kharif (summer crops) and early rabi (winter crops), and without storage facilities 
it would not be possible to meet even replacement uses of water. After more than eighteen 
months’ study of its experts the Bank accepted Pakistan’s argument and issued an “Aide 
Memoire on May 21, 1956.  recognising that the ‘flow surplus’ in the Western rivers would not 
be sufficient to meet even the replacement needs in early and late Kharif unless storage was 
provided.”114  
“It called for an adjustment in its February 1954 plan, to assure timely water supply to 
Pakistan. This adjustment could be managed in two possible ways: firstly, in the form 
of water delivery to Pakistan on continuous basis from eastern rivers; secondly, 
construction of storage facilities on the western rivers with India’s contribution. The 
Bank preferred the later course of adjustment.”115 
 India, though had accepted the principle of division in 1954, demanding the same 
from the very beginning, was reluctant to accept the specific works the Aide Memoire was 
suggesting under the principle of ‘beneficiary-pays the costs’.116 
“Under the Bank proposal, as clarified by the management of the Bank, and to work 
out the adjustments in the division of supplies proposed which are deemed to be 
required in order to accomplish the objectives envisaged in the proposal. The ... 
issue as to the apportionment of water supplies is: How much, if any, water (by 
periods) should Pakistan continue to receive from the Eastern rivers?”117 
4.2.9 The 1958 Pakistani Plan 
 In the light of aide memoire Pakistan agreed to work out a plan: 
“The plan to be prepared will include transfers of supplies from the Western rivers to 
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replace to the extent possible the supplies historically used by Pakistan from 
Eastern rivers. It is apparent that available supplies in the Western rivers during July 
and August surplus to Pakistan’s historic uses and the requirements of projects in 
progress are sufficient to meet the full requirement of Pakistan’s existing uses on 
the Eastern rivers during these months. This fact alone will determine to a large 
extent the capacities and the alignment of the necessary link channels, working out 
the aspect of the problem can, therefore, proceed immediately even before the 
ultimate apportionment of supplies is finally determined.”118 
 The Pakistani plan further states: 
“Assuming that India agrees that supplies from the Western rivers should be 
transferred to meet the full requirements of Pakistan’s existing uses on the Eastern 
rivers during July and August (and to pay the cost of link channels and other works 
of necessary capacity), the volume of deliveries required from Eastern rivers will be 
substantially reduced.”119  
 In working out the ultimate division of water to be provided under the comprehensive 
plan, there are some major problems to be resolved. Pakistan expressed its four 
concerns:120 
1. What supplies are to be provided for Pakistan’s historic uses and projects in 
progress on the Western rivers? 
2. What new engineering works are to be constructed? 
3. What supplies are to be assumed to be available to meet Pakistan’s requirements? 
4. What adjustments are to be made if the dependable flow supplies available are 
insufficient to provide for Pakistan’s historic uses and projects in progress on the 
Western rivers? 
 The Bank further explained: 
“The Bank proposal...provides that historic (pre-Partition, actual) withdrawal of all 
canals should be... from flow supplies, while there may be differences of opinion as 
to what constitutes appropriate protection of these supplies, there will be no dispute 
as to what the pre-Partition, actual pattern was.”121 
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For the purpose of data it was agreed that: 
“The actual withdrawal for all canals as published in the Punjab Gauge and 
Discharge registers for the period 16 October 1921 to 15 October 1946 were 
accepted as correct basic data at the second meeting of the Working Party. These 
data are summarized by canals by 10-day periods for each year of the 25-year 
period in the Working Party study withdrawal from the Indus River System.”122 
 Considering all the factors and explanations, Pakistan presented its cost-effective 
alternative London Plan to the Bank and India in a meeting held in July 1958. It proposed 
construction of dams on the rivers Indus and Jhelum and ten link canals instead of the Upper 
Indus Link canal, construction of which would have been too expensive. The Tarbela Dam on 
Indus River envisaged providing water reservoir for development in Sindh, and replacement in 
Punjab and Bahawalpur via two trans-Thal link canals transferring water from Kalabagh to 
Jhelum, and Taunsa to Panjnad. The Mangla Dam on the Jhelum River, in Pakistani-held 
Kashmir, planned supplying replacement water to Punjab. On the tributaries of rivers Indus 
and Jhelum three additional subsidiary dams were also proposed to transfer the stored water 
to the upper parts of Punjab and Bahawalpur via a series of link canals.123 
4.2.10 The 1958 Indian and Pakistani Plans 
 In December 1958, the Indian delegation proposed using a number of sites on the 
Chenab River in Indian-held Jammu-Kashmir and Himachal Pradesh.124  
 The plan was to build two diversion tunnels transferring water from the Chenab to 
other rivers, thereof to the canal command areas. India suggested that if a storage dam was 
still needed then one would be built at Dhiangarh on the Chenab, where India constructed 
Salal Dam during 1970s. India promised that if Pakistan would authorise use of these sites, it 
could guarantee delivery of half of its replacement needs. According to the Indian estimates 
Pakistan would need 10 MAF, thus 5 MAF should be supplied from within Pakistan by the 
MR, BRBD and BS link canals.125 
 “Pakistani plan persuaded the Bank to look into its real concerns. Because without 
some storage facilities, the flow supply of western rivers was totally inadequate to replace 
Pakistan’s existing uses of the waters from the eastern rivers; and Pakistan with limited 
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resources could not construct any dam.”126 
 Eugene Black himself later pointed out that “the Bank’s plan would have left much of 
Pakistan’s irrigation system without water.”127 To solve this, an independent engineering 
appraisal of Bank plan was undertaken for Pakistan by R. J. Tipton, a consulting engineer of 
Denver, Colorado. It revealed that the Bank proposal did not meet the standard of fairness 
under International Law, that it failed to distribute equitably the water of the Indus rivers 
system, and that it would be violation of the principle of utilizing water resources in such a 
manner as to promote development most effectively.128 
 After some further consultation, the Bank reached the conclusions contained in its 
aide-memoir of May 21, 1956. The aide-memoir concluded that: There would be consistent 
shortage in rabi, occasionally beginning in late September or extending into early April...of a 
degree, duration and frequency which the Bank could not regard as tolerable.129 
 The Bank, therefore, felt that an adjustment in its proposal of February 1954 (was) 
called for. This adjustment should, in the Bank's view, assured Pakistan timely supply of water 
sufficient to eliminate the shortages. The adjustment could take the form of continued 
deliveries of “timely” water from the eastern rivers, or construction of storage dams on the 
western rivers. The Bank preferred the later course, and suggested for this purpose that flows 
of the western rivers should be exploited to the maximum possible extent.130 
 The basic issue was solved, but it took four years of hard negotiations to work out a 
concrete solution. The difficulties did not arise merely from differences in approach between 
India and Pakistan. There were big problems of finance. It had become apparent that the cost 
of the construction required for a settlement on the lines of the World Bank proposal was 
beyond the capacity of India and Pakistan.131 
 The final agreement was made possible by the steadfast perseverance and 
“economic diplomacy,” to use the phrase of President Black of the World’s Bank, and through 
the friendly assistance of the United States, the United Kingdom, Canada, Australia, New 
Zealand and West Germany. The Indus Waters Treaty, ultimately, was signed at Karachi on 
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September 19, 1960.132  
4.3 SUMMARY 
 The overview of the Indus waters dispute highlights that the conflicting claims 
(riparian rights based on relative geographic location) and the attempts of the upper-riparian 
(because of superimposed/armistice boundaries and favourable surface features) in 
exploiting weaknesses (relative location and dependency on resources) of the lower-riparian, 
brought a deadlock in India-Pakistan dialogue. The Indian action to cut-off water supply to 
Pakistan generated sense of insecurity for the latter and conferred permanency to the 
ongoing distrust between them. 
 Bilateral negotiations pursued to settle the dispute intensified the acrimony between 
India and Pakistan. The Delhi Agreement proved to be an obstacle for any bilateral 
settlement. Both countries persistently asserted that their demands and rights are legally 
justified. 
 The resultant deadlock and aggravating tensions made intervention of a third party 
inevitable. Pakistan repeatedly demanded ICJ arbitration but India, with equal frequency, 
rejected the request. The separation of the Kashmir and the Indus waters disputes and the 
undertaking by India to the Bank that existing supplies to Pakistan would continue till the 
final agreement is reached marked the start of nine-year long process of international 
mediation between the enduring rivals.  
 The section on mediation process argues that timing of intervention by a mediator is 
very pivotal and it also influences the outcome. The greater the deteriorating relations 
between disputants the higher would be need to search for an intermediary. A conflict is 
considered as ‘ripe’ for resolution when the disputants reach a ‘mutually hurting stalemate’, to 
use Zartman’s terminology. Generally, the influence of a mediator emanates from its 
institutional credibility in terms of financial independence and soundness. Moreover, an 
efficient and timely communication is essential between the mediator and the disputants. The 
mediator should not impose a given solution but persuasion is vital in terms of economic 
gains and incentives. These factors not only determine success but also suitability of the 
mediator to the nature of the dispute.  
 The Bank assumed its role as facilitator promoting communication between India 
and Pakistan. It repeatedly provided opportunities to the disputants to project their own points 
of view; a feature which persisted throughout the mediation process. Nevertheless, the Bank 
gradually strengthened its control over the mediation process and presented its own resolve 
to break the impasses. It controlled the physical and psychological environment within the 
mediating room but also encouraged the disputants to take the final decision. The bargaining 
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lever with the Bank was the dependency of the disputants for financial assistance. The 
mediator effectively used this tool to keep the disputing parties in negotiation. 
 It is also important to note the specific nature of the Indus Waters Treaty. The 
accommodation became possible with the postponement of vexing political issues. For 
example, the dispute over Kashmir still remained, and may even have been intensified 
because the rivers Pakistan was still dependent flowed through this disputed state. Here 
question arises: why then Pakistan accepted an ‘inferior’ solution? Postponement of political 
dimensions of the issue, nature of the disputed resource, suitability of a mediator and 
accommodation as preferred security strategy, on the part of lower riparian, offer the 
explanation. 
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Chapter 5 
THE STRATEGY OF ACCOMMODATION OVER INDUS RIVERS 
 This chapter categorically deals with the question of preferring accommodation as a 
security strategy and postponement of political issues in face of vital economic issues in 
certain situations. Focus of the study is to explore, what factors compel the riparian for 
seeking accommodation, which party initiates it and why it becomes a preferred security 
strategy even amid enduring rivalries. The initiation of accommodation by the lower riparian, 
Pakistan, and acceptance by the upper riparian, India, is the main thrust of this section. The 
core hypothesis of study: If enduring rivals reach a mutually hurting-stalemate then they 
prefer accommodation on critical concerns and postpone political issues, is tested in this 
chapter. 
 For this purpose the chapter is divided into three sections. The first section analyses 
the factors behind the initiation of accommodation by Pakistan. There were series of initiatives 
for accommodation. The lack of culture of negotiation and complex nature of the water 
dispute led to a virtual breakdown of negotiations on various occasions. Every time a new 
initiative was proposed by the third party mediator, to save the negotiation process, which 
continued for about nine years until the Treaty was concluded in 1960. Here, the focus is on 
two principal initiatives: first, the initiative at the onset of the conflict in 1948 when India 
clogged the water supply to Pakistan; and second, the initiative of 1958 when negotiations 
were made successful by the military regime in Pakistan with the unconditional acceptance of 
the World Bank’s Proposal.  
 The second section identifies the techniques that facilitated the process of 
accommodation, specifically engaging the disputants in decade-long negotiations under the 
auspices of the World Bank with a promise to make available financial resources if they 
reached a settlement. 
 The third section delves on a post-treaty event of accommodation, where both parties 
accommodated each other’s concerns for the construction of a dam by the upper riparian on 
the River Chenab, commonly known as the Salal Dam. India created the issue in early 1970s, 
used it as a political tool and kept this issue lingering, until Pakistan recognised separation of 
East Pakistan as an independent state of Bangladesh. Consequently, India accommodated all 
Pakistani concerns related to the design of the dam. 
 5.1 Initiation of Accommodation 
 For an explanation of the motivations of Pakistan in 1948 and 1958, in initiation of 
bilateral dialogue and then accommodating the Indian demands by yielding to its legitimate 
claims to the “historic uses” of waters from the eastern rivers, the following three factors are 
analysed: (1) efforts of various governments in Pakistan to minimize losses, (2) the 
commitment to domestic economic and political reforms, and (3) the involvement of an 
influential third party mediator. 
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5.1.1  Efforts to Minimise Losses 
As stated earlier, on 1 April 1948, India cut off water supplies to Pakistan using the 
headworks of the eastern rivers that were situated in its territory as a result of the Partition of 
Punjab. Overnight, this action gave birth to another crisis (beside the ongoing war between 
Indian regular army and the tribals of northern Kashmir and the peoples of Jammu and 
Kashmir) between India and Pakistan. Prior to the description of the compelling 
circumstances under which Pakistan initiated accommodation with India, the external politico-
military dimension should be dilated upon, in addition, to the domestic economic situation. 
Indian action produced a prompt and devastating impact on the domestic economy of 
Pakistan. Although, it was a well thought-out strategy of India but interestingly, the only 
explanation it could state for its action was that East Punjab was anxious to establish its 
exclusive ownership of the waters flowing through its territory and it did not want West Punjab 
to acquire any legal rights through its continued use of these waters.1 
One of the major reasons behind Pakistan’s initiative for accommodation with India in 
1948 was its desire to minimise losses in the external military, political and internal economic 
spheres.2  
To estimate the acuteness of the situation, as perceived by the Pakistani leaders at 
that time, one has to realise the importance of river water for Pakistan’s predominantly 
agrarian society and national economy, especially in the provinces of Punjab and Sindh. In 
fact the five tributaries (the Jhelum, Chenab, Ravi, Beas and Sutlej) of the Indus river system 
in Pakistan provide the largest integrated irrigation system in the world, irrigating about 30 
million acres. The extended system of canals originating from their headworks in the upper 
part of the Basin (East Punjab) was irrigating about 90 per cent of crop lands and supporting 
a population of about 40 million in Pakistan (West Punjab), more than half of the country's 
total population at that time.3  
Obviously, the absolute dependence of the West Punjab’s agrarian economy and 
society on irrigated agriculture made it extremely vulnerable to any fluctuation in river water 
supplies. 
Prime Minister of Pakistan, Liaquat Ali Khan, expressed his concerns to his Indian 
counterpart, Jawaharlal Nehru: 
“The view of the West Punjab Government is that the water supply cannot be stopped 
on any account whatsoever and we fully endorse this view. Such stoppage is a most 
serious matter and affects nearly a million of acres of land. It will cause distress to 
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millions and will result in calamitous reduction in production of foodgrains, etc.”4 
The gravity and extent of major losses which motivated Pakistan to initiate 
accommodation with India were also projected in one of Pakistan’s official publications: 
“The economy of West Punjab is agricultural.... The flow of water in rivers and canals 
is the life-blood of the country. Yet in April 1948,… India cut off this flow in every 
canal crossing the border....In an area as arid and densely populated as the Indus 
basin, the appropriation of one community of water of another is an act, with tragic 
and far-reaching consequences…. Such an act can be more devastating than an 
armed attack….”5 
 Although, the water supply was restored after five weeks, but this period coincided 
with the critical summer sowing time when there was an acute need for irrigation water. 
Obviously, late availability of water was useless, and an entire season was lost. Under such 
circumstances, minimising such losses to possible extent was among the top priorities of the 
Pakistani government as it was a question of survival of Pakistan.6  
The fact immediately attracted attention of the world community when an independent 
study conducted by David E. Lilienthal, former chairman of the Tennessee Valley Authority of 
the United States, was made to public in 1951. He warned that: "No army, with bombs and 
shellfire, could devastate a land so thoroughly as Pakistan could be devastated by the simple 
expedient of India's permanently shutting off the sources of water that keep the fields and 
people of Pakistan alive.”7 
 For Pakistan the situation was appallingly worrisome because India not only was 
aware of its pre-planned power potential against Pakistan but also considered it legitimate to 
use to its advantage.8 Moreover, the Indian future intentions were also surfaced soon. In an 
article published in Vigil (New Delhi) on 8 August 1951 under the heading, "How Strong is 
Pakistan?" the Indian leadership challenged the national power and sovereignty of Pakistan 
saying:  
“...though Pakistan has one of the largest irrigation systems in the world, she is 
entirely dependent for water on the rivers of East Punjab and Kashmir. If India were 
to cut off the waters, it is bound to impair Pakistan's strength considerably. Even her 
very existence could be in danger. Whether India would adopt such a perfectly 
legitimate but ruthless attitude without grave provocations is another matter. Pakistan 
produces plenty of food but that production depends on canal water which in a sense 
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is a gift of India and is in her power to stop.”9 
 In addition to it in 1948, Pakistan’s vulnerability vis-à-vis India was enormous 
because of the ongoing war in Kashmir and the expressed desire of the Indian leadership to 
absorb Pakistan back into India.10  
It had experienced massive human losses and sufferings of Partition. Its meagre 
resources were already exploited to the maximum extent in an effort to address host of 
problems: the settlement of millions of refugees was underway and fierce fighting was going 
on with India in Jammu and Kashmir. Use of force to capture strategic headworks was 
unthinkable for Pakistan. Because, pursuit of any major armed conflict would have provided 
India a justification to keep water supply shut-off for an extended period, inflicting 
unaffordable economic losses and social costs. Under such circumstances, accommodation 
with India on the Indus waters dispute appeared to be the most prudent and pragmatic 
security strategy.11 
 Pakistan immediately asked for negotiation with India but this first Pakistani initiative 
merely succeeded in producing an interim agreement. The subsequent bilateral talks and 
later facilitations by the mediator were prolonged for a number of years, reaching more 
procedural or transitional agreements but nothing was agreed that could be called as 
substantial.  
One of the important procedural agreements negotiated under the good offices of the 
World Bank was India’s undertaking not to divert water from its eastern rivers till the time any 
acceptable solution had been worked out between the two states. This was a condition which 
provided Pakistan time to search for alternative sources.  
 Ayub Khan points out that: 
“India was trying to appropriate for her own use all the waters of the Sutlej, the Beas, 
and the Ravi; and, perhaps, some waters of the Chenab. As an upper riparian, she 
was in a position to deprive us of all this water which flowed through her territory. 
Tempted by the prospects of quick economic development by utilizing easily available 
water India started on huge engineering works which could only result in the complete 
desolation of vast areas of land in Pakistan.”12  
When in 1954 India opened new network of canals including Bhakara-Nagal Link, 
Pakistan expressed its strong resentment and the national press also projected its posture 
very strongly. The precise and focused reports highlighted that, "the supply of water in the 
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Sutlej canals [Pakistan] registered a steep drop of 12,000 cusec in the last 24 hours as a 
result of India's action in letting go her Bhakra-Nagal Canals.”13  
The Prime Minister of Pakistan called it "the most serious and most recent violation of 
the [transitional] agreement of March 13, 1952”14 and the national feeling was projected in an 
editorial, which said: "today our independence, our sovereignty is in danger. Have we totally 
lost the will to defend freedom?"15 The Zamindar (newspaper) termed it an act of aggression 
and added: “There are now two ways open to Pakistan—either to submit to India and let her 
economy be ruined, or to resort to direct action to secure her just rights.”16 
Bhatti argues that the opening of the huge Bhakra-Nagal canals was the beginning of 
a “mutually hurting stalemate” for India and Pakistan. Indian undertaking to the World Bank, at 
the time of accepting its Good Offices, not to work on any further projects in East Punjab, 
which could impair the existing supplies to Pakistan, proved to be very effective. This meant 
that economic development would remain arrested in East Punjab until the final settlement 
was reached. Therefore, the stalemate was hurting India in two major ways: first, India could 
not economically benefit by developing mass irrigation projects in East Punjab; second, the 
opportunity cost of time (i.e. the level of development India could have attained in that time) 
was increasing with the passage of time.17  
On the other hand, Pakistan's situation was even worse. It wanted a resolution but 
domestic political concerns prevented leaders from yielding its claim over "historic uses" of 
waters from the eastern rivers. The dilemma was that Pakistan could not keep India 
indefinitely in negotiations. Possibilities were high that either India would unilaterally withdraw 
from the negotiations or the stalemate would force the World Bank to quit as a mediator. 
Pakistan’s worry was to win a solution which could provide it an adequate replacement for the 
three eastern rivers, which of course was not possible without provision of storage facilities.18  
India, on the other hand, was not only in hurry to develop water resources but was 
also asserting its upper riparian status. In March 1958, Sardar Patel, a senior minister of the 
Indian government, stated in the parliament: 
“We shall not wait a day longer than 1962. When our [Rajisthan] canal and the 
Sirhind Feeder are ready we shall withdraw the water that now goes to Pakistan. I 
shall implore Pakistan that they should not regard this as any kind of threat….”19 
 In Pakistan, Patel’s statement was understood as a deadline. Later, in the same year 
(1958), civilian government was overthrown and General Ayub Khan imposed Martial Law in 
                                            
13
 The Pakistan Times, (Lahore), July 9, 1954, quoted by Aloys Arthur Michel, The Indus Rivers: A 
Study of the Effects of Partition (New Haven and London: Yale University Press, 1967). 
14
 Gulhati, Indus Waters Treaty, op. cit., p. 163. 
15
 The Evening Star (Karachi), July 9, 1954, quoted by Gulhati, Indus Waters Treaty, op. cit., p. 162. 
16
 Quoted by Gulhati, Ibid. 
17
 Bhatti, op. cit., pp. 41-42. 
18
 Ibid. 
19
 Gulhati, Indus Waters Treaty, op. cit., p. 234. 
5: The Strategy of Accommodation over Indus Rivers 
 
129
Pakistan. Soon after a radical shift came in Pakistan’s previous stance of not yielding its 
historic uses, when it unconditionally accepted the Bank’s proposal of 1954 and agreed not 
only to the surgical divide of the geographically integrated Indus river system but also 
implicitly relinquished propriety rights of these rivers to India. 
Why did military leadership decided to accommodate Indian demands? In his 
autobiography, General Ayub Khan stated: 
“Soon after Partition, India chose to take the drastic action of withholding water 
supplies to our certain canals and created a grave crisis for us. Water was released 
only under certain conditions to which we had no option but to agree, for the 
alternative was the physical devastation of vast fertile areas. The problem was made 
more complex because, until then, the Indus Basin irrigation system had been 
developed entirely from river flow and without reservoir storage. Water supplies were 
governed not only by seasonal variations, but also by the yearly variations in the flow 
of the rivers depending on rainfall in the upper reaches of the Himalayas.”20 
“My main worry was the vulnerability of Pakistan. The sources of the rivers were in 
India along with the headworks. India had made all arrangements to divert the waters 
and the Indian Army was three times the size of our army. I felt that if negotiations 
with India broke down, and the Indians did decide to divert the waters, we should be 
facing a situation of war. Every factor was against us. The only sensible thing to do 
was to try and get a settlement even though it might be the second-best, because if 
we did not, we stood to lose everything.21 
 General Ayub Khan had been Commander-in-Chief of the Pakistani armed forces 
since 1951. Prior to the Partition, he had served in the British Indian Army for 18 years. 
“When I was Commander-in-Chief, there was a great deal of talk in the Press about the Indus 
Basin dispute. The Indian seemed determined to cut off water supplies to our canals. If that 
had happened, the country might well have found itself involved in an armed conflict with 
India.”22 
Ayub Khan also faced confrontation from the technical experts as well as 
administration of Pakistan. He points out that: 
“I should like to describe the confrontation I had with our own technical experts and 
administration, I sensed that they did not fully realize the gravity of the situation and 
were asking for moon when we were in a position of weakness all along the line. 
They were also trying to dictate policy and were taking up extreme positions. Some 
thirty or forty of them were assembled in Government House, Lahore, where I 
addressed them. I said: ‘Gentlemen, this problem is far-reaching consequences to us. 
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Let me tell you that every factor is against Pakistan. I am not saying that we should 
surrender our rights but, at the same time, I will say this that: if we can get a solution 
which we can live with, we shall be very foolish not to accept it. Now when I say that, I 
am in fact saying it to myself because I shall have to take the responsibility for the 
solution. ‘The responsibility does not lie on any one of you, so let me tell you very 
plainly that the policy is going to be mine, I shall consult you whenever I am in doubt 
regarding technical details, but if any one of you interferes with the policy, I shall deal 
with him myself.’”23  
Bhatti argues that Ayub Khan was fully acquainted with the inherited sound military 
infrastructure of India and the power asymmetry that existed between Pakistan and India. 
Furthermore, Pakistan neither had the “strategic depth” necessary for effective defence nor 
any strategic military alliances within the major powers that could offset its various 
weaknesses. To shore up Pakistan's defences, General Ayub Khan convinced the leaders to 
join military alliances with the West which Pakistan signed as SEATO on 8 September 1954 
and CENTO (earlier named Baghdad Pact) on 23 September 1955. During this period, 
Pakistan also received substantial military aid from USA for the modernisation of its defence 
forces.24 
By the year 1958, Pakistan had achieved a credible defensive capability vis-à-vis 
India but this capacity was not enough to go on offensive against India. In terms of strength of 
armed forces, weapons and ammunition Pakistan was legging behind India. General Ayub 
Khan in his book mentioned the 3 to 1 numerical inferiority of the Pakistan Army in 
comparison to its Indian counterpart. Apparently, Pakistan was unable to counter Indian 
predominance in military power if India ever decided to sever water supplies to Pakistan. 25 
Soon after military coup realism and prudence was followed by the Pakistani military 
leadership, as Ayub Khan states: 
“When one is dealing with a sensitive problem of this nature, one has to be realistic 
and judge the situation dispassionately in order to formulate a rational approach. Very 
often the best is the enemy of the good. We abandoned the chase of the ideal and 
accepted what was good after a careful and realistic appreciation of the overall 
situation…. Emotions had no place in it, nor could they be allowed to have any place 
where the future and safety of the millions of people depended on a solution.”26  
Under such circumstances, the accommodative initiative of the Ayub regime was, in 
part, driven by the motivation to minimise expected losses in the domestic economic and the 
external politico-military spheres.  
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 5.1.2  The Commitment to Domestic Political and Economic Reforms 
 This section explores the magnitude and pace of domestic economic, political, and 
administrative reforms in Pakistan at two points in time: in 1948 and then in 1958. The 
objective is to illustrate how these reforms facilitated the decision of the civil and military 
leadership of Pakistan to launch an accommodation process with its arch rival India. 
 In 1948, when the Indus waters dispute was created by India, the leaders of Pakistan 
were not only in the midst of introducing various reforms in the country rather they were 
committed to implement them. The reforms were being carried out at two levels: 1) at the 
procedural level, the leaders were trying to build administrative, political and economic 
systems that could not only fill the gap left by the British colonial rule but would also work 
more effectively for Pakistan; 2) the most dear to the leaders, on a broader scale, were their 
efforts to realise the vision of Pakistan that they had envisaged and promised to the Muslims 
of the Subcontinent during the independence movement.27 
 These procedural reforms were affected very deeply due to the lack of availability of 
resources with Pakistan because neither the share promised to Pakistan at the time of 
Partition was judicious nor did India fulfil the commitments. For example, Pakistan inherited 
96 ICS (Indian Civil Service) officers in comparison to India's 418. Literary speaking, Pakistan 
had to build its administrative system from a scratch.28  
President Ayub Khan states in his autobiography that when he took over as General 
Officer Commanding in East Pakistan in 1947 he found that the provincial government was 
‘poorly staffed,’ "worse still, it was politically weak and unstable. There was no army….We 
had very poor accommodation; at Headquarters there was no table, no chair, no stationery—
we had virtually nothing at all; not even any maps of East Pakistan.”29 
To improve administrative performance the government initiated a major drive to 
recruit able Pakistanis from around the globe, especially students studying Britain and North 
America. The government was anxious to train these young men and employ them to solve 
the grave problems, such as rehabilitation of more than six million refugees who had crossed 
over from the Indian Punjab, resolve evacuee property issues and other revenue matters. 
Efforts were made to form basic organisation and the provision of office space and furniture 
for the government officials. However, limited resources remained a major constraint on the 
government's ability to carry out various reforms.30 
 Fresh recruitment was also carried out in the Pakistan Army. At the time of Partition, 
India received the lion's share of military assets. In personnel, Pakistan received one-third of 
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the Royal Indian Army, one-fourth of the Royal Indian Navy and one-fifth of the Royal Indian 
Air Force. Moreover, all of the sixteen ordinance factories and major training centres went to 
India, with the notable exception of Quetta Staff College. Pakistan received approximately 
one-fifth of the military hardware (including jeeps, tanks, etc.).31 Moreover, defence of East 
Pakistan was a logistical nightmare while both parts of Pakistan were separated apart by 
more than 1,000 miles (1,565 km) of Indian territory. Immediate reforms undertaken in 1948 
were included the retention of British officers, organisation of personnel from the Royal Indian 
Forces into new units, recruitment and training of new personnel and procurement of military 
hardware.32 
 On political front, various reforms were also carried out: Firstly, the government was 
trying to regulate its relations with various autonomous units within West Pakistan, such as 
the princely states (of Bahawalpur, Kalat, Swat and Dir), tribal agencies in the Northwest 
(previously under the direct control of the Viceroy of India) and the fully autonomous tribal 
areas. Secondly, the government had initiated a debate in the Constituent Assembly on the 
future Constitution of Pakistan. At that time, constitution making was perhaps one of the 
gravest issues confronting the government. The leaders, since 1948 were aware of the 
significance of framing a new constitution, at the earliest. This document was supposed to 
deliver a stable, independent homeland for the people who had struggled relentlessly for 
years to have their own separate country. Guiding principle was to create and establish 
political institutions, preferably based on Islamic thought and ideology.33  
 The situation in the domestic economic sphere was worst comparative to the other 
sectors. "Partition gave India most of the industry of undivided India, and because many of 
the entrepreneurial and trading classes migrated to Pakistan at Partition, India also had a 
more skilled labour force than Pakistan.”34  
The following table provides a clear picture of the industrial imbalance between the 
two states. 
-------------------------------------- --------------- TABLE-6-------------------------------------------------------- 
The Division of Industrial Assets between India and Pakistan in 1947 
Type of Industry      India   Pakistan 
Cotton        857  15 
Sugar        176  15 
Jute        111  00 
Cement, Lime-work and Potteries    057  08 
Iron and Steel       036  00 
Glasswork       112  05 
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
Source: O.H.K. Spate, "The Partition of India and the Prospects of Pakistan," Geographical 
Review, No.38 (1948), p. 22. 
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 Bhatti believes that the only area where Pakistan was better off than India was the 
extensive and well-integrated irrigation network that the British had built in West Punjab, 
which fortunately happened to form part of West Pakistan. These irrigation channels were the 
lifeline for the sustenance of its socio-economic system. Pakistan’s total dependence on India 
for irrigation supplies compelled it to negotiate the issue immediately. It did not have the will 
and mandatory resources to fight over the Indus waters dispute with India. Mohammad Ali 
Jinnah, died in 1948—a year after the Partition. His successor, Liaquat Ali Khan, was 
assassinated in 1951. The early and untimely disappearance of these two popular leaders 
from the political scene of Pakistan has rightly been attributed as the cause of the political 
crisis that gripped the state in its formative years. Between 1951 and 1958 Pakistan had 
seven prime ministers. The politicians at national level, totally disregarded to the political 
ethics, social morality and principles of conscience, kept continually changing their party’s 
loyalty. Another characteristic of this period was the acute and unending tussle between the 
federal and the provincial governments. Much before the imposition of the 1958 Martial Law, it 
had become a routine for the Governor General and then President to dismiss provincial chief 
ministers who did not toe the official line.35  
Economic development in Pakistan was put on the back burner during this era. The 
politicians were busy looting the meagre national treasury as if there was no tomorrow. 
“Suffice it to say that the public had become disenchanted with the politicians and many 
quarters of the society looked towards the Army to salvage the country from its pathetic state 
of affairs.”36 President Ayub Khan described his martial law regime as ‘revolution’: “the 
immediate objective was to rehabilitate the civil and constitutional organs of the state. They 
had become ineffective and oppressive through misuse and exploitation.”37 Bhatti highlights 
that the reforms in land acquisition, the settlement of refugees along with economic measures 
to control price-hike and prevent smuggled goods from entering the market, and 
establishment of education and judicial systems were Ayub’s foremost priorities at domestic 
front. However, his ambitions for Pakistan were quite grandiose, to say the least.38 According 
to him,  
"…among the long-term objectives of the revolution was the introduction of major 
reforms designed to remove the confusion and imbalance in the social and economic 
life in the country. These reforms were to culminate in the introduction of a proper 
Constitution and restoration of constitutional life...[Furthermore] what the country 
needed was a positive effort to move forward to build itself and the economy into a 
dynamic and progressive force.”39  
 Thus, military leadership’s commitment to major domestic reforms was a significant 
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factor in Pakistan's acceptance, in 1958, of the Bank’s Proposal pending since 1954. This 
was a new initiative for accommodation with India after the protracted negotiations had almost 
reached a stage of deadlock in 1957. Though the perception of loss prevention in the external 
politico-military sphere was the motivating factor for accommodation initiative in 1958, the 
regime was well aware of the fact that "peaceful co-existence" (in President Ayub's words) 
with India would free-up resources that would help the regime in the domestic agenda.40  
 In addition to the above circumstances, three additional factors played a significant 
role: (1) Fear of losing external military and political support from the US and the West if 
Pakistan ever refused to accept the US and World Bank’s advice; (2) Signing of the Treaty 
under international mediation was a formal acceptance of Pakistan’s sovereignty by India; (3) 
The Bank’s plan for the construction of link-canals for diversion of water from western rivers to 
the eastern rivers, within Pakistan’s territory, had an inherent military advantage to defend the 
country against future ground offensive from India. Each of these points is elaborated below. 
 Pakistan was totally banking upon the US and its Western allies for any needful 
political support on the Kashmir issue. It’s joining to the US-sponsored alliances, such as 
SEATO and CENTO and keeping Commonwealth membership was purposefully geared to 
secure, political support on Kashmir issue. Notwithstanding the fact and knowingly well, that 
these alliances only had a military utility against Communist aggression. 
 The conclusion of the Indus Waters Treaty under the auspices of the World Bank 
ended the long-standing Indian moves and aspirations to compel Pakistan to join back the 
Indian Union. The Treaty was a declared acceptance of Pakistan’s sovereignty by its archrival 
India. As an illustration, the Article IX of the Indus Waters Treaty guaranteed Pakistan’s 
sovereignty and independence as a separate nation state. 
 The Indian military presence in Kashmir was a sword of Damocles hanging over 
Pakistan’s head. The river corridors were wide open and were totally vulnerable to all types of 
military manoeuvres and threats of deep penetration into its territory. The construction of 
canals, linking western rivers with the eastern rivers, provided a flank protection against any 
mechanized military manoeuvrability. For, crossing of canals was a nightmare for even a 
highly modern mechanized army during that period. The Indian objective to capture major city 
of Lahore in 1965 War was frustrated only because its mechanized troops failed to cross by 
the BRB link canal, which provided sufficient reaction time to Pakistan army to check the 
Indian massive onslaught aimed at capturing Lahore—the capital of Punjab province. Had it 
eventuated, India would have secured a golden opportunity to bargain Kashmir. 
 5.1.3  Involvement of an Influential Mediator 
 One can’t say with confidence that Pakistan's first initiative in 1948 for 
accommodation was influenced by any third party. Nor one can blame an absence of culture 
of negotiation from Pakistani side in 1948. Rather Pakistan was eager to settle water dispute 
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with India because of compulsions of geography—the water of the Ravi and Sutlej rivers was 
a life-line for the ‘food-basket’ of Pakistan (West Punjab). However, the presence of the World 
Bank as mediator, over the Indus waters dispute, since 1951 did have a momentous impact 
on Pakistan army precipitating into General Ayub Khan's decision to accommodate the Indian 
demands in 1958. 
 Mediators from the World Bank considering the charged political environment of non-
cooperation between India and Pakistan reached the decision that the only way to resolve the 
stalemate was to persuade Pakistan to accept the division of rivers in the wake of the offer to 
build storage dams on two of the three western rivers that Pakistan would have received 
exclusively for appropriation and development. This offer was in addition to the construction of 
link canals that would transfer waters from the western rivers to the areas of the West Punjab, 
previously irrigated by the eastern rivers. India remained obstinate that it would only pay for 
the link canals and not for the proposed dams. The Indian intransigence provided an 
opportunity for the Bank to take up the financial issue with some friendly countries (including 
USA., UK, Canada, Australia and New Zealand) regarding funds for irrigation projects in 
Pakistan. 
 Military government realised the vulnerabilities of Pakistan vis-à-vis the upper-riparian 
India. President Ayub Khan fully comprehended the situation that the problem “if not tackled 
properly, may well mean the end of the country.” He was fully acquainted with the Bank's offer 
too and knew that if Pakistan did not reach a settlement with India in the near future, the 
golden opportunity to develop the water resources with the help of friendly governments along 
with the waters of the three eastern rivers would be lost for ever.  
There was another genuine problem in Banks’ offer. The Bank promised 600 million 
dollars for the construction of two dams at river Jhelum—Mangla and Rohtas. Rohtas was a 
small dam and there was no facility to store surplus water, especially during rainy season. 
Pakistan wanted a dam at Tarbela (on the Indus River) instead of the much smaller, Rohtas 
dam, proposed by the Bank. The difference in the costs of these two projects was about $200 
million. President Ayub Khan explained how he tried to convince the Bank's President, Mr. 
Eugene Black: 
“I knew that when Eugene heard it [the staggering difference in the costs of two 
projects] he would hit the roof. And so he did. But I told him, and I quote the words as 
I recall using then: 'I have been around these areas which are going to be affected by 
the withdrawal of waters by India. People have told me very plainly that if they have to 
die through drought and hunger they would prefer to die in battle and they expect me 
to give them that chance. Our jawans [troops] and the rest of the people feel the 
same way. So this country is on the point of blowing up if you don't lend a helping 
hand. This is a human problem of a grave nature and cannot be blinked away. What 
we are being called upon to do is to barter away naturally-flowing waters into our 
canals, for storage water, and the history of storage is that it begins to silt the moment 
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it is completed. Besides, we are going to be put back by about ten years or so by 
building these storages and link-canals. All this effort could have been put to more 
constructive effort. So, we are making great sacrifices.”41  
Bhatti argues that Pakistan was not able to raise the finances needed for the 
construction of these dams and link canals. Had the Bank not been present on the scene or 
had it not offered to raise funds for development projects in Pakistan, Ayub Khan's initiative 
would not have come about. The ‘carrot’ extended by the Bank played a significant role in 
facilitating Pakistan's initiative for accommodation in 1958.42 
 5.2 Process of Accommodation 
 In this section, various techniques that the negotiator employed in order to facilitate 
the process of accommodation over the Indus waters dispute are dealt with precisely. The 
factors instrumental in accommodation between India and Pakistan were: (1) successful pre-
negotiation, (2) involvement of an influential third party, (3) quiet or secret diplomacy, (4) 
postponement of political issues, and (5) reminiscent wording of the agreement. 
 
 5.2.1  Successful Pre-Mediation Negotiations 
 The accommodation over the Indus waters dispute took about twelve years long 
negotiation and mediation process. Initially, the chief engineers of the East and West Punjab 
involved in negotiations, later, the dispute was taken over by the central governments of India 
and Pakistan. Moreover, the Bank also favoured another round of formal pre-mediation 
negotiation which was held under its auspices from 1951 to 1952. 
Bhatti describes that the successful pre-mediation negotiation paved the way towards 
accommodation and achieved the following four objectives43: 
 First, the parties were able to define the boundaries of the Indus waters dispute. 
Pakistan made several attempts to interlink water and Kashmir dispute. It argued that a 
peaceful resolution of Kashmir dispute would confer its control over the source of three out of 
the five main rivers of Punjab—a lifeline of Pakistan. Only in that case, India would never be 
able to divert or sever water supplies to Pakistan. On the other hand, as long as India 
controlled the Kashmir territory, there would always be a threat to Pakistan's territorial and 
economic interests, most pertinent of which was water supply. The Indian position was that 
Kashmir should not be discussed at this forum and both the issues should be tackled 
separately. The Lilienthal’s proposal which was convincingly sound for a professional 
engineer and credited by the acceptance of the World Bank as base line, also argued that the 
Indus water dispute was a technical one and should be handled by professional engineers as 
politicians were ill-equipped in resolving it. The Bank management also endorsed the Indian 
                                            
41
 Ayub Khan, op. cit., p. 110. 
42
 Bhatti, op. cit., p. 49. 
43
 Bhatti, op. cit., p. 50.  
5: The Strategy of Accommodation over Indus Rivers 
 
137
line of thinking that water issue be tackled first then it could pave the way for the resolution of 
the intractable Kashmir dispute.  
Second, pre-mediation negotiation identified the actors and defined their roles. To 
address the India's initial reservations about the Bank's role as a mediator, it was made clear 
to both sides that the it would try to facilitate the negotiation process and mediate the issue 
but under no circumstances will accept the responsibility of arbitration. 
Third, pre-mediation negotiations defined the agenda for talks. Both the parties were 
asked to submit their respective plans. It provided an opportunity for the disputants in 
conducting research and comprehending the hydrology of the Indus river system and chalk-
out developmental possibilities to cater for their present and future needs. Logically, it also 
facilitated the Bank to comprehend the viewpoints of the disputants and provided an 
opportunity for the Banks’ professionals to formulate their comprehensive proposal.  
Fourth, pre-mediation negotiations helped establish a satisfactory degree of 
understanding between the negotiating parties. Joint studies provided an opportunity for each 
side to learn about the negotiating style of the other. The parties knew exactly what was at 
dispute, whom they were dealing with and what agenda they were supposed to follow. This 
clarity facilitated the first few stages of the accommodation process.  
 5.2.2  Mediation by the Influential Third Party  
 The influential World Bank played a pivotal role in the entire process of mediation. 
The most important dimension of the third party mediation in the context of this study was its 
role as financer in the river development infrastructure. The Bank accorded to this status, 
possessing both resources and expertise required for the development of water resources. It 
served as best possible communicator, formulator and also manipulator in the entire process 
of mediation.44  
From the very beginning of its involvement, Bank maintained vital communication 
links between the disputant parties. It was mostly through the Bank that the two sides clarified 
each other’s real position.  
Second, the Bank’s involvement also proved useful in extending certain constructive 
and innovative proposals to break deadlocks. At the time, when India refused to contribute to 
the construction of replacement infrastructure i.e. link canals and especially two storage 
reservoirs, the Bank suggested to raise capital from the other states for the purpose. 
 The Bank also tried its best to maintain neutrality throughout the process 
consequently it had gained enormous respect and trust of India and Pakistan. Nevertheless, 
its financial clout gave it unequivocal leverage which helped it to play pivotal role in salvaging 
the process of accommodation from virtual breakdown.  
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5.2.3  Secret Diplomacy  
 Another technique that helped to conclude the process of accommodation was the 
employment of secret diplomacy. The publics in both India and Pakistan were generally 
aware of the fact that some sort of talks were ongoing regarding the Indus waters dispute but 
they did not have any real-time, factual or instant information (through radio, television or 
other modern channels of communications) about the precise nature and the stage of the 
negotiations. This strategy of the Bank shielded the negotiators from domestic pressures and 
politicisation of the issue. Domestic environment, journalists and local politicians in both 
countries, particularly in Pakistan, often demanded top leaders to disclose the contents and 
make impassionate comments on the dispute but the top leadership remained tight lipped.  
Bhatti argues that the Indus waters dispute could have become a convenient tool for 
local and national politicians for gaining cheap popularity. This fact was well captured by a 
national daily editorial which stated: “Having merely exhausted the possibilities offered by 
Kashmir issue, the forces out to exploit the complications of the Indo-Pakistan relationship as 
a short cut to electoral success have turned to the canal waters question”45 but nothing was 
ever disclosed by the top leadership of both states. 
 Gulhati points out that the selection of venue for negotiation was another important 
measure for the success. Barring a couple of discussions almost all meetings were held either 
in Washington DC, or in London and Rome. Once, the Indian Prime Minister, Jawaharlal 
Nehru, insisted that the venue be shifted to the Subcontinent, the Indian principal negotiator 
politely advised that India and Pakistan could not expect the World Bank’s management to 
leave its regular duties and move to the Subcontinent for an indefinite period. Maintaining the 
venue of negotiations outside the Subcontinent proved, to be major decisive feature of 
keeping the parley out of the reach of local as well as international press. 46 
5.2.4  Postponement of Political Issues 
 The placement of major intractable issue of Kashmir on backburner was a success of 
the World Bank’s mediation skills. Although Kashmir and Indus river system were very much 
intertwined, the separation of the issue of Kashmir from the Indus dispute facilitated the 
settlement of water issue on purely functional and technical lines. Nature proved to be of 
great help as it was the peculiar geography of the Indus rivers system that diversion of rivers 
became possible and such proposal also deemed fit for the geo-political interests of the upper 
riparian. For lower riparian, Pakistan, the immediate supply of the irrigation water for existing 
uses, was a question of survival of the state in its formative phase. Although, the Kashmir 
dispute already had become a hot political issue since India had taken it to the United Nations 
immediately after the Partition but at the same time it had reached a stalemate with the 
acceptance of the ceasefire by the parties.  
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Bhatti makes an interesting observation relating to the postponement of political issue 
to reach an agreement on substantial matter. The wish to settle the Indus dispute compelled 
Pakistan to negotiate various transitional agreements, almost on a yearly basis, for the supply 
of irrigation waters from the eastern rivers. Thus negotiating transitional matters had some 
merits too. India always tried to use these occasions to squeeze major benefits towards the 
final settlement of the Indus dispute. When India opened its Bhakra-Nagar canal and diverted 
a portion of the water from the eastern rivers into the land of East Punjab, some Indian circles 
argued that such incremental diversion of the water every year would eventually force 
Pakistan to negotiate on their terms. However, to save the negotiations from a complete 
failure the Bank proposed to postpone substantive issues for later review. This forced 
Pakistan to sign transitional agreements on Indian terms and conditions and wait till the final 
settlement of the Indus dispute was reached. This phenomenon raises an interesting 
question: Is it better to negotiate transitional or procedural agreements before tackling the 
substantive issue? Could such a technique further help the process of accommodation in 
other cases?47  
In other words, would it be more rational to search solutions for other procedural 
issues between India and Pakistan before tackling the dispute of Kashmir? This approach 
may not be acceptable to Pakistan any more. 
 5.2.5  Wording of the Agreement  
 Drafting of the Indus Waters Treaty (IWT) was an uphill task and was profoundly 
debated, as each party wanted to secure its future rights and uses at the expense of the 
other. The foremost concern of each side was that the treaty should not change the nature of 
its claim over Kashmir territory. The fear of the lower riparian about Indian interference with 
the rivers flowing through the territory of Jammu and Kashmir remained persistent throughout 
the negotiation and also during drafting of the treaty. Each party tried to incorporate terms and 
phrases defining rights and obligations to prevent other misinterpreting it. It necessitated 
inclusion of a number of annexes with the main treaty almost ten times larger than the original 
text of the agreement.48 
Language, in terms of the wording of the agreement is crucially important that can 
help the process of accommodation in different ways in which the agreements are written. 
Parties to the dispute always sought to use tentative and multi-meaning words, while 
negotiating a procedural agreement, and comprehensive terminology, while negotiating a 
substantive agreement. The former kind of agreement is meant to be vague so that the 
parties can proclaim victory at home by interpreting the agreement as they wish.49 The glaring 
example is the Delhi Agreement 1948 (see Appendix 1). The wording of the agreement was 
so tentative and subject to various explanations that both parties have been interpreting it 
                                            
47
 Bhatti, op. cit., p. 53. 
48
 See full text of the Indus Waters Treaty at: http://www.worldbank.org. 
49
 Bhatti, op. cit., p. 95-96. 
5: The Strategy of Accommodation over Indus Rivers 
 
140
differently. Although, it was an interim agreement as no expiry date was fixed but India 
claimed it as an international as well as a permanent agreement. It reads at Para 5-7 as: 
“The West Punjab Government has agreed to deposit immediately in the Reserve 
Bank such ad hoc sum as may be specified by the Prime Minister of India. Out of this 
sum, that Government agrees to the immediate transfer to East Punjab of sums over 
which there is no dispute.” 
“After an examination by each party of the legal issues, of the method of estimating 
the cost of water to be supplied by the East Punjab Government and of the technical 
survey of water resources and the means of using them for supply to these canals, 
the two Governments agree that further meetings between their representatives 
should take place.” 
The Dominion Governments of India and Pakistan accept the above terms and 
express the hope that a friendly solution will be reached. 
 India projected it as an international agreement and got it registered with the UN 
Secretariat, but for Pakistan it was purely an interim agreement, awaiting further negotiations 
for the final resolve. The agreement proved to be a pretext for the Indian negotiators to assert 
their claims over eastern rivers. They manipulated it against Pakistan at every forum, 
charging that Pakistan had recognised the Indian propriety rights on these rivers: though, the 
phrase used was “supply to these canals”. In this way, Pakistan ultimately lost three eastern 
rivers for ever. 
A substantive agreement, on the other hand, cannot have the liberty of being open to 
various interpretations. The Indus Waters Treaty was written with extreme care and precision 
leaving no ambiguity regarding implementation. The Treaty, which "reads like a masterpiece 
of legal and technical drafting,”50 contains eight main annexure, countless appendices and 
continues over more than two hundred pages. Actually, the prevailing nature of the 
relationship between the parties demanded extreme care in articulating the treaty text. 
Although, there are numerous instances of different interpretations but due to clarity of the 
wordings, the Treaty has managed to survive three subsequent wars and many crises.  
 Moreover, the specific nature and clearly defined boundaries of the treaty regarding 
"rights and obligations" made it more focused to the water problem only but is “still pregnant 
with meaning”.51 The Article XI of the treaty states in part:52  
(1) It is expressly understood that: 
(a) This Treaty governs rights and obligations of each Party in relation to the other with 
respect only to the use of the waters of the Rivers and matters incidental thereto; and 
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(b) nothing contained in the Treaty, and nothing arising out of the execution thereof, shall 
be construed as constituting a recognition or waiver (whether tacit, by implication or 
otherwise) of any rights or claims whatsoever of either of the Parties other than; those 
rights or claims which are expressly recognized or waived in this Treaty. 
(c) Each of the Parties agrees that it will not invoke this Treaty, anything contained 
therein, or anything arising out of the execution thereof, in support of any of its own 
rights or claims whatsoever of the other Party, other than those rights or claims which 
are expressly recognised or waived in this Treaty. 
By this provision the status of other disputes, especially that of Kashmir, was clearly 
and absolutely not to be affected. Thus, the resolution of the riparian dispute became possible 
only by isolating it from all other matters. 
 5.3 Post-Treaty Accommodation on Salal Dam 
In 1970, India started to construct a huge dam on the Chenab River at a place called 
Salal, capable of diverting water of Chenab River and resulting in severe fluctuation in the 
downstream flow. The Salal Dam53 project was perceived by many analysts aiming at first, to 
divert Pakistan's attention from then East Pakistan crisis. India held it hanging until Pakistan 
had recognised Bangladesh. The other objective was to generate electricity. Thirdly, to collect 
political benefits by controlling river Chenab flows as and when desired.   
 5.3.1 Implications for Pakistan 
By constructing Salal Dam, in the late 1970’s on the Chenab at Dhiangarh, along with 
diversion structure by completing Marhu Tunnel to divert Chenab water into the Ravi, Ravi to 
Beas and Beas to Sutlej and thereof, India is capable of converting the fertile lands of Punjab 
totally barren or destroying crops by opening flood gates of the headworks, affecting lives of 
millions of farmers along with their belongings in the core cities of Punjab. In both the ways, it 
would be a lethal “powder keg” more than a nuclear bomb.54  
 The Salal Dam site, near Dhiangarh on the River ‘Chenab Main’,55 is approximately 
50 kilometres upstream from Pakistan’s Maralla headworks. Apparently, it was meant to 
harness the waters at a village called Salal. The construction of the dam could cause total or 
partial stoppage of water to Pakistan for a certain period. It could have an adverse impact on 
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Pakistan’s socio-economic security and well-being, as a number of canals running close to 
the Indo-Pakistan border originate from Maralla headworks and could be dried up in reaction 
to any conflict or tension between India and Pakistan. During any military operation, the water 
could be stopped for 25 days—rendering the water obstacles along border-crossing between 
the two countries ineffective, and making crossing of the canals much easier.  
The economic implications were alone far-reaching. The River Chenab, the second 
largest river of Pakistan’s three western rivers: the Indus, Jhelum and Chenab, irrigates about 
70 per cent the fertile lands of the province of the Punjab. There are three canal systems built 
on river Chenab. The first canal system, Upper Chenab Link Canal, originating from Marala 
headworks falls into River Ravi at Balloki headworks. It carries irrigated water for 1.4 million 
acres of fertile land. The second canal system, Lower Chenab Canal, originating from Khanki 
headworks, irrigates about 270,000 acres of fertile lands in Rachna Doab area. While a 
number of canals originating from Trimo headworks irrigate about one million acres of fertile 
lands. In total, the River Chenab is source of water for irrigation of about 2.7 million acres of 
the lands of province Punjab—these areas fall in the districts of Sialkot, Gujranwala, 
Sheikhupura, Faisalabad, Okara, Sahiwal, Jhang and Multan. These districts constitute the 
privilege ‘food basket’ and hence backbone of Pakistan’s agrarian economy.56 
 5.3.2 Pakistan’s Objections 
 Pakistan raised the following five objections regarding the design of the Salal Hydro-
electric Plant and the diversion programme during construction on the basis of the criterion 
specified in the Indus Waters Treaty 1960. (1) Works as proposed will be capable of artificially 
raising the water level in the Operating Pool57 and will, therefore, have the capability of 
causing fluctuations in the river flows [Criterion (a) of Paragraph 8 of Annexure D to the Indus 
Waters Treaty, 1960]; (2) A gated spillway has been provided although the site permits the 
use of an un-gated spillway. A gated spillway can be utilized for temporary storage of water 
contrary to the provisions of the Treaty [Criterion (e)]; (3) Outlets have been provided below 
the dead-storage level which can be operated to deplete the reservoir and on being shut 
again can cause the temporary stoppage of river flows [Criterion (d)]; (4) The intakes for the 
turbines are proposed to be located at a low level which could enable the hydro-electric plant 
to be used for peaking and thereby fluctuations could be caused in the flows of the river 
[Criterion (f)]; and (5) The diversion programme during construction would cause fluctuations 
in the supplies downstream, which is not permitted under the Treaty. 
In the wake of Salal Dam, Pakistan’s perceived security implications were also 
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substantive. India can stop flow of Chenab river for up to 25 days to facilitate its offensive 
operations in Ravi-Chenab corridor for capturing strategic cities of Gujranwala, Wazirabad on 
the GT Road and secure major military advantage by cutting off GT Road, linking Lahore to 
Islamabad. It was the only highway, linking the whole of Pakistan. To avoid the contravention 
to the Treaty in completely closing of the Chenab river, India may keep open the low level 
outlets of Salal Dam which will significantly reduce the obstacle value of Marala Ravi Link 
(MRL), Bambanwala Ravi Badin Link (BRBL) and Upper Chenab Canal (UCC) emanating 
from Marala. Neutralisation of these canals will facilitate the Indian military operations.  
Flooding of the river with large quantities of water exceeding 100,000 cusecs could 
saturate the river bed within the flood banks and beyond resulting in: a) Activation of multi-
channels. b) Rise in water table with massive deterioration of road infrastructure resulting in 
poor traffic-ability necessitating heavy expedient treatment. c) Damage to communication 
infra-structure. d) Non-availability of crossing sites. e) Fluctuation of water discharge will 
increase / decrease the river span either submerging the approaches / exits or grounding the 
bridging equipment. The crossing sites once inundated will become saturated / boggy 
requiring expedient treatment and the bridge design will have to be altered suspending the 
traffic. f) Gradual increase of water flow will put the bridging equipment afloat. g) Reduction in 
water level will ground the floating bridges. h) Sudden release of large quantity of water may 
wash away bridging equipment. i) Indian action of flooding the battlefields either north of 
Sutlej inside India or South of it up to the Ghaggar depression, or combined, provides a flank 
protection to Indian operations in Southern Punjab and Sindh. However, India will have to 
time these actions in conjunction with its operational strategy. 
 5.3.3 Settlement of the Issue 
The issue was formally taken up between the two countries, in several rounds of a 
technical meeting held in 1975, culminating in,a meeting at the secretaries’ level in October 
1976. Both the states formulated a draft of an accord, and finally, on 14 April 1978 the issue 
was settled to the satisfaction of both parties.  
The agreement states that without prejudice to the provisions of the Indus Waters 
Treaty 1960, or to the rights and obligations the parties have agreed as follows: The Full 
Poundage level will not be higher than EL 1600 feet, Dead Storage Capacity will not exceed 
230-303 acres-feet and there will be no Operating Pool as such. The Spillway will not be more 
than 30 feet below the full-Poundage Level. Spillway gates will be 12 in numbers with length 
not exceeding 50 feet and height at 30 feet. While the level of power intake will not be lower 
than 27.5 feet below the full-Poundage level. The Outlet Works six in numbers with level not 
below that EL 1365 feet. These shall be permanently closed with concrete plugs within one 
year of the date of the first filling of the reservoir up to the Full Poundage level or within three 
years of the date of the first filling of the reservoir up to the crest of the spillway, whichever is 
earlier. The Dead Storage shall not be depleted except in an unforeseen emergency 
endangering the safety of the dam. In that event, India shall give immediate information to the 
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Government of Pakistan of the nature of emergency and may simultaneously undertake such 
action as may be necessary. In case the removal of concrete plugs becomes necessary, India 
shall hold immediate consultations with the representatives of the Pakistan Government 
including site inspection of the plant.  
Moreover, India shall not make any further alterations in the features of the design of 
the hydro-electric plant except by mutual agreement. Any question which arises between the 
parties concerning the interpretation or application of this Agreement or the existence of any 
fact which, if established, might constitute a breach of this Agreement and shall be dealt with 
under the provisions of Article IX of the Indus Waters Treaty 1960. Matters not expressly 
provided shall be governed by the provisions of the Treaty. 
5.4 Summary 
 The discussion leads us to conclude that the enduring rivals prefer accommodation 
over vital economic and security concerns of immediate nature and postpone political issues 
when they reach a mutually hurting stalemate situation. This stage comes in with the 
realisation that no military solution would bring forth the desired outcome. Conclusion of the 
Indus Waters Treaty amid enduring rivalry between India and Pakistan testifies the core 
hypothesis formulated in the study. Obviously, lower riparian, having disadvantageous locale 
and militarily weak infrastructure, comparative to the upper riparian, initiates process of 
accommodation. The upper riparian reciprocates the accommodative initiatives of the lower 
riparian but tries to settle the issue on its own terms and conditions and manipulates lower 
riparian vulnerabilities. The lower riparian initiate(s) peace overtures in an effort to minimise 
perceived losses. Moreover, a government committed to the domestic reforms, generally, 
prefers accommodation as a part of security strategy.  
An influential third party not only facilitates the process but has a strong mediatory 
role to skilfully play (sometimes by accelerating the process of mutually hurting stalemate). 
Besides, a third party, having leverage of financial support, accords special status in the 
settlement of water issues involving resource development infrastructures necessary to fulfil 
the needs of the disputants. 
 Moreover, in the presence of a treaty, the riparian may prefer bilateral settlement of a 
water sharing issue like Salal Dam, signed in 1978. Although the Salal Dam issue also refers 
to the same type of environment for the lower riparian Pakistan—militarily weaker in the wake 
of the 1971 War and recovering from the shock of separation of East Pakistan. There was the 
desire to minimise losses and to implement internal institutional reforms. Hence, the nature of 
accommodation was different from the environment of 1950s as Pakistan was entitled to 
invoke the Treaty provisions. Nevertheless, in the 1970s India used water more or less as a 
political tool than a military weapon, but could not succeed to settle the issue on its terms and 
conditions. Rather, all Pakistani objections, relating to design of the dam, were removed by 
India before any accommodation became possible. Also notable here, is that the 
accommodation on Salal Dam was the first and last after the signing of the Indus Waters 
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Treaty in 1960 and completion of all related developmental infrastructures in the late 1970s by 
both the riparian. The water-related issues that emerged later are not only lingering, but have 
also become a major irritant in India-Pakistan relations.  
The subsequent chapters describe in detail the post-treaty implications, the emerging 
scenarios and their linkages in further hardening the positions of both states on the Kashmir 
dispute. They provide a comprehensive view of the ongoing process of hurting stalemate 
underpinning the intertwined nature of the Indus and Kashmir disputes in India-Pakistan 
conflict. 
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Chapter 6 
INDUS WATERS TREATY: IMPLICATIONS 
This chapter focuses on the post-treaty implications for the riparians and highlights 
the repercussions1 of an accommodation, in disregard to natural geographic and political 
imperatives, between enduring rivals in general and India-Pakistan in particular. It addresses 
the questions: What role has the accommodation over Indus waters played in India-Pakistan 
relations? Has the Treaty overemphasised the political status of Kashmir, promoted divisive 
politics in the region and paved no way towards promoting mutual cooperation between the 
parties?  
6.1 Gains for India  
Gains for India far exceeded than one could envisage when the ‘canals dispute’ arose 
in 1948. Initially, Indian demand was an exclusive right over water of the river Sutlej alone but 
as the negotiations proceeded, it demanded total diversion of three eastern international 
rivers originating from its territory and also claimed share from three western international 
rivers of the Indus system originating from the disputed territory of Jammu and Kashmir 
(J&K). 
Under the provisions of the Treaty, it secured full freedom to put to use, in the first 
instance, all the waters of the three eastern rivers (The Ravi, Beas and Sutlej) that it was not 
using prior to the Partition of the Subcontinent. Before Partition India was utilizing hardly one-
fifth of two out of the three eastern rivers.2  
The Treaty multiplied many times the availability of water to India. India was free to 
develop the water courses of eastern rivers in any manner deemed fit to her requirements 
and was also allowed to construct, under conditions specified in the Treaty, infrastructures for 
the generation of hydro-electric power and also substantially increase its irrigated areas in the 
upper catchment areas of the three western rivers (The Indus, Jhelum and Chenab) bounded 
in disputed territory of Jammu and Kashmir under its control.3  
 Before the signing of interim Agreement of May 1948, India worked out schemes to 
utilize the waters of the Central Bari Doab Canal (CBDC) and the Dipalpur Canal to be 
withheld from Pakistan. Since India was free to utilize the entire flow of the Sutlej, steps were 
taken to enlarge the scope of the old Sirhind Canal and of the Bhakra-Nangal project. During 
British rule these plans were formulated to make available river supplies to the Sutlej Valley 
Canals, now mostly in Pakistan. The principal works carried out between 1948 and 1954 
included: 1) Construction of several new distributaries on the Upper Bari Boab Canal 
                                            
1
 The narrative about Gains and Losses for riparian has been taken from  author’s previous work for 
details see Muhammad Nasrullah, Wullar Barrage Issue: An Analysis (MPhil Thesis submitted in the 
Department of International Relations, Quaid-i-Azam University, Islamabad, 1991), pp. 93-110 and 
152-162. 
2
 Ibid., p. 93. 
3
 Ibid., p. 93. 
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(UBDC)—first time put into operation in 1950-51. Furthermore, the capacity of the canal was 
enlarged many times; 2) A barrage at Harike, at the confluence of the Beas and Sutlej, was 
constructed in 1950-52, providing head regulators for the proposed Rajasthan Canal and 
Ferozepur Feeder; 3) The capacity of Sirhind Canal was increased; the Sidhwan Branch and 
four new distributaries were added to the canal in 1949-52; and 4) Priority was given, in the 
First Five-Year Plan, to the Nangal and Bhakra Canals and construction was completed by 
1954.4 
 From the Eastern rivers, a required quantity of water was withheld from Pakistan, in 
early and late kharif, to the extent additional use had been developed on the Ganga and other 
eastern canals. During 1947 to 1954 the area irrigated in India, from the eastern rivers, was 
increased by about 700,000 acres from 3.84 to 4.54 million acres.5 In July 1954, the Bhakra 
Canal was opened for operation, on the basis of surplus water available during the monsoon 
season. From 1958, India started utilising the waters stored at the Bhakra Dam for irrigation 
with the irrigated acreage increasing to 6.2 million acres by 1960.6 In 1965-66, the area 
irrigated from the eastern rivers in India rose to 8 million acres.7 In other words, through works 
constructed between 1948 and 1960, “as much new irrigation had been developed in the 
Indian part of the Indus basin as in about 100 years preceding Independence.”8 
 In the autumn of 1954, steps were taken to assess the quantity of utilizable water 
available for development in India under the Bank’s proposal. As a first step, it became 
necessary to distribute the supplies to be developed between the Indian states, viz., Punjab, 
PEPSU9, Rajasthan and Jammu and Kashmir. “This was necessary to bring home to the 
visiting Bank and Pakistan groups [delegates] the need for, and the importance we attached 
to, the full utilization in India of the waters of the Eastern rivers.”10 
 Before the end of January 1955, an inter-state agreement was concluded under 
which 15.85 MAF waters of the Ravi and Beas was allocated between the states concerned: 
Jammu and Kashmir—0.65 MAF: PEPSU—1.30 M.A.F.: Punjab—5.90 MAF: and 
Rajasthan—8.00 MAF. The waters of the Sutlej were to be used entirely for the Sirhind-
Bhakra-Nangal complex and divided between the states concerned in accordance with 
                                            
4
 Ibid., p. 94. 
5
 IBRD Note dated 15 January 1960, prepared in response to a request from Gen. Wheeler. See also 
Muhammad Nasrullah, Wullar Barrage (1991), p. 93, 94. 
6
 Muhammad Nasrullah, Wullar Barrage (1991), p. 95. 
7
 Muhammad Nasrullah, Wullar Barrage (1991), p. 95. 
8
 Niranjan D. Gulhati, Indus Waters Treaty: An Exercise in International Mediation (Lahore, New 
York, New Delhi: Allied Publishers, 1973), p. 358; See also Muhammad Nasrullah, Wullar Barrage 
(1991), p. 95. 
9
 PEPSU (Patiala and East Punjab States Union) was merged with Punjab in November 1956. Ten 
years later, the combined state was split into Haryana and Punjab in November 1966, with the upper 
hilly areas transferred to Himachal Pradesh; See also Muhammad Nasrullah, Wullar Barrage (1991), 
pp. 95-96; See also www.globalsikhstudies.net/pdf/ Fundamental_Issues_in%20_SikhStudies.pdf. 
10
 Niranjan D. Gulhati, Indus Waters Treaty (1973), p. 358; Se also Muhammad Nasrullah, Wullar 
Barrage (1991), p. 96; See also www.worldbank.org/html/dec/Publications/ 
Workpapers/wps2000series/wps2045/wps2045.pdf. 
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agreements already reached. This led to the sanction of the Madhopur-Beas Link 
(constructed in 1954-55): the Sirhind Feeder11 (constructed in 1954-58); and the Rajasthan 
canal; and prompt investigations were started to find sites for storage dams on the Ravi and 
the Beas rivers.12 
 The revised Sirhind-Bhakra-Nangal complex, as re-planned in 1954 on the basis of 
the Bank’s proposal and since it was constructed, was much bigger in scope and overall 
benefits than the Bhakra and Nangal projects on the basis of which work had been started in 
1945. The live-storage capacity of the Bhakra reservoir was almost doubled, the anticipated 
annual irrigation was increased from 1.4 to 4.0 million acres and hydro-power generation from 
920 to 2,339 MW annually.13 
 In January 1960, in response to a request from the Bank the Indian officials reported 
that excluding the developments on the UBDC, undertaken after 1947, the total cost of new 
works already planned on the three eastern rivers in India would be of Rs. 3,330 million.14 On 
completion, these works irrigated annually about 6.2 million acres and produced hydro-
electric power about 744,000 KW (excluding additional power units to be installed at Bhakra 
in the Right Power House).15 
 The Rajasthan Canal, the construction of which was inaugurated in March 1958, had 
a capacity of 18,500 cusec and was about 300 miles (450 KM) long, not counting 134 miles of 
the Rajasthan Feeder, a lined supply channel from Harike running for 111 miles (178.5 KM) in 
Punjab and Haryana areas. The canal has about 6,000 KM of branches and distributaries to 
command 3.69 million acres of the Rajasthan desert.16  
Writing about the canal, Arnold J. Toynbee said in 1961: 
“...within a few years from now, the western most and thirstiest fringe of Rajasthan, 
along the Indo-Pakistani border, is going to be brought to life by the digging of what 
will be the longest irrigation canal in the world up to date. Though the climate is torrid, 
the soil, here too, is good. When the water reaches it, it will grow wheat, maize, oil 
plants, citrus fruit, and even grapes. Two million people will live by agriculture in an 
                                            
11
 This Sirhind Feeder takes off the Ferozepur Feeder at mile 11 (16.5 KM) of the latter. It is 89 miles 
(133.5 KM) long link-canal, having capacity at head of 4,762 cusec and provides a new source of water 
supply from the river Beas to the lower part of the old Sirhind Canal system which could be 
commanded from Hrike, thus setting free equivalent water supply of river Sutlej at Bhakra. Please see 
Muhammad Nasrullah, Wullar Barrage (1991), p. 96-97. 
12
 Muhammad Nasrullah, Wullar Barrage (1991), p. 97. 
13
 Niranjan D. Gulhati, Indus Waters Treaty (1973), pp. 358-359; See also Muhammad Nasrullah, 
Wullar Barrage (1991), p. 97. 
14
 Bhakra-Nangal Project of costing Rs. 1,700 million included: Sirhind Feeder. Rs. 60 million: Beas 
Dam, Rs. 873 million: Modhopur-Beas Link, Rs. 24 million: Harike Barrage, Rs. 58 million: and 
Rajasthan Canal, Rs. 615 million. See Niranjan D. Gulhati, Indus Waters Treaty (1973), p. 359; See 
also Muhammad Nasrullah, Wullar Barrage (1991), pp. 97-98. 
15
 Ibid. 
16
 Niranjan D. Gulhati, Indus Waters Treaty (1973), p. 360; See also Muhammad Nasrullah, Wullar 
Barrage (1991), pp. 98-99. 
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area which at present maintains no more than 100,000 pastoralists….”17 
 The Rajasthan Canal was inaugurated by Govind Ballabh Pant, the then Indian home 
minister, on 11 October, 1961. 18  “Water from Rajasthan Canal” was “first” released for 
irrigation only. An area of 90,000 acres was irrigated in 1965-66 and of 240,000 acres in 
1968-69. In 1971-72, 450,000 acres were irrigated.19 
 Several agreements relating to ad hoc, transitional arrangements state that, India was 
enabled to withhold progressively increasing supplies of water from Pakistan from about mid-
April to September.20 With these and the surplus waters available during the flood months, 
India could fully meet from 1954 onwards the requirements in Kharif of such new irrigation 
channels as were completed and were fit for operation, including the Bhakra Dam which 
started storing water in 1958.21 
 Soon after the Treaty was signed in September 1960, the supplies available during 
different periods of the year, as at Ferozepur, for direct use by canals or for the storage at 
Bhakra and Pong are shown in the following table in comparison to the actual use in India 
prior to Partition:22  
-----------------------------------------------------------TABLE-7--------------------------------------------------- 
    Oct.-Mar.    Apr.-June    July-Sep.  Annual 
             (Million  Acre Feet-MAF) 
Pre-Partition use         2.7  2.3  03.0  08.0 
Supplies available from April 1960     3.1  5.8  16.0  24.9 
Supplies available during 2nd phase23  3.1 6.3  17.9  27.3 
-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
  
With the completion of the Mangla Dam in Pakistan in November 1967, the Indian 
were able to withhold Rabi waters from Pakistan, in addition to those shown above, nominal 
supplies during Rabi 1967-68, 1.8 MAF during Rabi 1968-69 and 2.0 MAF during Rabi 1969-
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 Arnold J. Toynbee: Between Oxus and Jammu (New York: Oxford University Press, 1961), as 
quoted by Muhammad Nasrullah, Wullar Barrage (1991), p. 99. 
18
 Work on the Rajasthan Feeder in Punjab had been started much earlier. Please see Muhammad 
Nasrullah, Wullar Barrage (1991), p. 100. 
19
 See Niranjan D. Gulhati, Indus Waters Treaty (1973), p. 360. 
20
 It should be noted that the period April-June is a period of short supply in the Eastern rivers but 
important for the sowing of Kharif crops, particularly cotton. Please see Muhammad Nasrullah, Wullar 
Barrage (1991), p. 102 
21
 Muhammad Nasrullah, Wullar Barrage (1991), p. 103. 
22
 Government of Pakistan, National Documentation Wing, Cabinet Division, Islamabad, Post IWT 
Studies, Vol. I; Please also see Muhammad Nasrullah, Wullar Barrage (1991), p. 103. 
23
 The second phase of the Transition period was to begin from April 1965 or under certain conditions 
from April 1966 and was to continue till March 1970. It could be extended at Pakistan’s request for 
one, two or three years, but no such request was made. Government of Pakistan, National 
Documentation Wing, Cabinet Division, Islamabad, Post IWT Studies, Vol. I;  Please also see 
Muhammad Nasrullah, Wullar Barrage (1991), p. 104. 
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70 were made.24 With effect from 1 April 1970 when the Transition Period came to an end, 
India was entitled to use the entire flow of the Eastern rivers.25  
Article 11(9) of the Treaty provides: 
After the end of the Transition Period Pakistan shall have no claim or right to releases 
by India of any of the waters of the Eastern rivers. In case there are any releases, 
Pakistan shall enjoy the...use of the waters so released.... Provided that in the event 
that Pakistan makes any use of these waters, Pakistan shall not acquire any right 
whatsoever, by prescription or otherwise, to a continuance of such releases or such 
use.26 
India utilized every drop of these waters by constructing a network of dams and link 
canals on Eastern rivers and also on the Western rivers allegedly in violation to the Indus 
Waters Treaty (See Map-12 below). 
It can be noticed that from a total pre-Partition use of 8.0 MAF Indian withdrawals were 
increased to 13.3 MAF in 1960-61, to 16.05 MAF in 1961-62 and to 27.3 MAF in 1968-69. On 
full development, after the Beas Project and a storage infrastructure on the Ravi have been 
built, and the Rajasthan Canal completed the Indian withdrawals increased to about 30 MAF. 
Indian at that time took some advantages secured by the Treaty and there was tremendous 
potential for future development too.27  
From the upper reaches of the Western rivers; the Indus, the Jhelum and the Chenab, 
India is entitled to develop in its territory, in terms of Annexure C to the Treaty, an “irrigated 
cropped area” of about 700,000 acres over and above that developed as on 1 April 1960. 
Information was not readily available about the extent to which irrigation use has been 
developed from the western rivers by India (in Jammu and Kashmir) after the conclusion of 
the Treaty—presumably such development has not been substantial. Apart from this, the 
Treaty assures to India an enormous potential of hydro-electric power on the western rivers in 
the Kashmir territory under its control. With the provisions made in the Treaty, on the Chenab 
alone, India has a potential of about 3,000,000 KW or more.28  
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 Government of Pakistan, National Documentation Wing, Cabinet Division, Islamabad, Post IWT 
Studies, Vol. I; Please see also Muhammad Nasrullah, Wullar Barrage (1991), p. 104. 
25
 Muhammad Nasrullah, Wullar Barrage (1991), p. 105. 
26
 Indus Waters Treaty 1960, Article 11(9) attached as Annexure-7as quoted by Muhammad Nasrullah, 
Wullar Barrage (1991), p. 106. 
27
 Government of Pakistan, National Documentation Wing, Cabinet Division, Islamabad, Post IWT 
Studies, Vol. I ; Please see also Muhammad Nasrullah, Wullar Barrage (1991), p. 106. 
28
 Gulhati in a letter from Washington, in March 1960, urged that a special organisation be set up 
immediately in consent with the Indus Basin States in India, for the early development of power on the 
Western rivers. He observed that nothing so far has been done in this direction. Please see Niranjan D. 
Gulhati, Indus Waters Treaty (1973), p. 365; See also Muhammad Nasrullah, Wullar Barrage (1991), 
pp. 106-107. 
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Map-12: Post-treaty Development of the Three Eastern Rivers by India 
Source: Subrahmanyam Sridhar, “The Indus Water Treaty,” Security Research 
Review, 2005 
 
 
   
Recently, extensive hydro-electric development has been made on the Jhelum river 
and India is trying to exploit all such potentials on the Indus river too. In addition to the 
existing dams and projects shown in the below, (Map 13 a, b, c) there are reports that India 
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plans to construct 3-4 more dams on river Jhelum and 16-17 on river Chenab29 and also a 
number of dams on River Indus. 
 
Map-13a, b, c: Disputed river projects being built by India on Western Rivers 
Source: Indus Waters Commissioner Pakistan January 2011. Maps are 
drawn free hand. The aim is merely to give an idea of the location of the projects. 
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 Roberts J. Wirsing & Christopher Jasparro, “River Rivalry: Water Disputes, Resource Insecurity, & 
Diplomatic Deadlock in South Asia,” Asia-Pacific Center for Security Studies Honolulu, Hawaii, 2005. 
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 Summarising the discussion about developments in India, Pakistani policymakers 
should admit that they had entered the negotiations without doing proper home-work, and that 
the Indians were far ahead of them. The clear proof is the steps taken by the Indian 
government before the signing of the Indus Waters Treaty in 1960. As to the signing of the 
Treaty, India had already developed the diversion infrastructure on the Chenab, Ravi, Beas 
and Sutlej rivers and there-off to Rajisthan canal.30  
Situation would have been worst for Pakistan if refused to sign the Treaty. It was 
because that at the time of signing of the Treaty in September 1960 India had gained the 
bargaining lever having capacity of withholding entire water supplies through the eastern 
rivers, rendering the blooming fields of the Pakistani Punjab [West Punjab] to severe 
droughts, or destroying them by flooding as and when required. India has been exploiting the 
latter factor most often even after signing of the Indus Waters Treaty, especially in lean 
periods and monsoon seasons.31 
6.2 Gains versus Losses for Pakistan 
 The material benefits emanating from the Treaty for Pakistan have not been real and 
great as imagined and highlighted by the World Bank’s experts. Although the Treaty has 
assured to Pakistan the unrestricted use of three out of six international rivers, but, in addition 
to three Eastern rivers given to India, the provisions for ‘specified uses’ of Western rivers by 
India became continuous headache for Pakistan. The world’s greatest system of hydraulic 
works in Pakistan “the grandest ever conceived by man” has been losing its capacity day by 
day and now almost has lost its meanings and effectiveness due to huge siltation in the dams 
reducing their storage capacity.32 There is a growing realization, world over, that man can 
interfere with natural river systems only up to a certain point and that the long-term 
consequences of dams or major river diversion schemes often outweigh the short-term 
benefits. Already the country has to reserve more than half its GNP in foreign debt servicing, 
largely from international loans required to develop the water storage and irrigation schemes 
developed under IWT.33  
Moreover, the right of specified uses on Western rivers to India and ever increasing 
problem of water-logging and salinity as a result of huge infrastructure for the diversion of 
waters from natural courses in Pakistan (the links canals system), one de facto and the other 
de juro has been equivalent to rescuing Pakistan from becoming a desert to putting it into 
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 Eastern Rajasthan, including Jaipur, is definitely in the Jumna-Ganges Basin. Now Rajasthan canal is 
supplying water to this area from the Indus river system beyond the Indus Basin as cited by 
Muhammad Nasrullah, Wullar Barrage (1991), p. 107. 
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boiling waters and vice versa.34 
Pakistan has mainly suffered three losses35: 
1. It lost forever three out of its six rivers.  
2. By diverting water from natural courses, the gigantic problem of water-logging and 
salinity was aggravated to beyond the extent of controls the latest technology can 
offer. 
3. By giving ‘specified rights’ of using waters of Western rivers to India under the Treaty, 
Pakistan itself has invented a perpetual problem-generating mechanism. 
 The water closures of 1 April 1948 were an assertion of India’s claim to waters of all 
the international rivers that flowed through its territory. It obviously implemented the sentiment 
attributed by Mosley to Nehru, “that what India did with India’s rivers was India’s affair.”36 In 
fact, the question can be posed: Were these (three eastern rivers) “India’s rivers”?37  
 After 14 August 1947, the international system of acquisition of surface-water use 
which also has retained different legal regimes, as the system is being practiced by most of 
the western countries, was also applicable in the Indus river basin.38 Some analysts think that 
Pakistan and India have signed the Treaty in isolation from the provisions of international law 
as well as system of acquisition of surface-water use rights, which is neither division nor 
sharing of natural assets. But prior to the Partition these principles have governed the 
development of irrigation in the Indus Basin.39 As in 1942, they were expressly confirmed by 
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the Indus (Rau) Commission as governing principles for the apportionment of the waters of 
the Indus rivers among the several states and provinces through which they were flowing.40  
In applying the principle of equitable apportionment to the case before it, the Rau 
Commission affirmed that new withdrawals by the upstream province of the Punjab (East 
Punjab in undivided Punjab) must be so regulated as not to cause material damage to the 
canals of the downstream province of Sindh.41 The Commission advised further that the 
parties might agree that such damage could be prevented through the construction of two 
barrages across the Indus downstream, in such situation the lower Punjab should make a 
substantial financial contribution toward their cost.42  
Thus the distribution of river water for irrigation canals has been determined by 
several principles. There is, for example, the law of riparian rights, by which the owner of land 
contiguous to a stream has proprietary rights. In India this law has not been upheld in 
practice, or there could have been no large-scale prior appropriation, by which the first user of 
water acquires a priority right, whether or not his land is contiguous to the state. Finally, there 
is the principle of equitable distribution, which regards a river as an indivisible unit to be 
developed for the benefit of the maximum number of people regardless of territorial 
boundaries. In India, this principle was recognized in the early days of British administration, 
and it has been adopted under numerous international treaties the world over but was 
disregarded after the Partition.43 
 Under the Indian Act of 1935, which came into force in April 1937, irrigation became a 
purely provincial matter, though provision was made for the appointment of commissions to 
investigate complaints relating to water rights and irrigation needs. This did nothing to 
facilitate the settlement of disputes among the states and provinces and frequent deadlocks 
and frustrations indicated the desirability of a centralized, all-India, policy that nevertheless 
permitted local freedom of action in constructing irrigation works.44 
 This problem was aggravated in both sovereign states but in Pakistan it became 
alarming since Partition. First, because of the Radcliffe’s, ‘illogical’ partition line in dividing the 
Punjab province between the two new sovereign states (India and Pakistan, discussed in 
detail in chapter 2 and 3), and, second, the occupation of princely state of Jammu and 
Kashmir enormously complicated the problem, giving India not only control over the main 
Chenab and Jhelum rivers but also their entire catchment areas, which supply no irrigation in 
India and very little in Jammu-Kashmir, but upon which Pakistan is heavily dependent. Third, 
since the signing of the Indus Waters Treaty, 1960 [West] Punjab had lost its three Eastern 
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rivers and became fully dependent on Western rivers which had been furnishing irrigation in 
other provinces as well as in NWFP and Sindh. Interestingly, the Sindh province claims its 
exclusive rights on the river Indus to whom Chenab and Jhelum are tributaries.45 
 Thus the Indian Act of 1935 which established high degree of provincial autonomy (as 
envisaged in the Cabinet Mission Plan) was found unsuitable both in India and Pakistan. 
Since 1955 Pakistan has tried to ignore regionalism by centralisation of power, first, in West 
Pakistan with Karachi [Sindh] as the capital and now in Islamabad [Punjab]. Pakistan, like 
other developing countries, found it necessary to introduce central controls on economic life, 
including river development projects, public and private spending, and the allocation of vital 
foreign exchange. Needless to say that it did not prove beneficial rather it aggravated the 
sense of deprivation amongst the provinces. The other provinces have been often accusing 
Punjab of monopolising all benefits being a majority in the central administration of the 
country while depriving them of due shares. The ever-increasing demands of greater 
provincial autonomy led to the strengthening of ethno-national movements in the country is a 
concomitant of reactionary responses to such controls. It gave rise to many disputes among 
the provinces like the one on the construction of Kalabagh Dam between Sindh and Punjab.46 
The Sindh-Punjab water dispute has its roots in the history of the Subcontinent. The 
UBDC was not included in the water-sharing programme of the five link-canals but India 
continued to draw, by prior appropriation47 or “prior allocation,” all the water it could use from 
the Ravi. 48  Similarly Sindh after 1923, made persistent efforts to outguess and forestall 
Punjab lest a prior allocation to that province diminish the share that Sindh would enjoy under 
equitable distribution.49  
When the Indo-Pakistan dispute over river waters developed, it also became a 
question whether a prior allocation has to be an actual use or whether an agreement or 
project sanctioned was sufficient to constitute such an allocation? It is correct to say that 
equitable distribution was the guiding principle in the Indus Basin under British rule, but it 
must also be said that, because the irrigation system grew piecemeal rather than single fiat, 
prior allocation played an important modifying role.50 
 But what India was asserting, in April 1948, at least by implication, was neither of 
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these doctrines. On the other hand, in total disregard to these doctrines, it invented and 
exploited the absolute territorial sovereignty principle which had no historical basis. In effect, it 
was saying that Partition and Independence had created a new situation, and that it could 
proceed from any prior basis of its choice.51  
 This Indian position was for the East Punjab in 1948 may be well seen from a short 
analysis of the situation. Although the recommendations of the Indus (Rau) Commission had 
not been put into effect, and the 1945 agreement between the Chief Engineers of Punjab and 
Sindh had never been formalized, the pre-Partition Punjab would hardly have been allowed to 
proceed with the Bhakra Project without paying to Sindh at least some of the costs of one or 
two new barrages (at Gudu and Kotri-Hyderabad) on the lower Indus.52  
The pre-partition Punjab would have been subject to limitations on the size of Bhakra 
and on its operation-limitations reflecting the requirements not only of Sindh but of the Sutlej 
Valley Project below Ferozepur. After Partition, East Punjab was relieved of such obligations. 
Furthermore, since no additional supplies had to be allocated to West Punjab or Bahawalpur, 
the Bhakra Project could be redesigned yet another time and Sutlej water allocated to new 
areas in Rajasthan (India).53  
Michel writes: nor, in the Indian view, could Pakistan prevent her from proceeding 
with any of a series of proposed schemes to divert Beas water into the Sutlej (above Bhakra), 
Ravi water into the Beas (at Madhopur), or Chenab water (via the proposed Marhu Tunnel) 
into the Ravi. There would, of course, be no point in proceeding with the Wullar Lake scheme 
in Kashmir since a dam of any size would inundate more land (possibly including Srinagar) 
than could be commanded above the point where the Jhelum passed into “Azad” Kashmir. 
Yet possession of the site was another means of intimidating Pakistan, since a dam there 
could ruin the entire Triple Canals Project.54 Similarly, a dam constructed on the Chenab at 
Dhiangarh, north of Jammu, would enable India to withhold water from Marala. It was an 
extremely advantageous position as later summed up by one of the chief Pakistani 
negotiators of the Indus Waters Treaty: “India held all the cards.”55 
 No doubt India holds all the cards. Till the time the Kashmir dispute is not resolved to 
the satisfaction of the parties and the Jammu and Kashmir remains under Indian control, India 
can create extreme security crises for Pakistan many times greater than it created in 1948. 
Water weapon is more lethal than a nuclear bomb as was observed by Lilienthal in 1951, in 
his article “Another Korea in the Making”. The accommodation in the form of the Treaty 
provided Pakistan a safety valve but provisions relating to specified uses by India in Jammu 
and Kashmir are in no way less than permitted by International Law but for Pakistan any 
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further change in water supply is a question of extreme insecurity.56 
The Treaty provisions in Article III and Annexure C and D give India some specified 
rights to use waters of Western rivers. These provisions relate to the areas in Jammu irrigated 
by the Ranbia and Pratap inundation canals off-taking from the Chenab river above Marala, 
and Jhelum river above Srinagar-Verinag and they even allow India to build barrages, but not 
dams, to control water. India can maintain continuous withdrawal for irrigation of those areas 
that were irrigated on the effective date of the Treaty (1 April 1960), and may even enlarge 
the irrigated cropped acreage (counted twice if cropped twice a year) by 70,000 acres in the 
Indus valley, 400,000 in the Jhelum Valley, and 225,000 (of which not more than 100,000 in 
Jammu District) in the Chenab Valley, plus 6,000 acres from the Chenab but outside its basin. 
For this purpose India may construct barrages of storage capacities of up to 250,000 acres 
feet (AF) on the upper Indus, 500,000 AF on the Jhelum above Verinag, and 500,000 AF on 
the Bhaga and Chandra tributaries of Chenab, plus some additional capacity for power 
generation and incidental storage for flood control up to 10,000 AF on the river Jhelum only. 
Moreover, with the acquiescence of Pakistan and subject to the Treaty provisions (Article IX) 
for settlement of disputes, India can build new run of the river hydroelectric plants.57 
 These “specified rights” of using western rivers to India are not less, in any way, than 
any international covenant provides to any upper riparian in addition to the three Eastern 
rivers whose unfettered use was awarded to India under IWT after the transition period.58 
 Indian has got what it wanted with only two exceptions: i) It has to relinquish her claim 
to the Chenab with its Marhu Tunnel diversion possibility, and accordingly ii) It have slowed 
down the Rajisthan Project until additional storage on the Beas (at Pong) and Ravi (at Thein) 
was available to Bhakra. But this delay and continued supplies to Pakistan over a period of 
less than five years, “was a small price to pay for the three rivers, especially since her 
contributions to the link canal was limited to her benefits.”59  
 The simplicity of Pakistani decision makers in accepting the Bank plan and its 
execution was of the great merits of the plan. Once the transition period was over, the two 
countries could go their separate ways. The problem for the negotiators was that, neither 
India nor Pakistan wanted an integrated irrigation system, even if the World Bank could be 
persuaded to lend much of the cost. Pakistan did not want it because her entire experience 
from the Cabinet Mission and Mountbatten-Menon negotiations, through the Partition 
holocaust, to Kashmir and the canal closures of April 1948, had proved that it could not trust 
India with its life-giving supply of irrigation water. India did not want it because it could go 
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ahead, at considerably less cost to itself, with the Bhakra-Beas-Rajisthan Project, nor did 
Indians want to accept partition as a final and permanent thing. Pakistani decision makers 
should have been aware of this Indian attitude, but they would have been taking to India’s 
word that it would not interfere with the Chenab and Jhelum supplies. India, eventually 
obtained the rights of “specified uses” of the Western rivers in the Himalayas and in Jammu 
and Kashmir.60 
 Of course Pakistan welcomed Indian promise (not to interfere with Chenab and 
Jhelum flows) by considering three factors: First, as long as Southern Jammu-Kashmir 
remained in Indian hands, Pakistan could not use Dhiangarh dam site on the Chenab or the 
Wullar Lake site on the Jhelum. Second, it believed in General Wheeler’s estimates that the 
net loss of the Dhiangarh site to Pakistan is only about 2.5 million acre feet per year and his 
argument that the advantage of the Wullar Lake site was restricted by the danger of flooding 
the entire Kashmir Valley—Pakistani administered Kashmir—”Azad Kashmir” and Srinagar. 
Third, these dam sites were not included in the Bank’s Indus Basin Development Plan for any 
financial arrangement.61 
 From the engineers’ standpoint, the Marhu plan had the great advantage. It was 
obvious that it could never be acceptable to Pakistan. The only way out of the impasse for the 
Bank was to divorce it from the two basic issues, the scheme of works necessary for 
replacement and the cost of such a scheme from its plan.62 
 In this way, Pakistan lost its unfettered right of use of the three Eastern international 
rivers and India gained a strong and real political tool under the IWT clause of “specified 
uses” to intimidate Pakistan, strangulate it economically and threatens its security whenever 
required so.63  
6.2.1 Domestic Political Losses: Provincial Disharmony 
 The policies of the British in United India for the development of Punjab on the 
criterion of irrigation-based agriculture in the Indus Basin had created deep tensions between 
Sindh and Punjab provinces over the distribution of the available surface water. Punjab saw 
itself as the country’s breadbasket and naturally expected preferential treatment in the use 
and development of the water resources of the Indus river system. Sindh, in contrast, felt 
neglected after decades of British policies focused on the development of upper Indus Basin. 
Sindh not only had to lobby hard to convince the British to consider its needs seriously, but 
also had to defend against Punjab’s efforts to secure as much water as possible for own 
irrigation schemes. When the British finally started trying to lessen water-related tensions 
between Sindh and Punjab, they failed to persuade both the provinces for cooperation.  
 The water dispute between Sindh and Punjab exacerbated from 1947 to 1960. The 
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Indian action of 1948 and its subsequent demand of exclusive rights to the waters of three 
eastern rivers, which culminated into signing of the Treaty, remained an issue of hot debate 
among the political elite for a decade but further worsened after relinquishing by Pakistan the 
waters of three eastern rivers of Punjab to India. Consequently, in the post-Treaty 
environment the shortfall was to be met by diverting waters from the western rivers. The other 
provinces of Pakistan blamed Punjab for selling-out of its rivers to India and developing on the 
behest of the resources of other provinces. Thus, it fuelled political and ethnic tensions which 
persistently troubled post-colonial Pakistan. Mainly because of the Treaty and partly due to 
inequitable distribution of economic and political power between ethnic groups, elites from the 
non-dominant groups increasingly viewed major decisions and policies over water distribution 
and other issues in purely ethnic terms. To mobilize support against the central state [Punjab], 
non-Punjabi, non-Muhajir elites in the smaller provinces emphasized ethnic differences 
between the provinces and highlighted the ethnic component of economic and political issues. 
Sindhi elites were quick in portraying the water dispute as an ethnic issue. Their appeals soon 
resonated with the local population, for whom the Indus waters were a question of survival of 
vital agrarian economy. Many people in the smaller provinces were already resentful of the 
Punjabi-dominated central state for not upholding promises of democracy and provincial 
autonomy. Debates over water allocation began to echo grievances over Punjabi domination, 
encroachment of provincial autonomy, and unfulfilled promises of political liberalization.64 
 The Indus waters issue was vital to Sindh and Punjab, later NWFP and Baluchistan 
also aired their grievances, because they were the principal beneficiaries of the Indus river 
system and as they had the capacity for developing canal irrigation systems. The British 
“favouritism of Punjab” in irrigating the Indus Basin had already caused feelings of resentment 
and neglect in Sindh in United India. After Independence, Sindhis feared that the pre-
eminence of Punjabis in the military and bureaucracy would culminate in state policies which 
would entrench Punjab interests at their expense.65 
 Although Sindhi nationalist leaders have played a major role in stirring up emotion 
on the water dispute, the issue is not important just because they have used it to arouse 
public discontent. The water dispute is both an economic and symbolic issue to Sindhis and 
their concern about possible reductions in the water supply should not simply be attributed to 
manipulation by politicians or ethnic elites. A reduction in the flow of the Indus would have 
serious repercussions for Sindhis as most of them depend on the river Indus—virtually the 
only source of water for their agricultural, industrial and drinking needs. Sindh’s position as 
the downstream riparian and its long-standing mistrust of Punjab further crystallised these 
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concerns. To the extent that while the Indian threat to Pakistan’s water supply loomed in the 
early years of independence, Sindhis worried about Punjab’s water-related activities. In the 
early 1950s, for example, Sindhi members of the central legislature complained that Punjab 
was undertaking projects detrimental to the water supply downstream. The central 
government tried to allay their apprehension by affirming that no schemes outside the scope 
of the 1945 Sindh-Punjab Draft Agreement would be sanctioned without consulting Sindh. 
Sindh was also concerned that the case which Pakistan presented in negotiations with India 
could be detrimental to it when the matter of provincial water rights was addressed. In 1954, 
the central government assured the provinces that what took place regarding the international 
dispute would not affect their positions in the domestic water disagreement and that, if 
necessary, it would appoint an impartial commission to resolve points of contention.66 
 The imposition of One Unit government in western Pakistan in 1955 ended debate 
over provincial water allocation by technically rendering it a non-issue and eliminating Sindh’s 
voice as a separate entity. 67  After One Unit government ended in 1970, the provincial 
distribution of almost anything became very controversial and the water dispute immediately 
re-emerged as a major source of tension between the provinces. Debates over the water 
issue in the provincial and national assemblies and in the press were particularly heated as 
the rhetoric tapped into the inter-ethnic tensions. As both mainstream politicians and ethnic 
nationalists exploited the issue for political gains, technical details became muddled and 
misperceptions and misinformation abounded. The emotion aroused by the dispute also 
affected engineers in the provincial irrigation departments and they could not agree on even 
basic technical matters. Public pressure, especially in Sindh and Punjab, discouraged 
compromise and hardened the provinces’ positions. For politicians, appearing weak on the 
water issue was politically unacceptable: no one wanted to be accused of giving water 
away.68 
 Arguments over water allocation were frequently couched in terms of provincial 
versus national interests. These arguments have echoed the feeling in the smaller provinces 
that Punjab has imposed its will under the guise of Pakistan’s “national interest”. In their view, 
policies beneficial to Punjab are equated with the needs of Pakistan while those which looked 
after the smaller provinces are condemned as selfish, parochial and “anti-Pakistan”. Punjab 
has contended that, as Pakistan’s “breadbasket,” it is in the national interest for the province 
to develop agriculture to the maximum extent possible. The province should thus receive 
enough water to irrigate all its cultivable land. This position is reflected in the province’s earlier 
arguments against the British decision to expand irrigation in the Lower Indus Basin. Punjab 
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has further accused Sindh of wanting to sacrifice the interests of Pakistan to “selfish 
provincialism.” Sindh on the contrary has countered that agricultural expansion being pursued 
by Punjab was against the national interest as it would hurt Sindh’s development by 
decreasing the quality and quantity of water flowing downstream. Moreover, Sindh has 
resented what it perceives as Punjab’s claim to a disproportionate share of water under the 
guise of the national interest; to many Sindhis, Punjabis are the ones pursuing provincial 
interests.69 The issue of Kalabagh Dam is a vivid example of Sindh-Punjab row over water 
allocation and development of the Indus river.70 
6.2.1.1  The Gulf between East and West Pakistan 
Ben Crow et al state in their book, Sharing the Ganges, that the signing of the Indus 
Waters Treaty overshadowed the Ganges issue. The decision to go ahead with the Ganges 
project received a boost after the departure of the British from India and the partition of the 
lower Ganges delta into bitter political rival in the form of Indian West Bengal and East Bengal 
(former East Pakistan). The main forces at work lobbying for the Barrage project were 
commercial and industrial interests in West Bengal who saw it a technical panacea for the 
political and economic decline of the state. The chronology of events in its construction 
reflects the nature of the forces that guided this resolve. Though the project was in the mind 
of the Indian Government from very early on, yet the decision to go ahead with it was 
announced only in 1960 and Pakistan was informed of this only in 1961, four months after the 
September 1960 signing of the Indus Treaty. 
 The government of West Bengal exerted consistent pressures to secure central 
government’s support to expedite implementation of the barrage. In 1958, when progress was 
delayed, S. K. Patel, Minister of Transport in Government of India told the Indian Parliament 
that there was a reason for the delay but that he could not tell the House what it was. Before 
the conclusion of Indus agreement, in a letter dated 12 March 1960, Prime Minister 
Jawaharlal Nehru wrote to BC Roy the Chief Minister of west Bengal: 
“I can assure you that we are anxious to go ahead with the scheme [Farakka barrage]. 
In fact, work to that end is being done in various ways. We did feel, however, that we 
might not make public announcement about this for two or three months while the canal 
water [Indus Waters] discussions are going on. We hope they will be completed in 
about two month’s time. But this does not mean any delay and this project is certainly 
being included in our plans (emphasis in original).”71 
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 According to Arun, the authors summarised the period of 1961-1971 as one marked by 
conflict and disagreement between East and West Pakistan as well as between West Bengal 
and the Indian Government. The Indian government resorted to a strategy of procrastination, 
adhering to the position of absolute territorial sovereignty over the Ganges waters. It evaded 
high-level discussions promised by the Nehru-Ayub Khan agreement. The Pakistani 
government’s response to the Farakka project, on the other hand, is interpreted as a 
response in five stages: (i) cooperation, (ii) technical exchanges, (iii) pressure to hold high-
level talks, (iv) attempts to involve third parties, and (v) threat of retaliation.72  
 This was the time when Nepal also sought to re-negotiate with India the agreements on 
the Kosi and the Gandak projects, upstream tributaries of the Ganges river. Arun points out 
that Sharing the Ganges misses this broader dimension of the region’s international politics 
and its relevance to the Farakka issue.73 
 Although the authors are silent whether there was any trade-off made by Pakistan 
on Ganges issue but the leadership and the public of East Pakistan was of the view that 
“trade-offs were made” during the negotiations on the Indus waters issue. This factor certainly 
played a significant role in widening the political divide between East and West Pakistan as 
the former struggled and gained independence in 1972. 
The complexity and intertwined nature of the Indus rivers question together with all 
water-related issues in South Asia are occasionally highlighted by technical experts. The 
water resource negotiations in South Asia have been referring to the assessment of complex 
natural processes and evaluating the outcome of the large-scale engineering ventures. The 
uncertainties inherent in such assessments lead to debates in which technical expertise plays 
an important role. Some of these debates would remain difficult to resolve in whatever context 
they arose. In the highly charged context of conflicting interests, and the information-restricted 
atmosphere in which international diplomacy is pursued, resolution is more elusive. Technical 
ambiguities and uncertainties remain despite the large teams of highly competent experts. 
These uncertainties, the alternative ‘facts’ which can be constructed around them and, to a 
certain extent, the experts who comment on the uncertainties—all get drawn into the 
negotiation as resources, and are used (consciously and unconsciously) in partisan ways. 
Within the negotiations, technical ambiguities and uncertainties sometimes spawn 
intractable debates. For example, would the Farakka diversions improve navigation in the 
Hooghly River? How much ground-water recharge should be expected where the Ganges 
River crosses into Bangladesh? Some ambiguities were intentionally leaked-out of the 
negotiations to encourage widely-believed ideas about how natural processes, engineering 
projects and other governments are affecting people’s lives. Widely-disseminated, these 
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myths may take on a life of their own thus constraining subsequent discussions. 
The most prominent of the myths encouraged by technical ambiguity says India’s 
intentions in the building of the Farakka Barrage were malignant. An articulate expression of 
this myth of malign intent is contained in a contribution to and electronic bulletin board made 
by in 1993 by a Bangladeshi student studying in the US. In the course of a discussion about 
water sharing negotiations, he wrote the following: 
Jyoti Basu [Chief Minister of West Bengal] has admitted that the Farakka [Barrage] 
hasn’t solved any problem that [it] was originally intended for (most of the Indian 
scientists that I have met admitted to this fact; the reference of Jyoti Basu’s assertion 
in an interview published in a Bangladeshi Newsweekly Bichitra in 1994). Now the 
reason for such a failure lies in the lack of scientific feasibility of the project. I don’t 
think the Indian scientists didn’t know that the Farakka [Barrage] wouldn’t solve the 
problem of siltation on riverbeds. They, especially the geoscientists, must have 
known that. Their geoscience, by the way, is very good. The reason the government 
[decided] not to go far any scientific reasoning is obvious: the project was never 
meant to solve any physical problem, it was originally designed as a political tool to 
teach Pakistan (in the 1960s) a lesson. …hypothetically speaking, if Bangladesh 
were a state of India, then under no circumstances India would plan to build the 
Farakka Barrage because there is no scientific reason or validity to such an 
unnecessary undertaking (emphasis in original).74 
In fact, one of the criticisms which can be sustained is that the technical ambiguity 
was explicitly used to give legitimacy to a political belief. “It was originally designed as a 
political tool to teach Pakistan…a lesson”75, but it also served as catalyst for widening the gulf 
between East and West Pakistan. 
6.2.1.2  Alienation of Kashmiris 
 Neither Pakistan nor Indian leadership consulted Kashmiris on the issue of signing of 
the Indus Waters Treaty in 1960. The whole process of negotiation and mediation, 
encompassing more than nine years, was kept secret from the public of Kashmir as well as 
the peoples of both states. Effigies of both leaders were put on fire in their states immediately 
after the signing of the Indus Waters Treaty in 1960. Public pressures were mounting on the 
side of Pakistan to resolve Kashmir issue rather the demands were made to ‘capture’ 
Kashmir. Meanwhile, the revival of talks in continuation of the Indus Waters Treaty between 
India and Pakistan brought a lull in public pressure in Pakistan. The talks continued during 
1962-63 and diplomats, including Shamshad Ahmad, the former foreign secretary of Pakistan, 
who raised the hopes that Kashmir dispute was near to be resolved in the same spirit of the 
Indus Basin Treaty.  
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 According to Shamshad Ahmad, the Bhutto-Swaran Singh talks in 1962-63 were the 
only high-level India-Pakistan negotiations dedicated to exploring ‘a political solution’ of the 
Kashmir dispute, which, as both sides agreed, was to be ‘honourable, equitable and final’, 
taking into consideration: i) delineation of international boundary in Jammu and Kashmir; and 
ii) disengagement of the forces of India and Pakistan in and around Kashmir, and iii) the 
removal of all elements of tension.76 
Shamshad Ahmad further states that:  
“During those talks, Pakistan accepted the partition of the state but urged that 
territorial division should take into account the composition of the population of the 
State, control of rivers, requirements of defence and other considerations relevant to 
the determination of an international boundary and acceptable to the Kashmiri 
people. India was also ready to accept the partition of Kashmir while urging that the 
division should take into account geographic, administrative and other considerations, 
and that the settlement should involve the least disturbance to the life and welfare of 
the people.”77  
 The ‘Chenab Formula’78  has its origin in Bhutto-Swarn Singh talks. The Chenab 
riverbank as boundary was acceptable to both governments but Ayub Khan was afraid of that 
the people of Pakistan might not endorse it. Pakistanis, mainly Punjab and NWFP provinces, 
wanted the whole of Kashmir to join with Pakistan. The untimely, death of Jawaharlal Nehru 
dissipated hopes of Kashmir settlement on the basis of the Chenab formula. Securing of 
Kashmir along Chenab line was a latent wish of Ayub Khan. He states in his book that “the 
very fact that Pakistan had to be content with the waters of the three western rivers 
underlined the importance for us of having physical control over the upper reaches of these 
rivers to secure their maximum utilization for the growing needs of West Pakistan.”79  
The growing public pressures and development of strong military muscle of Pakistan 
through American assistance under the SEATO and CENTO pacts encouraged the military 
government of Ayub Khan to exploit the opportunity and to settle the Kashmir even by force. 
Pakistan then launched an operation named ‘Operation Jibraltar’ in the Indian-held Kashmir. 
The planning was to ignite a peoples’ uprising in the Indian-held Kashmir and later with the 
support of Kashmiris ‘liberate Kashmir’ by cutting off the Indian line of communication to 
Kashmir at Akhnoor, by a limited military action. The Pakistani military strategists laboured 
under the misconception that India would not cross the international border. Unfortunately, 
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their calculations proved wrong and India retaliated with full military might and attacked 
across the international border along Lahore and Sialkot cities. In this way, the ‘Operation 
Jibraltar’ culminated into full-fledged war on Kashmir between India and Pakistan in 
September 1965.  
The support of Pakistani public was unprecedented as they contributed 
wholeheartedly to National Defence Fund and the public of Lahore have not only been 
supplying home-made food to their troops fighting on the borders, but also extended all 
possible physical support in terms of war material, for example shot guns, kitchen knifes and 
sticks etc. As the war resulted in a drawn match between India and Pakistan and the Russian-
brokered Tashkent Declaration called for withdrawal of troops to pre-war positions, the hopes 
to liberate Kashmir by force also dissipated in 1965.  
From the signing of the Tashkent Declaration to the uprising of Kashmiris in Indian-
held Kashmir in 1989, no serious efforts have been made by Pakistan towards the resolution 
of the Kashmir dispute. Various governments have been justifying non-pro-active Kashmir 
policy because of their involvement in the US ‘proxy war’ in Afghanistan, which started some 
years after they faced the East Pakistan crisis. This policy alienated the Kashmiris from 
Pakistan that it had solved the issue of vital concerns (Indus water question) but paid no heed 
to Kashmiris cause, the Kashmiris demand for independence is a glaring consequence. 
However, the Kashmiris uprising in 1989 encouraged Pakistan to extend ‘moral and political 
support’ and keep on raising the level of violence in Kashmir. The Kargil episode of 1999-
2001 is a glaring example of this policy.  
6.2.2  Long-Term Domestic Economic Costs 
The huge infrastructure of dams and link canals for the transfer of water from western 
rivers to eastern rivers under the Indus Waters Treaty 1960, to compensate for the shortfall 
created by the total diversion of three eastern rivers by India, has exacted tremendous 
economic costs on Pakistan because of huge bills for maintenance of the canal infrastructure 
and is also hindering effective water management in the basin.  
Pakistan’s agricultural sector, which remains very dependent on the canal irrigation 
system, reflects the problems with water management which is not only remained disputed in 
fragile political environment but also it is unaffordable financially and unsustainable 
technically. The centrality of agriculture to the national economy makes the issue especially 
critical, the expansion of irrigation in the Indus Basin continued in the post-colonial period, 
and Pakistan now has three major storage reservoirs, 19 barrages and headworks, 43 main 
canals, 12 inter-river link canals, over 36,000 miles (59,400 sq km) of irrigation canals, and 
over a million miles of watercourses and field channels—the world largest integrated canal 
irrigation system. About 80% of the 51 million acres of cropped land are under canal irrigation, 
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and irrigated land produces over 90% of the value of national agricultural production and 
caters for 70 percent of workforce of Pakistan.80 
The water dispute began to reflect the political tensions between Pakistan’s provinces 
and ethnic groups. As one government appointed committee after another but all failed to 
settle the water issue. In the absence of a permanent arrangement for distributing the waters 
of the Indus river system, the federal government’s Water Distribution Committee was 
required to decide the allocations twice (once each for the Winter and Summer growing 
seasons) every year.81  Either the Prime Minister or President must have to approve the 
allocation before it becomes effective. With each ad hoc decision, the Government of 
Pakistan has emphasized that the arrangements are without prejudice to the rights and claims 
of the provinces and that they will not become a precedent for permanent water allocations in 
the future. Provinces were seldom satisfied with the shares which they receive under the 
seasonal ad hoc arrangements.82 
The ad hoc process of water distribution has sharply constrained efforts to improve 
water management by encouraging inefficient and often destructive water use and diverting 
money and attention from other water-related problems. 83  Uncertainty about long-term 
provincial water rights also discourages farmers from making on-farm investments which 
could increase production, while the frequent delays on decisions about ad hoc water 
allocation have hindered efficient use of the available water. For decades, the provinces have 
viewed it as desirable to establish “existing uses”—often by irrigating as much land as 
possible regardless of whether it is optimal use of the water—so that historical rights can be 
claimed in water negotiations.  
In the Province of Punjab, the problem has become uncontrollable despite huge 
expenditures on numerous salinity control and reclamation projects (SCARPs), details have 
been given in the following section. Provincial irrigation departments have been reluctant to 
acknowledge the high-rate of water losses in their canal systems because of apprehension 
that this would support other provinces’ claims that they are demanding too much water. 
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Similarly, the controversy surrounding water allocation between provinces deflects attention 
from the problem of suboptimal water allocation within provinces. 84 
The non-existence of any water-sharing agreement has also impeded the federal 
government from pursuing major new irrigation projects. This happened because without a 
water-sharing agreement their water requirements cannot be guaranteed. Therefore, they 
oppose any such plan of the federal government. Water stored at Tarbela Dam, a 
replacement work built as a result of the Indus Waters Treaty 1960 agreement, has not been 
efficiently used either. Because of inter-provincial contention over the allocation of storage 
water, water released from Tarbela has been passed on to the existing system. By sending 
excessive water to some areas where it is not needed aggravates the problem of water-
logging and salinity.85 Meanwhile, precious water flows down unused into sea.86  
The water dispute has also hindered efforts to implement a system of basin-wide 
water management, which experts have argued, could spawn significant increases in 
agricultural production. Despite the vast canal irrigation system and the importance of 
agriculture to the economy, Pakistan’s overall agricultural sector has not done well since the 
1960s, when Green Revolution technology helped generate a 6 per cent growth rate in the 
agricultural sector. In the 1970s, the average annual rate of growth in agriculture fell to 2 per 
cent. It rose to about 4 per cent in the 1980s, but this was largely attributable to a 10 per cent 
increase in cotton, which benefited from higher yielding varieties and better plant protection. 
Yields for other crops are among the lowest in developing countries. Given the region’s 
climate and soils, one acre foot of irrigation water should produce between $500 and $1,000 
of crop output; actual crop output per acre foot of water is less than $100.2. In the 1980s, 
increases in the production of all food crops (2.4%) failed to keep pace with the rapid 
population growth (3.1%) in the same period. “If this trend continues, Pakistan will face a 40 
per cent deficit in food-grains, an 80 per cent deficit in edible oils, and a 30 per cent deficit in 
sugar by the year 2000.”87 Pakistan has crossed all these projected limits and the situation is 
going bad to worse. 
The water dispute is obviously not the only factor for Pakistan’s difficulties with 
agricultural production but certainly it is the major one. Other interrelated problems, ranging 
from irrational pricing policies to inadequate agricultural support services, contribute to the 
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sector’s sluggishness. Moreover, settling the water dispute may not end difficulties with water 
management because it is only one of many reasons why barely half of the surface water in 
the irrigation system makes it to the fields.88 Still, even the lower estimates of the financial 
loss incurred primarily because of the water dispute are staggering. The World Bank 
estimates that Pakistan could gain $50 to 100 million annually by ending the dispute. 
According to the Government of Pakistan, the national economy forfeits about $1.7 billion 
annually in direct and indirect benefits because of the lack of a water-sharing agreement.89 
Overcoming problems with water management which the water dispute has created 
or exacerbated requires the successful implementation of a water agreement which the 
provincial governments, their irrigation department personnel, and farmers perceive as both 
fair and permanent. If water users or provincial irrigation departments view a decision on 
water distribution as unjust or apt to be changed by subsequent governments, they will 
continue detrimental practices and policies. For instance, landowners who think that their 
water allocation might change significantly in the near future will remain reluctant to make 
long-term investments which are needed to increase production. Similarly, provincial irrigation 
departments will persist in encouraging the use of as much water as possible in an effort to 
establish historical rights in future negotiations. They will also avoid using the prescribed 
allocation in long-term planning out of concern that it would serve to legitimize or reinforce a 
water decision which they consider unfair. 
Why has it been so difficult for Pakistan to resolve the issue of inter-provincial water 
distribution? The water dispute was already very intense before 1947 and, in the post-colonial 
period, Indian refusal to accept historic uses from the eastern rivers by Pakistan and the 
diversion of three international rivers got entangled in the tensions between the provinces’ 
major ethnic groups made it such a sensitive issue that even authoritarian rulers were unable 
to settle it. Even if they imposed a decision on the water issue, it would not foster the kinds of 
changes in behaviour which were necessary to improve water management practices. 
During Pakistan’s longest periods of authoritarian rule, Field Marshal Ayub Khan 
(1958-1969) and General Zia-ul-Haq (1977-1988) created commissions to deliberate the 
water issue, but neither could isolate the proceedings from the broader ethnic and political 
tensions that troubled the country. Arrangements reached under the auspices of authoritarian 
rulers are always handicapped because they will be popularly viewed as imposed, not freely 
negotiated. General Zia, in fact, tried to use his presidential and martial law powers to put 
pressure on the provinces to reach a consensus, but he only got the commission members 
from three provinces to fully accept the proposed arrangement. Provincial irrigation 
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department personnel from at least two of the provinces also sharply criticized the 
commission’s recommendations for water distribution. Ultimately, Zia not only did not try to 
implement the proposal but his government explicitly refused to even disclose the contents of 
the commission’s report. 
Intuitively, it seems that authoritarian rulers could have just imposed a permanent 
arrangement for apportioning water among the provinces when negotiations had failed. 
However, a closer examination of the water issue reveals that this was not a practical option, 
or at least not an option which would generate any benefits. Just as civilian leaders face 
major political constraints in attempting to end the dispute, so do the authoritarian rulers. 
Historically, one of the biggest challenges to Pakistan’s authoritarian regimes emanated from 
discontent in the smaller provinces over Punjabi alleged domination of the central state. 
Already faced with serious ethnic discontent and ethno-nationalist groups which were rapidly 
gaining support, the authoritarian rulers were averse to further inspiring opposition by issuing 
proclamation on water distribution. 
Even if Ayub or Zia had forced a permanent arrangement for apportioning the Indus 
waters on the provinces, it would not have led to significant improvement in water 
management practices because of the decision’s association with authoritarian rule. Since 
rectifying problems with water management in Pakistan ultimately requires altering behaviour, 
not just changing the way water is distributed, popular perceptions play a critical role in 
determining the success or failure of a new arrangement for distributing the Indus waters. If a 
decision on water apportionment is to generate positive change in Pakistan agricultural 
sector, it must be based on a broad consensus of all provinces. An arrangement widely 
perceived as an edict from the central state—not an agreement freely negotiated among the 
provinces, will remain ineffective at fostering necessary changes in behaviour at the level of 
the provincial irrigation departments or individual agricultural producers. 
Like authoritarian counterparts, democratically-elected leaders, too, face substantial 
political obstacles in attempting to end ethno-regional disputes, but they have a distinct 
advantage over authoritarian rulers in that agreements which they broker are much more 
likely to be accepted as negotiated rather than imposed. However, having an elected, civilian 
government is certainly not a sufficient condition for allowing a central leader to settle ethno-
regional disputes: For instance, Zulfiqar Ali Bhutto, Benazir Bhutto and Nawaz Sharif all 
attempted to bring the provinces into agreement on a water-sharing arrangement, but only 
Nawaz Sharif succeeded in 1991, though it also turned controversial soon. 
6.2.2.1 Salinity and Water Logging 
The problems of salinity and water-logging are the biggest environmental hazards 
faced by Pakistan.  Since the building of link-canals system to transfer irrigation water from 
western rivers to eastern rivers, for the purpose of compensating the shortfall in eastern rivers 
after being diverted by India under the Indus Waters Treaty arrangements, it has become very 
severe. Because of the diversion of rivers water away from its normal flow and beds the 
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problem of drainage becomes an uphill task and has substantially drained Pakistan’s 
economy.90  
The dilemma is that salinity and water-logging are reinforcing phenomenon. Applying 
more water for irrigation than the requirement of crops is making land water-logged by raising 
water-table in irrigated areas. High water-table brings more and more salts from the 
subsurface soil to surface. For reclamation of water-logged fields, more fresh water is 
required which further enhances water-logging and later salinity. 91 
Pakistan is facing both the problems in the province of Punjab—the major base of 
agricultural production of the state. On the other hand, diversion of water from western rivers 
reduces water supply in the coastal areas—required to flush away sea water intrusion. Thus 
more land is becoming saline due to intrusion of the sea water in coastal areas of Sindh and 
the problem has become colossal. Sindh province is accusing Punjab for the problem as the 
latter has to divert water from western rivers to compensate shortfall in eastern rivers. Thus it 
has hampered any development of water resources in Pakistan since the infrastructures was 
completed under the Indus Treaty in the mid-1970s. 
Numerous studies on the Indus Basin irrigation system refer to the gigantic problem of 
salinity and water-logging.92 Almost all indicate the major cause as the seepage from the link-
canals and poor drainage system while some refer to the mismanagement of river water. The 
aim of this study is not to pinpoint the causes of salinity and water-logging; rather, existence 
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of the phenomena and gravity of the problem itself which is eroding the production-base of 
Pakistan in the fertile provinces of Pakistan [Punjab and Sindh] and its linkages with conflict 
and peace in the region. 
In a recent article, an irrigation expert and former chairman of IRSA (Indus River 
System Authority, Pakistan), Fateh-Ullah Khan states that the colossal wastage of about 52 
MAF (million acre-feet) of water due to seepage from the unlined and supply-based canal 
irrigation system has created a drainage dilemma in the Indus basin. This is because the 
Indus Basin Irrigation System (IBIS) has been without a drainage system for removing excess 
water from the fields. Thus harmful saline drainage effluent has been accumulating in the 
Indus Basin from the wasteful seepage from the link-canals and the supply-based canal 
system in the form of groundwater.93 
About 45 MAF of harmful saline drainage effluent is indiscriminately pumped through 
about 700,000 tube wells of small farmers for use as irrigation water in Punjab. The pumped 
effluent contains about 150 million tons of injurious salts that are added to the land each year. 
The saline drainage effluent of 45 MAF has now become the second source of irrigation in 
Punjab besides its own share of 55.96 MAF of the canal water allocated under the 1991 
Water Accord.94 
The use of saline drainage effluent and the absence of sub-surface tile drainage of land 
at the root-zone level of crops to evacuate salinity have affected about 60 per cent of land in 
the Indus Basin. About 7-10 per cent of the land has become a disaster zone. Some 70 per 
cent of the drainage effluent pumped is saline and saline-sodic. As a consequence, the crop 
yield per acre in the Indus Basin is one of the lowest in the world. All these problems are 
created due to lack of drainage and the large-scale misuse of saline drainage effluent.95 
In order to tackle the deteriorating situation of land because of salinity and water-
logging in the Indus Basin, two mega-drainage projects of SCARP (Salinity Control and 
Reclamation Project) and NDP (National Drainage Programme) were executed since the 
early sixties at a cost of Rs. 250 billion and Rs. 500 billion respectively.96 Both of these tube-
well based mega-drainage projects have failed, as tube-wells cannot eradicate salinity, which 
is not their function. On the contrary, they circulate groundwater salinity between the topsoil 
and the sub-soil. Altogether, the two failed drainage projects have led to wastage of Rs. 750 
billion and 40 years time.97 The situation is growing from bad to worse as the following two 
maps highlight. 
Today, the dilemma faced is deciding whether to abandon the use of 45 MAF of the 
injurious saline drainage effluent that has become the second source of irrigation in Punjab or 
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to have sub-surface tile drainage to evacuate saline drainage effluents out of the area to 
reclaim saline lands, control salinity and maintain salt and water balance.98 The drainage of 
land to remove and control salinity by a proper method of ‘sub-surface tile drainage’ is 
recognized and practiced all over the world. If no sub-surface tile drainage were provided then 
salinity and sodicity would destroy the fertile lands of the Indus Basin by the year 2030.99 
Map-14& 15: Salinity and water-logging in the Indus Basin and the SCARP projects 
launched by Pakistan since 1960. (Source: Michel, Indus Rivers, op. cit., p. 441) 
 
 
 
 
 
Map-15: Gravity of the Salinity and Water-Logging in Punjab and Sindh Provinces. 
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6.3  Summary 
The Indus Waters Treaty, though admittedly brought substantial gains for both 
parties but in the long-run it has engendered more complexities for Pakistan-India relations. 
The development infrastructure envisaged under the treaty lessened the ‘hurting stalemate’ 
for the time being, but the permanent division/diversion of an integrated river system has 
given permanency to the distrust between both the states by minimising chances of 
interaction as envisaged in various annexure of the IWT. Moreover, it has highlighted the 
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vulnerability of lower riparian, Pakistan, till the time the physical control of sources of its life-
giving water supply [catchment areas of Chenab, Jehlum and Indus rivers] remained with 
rival upper riparian, India.  
Staggering economic costs for the maintenance of river diversion and link-canals 
infrastructure along with ecological un-sustainability in Pakistan, political losses in terms of 
alienation of Kashmiris, provincial disharmony because of water sharing issue being 
obstacles for river development in Pakistan and Jammu and Kashmir—all proved to be 
counter-productive.  
The separation of Kashmir from the Indus rivers’ issue by India has labelled the 
Kashmir Dispute as only a political. This has also given both India and Pakistan enough time 
to consolidate control and harden their respective attitudes on Kashmir territory. Moreover, it 
has paved no way towards promoting mutual understanding or cooperation between the 
riparian as was expected and assumed by the mediator, World Bank, at the time of the 
signing of the Indus Waters Treaty in September 1960.  
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Chapter 7 
EMERGING SCENARIOS: 
Water Disputes and Diplomatic Deadlock 
This chapter focuses on the major ongoing water disputes—Wullar Barrage, Baglihar 
and Kishenganga dams—and their role in bringing diplomatic deadlock to Indo-Pakistan 
relations. It addresses in detail the nature of the emerging scenarios in the region and the 
likely role of river water resources in Indo-Pakistan relations. The main contention is that a 
‘final settlement’ on the Kashmir issue, or long-term peace in the region, is inconceivable 
without giving due consideration to realities on the ground, namely the geographical 
imperatives of the Indus river system.   
Four major issues have surfaced since the signing of the Indus Waters Treaty(IWT) in 
1960, three of which, namely the Wullar, Baglihar and Kishenganga issues, are not only 
enduring but have been responsible for diplomatic deadlock in Indo-Pakistan relations. 
7.1  THE WULLAR BARRAGE ISSUE 
  Focusing on the Wullar Barrage (referred to by India as the Tulbal Navigation 
Project), this section highlights the geo-strategic importance of the Wullar Lake, Pakistan’s 
objections to the project, Indian justifications of it, and a brief account of the bilateral 
negotiations over this issue.1 
 In order to understand the geo-strategic significance of the Wullar Lake it is 
necessary to note that “The river ‘Jhelum Main’ starts from Verinag.” 2  Passing through 
Srinagar and the district of Baramulla, it enters into Azad Kashmir at Muzafarabad3 (see Map 
16). “Here the rivers Nilum and Kunhar fall in it simultaneously and then it turns towards south 
and enter into Mangla Dam near Mirpur.”4 
 The Wullar Lake is located approximately 25 kilometres north of Srinagar (in Indian 
held Kashmir) on the river Jhelum Main, 5187.24 feet above sea level.5 The river Jhelum 
                                                
1
 The narrative in this section is taken from author’s previous works: Mirza M. Nasrullah, “Wular 
Barrage,” (Jan. 1994), Pakistan Horizon, Vol. 47, No. 1, (Jan. 1994), pp. 47-66; For further details see 
also Muhammad Nasrullah, Wullar Barrage Issue: An Analysis (unpublished MPhil [Magister]Thesis 
submitted in the Department of International Relations, Quaid-i-Azam University, Islamabad, 1991), 
pp. 165-202; Please see also Mirza, M. Nasrullah, “Wullar Barrage: Device to Throttle Pakistan”, The 
Nation (Lahore), in 2 vols. January 4 and 11, 1991.  
2
 The Indus Waters Treaty 1960, Article I (4); See also Muhammad Nasrullah, Wullar Barrage Issue 
(1991), p. 165; See also Mirza M. Nasrullah, “Wular Barrage,” (Jan. 1994), (Jan. 1994), p. 49. 
3
 Government of Pakistan Location Map Indus Basin Plan, Water & Power Development Authority; 
See also Muhammad Nasrullah, Wullar Barrage Issue (1991), p. 165; See also Mirza M. Nasrullah, 
“Wular Barrage,” (Jan. 1994), (Jan. 1994), p. 49. 
4
 Kalim Akhtar, “Indian Plan to build a Barrage on the River Jhelum,” Nawa-i-Waqt, Sept. 27, 1986; 
See also Muhammad Nasrullah, Wullar Barrage Issue (1991), p. 166; See also Mirza M. Nasrullah, 
“Wular Barrage,” (Jan. 1994), p. 49. 
5
 Shah Nawaz Niazi, “Wullar Dam,” The Nation, October, 1989; See also Muhammad Nasrullah, 
Wullar Barrage Issue (1991), p. 166; See also Mirza M. Nasrullah, “Wular Barrage,” (Jan. 1994), p. 
49. 
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flows into the lake from the south and flows out of it in the west.6 The lake is “an impediment 
in the way of the river Jhelum Main.”7 
 Map-16: The Development Plan, showing dams and canals network. (Source: 
Michel, The Indus Rivers, p. 266) 
 
                                                
6
 Ijaz Hussain, “Pakistan and the Wullar Barrage Project,” Regional Studies, Vol. VI, No. 2 (Spring 
1988), p. 47; See also Muhammad Nasrullah, Wullar Barrage Issue (1991), p. 166; See also Mirza M. 
Nasrullah, “Wular Barrage,” (Jan. 1994), p. 49. 
7
 Mr. Abdul Aziz, “Wullar and the proposed Barrage,” The Muslim, Islamabad, October 24, 1986; See 
also Muhammad Nasrullah, Wullar Barrage Issue (1991), p. 166. 
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The geo-strategic significance of the site lies in the fact that any type of water-control 
structure enables India to intimidate Pakistan, as it has the potential to ruin the entire system 
of Triple Canals Project8 (namely, the Upper Jhelum Canal, the Upper Chenab Canal and the 
Lower Bari Doab Canal—see Map 16).  
Experts are of the opinion that the control of the flow of the river Jhelum would amount 
to a crippling blow to the economies of Pakistan and Azad Kashmir. It would, for instance, lay 
waste hundreds of thousands acres of fertile land in the Punjab and Sindh provinces. 
Furthermore, it would magnify the risk of floods and droughts, since the control of the Jhelum 
at its source, along with the colossal reservoir of water in the Wullar Lake, would provide India 
with the potential to release or obstruct the river’s flow any time, causing either a deluge or 
drought in the land of this region.9  
Since the Mangla Dam near Mirpur is fed by river Jhelum, development of the Wullar 
Barrage would put its survival at stake.10 The Dam produces half of the total hydro-power 
used in Pakistan, and interference in its functioning would cause a severe power shortage in 
Azad Kashmir and half of Pakistan, affecting Pakistan’s economy by reducing its industrial 
activity and agricultural production. 11  Moreover, “...construction of the Barrage would 
jeopardize irrigation of two third of the cultivated area of the Punjab, and also…give India the 
power to flood 13 million acres whenever it wished.”12 
The Wullar barrage would also be detrimental to Pakistan’s defence infrastructure. The 
control of Jhelum river by India, coupled with the river Chenab through the Salal Dam 
(constructed by it during the 1970s) and the three eastern rivers (whose control is with it 
under the IWT) would give with further military advantages vis-à-vis Pakistan. Should a 
conflict situation arise between the two states, India would be able to control the mobility of 
Pakistani troops by flooding the battlefield or canals, and could equally enhance 
manoeuvrability of its own troops by closing the barrage gates, rendering the canal system 
dry and easy to traverse.13 It is a proven fact that during the 1965 war, the Indian army failed 
to cross the BRB (Bombanwala-Ravi-Bedian-Dipalpur) link canal because it was in full flow.14 
                                                
8
 Aloys Arthur Michel, The Indus Rivers: A Study of the Effects of Partition (London & New Haven: 
Yale University Press, 1967), pp.201, 239-240; See also Muhammad Nasrullah, Wullar Barrage Issue 
(1991), p. 167. 
9
 A. A. Salaria, “Wullar Barrage: An explosive Issue,” Dawn, (Karachi), April 9, 1989; See also 
Muhammad Nasrullah, Wullar Barrage Issue (1991), p. 167. 
10
 Ibid.; See also Muhammad Nasrullah, Wullar Barrage Issue (1991), p.  167. 
11
 Asghar Ali Abdi, Sitara-e-Khidmat, General Manager, Mangla Dam, Statement passed by him 
during briefing to Water and Power officers at Mangla, November 24, 1970; See also Mirza M. 
Nasrullah, “Wular Barrage,” (Jan. 1994), p. 50; See also Muhammad Nasrullah, Wullar Barrage Issue 
(1991), p.  167. 
12
 Nasrullah Dareshak, Irrigation Minister Punjab, “Punjab to rise against Wullar Barrage,” The Nation, 
(Lahore) November 25, 1989; See also Mirza M. Nasrullah, “Wular Barrage,” (Jan. 1994), p. 50; See 
also Muhammad Nasrullah, Wullar Barrage Issue (1991), p.  169. 
13
 Ibid. 
14
 Ch. Muhammad Anwar Ali Sarya, “Wullar Barrage”, The Nation, November 17, 1989; See also 
Muhammad Nasrullah, Wullar Barrage Issue (1991), p.  168. 
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 To India, the Wullar Barrage would be of enormous significance, since the Wullar 
Lake could serve as a transportation infrastructure linking Baramulla with Srinagar.15 It would 
facilitate the transportation of 0.5 million tons of apples and other fruits from the orchards 
adjacent to Baramulla along with a huge quantity of timber from Baramulla forests to 
Srinagar.16 The adjacent land’s topography hardly permits the construction of a metalled road 
or railway line,17 and furthermore, the construction cost of the road would be many times 
greater than the Barrage construction.18 India claims that the Tulbal Navigation Project would 
be 90 per cent beneficial to Pakistan, as it would regulate the water supply to the Mangla 
Dam, increase the capacity for power generation, and regulate the supply to its triple canals 
system for greater irrigation in the Punjab.19 They also contend that the project could not be 
used for any purpose other than navigation as any type of significant storage would not only 
submerge Srinagar but also cause salinity and water-logging in a vast tract of land.20  
 An analyst has observed that, “the lay of land around Wullar lake is such that there is 
a little possibility of the stored water being put to agricultural use.”21 India has argued that the 
barrage would in fact be beneficial to Pakistan, since it would reduce the velocity of the flow in 
the river Jhelum, which, during the flood season, rises as high as 67 km per hour, compared 
to the lean season’s flow of 32 km per hour.22 According to another analyst India has not been 
able to create an infrastructure for the last thirty years with which to maintain the general 
storage of 0.3 million acre-feet.”23 
 These explanations appear remarkable when juxtaposed with a careful analysis of 
the impact of the Wullar Lake on the adjacent land, taking into account the general physical 
geography of the area and the topography of the Jhelum catchment area, including recent 
man-made structures.24 An analyst has claimed: “I have seen the lake and it presents a 
spectacle of an inland sea.”25 Moreover, “India is already using the water from the Jhelum 
Main for their 105-110 megawatt power station, on lower Jhelum and a 6-megawatt plant, run-
of-river at Mohora.”26 The “Tulbal Navigation Project” is a two-phase project: a barrage at the 
                                                
15
 M. G. Srinath, “India denies Pak Charge on Jhelum,” The Hindustan Times, September 27, 1986; See 
also Muhammad Nasrullah, Wullar Barrage Issue (1991), p.  170. 
16
 Author’s personal discussion with an expert from water and power ministry, Government of 
Pakistan, on November 22, 1989. 
17
 Ibid. 
18
 Ibid. 
19
 Ibid. 
20
 Ibid. 
21
 Altaf A. Shaikh, “Wullar Barrage” The Muslim, Islamabad, March 25, 1989; See also Muhammad 
Nasrullah, Wullar Barrage Issue (1991), p.  171. 
22
 Salamat Ali, “Propaganda barrage,” Far Eastern Economic Review (December 21, 1989); See also 
Muhammad Nasrullah, Wullar Barrage Issue (1991), p.  172. 
23
 Shah Nawaz Niazi, op. cit. 
24
 See also Muhammad Nasrullah, Wullar Barrage Issue (1991), p.  173. 
25
 Shah Nawaz Niazi, op. cit. 
26
 “True Story of Wullar Barrage,” Pakistan Times, December 20, 1989; See also Muhammad 
Nasrullah, Wullar Barrage Issue (1991), p.  173; Author’s personal discussion with some technical 
experts from Pakistan Indus Waters Commissioner, Lahore, on 10 January 1990. 
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mouth of Wullar lake at Ningali...and; a 960-megawatt hydroelectric power station at Uri, close 
to the Line of Actual Control in Kashmir”27 (see Map 17).  
Map-17: Location of Wullar Barrage 
 
 
7.1.1 The Dispute 
 The Indian Government began the construction of the Wullar Barrage in 1984.28 The 
Government of Pakistan, through its Commissioner, conveyed its objections to the proposed 
project and sought details in the spring of 1985.29 The Indian Government then supplied the 
required information, vaguely in spring 1986.30
 
On the basis of the provisions of the IWT, the 
Government of Pakistan strongly objected to the proposed plan. 
 According to the meagre engineering details made available, “the project comprises 
barrage of 439.33 feet in length located at the outfall of the lake with two under-sluices of 
39.37 feet each and six gated weir of 39.37 feet each, and a 12 meters wide navigational 
lock. The barrage on completion would create a storage of 0.3 million acre-feet (MAF); it 
would have a discharge capacity of 50,000 cusecs and would enable point level in the lake to 
                                                
27
 Ibid. 
28
 Editorial, Daily Jang (Rawalpindi), November 24, 1989; See also Muhammad Nasrullah, Wullar 
Barrage Issue (1991), p.  174. 
29
 Ijaz Hussain, “Pakistan and the Wullar Barrage Project,” op. cit.; See also Muhammad Nasrullah, 
Wullar Barrage Issue (1991), p.  174. 
30
 Ibid. 
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be raised and maintained at an elevation of 5,178.24 feet above sea level” (for details see 
Table-8 below).31  
The work on the project began in December 1984. The foundations of the navigation 
lock under-sluices, the adjoining lay of the barrage had been excavated, and work on the iron 
sheet piling was nearing completion.32 However, in November 1987 India agreed to suspend 
construction until a settlement could be reached.33 
----------------------------------------------------TABLE-8------------------------------------------------------- 
SALIENT FEATURES OF WULLAR BARRAGE 
1. Type of Structure     Barrage 
2. Designed Flood Discharge    50,000 cusecs 
3. Pond Level (Max. Operating Level)   5178.24 ft 
4. Width between Abutments      439.33 ft 
5. Navigational Lock         39.37 ft 
   a) Floor Level Upstream  5158.39 ft 
   b) Floor Level Downstream 5152.81 ft 
6.   Under Sluices (Overflow Portion 1): 
    Two Spans of       39.37 ft 
    Crest Level    5165.81 ft 
    Upstream Floor Level  5158.39 ft 
 
7. Estimated Cost: Indian Rs. 380 million (1990 estimates) 
8. STORAGE CAPACITY OF WULLAR LAKE 
Elevation  Surface Area    Volume (Acre-Feet) 
5167 ft   14172 sq km    055569 
5170 ft   22874 sq km    110478 
5174 ft   32365 sq km    247235 
5180 ft   48031 sq km    347235 
CAPACITY AT MAXIMUM OPERATING LEVEL (5178.24 ft) =  0.328 MAF 
 
7.1.2 Pakistani Objections and Indian Justifications 
 Pakistan contends that the provisions of the IWT cannot be read in isolation and that 
the document must be interpreted in the light of its object and purpose. As an upper riparian, 
according to IWT, India is under an unambiguous obligation to allow the water to flow 
downstream unhindered. If the barrage were to be completed, India would be in a position to 
release or withhold water. India is entitled to construct an incidental storage work on river 
Jhelum if it does not exceed 10,000 acre-feet of water. The Indian plan to store 300,000 acre-
feet is thirty times larger than the volume permitted under the IWT.34  
                                                
31
 Altaf A. Shaikh, “Wullar Barrage,” The Nation, Lahore: October 5, 1989. See also Aslam Sheikh, 
“India Told to Stop Work on Jhelum Barrage,” The Muslim, September 29, 1986; See also Muhammad 
Nasrullah, Wullar Barrage Issue (1991), p.  175. 
32
 Ibid. 
33
 Spokesman, Government of India, Daily Jang, January 1989. See also Dixit, “India Stopped Wullar 
Barrage Construction in 87” Staff Report, The Nation, December 5, 1989; See also Muhammad 
Nasrullah, Wullar Barrage Issue (1991), p.  175. 
34
 Dr. Ijaz Hussain, op. cit., p. 49; See also Muhammad Nasrullah, Wullar Barrage Issue (1991), p.  
177-178. 
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 India rebuts the Pakistani charge that “the structure she is building is not a ‘storage 
work’ but only a control structure envisaging use of natural storage.”35 India also justifies 
building the barrage on the ground that it is meant for navigational purposes during the winter 
months which, in its view, draws support from the “non-consumptive use” clause of IWT.36  
India contends that it is permitted four distinct kinds of uses of the western rivers: 
domestic use, for drinking, washing etc.; agricultural use, for irrigation; restricted use, for the 
generation of hydro-electric power in “run-of-river” plants; and what is called “non-
consumptive use”. Thus, according to India, it is allowed such “non-consumptive use” of the 
western rivers, including the Jhelum Main and its “connecting lake,” the Wullar Lake 37 . 
However, the central issue under dispute is whether the Wullar Barrage is essentially a 
project for the “control or use of water for navigation” or whether it constitutes a “storage 
work”.38 
 The term ‘storage work’ is defined as a work constructed “...for the purpose of 
impounding the waters of a stream”.39 Is the barrage being constructed would be for “the 
purpose of impounding” i.e. the collection or confinement of the waters of the Jhelum or as a 
“control of water for navigation?” The Indian standpoint is that the “water will indeed be 
‘confined’ for some time in order to raise the level of the lake, and then to regulate supply by 
‘control’ of the water for navigation or construct any storage works on, the western rivers.”40  
One such exception is for ‘run-of-river’ hydro-electric projects. The other, pertinent to the 
dispute, takes the form of limited permission for the storage of the waters of the western 
rivers, as spelt out in Annexure E to the IWT. India is allowed “any natural storage in 
connecting lake,” unlike the Wullar Lake which is a lake in the bed of the river ‘Jhelum main’, 
but it must be “storage not resulting from any man-made works”.41  
 Some Indian sources state that the Wullar Lake is in a pathetic state—a “patient on 
the death bed,”42 has “halved in its size over the past five decades,”43 and become “flatter and 
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 M. G. Srinath, op. cit.; See also Muhammad Nasrullah, Wullar Barrage Issue (1991), p.  176. 
36
 Article 1(11) of the IWT, 1960 defines the term “Non-consumptive use” that “any control or use of 
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 M. G. Srinath, op. cit.; See also Muhammad Nasrullah, Wullar Barrage Issue (1991), p.  179. 
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 Muhammad Nasrullah, Wullar Barrage Issue (1991), p.  179. 
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 Indus Waters Treaty, 1960, Annexure E Paragraph 2(a); See also Muhammad Nasrullah, Wullar 
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shallower.”44 The Wullar impedes navigation, especially during the winter, from late October 
to mid-February. The Barrage is not intended to add to storage as such, but to regulate 
depletion in order to ensure navigability all year round. 45
 This is sought by the Tulbal 
Navigation Project, which would see the construction of a 440 foot long barrage, with a 
navigation lock, at the mouth of the Wullar Lake.46 
  India offered three assurances:47 1) the “Tulbal Navigation Project is to control and 
regulate the depletion from Wullar Lake to provide the requisite flow in the Jhelum; 2) the 
volume of water that flows into the Jhelum as it enters Pakistan will not be diminished nor will 
be any material change in the flow in any channel;” and 3) “these precautions envisaged in 
the project will be in the interests of Pakistan as well.” 
 Pakistan strongly objects that it is not a work for navigational “control,” but of 
“storage”. It will affect the volume of water flowing into the Jhelum and apprehends that under 
the cover of a navigation project, India is in fact attempting to gain control of the water of the 
“Jhelum Main” for hydroelectric power production.48 
7.1.3 The Process of Negotiations 
 The IWT contains a self-executing procedure for resolving the differences and 
disputes relating to the interpretation and application of its provisions. Procedures are agreed 
upon under Article IX.49 
 Pakistan became aware of the Tulbal Navigation Project through a tender notice 
submitted by the Indian government in February 1985. The then military government under 
Ziaul Haq treated the matter urgently. Later, in May 1986, during an annual meeting between 
the Indus Waters Commissioners, India argued that the Wullar Barrage was being 
constructed for “non-consumptive uses” and, under the IWT, such a barrage could be built on 
the Wullar Lake for navigational purposes. India further attempted to clarify the issue by 
adding that the water stored at the barrage would not be used for the purposes of power 
generation.50  
 In the second round of discussions in December 1987, India adopted another stance, 
saying that the Wullar Lake was not a part of the river Jhelum and as such it had every right 
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to construct a “dam” or “barrage” on it. Islamabad reacted quite sharply to this assertion. 
Meanwhile, in October 1987, a committee contacted by the Junejo government, including 
some British and American experts, strongly recommended that Pakistan approach the 
International Court of Justice. The matter was under consideration when the Indian 
government agreed to discuss the issue directly and abandoned the construction work until 
an accord was reached.51 Later, the Indian ambassador contacted Prime Minister Benazir 
Bhutto, requesting negotiations in February 1989. Pakistan accepted and the first round of 
bilateral talks was held between Pakistan’s envoy in New Delhi and the then Indian 
Government in March 1989.52 
 During these negotiations, Islamabad expressed its apprehensions about the 350 
million rupee “Tulbal Navigation Project”, better known as the Wullar Barrage. Pakistani 
experts were also convinced that India planned to divert water from river Kishenganga into 
the Wullar Barrage.53 Consequently, as a result of the non-availability of water, the Neelum 
valley would be seriously affected, where Pakistan had designs of constructing a 969 MW 
hydroelectric plant.54 
 The Indian Commissioner for the Indus gave an assurance that the barrage water 
would not be used for the generation of electricity, but instead stored water would be used 
only for navigation purposes. The Indian government had already completed feasibility reports 
for the setting up of a power plant in the vicinity of the Wullar Lake and two other Indian power 
plants were already working at Mohra and lower Jhelum, a few kilometres downstream of the 
lake.55 
Nonetheless, India made the offer to Pakistan that in lieu of the barrage, it would 
forgo its IWT rights to use the three million acre feet “General Storage” from the tributaries of 
Jhelum river.56  
 In March 1989, the Government of Pakistan sent a delegation to New Delhi. A draft 
was reportedly presented to Indian officials.”57 Following these inconclusive talks Federal 
Minister for Water and Power, Sardar Farooq Leghari, denied that Pakistan had presented a 
draft to India and stated that the government would approach the International Court in the 
case of a complete failure of negotiations.58 
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 The then Punjab government, however, lodged a protest with the Federal government 
in April 1989 and asked the government not to negotiate any further. A committee was 
entrusted the task of revising the said “draft” and submit it to the Ministry of Water and Power 
by 31 August 1989.59 
 On 18 August 1989, the Federal government wrote a letter to the Punjab government 
that an agreement would be signed between Pakistan and India on 31 October 1989. The 
Punjab government refused to support the agreement.60 
 On 11 October 1989, the Chief Minister of Punjab, Mian Nawaz Sharif, wrote a letter 
to President Ghulam Ishaq Khan, requesting him to intervene in the Wullar issue, as the PPP 
government wanted to sign an agreement which was against the national interests.61 
 Meanwhile, a mass uprising in Indian-occupied Kashmir took place and the issue 
faded into the background. On 6 August 1990, the Bhutto government lost its legitimacy under 
the presidential order and Pakistan underwent a process of new elections. In India, V.P. 
Singh was removed in a no-confidence.62 
 The new governments of Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif and Mr. Chandra Shakher paid 
no attention to the issue, mainly due to Kashmiri uprising, the Gulf crisis and internal turmoil in 
both states. The issue remained unattended and was taken up again in January 2004 under 
the ongoing Composite Dialogue. However, no meaningful progress has been reported so 
far.63 
7.2  THE BAGLIHAR DAM ISSUE 
 The planned Baglihar Dam is located in the Doda district, approximately 110 
kilometres within the Indian-held Jammu and Kashmir valley. The construction of this hydro-
electric power plant is underway. The dam after completion would acquire a height of 144.5 
meters having huge storage capacity sufficient to produce 900 MW hydro-electric power.64 
The Baglihar is one of eleven reported major hydroelectric projects that India has identified in 
Jammu and Kashmir, with nine of them on the Chenab.65  
Since June 2004 two rounds of bilateral talks were held on the issue but the parties 
failed to resolve differences in the light of the IWT. In January 2005, Pakistan for the first time 
invoked the arbitration provisions of the IWT and requested the World Bank to appoint a 
neutral expert. A Swiss hydrologist, Raymond Lafitte, was appointed in May 2005. He paid 
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visits to the site and submitted his report after two years in 2007 which did not satisfy the 
lower riparian. Since then there is diplomatic deadlock and Pakistan is reportedly looking for 
the feasibility to take this issue to the International Court of Justice for arbitration / 
adjudication. 
7.2.1 Pakistani Objections and Indian Justifications 
 Pakistan has not questioned the Indian plan as such but raised three key sets of 
technical objections to the design of the dam. One set of objections relates to its storage 
capacity, the second to the power intake tunnels, and the third to the spillways.66  
 Pakistani officials maintain that the Baglihar’s design equips India with the means, 
on the one hand, to economically squeeze, starve or strangulate Pakistan, or, on the other 
hand, to flood Pakistan, perhaps for military purposes. They argue, moreover, that the 
Baglihar dam has huge precedent-setting significance: if Pakistan were to compromise on the 
IWT, or rather on Jammu and Kashmir, it would set a precedent that India could invoke 
whenever it liked elsewhere on the Chenab or Jhelum rivers. A trickle of Pakistani deviations 
from the IWT today, said one senior foreign ministry official, could become a flood of them 
tomorrow.67 
 Prof. Wirsing reports that Pakistani officials also cite the political importance of the 
Baglihar issue. It is, they concede, an extremely sensitive domestic political issue. The 
government’s political foes demand to know why it took so long for them to contest the matter 
before the World Bank. “Baglihar is a politically painful matter for Islamabad,” admitted one 
Pakistani official. Baglihar and other Indian hydroelectric projects, say the Pakistanis, are also 
extremely useful tools New Delhi exploits to win the political support of the energy-deficit 
Kashmiris—and to drive a wedge between Kashmiris and Pakistanis.68  
 The Indian officials, as stated by Wirsing, naturally have a rather different “take” on 
the Baglihar. Its design, they contend, is fully in compliance with the IWT. Notwithstanding 
Pakistani objections, Baglihar, according to them, is a ‘run of the river dam.’ India has built 
nearly 20 such dams, they point out, and neither the Baglihar’s height nor its storage capacity 
disqualifies it for designation in this category. The Indians accuse Pakistani officials of being 
deliberately obstructionist and wilfully interpreting the IWT in an excessively restrictive 
manner. The Pakistani objection to the positioning of the power intake tunnels, for instance, 
ignores the IWT provision, specifying that they should be constructed at the highest level 
consistent with sound engineering. Likewise, the Pakistani opposition to the gated spillways 
was “absurd”. Himalayan rivers, a senior Indian official pointed out, carry enormous quantities 
of silt, far more than one generally finds in rivers in the West. Gated spillways, lower 
positioned gated spillways in particular, are essential in order to flush the silt-laden waters 
through the dam. Otherwise, the silt bombards the wall of the dam, falls to the bottom and 
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swiftly builds up sediment on the river floor—a development that modern dam builders seek to 
thwart in order to prolong the useful life of the dam. In the view of Indian officials, the IWT 
authors could not possibly have intended that hydropower projects built in 2005 should be 
designed to conform to technologies in use in the 1950s. The Indians also argue that 
Pakistani anxieties about the latter’s potential ability, to shut off the flow of water downstream, 
posing a threat to the vital farmlands of Punjab, have no basis in reality. Whereas Pakistanis 
claim that it would take a full 28 days to refill the Baglihar in the dry season.69  
Experts are of the opinion that the Baglihar Dam will have major security and 
economic implications for Pakistan, owing to increased Indian control over its share of water 
supplies. India can stop full flow of the river Chenab for about 28 days and cause a loss of 
6,000 to 7,000 cusecs of water every day, equal to a 27 per cent decrease in the Chenab 
river.70  
The dam will provide India with the capability to manipulate the flow of water to 
Pakistan’s disadvantage, the complete stoppage of flow for a continuous period of 28 days 
during the lean period of December, January and February would adversely affect agriculture 
and other requirements at Marala headworks and the project could also lead to a deluge in 
the area above Marala headworks, due to the sudden synchronized releases from the 
Baglihar along with Dulhasti and Salal reservoirs located in Indian-held Kashmir.  
India has already constructed the Salal Dam on this river and has further plans to 
construct 16 to 17 dams on the river Chenab and 6 to 7 on river Jhelum. Pakistan has already 
sacrificed 27 MAF to India under the IWT. 71  This confirms Pakistan’s apprehensions 
regarding India‘s intensions on its storage potential. 
Reports are appearing in the press that India, together with the state of Jammu and 
Kashmir (J&K), is deficit in power, and it seems that the Indian government has taken the 
policy decision to increase power production. Even if the government of Pakistan is crying 
wolf over India’s Baglihar, Wullar and Kishenganga hydroelectric power projects, the Indian 
government is reportedly planning to construct another three projects in J&K with about 
15,000 MW of power potential. In the past two decades, Indians have been invested Rs. 40 
billion alone in the power sector of the state.72 
India seems to be determined to proceed with its plan and create a fait accompli 
similar to the Israeli settlements in the West Bank and other Palestinian territories. 
Unfortunately, nothing can force India to accept the terms of the IWT except moral force. As 
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the future unfolds, water in the region will grow ever scarcer, and once goodwill is lost, the 
resolution of the issues would be difficult.73 
 Wirsing pinpoints three reasons for the dissatisfaction with the IWT—firstly, that, as a 
postscript to the region’s territorial partition, it offers very thin support to the integrated or joint 
development of the Indus river basin; secondly, that the IWT, in practice, favours either one 
side or the other. In the case of the Baglihar Dam, for instance, Indians have ineluctably been 
led to view the IWT mainly as an impediment to be artfully bypassed in the drive for increased 
hydroelectric power; thirdly, it offers only a very frail defence against heightened conflict over 
river resources between India and Pakistan, and that it is only a matter of time before water 
war becomes a virtually unavoidable feature of the region’s political environment. Citing a 
chapter entitled “Water” and with the subtitle “The Secret”, of a report The Final Settlement he 
highlights the argument that water has been central to the Kashmir dispute from the very 
beginning, that the public debate over Kashmir—focused on lofty goals of self-determination 
and human rights (and not on Islamabad’s self-interest in water security)—has always been 
discreetly steered away from this fundamental fact.74  
 The report cites as evidence frequent unofficial Pakistani expressions of interest in 
recent years in a so-called Chenab formula of conflict resolution, according to which Jammu 
and Kashmir would be further partitioned, with Pakistan being granted the Kashmir Valley and 
a substantial (and Muslim majority) portion of Jammu, enough to give it command of the 
Chenab river. This, according to the report, has in recent years been the latent objective of 
Pakistani diplomatic and political activity relating to Kashmir.75 From The Final Settlement’s 
perspective, “The IWT” has engendered a vicious cycle. This would aggravate the mistrust 
and hostility between the two countries. This vicious cycle of depleting resources spawning 
unemployment and fuelling terrorism is feared to intensify in the near future.76 
Wirsing doubts the oversimplified linkage between water availability and terrorism in 
The Final Settlement’s analysis in the words that “it is not alone, however, in calling attention 
to the potentially severe security implications of the region’s water resource rivalry”, and 
quoted a senior Pakistani diplomat as saying: “Water has become the core issue between 
India and Pakistan…. [As a result,] India-Pakistan relations will retain [in future] the same 
level of tension [as they now have] (emphasis in original).” 77  However, using words 
reminiscent of the appeals by Verghese and others for greater Indo-Pakistan collaboration in 
the development of the Indus basin’s water resources, Wirsing refers the report finally ending 
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on a positive note by evolving a plan to be jointly developed by India and Pakistan, would 
involve a creative solution to the political dimension of the conflict in Jammu & Kashmir.78 
7.3 THE KISHENGANGA DAM ISSUE 
The river Neelum is a tributary of the Jhelum River over which Pakistan has exclusive 
rights under the IWT. The part of the river Neelum in Indian-held Jammu and Kashmir (J&K) 
is known as the Kishenganga. India plans to construct a 330 megawatt hydro-electric power 
plant on the river Kishenganga by damming the Neelum and diverting its water through a 27 
kilometre tunnel to the river Jhelum in the Wullar Lake, about 25 kilometres from 
Muzaffarabad, inside Indian-held Jammu and Kashmir. Where India is developing Wullar lake 
to a fullfleged dam of storage capacity of 0.3 MAF and power plant of 960 MW. Downstream 
of the Indian Kishenganga project Pakistan has already planned a 969 megawatt Neelum-
Jhelum hydropower project in Azad Kashmir. The diversion of the Kishenganga by India will 
enormously reduce the flow of water and badly affect the proposed Pakistani project.79 
The river originates and flows through a valley situated in the central area of Jammu & 
Kashmir, intersected by the "Line-of-Control" that divides the Pakistani and Indian 
administered parts of J&K. The Kishenganga Valley is separated from the wide Kashmir 
Valley by the north Kashmir mountain range which runs west from Zoji La Pass. The 
Kishenganga catchment in the north is delimited by the Great Himalayan range as some of its 
tributaries flow down the slopes of the high peak Nanga Parbat (8,126 meters). Rising in the 
mountain complex to the west of Dras and to the south of the Deosai plateau, the 
Kishenganga river receives the waters of a number of tiny tributaries, including a stream 
flowing from a place known as Koubal. At a place Shardi, it makes a sharp bend proceeding 
southwest until finally merging with the Jhelum River near Muzafarabad. The Kishenganga 
has a narrow and elongated basin, the width in many places spanning only twenty feet.80  
There are reports that India has established a Kishenganga Group of Contractors 
which consists of a Swedish consortium, Skanska International, and Indian companies, 
including the Power Development Corporation. The project aims to construct a 103 metre-
high dam on the Kishenganga River in the Gurez Valley. Once completed, the lake of the 
Kishenganga dam will inundate the entire Gurez Valley with water, destroying its ecology and 
driving out more than 25,000 Dard Shin people, a unique and virtually unexposed culture, 
from their ancient homeland. The project plans to dam the Kishenganga in the Gurez Valley, 
creating a large reservoir from which a channel and abut 22-27 km tunnel dug south through 
the North Kashmir mountain range will re-direct the Kishenganga waters to the Wullar Lake at 
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Bandipur, where a 960-MW hydro-electric power plant will be installed at the Wullar barrage. 
The total distance by which the river will be diverted is 100 km.81 
In addition to destroying the entire Gurez Valley, such a project would reduce the river 
Kishenganga’s flow below the dam to a mere trickle, negatively affecting the environment of 
the lush green valleys from Neelum to Muzafarabad. Also, the diversion of the river 
Kishenganga would increase the level of the Wullar Lake, forcing the displacement of the 
inhabitants from the Muslim majority areas of the Kashmir valley.  
There are reports that the $500 million project is to be completed with the assistance 
of 85 per cent international funding. The building contractors, such as Skanska International 
of Sweden, have pledged to arrange 85 per cent of the costs of the project from international 
financial institutions at nominal five to six per cent interest rates. The debt will be paid over a 
twelve-year period. The balance of fifteen per cent is to be contributed by the Jammu and 
Kashmir government from its internal resources.   
Map 18:  The Location of the Kishenganga Project and the Diversion Tunnel to Wullar  
(Source: Pakistan Indus Waters Commissioner, 2011; See aslo Subrahmanyam Sridhar, 
“The Indus Water Treaty,” Security Research Review, 2005. 
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 The inhabitants of the Gurez Valley are protesting that they were not once consulted 
before the Indian government entered into the deal with the Swedish consortium, The project 
is in its early stages. 
The Dard Shin locals have been given two options: to leave on their own or to 
evacuate through a government plan which will settle the people into concrete housing 
projects in an urban setting. Twenty-five villages, 6 summer high-altitude habitats for 
shepherds, and 8 camping sites will be consumed by the dam construction project. With the 
completion of the project, approximately 25,000 Dard Shin people will be forced to quit the 
Gurez valley.82 
 
7.4 The Indian Intentions 
 India has clandestine motives in the guise of water resource development in Jammu 
and Kashmir. First and foremost, its aim is to convert Indo-Kashmir hostility into Pakistan-
Kashmir confrontation. It is exploiting this issue by defaming Pakistan among the inhabitants 
of Indian-held Kashmir by propagating that it is interested in their welfare, but Pakistan is 
creating hurdles. This fact can be observed by the Indian Strategic Foresight’s report that 
Indo-Pakistan rivalry over Kashmir would be story of the past but Pakistan and Kashmiris 
would soon fight over the Indus rivers.83  
The second hidden objective is forcing Kashmiris to leave the valleys, with the 
Kishenganga and Wullar Barrage issues constituting as vivid examples. By constructing a 
diversion infrastructure in the shape of the Kinshenganga dam, thousands of Kashmiri 
Muslims would have no option but to migrate. As Michel points out that the huge storage 
reserves of the Wullar Lake would inundate the entire Kashmir valley,84 the main areas of 
Muslim population. Deprived of source of livelihood the Kashmiri people would not be able to 
resist the Indian occupation, thus ‘dissolve’ Kashmir issue in the name of development. 
 The third overriding objective is to keep under control Pakistan’s life-line of water 
resource upstream for military, political and economic purposes. The upper riparian status 
possesses all potentials, and in asserting them, India can browbeat Pakistan on all the 
bilateral issues, especially Kashmir.  
The rivers Jhelum and Chenab are crucial to the agrarian economy of Pakistan and 
are a matter of life and death for the farming communities of Punjab. These rivers constitute 
the main source to compensate the shortfall of the three eastern rivers Pakistan relinquished 
to India under the IWT. Any upstream control structure would be detrimental to Pakistan’s 
economy and security. Pakistan is already building a 969 MW hydroelectric power station on 
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the river Neelum (known as the Kishenganga upstream of the LOC) and raising the height of 
the Mangla Dam; both of these projects would become useless before their completion. 
The Indian objective of ‘solving the navigation problem’ between Baramullah and 
Srinagar by constructing the “Tulbal Navigation Project” is most likely a cover up. The Project” 
is not merely a “barrage” but a proper “storage work” for a complete “dam”. “India would be 
able to stop the water flow of river Jhelum for 20-30 days completely.”85 This could greatly 
reduce the production of electricity at Mangla and thereby adversely affect agricultural 
productivity in the Punjab province. Since the river Jhelum is an important tributary of the 
Indus,86 any reduction in its flow would automatically reduce the flow of water in river, and 
thereby not only inflict damage upon the agricultural sector in the Sindh but also exacerbate 
Punjab-Sindh tensions.87 
7.5 The Looming Water Scarcity 
Since 1990 an alarming scarcity of water is the catch-word in nearly all studies and 
research.88 Numerous studies have projected the looming scenario in Pakistan.89 At the end 
of the 20th century, the International Water Management Institute, Colombo, Sri Lanka, 
conducted a world-wide study on the availability of fresh water and projected emerging trends 
for the first quarter of the 21st century. The water scarce countries identified those located in 
the arid regions of the world: Africa, the Middle East, South Asia and Central Asia. In South 
Asia, the whole of Indus River Basin, comprising the total cultivable territory of Pakistan is 
projected as an ‘absolute water scarce’ area (see maps below). A number of causes of 
growing fresh water scarcity have been identified by academics, such as Homer-Dixon, Paul 
F. Diehl et al.  
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 The International Water Management Institute measured the emerging trends in fresh 
water by projecting three scenarios: 1) Business as usual (BAU), with a 5 to 10 per cent 
increase in irrigated areas, 2) Technology, Economy and the Private Sector involvement 
(TEC), combining all the technology the states have at their disposal and support of their 
domestic economy, including the involvement of the private sector in the water development 
infrastructures and 3) Values and Lifestyles (VAL), i.e. the respective state practice in terms 
of water use and national life-style. In all the three scenarios, it is predicted that Pakistan 
could become an absolute water-scarce state in the first quarter of the 21st century (for details 
see Map19 and Figures 4-5 below). 
A further aspect is related to the perception of scarcity in the Indus Basin. This differs 
as it is not limited to the environmental scarcity projected by the International Water 
Management Institute, Toronto group, headed by Homer-Dixon et al., or by the Bern group, 
headed by Kurt Spillmann and Gunther Bachler, but includes potential scarcity arising as a 
product of the control of critical resources, as defined by Lipschutz90 and Micheal Klare.91 It 
refers to the longstanding perception of scarcity in the Indus Basin until such time that a 
settlement on the Kashmir issue is sought between India and Pakistan.  
Map 19 a, b and c: IWMI World Water Scenarios—Pakistan facing Absolute Scarcity 
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Figure 4:    Population Growth in Pakistan and per capita Water Availability 
(Source: Pakistan Planning Commission, Water Sector Investment Planning Study 2000. 
 
 
 
Figure 5:   Future Water Requirements and Availability  
(Source: Pakistan Planning Commission, Water Sector Investment Planning Study 2000. 
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7.6 Climate Change and the Water Supply  
 In Pakistan’s part of Indus River System about 141 MAF water comes from melting of 
glaciers and snow melt of three mountain ranges of the region namely Himalaya, Karakoram 
and Hindukush. While, rainfall produces about 50 MAF mainly during monsoon season. 
Climate change can affect the availability of water supply, consequently Pakistan will not only 
face food and energy security but also in long-run it will jeopardize general security and 
stability of the region.92  
The growing mismanagement of water resources including inefficient use as well as 
changing land utilisation patterns are already aggravating the problems of deforestation and 
soil degradation but in the wake of climate change it will certainly further reduce water supply 
in the Basin. Moreover, inadequate and poor water supply systems in the cities will also be 
affected badly. Above all the inadequate knowledge, outdated technology and budgetary 
constraints to harness groundwater resources and lack of any general agreement about water 
rights and the value of water as economic commodity will certainly add fuel to the fire. 
“In Pakistan future water needs would be substantially greater than the total potential 
supply, and therefore, there is a need to reduce the water losses from the supply 
systems, to improve the overall irrigation efficiency, to construct water reservoirs on 
potential sites along with the adaptation of artificial ground water recharge techniques 
to integrate the rain and excess flood water to supplement the depleting water 
aquifers.”93 
The Ministry of Environment, Government of Pakistan, recently has identified some 
critical areas for integrated water management in the wake of climate change94 which are 
summarised below: 
1. While making water allocation to various sectors in the medium and long-term, due 
consideration should be given to the changes in sectoral demands invariably caused 
by climate change; 
2. For the protection of ground-water aquifers through management and technical 
measures like regulatory mechanism and frameworks, water licencing, delay dams, 
artificial recharge of ground aquifers in threatened areas should be incorporated in 
integrated water resources management concepts; 
3. Rational ground water extraction and mining by imposing restrictions on excessive 
pumping; 
4. Recycling of waste-water through state of the art water treatment techniques and use 
of recycled water in irrigation and other industrial purposes; 
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5. Measure to protect rivers ‘catchment’ areas, reservoirs and irrigation contamination 
through forestation, de-siltation of dams and avoiding excessive use of pesticides; 
6. By introducing active and participatory irrigation management reforms by encouraging 
formers and end users of irrigation water to take part in the campaign; 
7. In distribution of irrigation water among the provinces the crop sowing timings in the 
respective provinces be kept in mind; 
8. To check the intrusion of saline water into Indus Deltaic Region a required flow of 
fresh water downstream of Kotri is mandatory; 
9. Appropriate measures be taken to preserve the ecology of dry river reaches of the 
three eastern rivers diverted by India under the IWT 1960; 
10. Short-term contingency plans be adopted to help mitigate water shortages and 
droughts; 
11. Possibilities be explored for joint water-shed management of trans-boundary 
catchment areas with neighbouring countries; 
12. International norms and conventions be followed to safeguard Pakistan’s rights on 
trans-boundary water inflows; 
13. Pakistan should explore the possibility of signing a water treaty with Afghanistan ; 
14. Ecological conservation practices should be followed to promote integrated 
watershed management upstream. 
The draft paper on water policy indicates the emerging scenarios in the wake of climate 
change and highlights the need being felt in Pakistan for a fresh and integrated 
watershed management approach to meet future challenges. 
 
7.7 Solutions to the Kashmir Dispute and the Indus Rivers 
In the last sixty years, a number of solutions for Kashmir issue have been suggested, 
based on the assumption that the Kashmir dispute is a political or ideological issue or a 
question of human rights or self-determination.95 But hardly any reference is made to the 
Kashmir dispute as an economic security or territorial issue based on hard geographical 
realities. This may be because of the fact that both parties to the dispute attempted to 
manage the water issue by separating it from the Kashmir dispute, resulting in the signing of 
the IWT in 1960. The prior resolve, envisioned by the UNSC, was the institution of a 
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plebiscite. Thus, in the mid-1950s, both states were expecting to either lose or gain the whole 
of Kashmir, with the division of the Indus river system serving as a suitable option for both in 
anticipation of the outcome of the plebiscite. The intentional de-linking of the issue from 
Jammu and Kashmir by the then Indian Prime Minister, Jawaharlal Nehru and the benign 
neglect by his Pakistani counterpart, Liaquat Ali Khan, led to accommodation as the preferred 
security strategy.96 If the Kashmir dispute had been resolved in the early 1960s, the nature of 
Indo-Pakistan relations would have been different. On the other hand, one can deduce that 
the Indian intentional dissociation of the Kashmir dispute from the Indus waters dispute was a 
well-calculated strategy as India wished to maintain the Kashmir dispute as a symbol of its 
secular outlook. However, fifty years on, the emerging scenarios are alarming, and the 
linkage of Kashmir with the Indus river system has acquired prominence whereby the 
intertwined nature of the two disputes cannot be neglected in any resolution of the water 
issues. In other words, peace between India and Pakistan is inconceivable without giving due 
consideration to the geographical imperatives of the Indus river system.97  
 The Indian control over “Azad Kashmir” would bring Mangla Dam into its possession 
and would help it to control some of the upper storage sites on the Indus.  
Pakistan’s control over Jammu and southern Kashmir would give it the control over 
the Salal Dam on the Chenab and the Monawar and Tavi affluent. It would also bring the right 
abutments of the Madhopur headworks and the dam on river Ravi into Pakistan’s possession. 
The third possibility would be the revival of the independent status of Kashmir. In 
such a scenario, the IWT would no more stand valid. The possible new state would have to 
solve this issue on its own terms and conditions. 
 A suitable solution, although rejected by India, could be the partitioning of Kashmir 
more or less along communal lines. It would allow the drawing of the boundary along the river 
Chenab in the Dhiangarh reach. In such a situation, the IWT might acquire permanency, as it 
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would eliminate the causes of insecurity for the lower riparian and may provide an incentive 
for future cooperation between the riparian states as envisaged in the IWT.  
The highly intertwined nature of the Kashmir dispute and the Indus water issues 
between India and Pakistan have been highlighted in recent writings on Kashmir. 98  A 
provocative example is a report by Sundeep Waslekar.99  
The author agrees with Waslekar’s observations to the extent that water has been 
central to the Indo-Pakistan dispute over Kashmir and: “If India and Pakistan take a political 
decision to restructure their relations, they will have to ensure that water serves as a flow to 
bring them together, rather than taking them further on the course of conflict”.100 However, 
Waslekar has overlooked the fact that it was India who demanded exclusive rights to the 
three eastern rivers on the basis of absolute territorial sovereignty, in total disregard to lower 
riparian rights established in International Law and customary water codes and universal 
practices. The Indian stubbornness compelled Pakistan to accept division of the Indus river 
system in 1960. Pakistan, throughout the negotiation process, has been insisting on the 
continuation of the river water supply on the basis of its “historical uses” from the eastern 
rivers. It started considering the division of the Indus river system only when the World Bank 
agreed to include storage facilities in the Bank proposal: only “after the Aide Memoire was 
proposed in 1956 and was agreed in principle in 1957, did Pakistan accept the division of the 
Indus river system.”101  
It is clear that the Indus waters are the key to cooperation and durable peace 
between Pakistan and India. The ongoing proposals for ‘making boundaries irrelevant’ and 
‘joint management of Kashmir’ have opened-up a window of opportunity, However, the author 
believes that its possibility depends on India’s acknowledgement of Pakistan’s right to the 
waters of the three eastern rivers and renunciation of its traditional absolutist position. Only 
then, the joint management of Kashmir and the water resources of the Indus system could be 
made possible. In this way, the waters of the Indus rivers can become a ‘catalyst for peace’ 
between the enduring rivals. If Wasleker believes that only the water of the three western 
rivers will ‘serve as a flow to bring together’ India and Pakistan, he seems to be fully 
mistaken. 
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Nevertheless, if India adamantly pursues its planned construction of the disputed 
dams and development infrastructures in violation of the IWT on the western rivers, it may 
compel Pakistan to use force in order to implement its treaty rights. International law entitles a 
nation to undertake reprisals for the enforcement of treaty rights. In such a situation, Pakistan 
may destroy such infrastructures built by India on the western rivers through limited pre-
emptive strikes, whose likelihood depends on careful calculations of costs and benefits. It 
can’t be ruled out, however. 
7.8 Summary 
The water issue has always remained central to Indo-Pakistan relations. The 
dissociation of Kashmir from the Indus water dispute has led to the portrayal of Kashmir as a 
purely political issue. The signing of the IWT has alleviated the hurting stalemate 
economically, and to some extent militarily, but it has not eradicated the cause of conflict over 
Kashmir. The intertwined nature of Kashmir and the Indus waters is becoming ever clearer 
and crucial with the passage of time, and need for the further development of water resources 
is becoming urgency. All of the water-related issues which have emerged since the late 1970s 
are still simmering and have finally created a diplomatic deadlock between India and 
Pakistan. Further accommodation on the water resources is difficult until and unless the 
Kashmir dispute is resolved, and no solution to the Kashmir issue can avoid giving due 
consideration to dictates of geography. 
The looming water scarcity in the Indus Basin will further intensify competition 
between the riparian states in the acquisition of control over Kashmir territory.  
Climate change is a current and important dimension being added to the concept of 
water management. The growing mismanagement of water resources including inefficient use 
as well as changing land utilisation patterns are already aggravating the problems of 
deforestation and soil degradation but in the wake of climate change it will certainly further 
reduce water supply in the Basin. 
The integrated management of the Indus river system resource and joint control of 
the Kashmir territory offers one solution, and if achieved, it could enhance chances of further 
cooperation and possibility of a ‘final settlement’ over Kashmir. 
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CONCLUSION 
The discovery of a new dimension of the Kashmir conflict, based on the neo-realistic 
interests of riparian states in controlling vital water resources, is the hallmark of the study. It 
made a theory-driven case of India-Pakistan conflict and claimed with substantive empirical 
evidence that the control of the Indus resource has played a significant role in political 
thinking, strategic planning and warfare in the region. It brings to light the competition for the 
control of vital water resources as an issue of high-politics in the field of international relations 
and explains when enduring rival nations compromise on vital concerns and why they put 
politico-ideological issues on the backburner.  
The study argues that water is a cause of conflict or war, and can also be a catalyst 
for cooperation or peace, depending on the geography of the resource in conflict and the 
nature of relations between riparian states. Both dimensions of the Indus Basin’s water 
resources have been identified in Indo-Pakistan relations.  
This reinforces the neo-realist belief that states, as rational actors, pursue policies for 
the maximisation of power (by acquiring control of more and more vital resources) and 
security (by securing vital resources and minimising perceived losses) vis-à-vis their 
adversaries, as well as in the international political system. These twin goals constitute their 
uppermost national interests, and in order to achieve them, states opt for accommodation as 
a security strategy when reaching a mutually hurting stalemate in their relations. The rivalry 
between India and Pakistan is no exception to this reality: India attempted to capture and 
control vital resources in Kashmir, and Pakistan responded in order to secure its resources. 
On reaching a mutually hurting stalemate, they accommodated each other on vital concerns 
and postponed the political dimension of the Kashmir issue in an effort to achieve their 
topmost national objectives. Nevertheless, accommodation did not act as a catalyst for peace, 
as the states waged a number of wars and their enduring rivalry remained intact. The 
conclusion is thus, that accommodation may not - and did not - resolve or heal all the wounds 
existing between the disputants. The dispute over Kashmir still remains, and may even have 
intensified, since the rivers Pakistan still depends on flow through the Indian-controlled part of 
the disputed territory. Moreover, the infrastructure built under the IWT proved to be politically 
unacceptable, economically unfeasible and environmentally unsustainable. 
Plans to acquire control over the water resources in the region have their roots in the 
pre-Partition manoeuvres of the Indian leadership. Partition of the Subcontinent would not 
have been acceptable to the Indian leadership if the river-water control infrastructures, also 
containing a road link to the princely state of Kashmir, had not been placed under Indian 
jurisdiction. Pandit Jawaharlal Nehru’s biographer, M.J. Akbar testified this fact that during a 
meeting at Simla in May 1947 Nehru, “insisted that whatever the eventual nature of the post-
partition boundaries might be, the road link to the Kashmir valley through Gurdaspur would 
have been kept in Delhi’s control”.  
 203
Access to water resources played a significant role in the division of British Punjab—a 
superimposed boundary—which enabled India to capture Jammu and Kashmir on the one 
hand and use water as strategic, economic and socio-psychological weapon, in the 1948 
Indo-Pakistan war over Kashmir, on the other. India acquired territorial control over all the 
river headworks in Punajb, thereby depriving Pakistan of a vital resource and disregarding the 
principles of the Partition of the Subcontinent. If India had not succeeded in acquiring the 
Madhopur and Ferozepur headworks—the former also constituting the only land-link from the 
Indian side to Jammu and Kashmir—, the crucial linkage of water and the Kashmir dispute 
would not have ensued. Even if the Radcliffe boundary award had been able to maintain a 
balance in allocating the control of the river headworks to both India and Pakistan, the 
chances of a water dispute would have been minimal, since each country would have been in 
a position to counter-balance a unilateral closure of the headworks undertaken by the other 
party.  
The Indo-Pakistan conflict over the Kashmir territory also qualifies as being termed a 
resource war, as defined by Michael Klare. In combination with other factors, the 
superimposed boundaries in Punjab coupled with the surface features and the relative 
location of the Kashmir territory, home to the catchment areas of all the rivers of the Indus 
system, encouraged India to annex Jammu and Kashmir in October 1947. Retaliation by 
Pakistan in May 1948 was not a coincidence, but was aimed at safeguarding its freshwater 
life-line. In other words, the intertwined nature of the Kashmir and Indus disputes is rooted in 
the geographical characteristics of the territory. In the First Kashmir War the armies avoided 
facing each other while trying to consolidate their positions along river infrastructures. The 
Indian obduracy in maintaining control over Kashmir, and Pakistan’s efforts to ‘liberate’ the 
area, are intimately connected with the nature of its territory. The claims by the Indian 
leadership that the annexure of the Muslim majority state of Kashmir would destroy the very 
rationale of Pakistan and thus the basis of the two-nation theory have proved an ideal ploy 
with which to maintain control over the real resource.  
Control of the Indus resource has played a significant role in political thinking, 
strategic planning and warfare between India and Pakistan. The decision of the Indian 
leadership, in referring the Kashmir dispute to the UNSC for a peaceful resolution after 
capturing specific parts of the state, and the later acceptance of UN proposed plebiscite by 
both the parties, resulted in its portrayal as an ideological and political issue. This strategy 
worked very well for India, since its objective was firstly, never to resolve the issue but to keep 
it alive as a symbol of secularism and a disproof of the two nation theory, and secondly, to 
consolidate its control over real resources. Pakistan’s claims to the Kashmir territory only 
stood to gain legitimacy through the UN resolutions, thus it had no other option but to pursue 
this policy, which endorsed the Kashmir conflict as an issue of identity politics. Both states 
have accommodated each other on vital concerns in the shape of the Indus waters treaty, and 
both have pursued their national interests of security and power maximisation being rational 
actors in international system. 
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Realities on the ground have changed with the passage of time and the centrality of 
the control over vital water resources is emerging. Since 1989, Kashmiris have been in revolt 
against Indian rule. Opinion among the Kashmiri leadership is divided, with certain parts of it 
demanding a return to the independent Kashmir of pre-1947. Pakistan has extended ‘moral 
support’ to their cause but formally denies the provision of any material support. The 
conversion of the ceasefire line into an international boundary would be acceptable to India, 
while a further partitioning of Jammu and Kashmir would seem acceptable to Pakistan. The 
present standpoints of both parties are thus incompatible with the thesis of identity-politics. 
Since January 2004, both sides have agreed upon a number of CBMs without making any 
progress on the Kashmir issue, yet the matters over which both reach a diplomatic deadlock 
revolve around the ongoing water disputes, namely Indian plans to construct dams in the 
disputed territory of Jammu and Kashmir. This testifies that the Kashmir conflict and the water 
disputes are intertwined in nature and the Indo-Pakistan conflict is not exclusively ideological. 
This fact had been overshadowed by India’s unlinking of the Indus and Kashmir disputes as a 
precondition of accepting mediation by the World Bank, and Pakistan’s conscious neglect of 
the linkage issue in order to secure its survival, reduce its vulnerabilities and minimise its 
perceived losses.  
Nevertheless, the Indus river resource also offers enormous potential to act as a 
catalyst for peace. Yet the permanent dissection and diversion of a single and geographically 
integrated river system under the Indus Waters Treaty 1960 has intensified divisive politics in 
the region and conferred permanency upon the existing distrust between the two parties. 
Mediation does play a major role in smooth running of the relations between nations but any 
settlement which disregards natural geographical and political realities will likely lack 
sustainability and endurance. This constitutes a major flaw in the field of mediation and 
accommodation between enduring rivals and limits the viability of the science of water 
management and resource development.  
The study answers the core question, accepts the core hypothesis based on the 
empirical evidence, and thus achieves the research objectives. A model has been developed 
aimed at explaining the Pakistan-India conflict over the IRS and its linkage with the Kashmir 
dispute. At a more general level, the model examines the relationship between freshwater 
resources and war and peace between riparian states, and investigates the circumstances 
under which rival riparian prefer accommodation on vital concerns, thereby postponing 
political issues.  
The framework utilizes a single case-study method to analyze Pakistan's initiation of 
accommodative moves vis-à-vis the upper riparian, India, but is equally suited to explaining a 
number of other cases where Pakistan has initiated accommodation and India has 
reciprocated, or vice versa, both with or without third-party mediation. Examples include the 
Tashkent Declaration (1966), brokered by Soviet Russia following the 1965 India-Pakistan 
war; the Simla Accord (1972), a bilateral pact following the 1971 war; and the Salal Dam 
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issue, which erupted in 1974 and was settled in 1978. In addition, the ongoing Composite 
Dialogue process, initiated in 2004, and in fact almost all of the issues that have arisen 
between India and Pakistan, can be studied with the help of this framework. The framework is 
equally suited to investigating the phenomenon of accommodation as a preferred security 
strategy in international relations.  
It is concluded that the geographical dimensions of superimposed boundaries and 
disputed territories (such as surface features or relative locations) have played a major role in 
triggering water-related conflicts between India and Pakistan. If India had not succeeded in 
acquiring the Madhopur and Ferozepur headworks—the former also constituting the only 
land-link (from Indian side) to J&K—, the crucial linkage of water and the Kashmir dispute 
would not have ensued. It argues that the Kashmir conflict is a product of many factors, but 
that the hydro-strategic nature of its territory can be identified as a major cause. Access to 
water resources played a significant role in the division of British Punjab and enabled India to 
use water as strategic, economic and socio-psychological weapon in the 1948 Indo-Pakistan 
war over Kashmir. India’s actions instilled enormous fear into the Pakistani public, as did its 
statement that it perceives itself vulnerable until the J&K territory is firmly in Indian hands. 
This has been of great detriment to the trust Pakistan can ever have towards India regarding 
its river water life-line, should it ever opt to relinquish its claims over Kashmir territory. India’s 
abandonment of Kashmir would result in the loss of its upper riparian status and its enormous 
real-political capacity to intimidate, economically strangulate and threaten the very survival of 
Pakistan.  
The Kashmir tangle is explored in terms of its linkage with competition over natural 
resources. It concludes that, in combination with other factors, the surface features and the 
relative location of the Kashmir territory, home to the catchment areas of all the rivers in the 
IRS, encouraged India to capture Kashmir in October 1947. It reemphasises that the 
retaliation by Pakistan in May 1948 was not a coincidence, but was aimed at safeguarding its 
life-line. In other words, the complex nature of the Kashmir and Indus disputes is rooted in the 
geographic characteristics of the territory. The Indian obduracy in maintaining control over 
Kashmir, and Pakistan’s efforts to ‘liberate’ the area, are intimately connected with the nature 
of its territory. The anticipation of the Indian leadership that the annexure of the Muslim 
majority state of Kashmir would destroy the very rationale of Pakistan and the basis of two-
nation theory has proved an ideal ploy to maintain control of the real resource. 
The rival riparian, Pakistan and India, agree to negotiate only once they have 
exhausted military options, and that the peace initiative is generally taken by the lower 
riparian. Bilateral negotiations between the rivals, who are asymmetric in military terms, may 
not succeed since the more powerful upper-riparian often tries to take advantage of the 
situation. The Delhi Agreement of May 1948, although temporary, did more harm to the lower 
riparian. India used the agreement against Pakistan as proof that the former had 
acknowledged latter’s property rights over the three international rivers originating from its 
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territory. In reality, however, the agreement did nothing more than acknowledge that there 
was a dispute in which both sides had legal claims. Successive negotiations between India 
and Pakistan failed to mark any progress on the issue.  
Another finding has been that a bilateral deadlock between the disputants 
necessitated the involvement of a mediator. Interestingly, during this period, both India and 
Pakistan had applied to the WB for loans with which to complete their planned irrigation 
projects. Fortunately, the Bank, while refusing to fund projects related to the disputed river, 
was willing to assist the parties in resolving their dispute. The presence of the WB enhanced 
the likelihood of accommodation since it accelerated the mutually-hurting stalemate. The WB 
managed to commit India to not undertaking any new projects and to continuing to supply 
Pakistan with water for irrigation until a final settlement was reached. It also linked the 
availability of funding with compliance. The opening of the Bhakra-Nangal Canal brought a 
mutually hurting stalemate for India and Pakistan. The stalemate was “hurting” or detrimental 
to India in two ways: firstly, India was unable to benefit despite developing huge irrigation 
projects in East Punjab; and secondly, the “opportunity cost of time” (i.e. the level of 
development India could have attained during that period) was soaring every year. Pakistan's 
situation, on the other hand, was even worse. It was desirous of a settlement without yielding 
to its legitimate claims over the "historic uses" of the eastern rivers.  
The stalemate was equally hurting India and Pakistan when the WB offered its 
mediation. Pakistan accepted immediately. India though followed the suit but promptly 
disassociated the Kashmir issue from the water dispute.  
The postponement of the Kashmir issue amounted to an inferior bargain for Pakistan, 
who preferred conscious neglect of the issue in favour of addressing the matter of prime 
concern, thereby attempting to minimize its losses. Because it was becoming evident that 
either India would unilaterally withdraw from negotiations or the WB would quit as a mediator. 
A solution which can assure Pakistan an adequate replacement for the perceived loss of 
three eastern rivers was need of the hour. Pakistan did not have the requisite resources to 
fight over the IRS with India. Moreover, Ayub Khan’s commitment to economic reforms, 
minimise losses in external military and in domestic economic spheres played significant role 
in Pakistan’s initiative for accommodation.  
The presence of the WB as a mediator towards the end of 1951, coupled with the 
blessing of the USA and some major powers (UK, West Germany, Canada, Australia and 
New Zealand as loan and funds providers), ensured that India would be restrained from using 
water as a military weapon against Pakistan. Although armies were deployed on both sides, 
primed to deal with any military eventuality, and India also attempted to infuriate Pakistan with 
periodic cross-border firing, Pakistan did not respond militarily. Although India took complete 
advantage of its upper riparian position by securing full rights to the three eastern rivers and 
“holding all the cards” on the western rivers, it did not bring about the destruction described in 
Lilienthal’s article.  
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It is found that the assumption of mediators’ impartiality is not always true because 
they “are best seen as self-interested actors”. Actors mediating in international arenas 
generally pursue and work for their own set agendas. The WB’s interest in mediating over the 
Indus waters dispute was rooted in establishing its credibility as an international financial 
institution. However, the nature of the dispute also accords specific significance: although the 
mediation resulted in an agreement, it only became possible in the face of the adjournment of 
the political dimension of the Kashmir issue. The involvement of a third party provided a 
technical solution to the water problem in the shape of the IWT. Despite the inherent flaws in 
the treaty and their repercussions, it has served as a safety valve for Pakistan’s survival at 
times when the country’s very existence was at stake. Nevertheless, the IWT did not eliminate 
the root-cause of Indo-Pakistan conflict over Kashmir: the issue of control over the hydro-
strategic territory. 
The settlement of the Salal Dam issue can also be viewed within a similar context for 
the lower riparian, Pakistan, which was militarily weak after the 1971 War and recovering from 
the shock of separation of former East Pakistan. There was a strong desire to minimize 
losses and to achieve internal stability. The nature of accommodation was different from that 
of the 1950s since Pakistan was entitled to invoke the IWT provisions. Nevertheless, in the 
1970s India used the water issue more as a political tool than a military or economic weapon. 
It is noteworthy that the Salal was the first and last issue settled since the signing of the IWT, 
all the later disputes are not only still simmering but have grown to be a major irritant in Indo-
Pakistan relations.  
The IWT, although having delivered substantial gains for both parties, has, in the 
long-run, engendered more complexities for Pakistan-India relations. The division of an 
integrated river system has given permanency to the distrust between the two states by 
minimizing opportunities for their interaction. It has also established the vulnerability of the 
lower riparian as long as the physical control of the water resources remain with India. The 
development infrastructure envisaged under the IWT, while temporarily alleviating the ‘hurting 
stalemate’, has proved to be unsustainable. Moreover, neither the political leadership nor the 
public were taken into confidence at the time of signing the IWT, giving rise to one of the 
major causes of Kashmiri alienation on the one hand, and inter-provincial disharmony in 
Pakistan on the other. 
Thus, the staggering economic costs of maintaining the river diversion and the 
infrastructure of the link-canals, together with an increasing lack of ecological sustainability in 
Pakistan, political losses in terms of Kashmiri alienation, and provincial dissonance over 
water-sharing, hindered river development in Pakistan and J&K. Moreover, the separation of 
the Kashmir issue from the IRS rendered the dispute purely political or ideological and also 
equipped India and Pakistan with enough time to consolidate their respective territorial control 
and harden their attitudes on the Kashmir question. As a result, accommodation may not – 
and, in this case, did not – resolve or alleviate the animosity felt between the rival riparian. 
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The Kashmir dispute remains, and is likely to intensify, because the rivers Pakistan still 
depends on are located in, and flow downstream through, the Indian-controlled part of J&K.  
In the last sixty years, a number of solutions to the Kashmir dispute have been 
suggested which portray the Kashmir issue as political, ideological, a question of human 
rights or a case for self-determination. Barring one or two recent opinions, no reference to the 
Kashmir dispute based on geographic realities has been found to be available. The dispute 
arose because the resolution envisaged by the UNSC was the holding of a plebiscite, 
therefore in the mid 1950s; each party anticipated either the gain or loss of the whole of 
Kashmir. The division of the IRS was an apposite option available for both in the face of an 
unknown outcome.  
The accommodation reached over the issue of the Indus waters has delayed the 
resolution of the Kashmir dispute. India’s intentional disassociation of the Kashmir dispute 
from the Indus issue proved to be a well-calculated policy aimed at keeping the dispute alive 
as symbol of its secular out-look, however, with the passage of time, the nature of its inherent 
strategy is becoming apparent.  
The emerging scenarios are alarming. The linkage of Kashmir and the IRS has 
acquired prominence. In other words, peace between India and Pakistan is inconceivable 
without giving due consideration to the geographical imperatives of the IRS. The growing 
water scarcity will add fuel to the fire and intensify competition over Kashmir, until such time 
as the disputants once again realize they have reached a “mutually hurting-stalemate” which 
necessitates further accommodation or an enduring settlement of the Kashmir question. 
Some conditions of a mutually hurting-stalemate are partially met. Most prominent is 
the futility of war. With the nuclearisation of South Asia, a military solution to Kashmir is not 
only irrational but would be unthinkable in terms of its consequences. In other words, no 
geographical change is possible through the use of force, which was considered the rational 
policy instrument until the mid-1970s. Secondly, economic constraints mean that the cost of 
conflict is detrimental to both states. The Kashmir conflict is engaging a significant proportion 
of resources and has become a bleeding wound for both India and Pakistan.  
It is a fact that development in Kashmir is mainly dependent upon the exploitation of 
water resources for agriculture development and employment opportunities, in addition to the 
tourism industry, which is suffering tremendously both in Indian-held Kashmir as well as in 
Pakistan. Since the 1970s, both states have been unable to undertake any major project in 
the Indus Basin. The IWT checks any unilateral development by India on the western rivers in 
Kashmir and also hampers development in the Basin by Pakistan. Distrust of the Punjab 
among the smaller provinces of Pakistan is a legacy of the IWT.  
Any further deterioration of the water supply in the Jhelum and Chenab rivers will 
necessitate the diversion of more water from the Indus in order to compensate for the shortfall 
in the Punjab, and, as a consequence, will further fuel the fiery debate over Kashmir and 
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increase internal dissonance in Pakistan. The situation is even more alarming given Indian 
plans to interlink the peninsular rivers, which involve controlling of the Jhelum and diverting 
water from the Chenab into the eastern rivers and onwards.  
Overall, the study concludes that water is a cause of conflict and/or war but can also 
be a catalyst for peace. Upon reaching a mutually hurting-stalemate, states accommodate 
each other on vital concerns and postpone political issues. The rivalry between India and 
Pakistan is no exception to this reality. Hence the corollary of the findings is that a 
compromise on the issue of Kashmir is inconceivable unless a “mutually hurting-stalemate” is 
reached. Nevertheless, the Indus river resource also offers enormous potential as a catalyst 
for peace. Yet the dissection and diversion of a single and geographically integrated river 
system under the IWT has intensified divisive politics in the region and conferred permanency 
upon the distrust between the two parties. Mediation does play a major role in the relations 
between nations but any settlement which disregards natural geographic and political realities 
will likely lack sustainability and endurance. This constitutes a major flaw both in the field of 
mediation and in the accommodation.  
Contribution of the Study  
The substantial contribution of this study is the formulation of a theoretical model 
which explains the dual phenomena of conflict and accommodation between rival riparian 
states. At a more general level, the model examines the relationship between freshwater 
resources and war and peace between riparian states, and investigates the circumstances 
under which riparian prefer accommodation on vital concerns, thereby postponing political 
issues.  
The study claims that neo-realistic interests between rival neighbouring states are the 
cause of conflict and accommodation, and brings to light an issue of high-politics in the field of 
international relations, namely the competition for the control of vital water resources. It 
explains when rival nations compromise on vital concerns and why they postpone political 
issues. It reinforces the belief of geo-politicians that competition over, and control of, vital 
resources—be they oil, materials for warfare, or minerals—is the main cause of conflict 
between states, and adds substance to that belief by attributing equal significance to the 
territorial control of freshwater resources between riparian nations.  
The study explains how the rival nations pursue accommodation as a preferred 
strategy in order to secure their foremost national interests of security and power 
maximization, bilaterally as well as in the international political system, when the conflict 
“hurts” both of them. Given that the literature on the neo-realistic security dimensions of the 
Kashmir conflict is practically non-existent, a further contribution of the study is to bridge this 
theoretical gap and open up new vistas for research. This comprehensive study is the first 
effort in this direction. It addresses the question of linkage between the Indus waters and the 
Kashmir dispute and highlights its role in political thinking, strategic planning and warfare 
between India and Pakistan.  
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The framework is equally suitable for investigating the phenomenon of 
accommodation as a preferred security strategy in international relations in general and India-
Pakistan relations in particular. The study also highlights the pitfalls in the field of mediation 
and exposes the role of self-interested mediators in providing unsustainable solutions. It 
claims that the sustainable development of water resources is the key to development and 
peace in the region and argues that traditional and strictly realistic approaches to 
accommodation based on mediation by self-interested powerful parties (as identified by 
Zartman and Bercovitch) may not work in the long run and advocates that economically 
liberal-constructivist and culturally-sensitive approaches (Galtung and Cohen) in 
negotiation/mediation is the key to achieve durable and sustainable solutions for the regional 
conflicts. 
The model formulated in this study is suitable for studying role of international rivers 
in inter-state relations worldwide. The widely discussed major flash-points for inter-state water 
conflicts are the Jordan, Litani, Orontes and Yarmuk Rivers (Israel and Arab nations), the Nile 
(Egypt, Sudan and Ethiopia), the Euphrates (Turkey, Syria and Iraq), the Danube (Hungary 
and Slovakia), the Han (North and South Korea), the Amu and Syre Darya (Central Asian 
States), the Ganges (India, Bangladesh and Nepal) and the Kabul (Pakistan and Afghanistan).  
The model is equally useful to analyse water sharing conflicts within nation-states or 
intra-state and inter-group relations world-wide. Conflicting groups in society emerge to 
protect their water share or to acquire that of others. The activation of groups takes place in 
accordance with the existing religious, caste, class, linguistic, regional or other lines. 
Sometimes, local politicians or elites of a locality use water as a tool to instil group feelings, 
which introduces an “us/them” dichotomy into society. This inter-group conflict can evolve into 
a conflict with the state, when one party rightly or wrongly perceives the state as a 
collaborator with another, subsequently leading to secessionist movements. 
Some such major conflicts within nation-states which can be studied under this 
framework include: Sanmenxia and Three Gorges in China; Akasombo in Ghana; Kossou in 
Ivory Coast; Tana and Athi in Kenya; Itaparica and Tucurui in Brazil; Kainji and Niger Dams in 
Nigeria; Ataturk and Keban in Turkey; Lam Pao and Nam Pong in Thailand; Kedong Ombo 
and Batang Ai in Indonesia; Upper Pampanga in the Philippines; Manantali in Mali; Savajina 
in Colombia; Brokopondo in Suriname; Caracol and Netzahualcoyotl in Mexico and Nam 
Ngum in Laos. 
South Asia is particularly prone to such conflicts like, to name some of them, Madur 
Oya and Mahavali Project in Sri Lanka; Kalabagh, Mangla, Bhasha and Chashma in Pakistan; 
Kaptai in Bangladesh; Arun in Nepal; and Narmada Dam, Lower Manair Dam, Tehri Dam, 
Pong Dam, Subarnarekha Project, Nagarjunsager Project, Srisailam Project, Upper Krishna 
Project and Ukai Reservoir Project in India. The study claims that the mismanagement of 
water resources, because of the unnatural diversion of rivers in pursuit of the policy of 
absolute territorial sovereignty, has created an environment of uncertainty and chaos among 
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the stakeholders in the region. Nevertheless, it provides fully practicable policy 
recommendations for the resolution of India-Pakistan conflict. 
Policy Recommendations 
The desire to resolve the Kashmir issue is not yet two-sided. The most realistic 
approach would be to allow the issue to remain simmering until such time as the disputants 
reach a “mutually hurting-stalemate”, thereby necessitating any compromise on the Kashmir 
issue.  
A second, also realistic but more rational and pragmatic approach would be to realize 
that Kashmir can promise a prosperous future for the Indus Basin riparian. It serves as a life-
line to their agrarian economies and possesses enormous potential for the generation of 
hydro-power, sufficient in fact to cater for the energy needs of the region. In order to achieve 
this goal, the involvement of a third party to engage and convince the disputants to adopt an 
integrated approach to the development of the Indus water resources and the resolution of 
the Kashmir dispute, is the need of the hour. A promising investment opportunity in the water 
sector of the Indus Basin would act as an incentive to an interested mediator. 
Last but not least, the issue could be resolved bilaterally, although the requirement for 
such a resolution would be to institutionalize the accommodative initiatives. The present 
Composite Dialogue provides a framework for this purpose, but now a proper 
institutionalization of bilateral cooperation is called for. The Indus water resource issue and 
the Kashmir dispute demand urgent attention.  
As far as water resources are concerned, the Permanent Indus Commission, 
established in both countries under the IWT, is the only model of accommodative interaction 
between the two states. It requires further institutionalization, expansion and consolidation.1 It 
should be accompanied by a substantial change in the Commission’s charter and its 
functioning. Equal representation and the involvement of Kashmiri experts, from both the 
Indian and Pakistani-held parts of Kashmir, is vital. The Commission should be given a broad 
mandate to foster the cooperative development of the Indus Basin’s water resources. It 
should be autonomous in all spheres and should function to restore the Indus river system’s 
co-riparian status in their original beds and streams.  
Similarly, but not intended as a permanent measure, a Kashmir Commission should 
be established with an equal representation of Kashmiris from both sides of Indian and 
Pakistani-administered Kashmir. 
The status of the proposed Commissions should be recommendatory only. The 
Commissions should be assigned the task of joint research and planning, and come up with 
joint recommendations for a Basin-wide integrated development of the Indus water resources, 
along with a solution to the Kashmir dispute. The proposed Commissions would thus lay the 
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 Also proposed by Robert Wirsing and Christopher Jasparro, “Spotlight on Indus River Diplomacy: 
India, Pakistan and the Baglihar Dam Dispute,” Asia-Pacific Center for Security Studies, May 2006. 
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foundation for the consolidated institutionalization of bilateral cooperation by providing 
immensely urgent, fully practicable and sustainable resource utilization measures and guiding 
the two states towards a resolution of the Kashmir dispute.  
Further subjects addressed in the ongoing Composite Dialogue will not offer the 
same level of urgency and opportunity inherent in the Kashmir and the Indus disputes, 
however, commerce, nuclear and energy resource sectors also qualify for permanent 
Commission-like bodies. 
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Appendix 11 
 
INTERDOMINION AGREEMENT, BETWEEN 
THE GOVERNMENT OF INDIA AND THE GOVERNMENT OF PAKISTAN, 
ON THE CANAL WATER DISPUTE 
BETWEEN EAST AND WEST PUNJAB 
1. A dispute has arisen between the East and West Punjab Governments regarding the supply by 
East Punjab of water to the Central Bari Doab and the Dipalpur canals in West Punjab. The 
contention of the East Punjab Government is that under the Punjab Partition (Apportionment 
of Assets and Liabilities) Order, 1947, and the Arbitral Award the proprietary rights in the 
waters of the rivers in East Punjab vest wholly in the East Punjab Government and that the 
West Punjab Government cannot claim any share of these waters as a right. The West Punjab 
Government disputes this contention, its view being that the point has conclusively been 
decided in its favour by implication by the Arbitral Award and that in accordance with 
international law and equity, West Punjab has a right to the waters of the East Punjab Rivers. 
2. The East Punjab Government has revived the flow of water into these canals on certain 
conditions of which two are disputed by West Punjab. One, which arises out of the contention 
in paragraph 1, is the right to the levy of seignorage charges for water and the other is the 
question of the Madhavpur [sic] Head Works and carrier channels to be taken into account. 
3. The East and West Punjab Governments are anxious that this question should be settled in a 
spirit of goodwill and friendship. Without prejudice to its legal rights in the matter the East 
Punjab Government has assured the West Punjab Government that it has no intention 
suddenly to withhold water from West Punjab without giving it time to tap alternative sources. 
The West Punjab Government on its part recognises the natural anxiety of the East Punjab 
Government to discharge the obligation to develop areas where water is scarce and which 
were underdeveloped in relation to parts of West Punjab. 
4. Apart, therefore, from the question of law involved, the Governments are anxious to approach 
the problem in a practical spirit on the basis of the East Punjab Government progressively 
diminishing its supply to these canals in order to give reasonable time to enable the West 
Punjab Government to tap alternative sources. 
5. The West Punjab Government has agreed to deposit immediately in the Reserve Bank such ad 
hoc sum as may be specified by the Prime Minister of India. Out of this sum, that Government 
agrees to the immediate transfer to East Punjab of sums over which there is no dispute. 
6. After an examination by each party of the legal issues, of the method of estimating the cost of 
water to be supplied by the East Punjab Government and of the technical survey of water 
resources and the means of using them for supply to these canals, the two Governments agree 
that further meetings between their representatives should take place. 
7. The Dominion Governments of India and Pakistan accept the above terms and express the 
hope that a friendly solution will be reached. 
 
(Signed)       (Signed) 
Jawaharlal Nehru      Ghulam Mohammad 
Swaran Singh      Shaukat Hyat Khan 
N. V. Gadgil      Mumtaz Daultana  
New Delhi, May 4, 1948 
 
 
                                                
1
 Government of Pakistan, National Documentation Wing, Cabinet Division, Islamabad; Government of 
Pakistan, The Indus Bain Irrigation Water Dispute, No. 5 (November 1953); and Government of 
Pakistan, Canal Waters Dispute: Correspondence between the Government of Pakistan and the 
Government of India and Partition Documents, (May 1958); and Government of Pakistan, Canal 
Waters Dispute: Documents relating to Negotiations under the Good Offices of the International Bank 
for Reconstruction and Development (June 1958). 
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APPENDIX 22 
 
Letter from the World Bank President, Eugene Black 
to the Prime Minister of Pakistan, Liaquat Ali Khan: 6 September 1951. 
[A similar letter was sent to the Prime Minister of India, Jawaharlal Nehru.] 
 
There appeared in the popular American magazine “Colliers” of August 4, 1951, an article by 
Mr. David E. Lilienthal proposing a cooperative regional approach to the development of the water 
resources of the Indus Basin. Because of the wide circulation of this magazine and Mr. Lilienthal’s 
reputation as an authority in the field of regional development, this article has attracted a great deal of 
interest in the United States. I assume that copies of Mr. Lilienthal’s article have been brought to the 
notice of the Government of Pakistan. 
Mr. Lilienthal’s proposal contemplates meeting the requirements of both countries for 
expanded irrigation through the cooperative construction and operation of storage dams and other 
facilities to be financed in part perhaps by this Bank. It is the essence of the proposal, as I read it, that 
the development of the Indus water resources should be dealt with on an engineering basis and it 
appears to be Mr. Lilienthal’s belief, after visiting both countries and talking with the highest 
personalities in the governments, that it is within the realm of practicability to treat water development 
as a common project that is functional, and not political, in nature and that could therefore be 
undertaken separately from the political issues with which Pakistan and India are confronted. 
As you may be aware, both Pakistan and India have from time to time raised with the Bank 
the possibility of financing irrigation and hydroelectric works in the Indus Basin and in each case the 
international water-rights problem has been an obstacle. A constructive programme for the effective 
use of the water resources would, moreover, have important implications for the economic 
development of both countries in other fields. Since the matter is therefore of interest to the Bank and 
since the Bank’s name has now been publicly mentioned in this connection, I should like to ask you 
whether you are disposed to look with favour upon Mr. Lilienthal’s proposal. If so, I can assure you 
that, if your Government and the Government of India desired to approach the development of the 
Indus water resources along the lines suggested by Mr. Lilienthal, I should be most happy to 
recommend that the Bank lend its good offices in such directions as might be considered appropriate by 
the two governments, make available qualified members of its staff and consider any financing 
proposals that might develop as a result of joint planning. 
I am sending a letter in similar terms to the Prime Minister of India. 
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 Government of Pakistan, National Documentation Wing, Cabinet Division, Islamabad; Government of 
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APPENDIX 33 
Letter from the World Bank President, Eugene Black, 
to the Prime Minister of Pakistan, Khwaja Nazimuddin; 8 November 1951. 
[A similar letter was sent to the Prime Minister of India, Jawaharlal Nehru.] 
 
I have previously expressed my profound regrets on learning of the death of Mr. Liaquat Ali 
Khan. I must now revert to the subject of my correspondence with him which was interrupted by that 
tragic event. 
I was much gratified to receive, in Mr. Liaquat Ali Khan's reply of September 25, 1951, to my 
letter of September 6, 1951, assurance that the Pakistan Government favours looking at the Indus basin 
water resources from a regional viewpoint with the objective of cooperative development and that he 
welcomed my proposal along the lines indicated in his letter, which I have carefully studied. 
The Prime Minister of India has also sent a favourable reply. 
These two letters have convinced me that a solution to the problem of using the water 
resources of the Indus basin in such a way was to make a maximum contribution to the development of 
both countries is well within the bounds of practicability. I am therefore encouraged to suggest to the 
two Governments a procedure which seems to me to afford the best prospects of accomplishing that 
objective. 
I shall base my suggestions on the essential principles of Mr. Lilienthal's proposal which are, 
as I understand them, the following: 
(a) The Indus basin water resources are sufficient to continue all existing uses and to meet the 
further needs of both countries for water from that source. 
(b) The water resources of the Indus basin should be cooperatively developed and used in such 
manner as most effectively to promote the economic development of the Indus basin viewed as a unit. 
(c) The problem of development and use of the Indus basin water resources should be solved 
on a functional and not a political plane, without relation to past negotiations and past claims and 
independently of political issues.  
I assume that, in indicating their willingness to proceed on the basis of Mr. Lilienthal's 
proposals, the two Governments have accepted these principles. My suggestions as to procedure, which 
I believe faithfully reflect these principles, are based on that assumption. I should perhaps add that, 
through its contacts with the two countries, the Bank is convinced that the engineers and other 
technicians of Pakistan and India are fully qualified to provide the principal technical and planning 
skills needed to develop, for submission to the two Governments, a comprehensive program for the 
utilization of the Indus basin water resources. That has been a major consideration in my formulation of 
a suggested procedure. 
My proposal is as follows: 
(a) Pakistan and India would each delegate a qualified engineer of high standing to prepare, 
jointly with the designee of the other, a comprehensive long-range plan for the most effective 
utilisation of the water resources of the Indus basin in the development of the region. Each designee 
would be instructed to govern himself by the principles stated above and to approach the problem on its 
merits in the interest of economic development of the Indus basin viewed as a unit. Each designee 
would have such technical assistants as he might desire and as might be available, and the two together 
would be authorized to retain the services of such engineers, agricultural technicians, economists and 
other experts, from either or both of the two countries of from other countries, as they might mutually 
find desirable. 
(b) An engineer selected by the Bank would be continuously available during the planning 
stage to work with the designees of the two countries. He would keep himself informed of the planning 
in view of the Bank's previously expressed readiness to consider financing proposals and would 
participate in the working party as an impartial adviser, free to express his views on any aspects of the 
matter and available to perform such other services as might be mutually determined to be appropriate. 
He could thus assist in solving problems without being in the position of an arbitrator. Before selecting 
its representative, the Bank would ascertain that he would be acceptable to the two Governments. There 
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 Government of Pakistan, National Documentation Wing, Cabinet Division, Islamabad; Government of 
Pakistan, The Indus Bain Irrigation Water Dispute, No. 5 (November 1953); and Government of 
Pakistan, Canal Waters Dispute: Correspondence between the Government of Pakistan and the 
Government of India and Partition Documents, (May 1958); and Government of Pakistan, Canal 
Waters Dispute: Documents relating to Negotiations under the Good Offices of the International Bank 
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would be available to him and through him to the entire working party, such technical assistance 
furnished by the Bank as might be needed to supplement the resources otherwise available. 
(c) The working party would hold an initial meeting for the purpose of determining the 
procedure to be followed in working out the plan, the steps needed to be taken, the order and manner in 
which those steps would be undertaken and the persons by whom they would be undertaken, and would 
set target dates for completion of the various steps. On reaching agreement on these matters, the 
working party would promptly, without the need of any further authorization, put the agreed procedure 
into effect and begin work on the plan. I suggest that this initial meeting take place on January 3, 1952, 
at the Bank's Washington Office. 
I feel strongly that publicity should be avoided at least until an agreement on procedure has 
been reached by the working party at the initial meeting. Whether any public statement should be made 
after a working procedure has been decided upon would be a matter for discussion between the two 
Governments and the Bank. 
If I assume, the Governments of Pakistan and India are in agreement on the principles 
underlying Mr. Lilienthal's proposal, as I have set them forth above, I anticipate fruitful results from 
this suggested procedure. At the present stage I have not felt free to bring this matter before the 
Executive Directors of the Bank but I believe that I can assure you that if the two Governments are 
prepared to proceed, the Executive Directors, as well as the management and staff, will be happy to 
cooperate with them in facilitating a solution to this vital development problem. 
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APPENDIX 44 
Letter from the World Bank President, Eugene Black 
to the Prime Minister of Pakistan, Khwaja Nazimuddin; 13 March 1952. 
[A similar letter was sent to the Prime Minister of India, Jawaharlal Nehru.] 
 
I refer to the conversation we have had about the Indus Basin water problem and to similar 
conversations I have had with the Prime Minister of India. I am happy to say that I have found common 
understanding as to the bases on which we can go forward under the Lilienthal proposal. 
We all agree that the function of the working party is to work out, and the ultimate objective is 
to carry out, specific engineering measures by which the supplies effectively available to each country 
will be increased substantially beyond what they have ever been. Except as the two sides may hereafter 
agree, legal rights will not be affected and each side will be free to withdraw at any time; but while the 
cooperative work continues with the participation of the Bank neither side will take any action to 
diminish the supplies available to the other side for existing uses. 
It should be understood that the three main principles set forth in my letter of November 8, 
1951 provide the broad basis on which the engineers will meet but are not intended as rigidly fixed 
terms of reference. Within the broad outline of the basic framework the engineers should be free to put 
forward or consider proposals in pursuance of the general objective. 
With these clarifications both Governments are ready to go forward in accordance with my 
letter of November 8, 1951, the first meeting of the working party to be held on April 7, 1952 [April is 
crossed out, replaced by May]. I am therefore happy to invite the designee of your Government, and his 
technical assistants, to be present at the Bank's Washington office on that date. 
I am sending an identical letter to the Prime Minister of India. 
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APPENDIX 55 
Proposal by the WB Representative for a Plan to  
Develop and use of the  
Indus Basin Waters, 5 February 1954 
 
Introduction 
 
The Indus Basin Working Party, consisting of engineers designated by India and Pakistan and 
their advisors assisted by the Bank Representative and consultants, have for almost two years worked at 
their task of preparing a comprehensive plan for the utilization of the waters of the Indus system, in 
accordance with the suggestion made by Mr David E Lilienthal in August, 1951. Over a year was spent 
in compiling and analyzing data in a field trip of more than 9000 miles in the basin. Efforts to agree in 
advance on a common approach having proved fruitless, the two Designees, at the suggestion of the 
Bank Representative, each proposed a comprehensive plan. 
 
As presented above the plans differed widely in concept and in substance. Subsequent 
discussions have produced substantial concessions, but these have not been enough to bring about an 
agreement and the margin of difference between the two plans remains wide. In rough approximation, 
the two plans (as modified by recent concessions) provide for the following division of usable supplies 
of water: 
 
Indian Plan: Usable supplies allocated to:  
India  - all of the Eastern rivers and 7% of the Western rivers 
Pakistan  - none of the Eastern rivers and 93% of the Western rivers 
Pakistan Plan: Usable supplies allocated to:  
India   -30% of the Eastern rivers and none of the Western rivers 
Pakistan  - 70% of the Eastern rivers and all of the Western rivers 
 
In quantitative terms, the division of the usable supplies of water may be approximately 
shown as follows (in millions of acre-feet): 
 
Total uses excluding losses and unusable supplies 
For India   For Pakistan   Total Usable 
India   29    90    119 
Pakistan  15.5    102.5    118 
 
The present status is that it has not yet been possible to reach agreement and that, in the 
absence of some new development, there is no prospect of further progress in the Working Party. 
Before considering what step should next be taken, it will be useful to analyze the reasons that have so 
far prevented agreement. 
 
Essential Elements of the Problem 
 
The inability to agree in the Working Party has not been due to the technical difficulties or 
inability to devise appropriate engineering works and measures to make the most effective use of the 
waters. If this were the whole problem, a solution would doubtless have been found before now. 
The available technical resources are impressive.  
The proficiency of the Indian and Pakistani engineers in canal irrigation techniques is 
unsurpassed, and perhaps unequalled, anywhere in the world.  
Abundant technical data is at hand. It is doubtful whether such complete recorded flow data 
exists for the Indus system of rivers and canals could be duplicated for any comparable river system in 
any other country. 
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Moreover, there is a large measure of accord between the two Designees on certain 
fundamentals: 
 
1. The Working Party are in agreement that the average annual flow is not sufficiently 
dependable to be taken as a basis for planning and that some more conservative figures must 
be used.  
2. For the most practical purposes, they are in agreement on the amount of unusable supplies in 
the rivers, on the amount that can be developed through storage, on the sites and capacities of 
possible storage facilities and on the technical feasibility of proposed engineering works.  
3. They agree that existing uses of water must be respected (although they differ as to the 
meaning of “existing uses”).  
4. They agree that surplus usable supplies, including supplies that can be developed through 
storage, must be equitably apportioned among the potential new uses in the interests of the 
economic development of the basin as a unit (though they differ in defining the boundaries of 
the basin).  
5. They agree that existing inundation canals should be replaced by weir-controlled canals.  
6. Finally both sides appear to accept the concept that the cost of the new works should be 
allocated to the two countries in the proportion in which they derive benefit there-from. 
7. The extensive compilation of data and the large area of agreement that already exists provide 
firm foundations for a settlement, and thus represent most valuable contributions by the 
Working Party to an ultimate solution. Unfortunately, they are not enough in themselves to 
bring about an agreement. What hampers further progress in the Working Party is no matter of 
engineering complexity, but rather a combination of three basic difficulties which have so far 
prevented the Working Party from reaching the heart of the problem - a fair division of the 
waters between the two countries. 
8. The first difficulty lies in the fact that water supplies and storage potentialities are inadequate 
to the needs of the basin. The Indus is one of the world’s greatest river systems. With proper 
development by engineering works, it is capable of providing substantially more irrigation to 
each country than has ever been enjoyed. But even after full development, there will not be 
enough water to supply all the needs of the water. This means that there can be no ideal plan 
which will fully satisfy both sides. Any plan must involve a large element of compromise 
under which each country will have to forego some of the irrigation uses that it would wish to 
develop if adequate supplies and storage were available. 
9. The second difficulty is that although the Working Party is planning on the basis of the 
development of the Indus Basin as an economic unit, two sovereign states are involved. This 
greatly limits the practical potentialities of planning. A comprehensive plan can achieve 
maximum efficiency, economy and usefulness when it is developed and administered by a 
single authority. Under such an authority, decisions can be made promptly; plans can be 
readily changed to meet new circumstances and accommodations made to meet emergencies. 
10. When two sovereign authorities are concerned, it is difficult to use resources to the greatest 
advantage. Problems must be solved by negotiation and agreement rather than by decision. 
Minor questions of planning and operational detail must be referred to high authority and dealt 
with, perhaps, through diplomatic channels. Moreover the two countries may follow different 
development policies, or may have unequal resources available for development. They may 
also (as has been evident in the present discussions) be reluctant to have works regulating 
water supplies on which they depend constructed in territory controlled by another country. 
All these factors make agreement difficult.  
11. In the present case, it would be unrealistic to ignore this difficulty. The prospects of being able 
to establish an efficient and smooth-running joint administration are not favourable. At 
present, any comprehensive plan must be framed with this limitation in mind. 
12. The third difficulty, the most serious of all, has arisen in the course of discussions. The plans 
put forward by the two sides differ fundamentally in concept. An essential part of the Pakistan 
concept is that existing uses of water must be continued from existing sources. Moreover 
“existing uses”, in the Pakistan plan, include not only the amounts of water that have actually 
been put to use in the past, but also the allocations of water which have been sanctioned prior 
to partition, even though the necessary supplies have not been available for use. This concept 
protects Pakistan’s actual and potential uses on the Eastern rivers and reserves most of the 
water in the Western rivers for use in Pakistan. 
13. The corresponding concept of the Indian plan, on the other hand, is that although existing uses 
(here defined to include only actual historic withdrawals) must be continued, they need not 
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necessarily be continued from existing sources. This concept permits the water in the Eastern 
rivers which is now used in Pakistan to be released for use in India and replaced by water from 
the Western rivers. 
14. The basic divergence of concept, together with the other two difficulties mentioned above, 
effectively blocks progress towards a settlement. As long as it persists, there is no prospect 
that further discussions will prove fruitful. 
 
The Bank Proposal 
 
Both sides have repeatedly stated that they sincerely desire a settlement and that in this they 
reflect the desires of their Governments. It is vital that a settlement be reached. Moreover, after two 
years’ concern with the problem, the Bank is convinced that, despite the difficulties mentioned above, 
no insurmountable obstacle exists to a settlement which will benefit both countries. On the contrary, 
there is no doubt that this dispute can be settled on terms by which ‘the supplies effectively available to 
each country will be increased substantially beyond what they have ever been.’6 
In the circumstances, the Bank Representative feels that he has the responsibility to put 
forward a proposal for the consideration of both sides to serve as the basis of a comprehensive plan. 
The proposal has the concurrence of the engineering consultants to the Bank Representative and is put 
forward with the full support of the management of the Bank. 
This proposal has been framed in complete realisation of the nature of the Bank’s role in these 
discussions. Though the Bank Representative is ‘free to express his views on any aspect of the matter,’7 
neither he nor the Bank is in the position of a judge or arbitrator. The Bank cannot, therefore, pass upon 
any of the legal contentions that have been put forward by the parties in the past. The proposal here 
made does not express, and is not intended to imply, any opinion on those contentions. 
The Bank proposal is no arbitrary compromise arrived at by mathematically splitting the 
differences between the two sides. It is a plan based on concepts of its own, which produce a fair and 
economic result. 
In the formulation of the Bank proposal, the divergence of concept in the Working Party as to 
treatment of existing uses had to be faced at the outset. The Bank proposal embodies the principle that 
historic withdrawals of water must be continued, but not necessarily from existing sources. This 
principle allows water to be used so as most effectively to promote development. A requirement that 
existing uses must be supplied from existing sources would unduly limit the flexibility of operation 
needed for the efficient use of waters. In fact, no fair and adequate comprehensive plan could, in the 
opinion of the Bank Representative, be devised under such a requirement. 
The Bank proposal also embodies the principle that, in view of existing circumstances, 
allocation of supplies to the two countries should be such as to afford the greatest possible freedom of 
action by each country in the operation, maintenance and future development of its irrigation facilities. 
It is desirable, so far as practicable, to avoid control by India over waters on which Pakistan will be 
dependent, and to enable each country to control the works supplying the water allocated to it and 
determine in its own interests the apportionment of waters within its own territories. This principle has 
not merely the negative advantage of minimizing friction between the two countries (a matter of some 
significance in view of the disputes that have arisen from sharing waters from the same river) and of 
avoiding the necessity of a costly and perhaps ineffective permanent joint administration. It also has a 
positive advantage. There is every reason to believe that leaving each country free to develop its own 
water resources in the light of its own needs and resources, and without having to obtain the agreement 
of the other at each point, will in the long run mostly effectively promote the efficient development of 
the whole system. 
This does not mean that the Bank proposal places any obstacle in the way of cooperation 
between the two countries. On the contrary, it encourages cooperation and permits full advantage to be 
taken of any willingness to cooperate. But it is capable of bringing benefits even if a full degree of 
cooperation does not develop as rapidly as might be hoped. 
 
Statement of Bank Proposal 
 
The Bank proposal is that there be taken as a basis for agreement between India and Pakistan a 
plan under which the waters of the Western rivers would be reserved to Pakistan and the waters of the 
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7
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Eastern rivers would, subject to a relatively short transition period, be reserved to India. The plan may 
be summarized as follows: 
The entire flow of the Western rivers (Indus, Jhelum and Chenab) would be available for the 
exclusive use and benefit of Pakistan, and for development by Pakistan, except for the insignificant 
volume of Jhelum flow presently used in Kashmir. 
The entire flow of the Eastern rivers (Ravi, Beas and Sutlej) would be available for the 
exclusive use and benefit of India, and for development by India, except that for a specified transition 
period India would continue to supply from these rivers, in accordance with an agreed schedule, the 
historic withdrawals from these rivers in Pakistan. 
The transition period would be calculated on the basis of the time estimated to be required to 
complete the link canals needed in Pakistan to make transfers for the purpose of replacing supplies 
from India. A temporary cooperative administration would be needed to supervise the carrying out of 
the transitional arrangements. 
Each country would construct the works located on its territories which are planned for the 
development of the supplies. The costs of such works would be borne by the country to be benefited 
thereby. Although no works are planned for joint construction by the two countries, certain link canals 
in Pakistan will, as stated above, be needed to replace supplies from India. India would bear the costs 
of such works to the extent of the benefits to be received by her therefrom. An appropriate procedure 
would be established for adjudicating or arbitrating disputes concerning the allocation of costs under 
this principle. 
Some additional explanation may be helpful to a consideration of the Bank proposal. 
The entire flow of the Indus, Jhelum and Chenab Rivers (Western rivers) would be allocated 
to Pakistan. These rivers are now used within Pakistan, except for the insignificant volume of the 
Jhelum that is used in Kashmir. Although the Indus River has its source outside Pakistan in Tibet and 
flows for a considerable length before entering Pakistan, the mountainous topography is unfavourable 
for irrigation development. Therefore, unhindered use by Pakistan of its waters seems assured. The 
Jhelum River rises and flows for some distance in Kashmir and, although here also reasons of 
topography limit the opportunities for irrigation diversion, there should be agreement that the flow will 
not be disturbed. The Chenab River rises in India and before it enters Kashmir, provides a substantial 
flow that could be diverted for use in India. Assurance by India that the flow of this river will not be 
disturbed is essential. 
The entire flow of the Sutlej, Beas and Ravi Rivers (Eastern rivers) would be allocated to 
India when the necessary works have been completed to permit transfers of supplies from the Western 
rivers to replace historic withdrawals in Pakistan from the Eastern rivers. At present, India is not 
receiving the entire flow of these rivers but is supplying therefrom a substantial amount for canals in 
Pakistan, principally in the Sutlej Valley. 
The works that are necessary to replace supplies from India consist of link canals connecting 
the Western to the Eastern rivers. Several such link canals have already been constructed by Pakistan, 
one is nearing completion and some additional canals will undoubtedly be necessary. As the necessary 
link canals are to be constructed in Pakistan, their integration with present planning there must be 
determined by Pakistan. Since any plan for transfer of supplies is susceptible of various modifications, 
accurate determination of costs must await completion of engineering studies. 
It is proposed that the costs of these works will be borne by the two countries in proportion to 
the benefits. Thus, the cost of a canal in Pakistan of the capacity required to replace supplies from India 
would be borne by India; but if Pakistan decides, in its own interests, to increase the capacity beyond 
what is needed for such replacement, the cost would be shared proportionately by the two countries. 
It will be necessary, under the Bank proposal, for India to continue to supply the Pakistan 
canals until the necessary works are completed by Pakistan for transfer of supplies from the Western 
rivers. This will involve preparation of a construction time schedule and of a time schedule for actual 
transfer of supplies. 
These schedules would allow the actual transfers of supplies to come into effect progressively 
and the deliveries by India to diminish accordingly. They must be prepared cooperatively and agreed to 
by both countries. The period required for completion of the necessary link canals is roughly estimated 
to be about 5 years. 
As indicated in the summary, temporary cooperative administrative machinery would be 
needed in the transition period to facilitate the carrying of the time schedules. There would be exchange 
of data on river discharges and withdrawals and on construction of interest to both countries. Joint 
observations would be provided for. Arrangements for settling disputes concerning allocations of cost 
by arbitration or adjudication would also be needed. 
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The Bank proposal contemplates that no reservoir storage (aside from the Bhakra dam which 
should be completed by the end of the transition period) will be required to supplement flow water in 
continuing the historic withdrawals. The inter-connected system which the link canals would provide 
could be so operated as the meet the existing requirements of the Sutlej Valley lands except, perhaps, in 
small amounts in a few canals in exceptional years. 
Even without further storage construction, the Bank plan would permit the following uses 
after the transition period: 
Pakistan could supply her historic withdrawals and could bring most of the Sutlej Valley 
Canals up to allocation. She could also meet the requirements of projects in progress on the Indus. 
India could supply her historic withdrawals and meet the requirements of projects in progress except 
that some modifications of the Rajasthan Canal project would be required, at least until further 
reservoir capacity is available. 
There can be no doubt, however, that additional reservoir storage is necessary for the full 
development of the system and such storage is contemplated by the Bank plan. Any further storage 
capacity would greatly reduce the possibility of shortages and would support substantial new irrigation 
uses. 
As far as is now known the potential storage capacities which could be developed by the two 
countries under the Bank plan would be about equal. However, no thorough engineering studies have 
been made and accordingly storage capacity (except for Bhakra) cannot be definitely determined. 
Further studies may well disclose additional reservoir possibilities not now known. Costs can obviously 
not be estimated at present and construction time can be only approximated. 
The following table gives a rough quantitative comparison (in millions of acre-feet of usable 
supplies) between the Indian and Pakistan plans, as modified by recent concessions, and the Bank plan: 
Plan     Total Uses Excluding Losses and Unusable Supplies 
For India  For Pakistan   Total Usable 
Indian     29   90    119 
Pakistan    15.5   102.5    118 
Bank     22   97    119 
 
Comments on Bank Proposal 
 
An essential test of a comprehensive plan is its fairness. The Bank proposal provides a fair 
division of the waters. It protect existing irrigation uses from disturbance and allocates surplus 
supplies, those already developed and those that may be developed, in accordance with the principle of 
equitable apportionment. 
The Bank Representative is aware that certain minor adjustments would make the plan more 
economic if there were a sufficient assurance of cooperation between the parties to permit these 
measures to be planned and carried out. 
At the present time, however, no such adjustments are recommended. If in the course of the 
transition period the prospects for long-term cooperation appear favourable enough, there will then be 
ample opportunity to agree on adjustments. But in present circumstances, their disadvantages appear to 
be greater than their benefits. Most such adjustments would require the establishment of a permanent 
joint commission. Administrative arrangements of that kind are costly, and the costs recur annually. 
More significantly, joint commissions are likely to be inefficient except in extremely favourable 
conditions. 
One of the merits of the Bank proposal is that, unlike the plans of the two Designees, it avoids 
the complexities that would require the establishment of a permanent joint commission. 
A further advantage of the Bank proposal lies in the fact that, after transfer works are 
completed, each country will be independent of the other in the operation of its supplies. 
Each country will be responsible for planning, constructing and administering its own 
facilities in its own territories as it sees fit. This should provide strong incentives to each country to 
make the most effective use of water, since any efficiency accomplished by works undertaken by either 
country for storage, transfer, reduction of losses and the like will accrue directly to the benefit of that 
country. The same will be true of efficiency achieved in operations. Pakistan, for instance, will be able 
to take full advantage of the flexibility afforded by an inter-connecting system. As the flow of the rivers 
varies with the seasons, and from year to year, supplies that are surplus in one river can be transferred 
to a river in which supplies are low. Likewise India will be able to operate Bhakra so as to meet the 
varying requirements of different areas. By contrast, if the supplies from particular rivers were shared 
by the two countries, the administrative complexity of arranging necessary adjustments to meet 
variations in flow and scheduling for crop needs would be formidable. 
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The mutual independence afforded by the Bank proposal would also bring benefits of a 
different kind. The location of works serving each country on territories under its control, and the 
assurances against interference by either country with the supplies on which the other depends, should 
reduce the chances of disputes and tension and contribute to improved relations. 
All these factors should serve to promote the development of the entire basin. 
A number of contentions have been made in the Working Party discussions which need not be 
resolved by agreement if the Bank proposal is adopted. There has been discussion about the location of 
the easterly boundary of the Indus Basin, a question which is difficult to settle since the area is a desert 
with no discernible watershed. Under the Bank proposal, the question need not be settled by agreement. 
Each country will be free to use the waters allocated to it as it sees fit. 
There has also been discussion about the proper allowance for gains and losses, for salinity 
repulsion and for tube-well supply. It is not possible to answer these questions precisely at this time; 
nor will it be possible for some years until upstream storage and use permits much less wastage to the 
sea. The best method of dealing with these questions is to let each country make such provision out of 
supplies allotted to it, or take such engineering measures, as it deems wise. 
It might perhaps be said that the allocation of the waters of a river to lands far removed from 
its banks, rather than to adjacent lands, is abnormal. But the practice is not new; it was well known in 
the Indus Basin before partition and has been followed since partition. Besides, recent history of the 
Indus Basin has not been normal. It is unusual, to say the least, to find an elaborate irrigation system, 
originally planned and operated under a single political regime, suddenly cut in two by a new political 
boundary. 
It might also be said that the Bank proposal differs from pre-partition plans in that it 
contemplates irrigation of lands for which irrigation was not formerly planned. There would be 
substance in such a statement. The justification is that social and economic conditions have changed. 
Political developments have shifted large masses of population to new homes and these people now 
need irrigated land. No comprehensive plan would be realistic that failed to take account of the 
changed situation. 
 
Conclusion 
The Bank proposal is simple, workable and fair. It will effectively promote the economic 
development of the Indus Basin and will benefit both countries by substantially increasing the amount 
of usable water available to each of them. The Bank Representative recommends its acceptance as the 
basis of agreement. 
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APPENDIX 68 
Aide Memoire, 21 May 1956 
 
1. Cooperative work on the Indus Basin question was resumed in November 1954 on the basis of 
“Terms of Reference and Procedure” proposed by the Bank and accepted by the Government of India 
and the Government of Pakistan. The objective of this latest phase of the cooperative work has been to 
prepare ‘a comprehensive plan for the consideration of Governments, on the basis of the Bank proposal 
of February 5, 1954, taking as a starting point the division of waters envisaged therein.’ 
2. The Delegations of India and Pakistan, together with the Bank Group, have now been at work 
for almost 18 months. During this time a series of studies have been carried out by both Delegations 
and numerous memoranda have been submitted by each side bearing on the various issues arising out 
of Paragraphs 2 and 3 of the Terms of Reference. The Bank has also arranged for the Bank Consultants 
(TAMS) to carry out a series of independent studies of the same nature. 
3. The present status of the discussions can be summarized as follows: 
[a] It has not been possible to secure full agreement between the two Delegations on:- 
[i] the quantitative aspects of certain of the uses specified in Paragraph 2 and in 
Paragraph 3 of the Terms of Reference. 
[ii] certain technical considerations involved (e.g. the effect of the proposed changed 
regime of the rivers on “Gains and Losses”) 
[b] In the absence of agreement on the points mentioned in [a] above, it has not been possible 
to secure a common approach to the actual engineering features of a “Comprehensive Plan.” 
4. The Bank continues to hold the view that the “division of the waters” contemplated by the 
Bank Proposal of February 1954 affords the best prospects for a settlement of the Indus Waters 
question; that out of the flow-cum-storage potential of the rivers allocated to them, India and Pakistan 
could each develop very substantial irrigation uses, additional to those that they now enjoy; and that no 
insuperable engineering difficulties are likely to arise in either country in constructing the physical 
works necessary to develop these additional supplies. The works would, however, be costly; and their 
financing would present a serious financial problem. 
5. The Bank is of the opinion that no useful purpose is likely to be served by continuing to 
devote the cooperative work to an attempt to obtain agreement of the two Delegations on the issues 
arising out of Paragraph 2 and Paragraph 3 of the Terms of Reference. The Bank, however, feels it 
desirable, at the stage which the discussions have now reached, that the Bank should consider, in the 
light of the studies made by the consultants, whether any “adjustment” in the Bank Proposal of 
February 1954 is called for; and also to make proposals to the two Governments with regard to future 
Bank participation. 
 
 
Paragraph 2 Uses and Surplus 
6.  [a] The Bank’s consultants have studied the extent to which the flow of the Western Rivers 
will meet the uses envisaged in Paragraph 2 of the Terms of Reference, and the nature and extent of 
any surplus. 
[b] For this purpose, the Bank asked its Consultants to adopt the following quantum of uses:- 
[i] Historic withdrawals of all canals (except the Pakistan Sutlej Valley Canals); 
[ii] Allocations for the Pakistan Sutlej Valley Canals (11.1 MAF)*; 
[iii] 3.6 MAF for Thal;* 
[iv] 9.5 MAF for Kotri.* 
(* With distribution shown in Appendix A). 
[c] These studies have led the Bank Group to the conclusion that, after taking into account the 
possibilities of the transfer of flow supplies of the Indus, Jhelum and Chenab by a system of link 
canals:- 
[i] There would be no shortages in Kharif, except for occasional 10-day periods in 
April and September in occasional years. 
                                                
8
 Government of Pakistan, National Documentation Wing, Cabinet Division, Islamabad; and Government 
of Pakistan, Canal Waters Dispute: Correspondence between the Government of Pakistan and the 
Government of India and Partition Documents, (May 1958); and Government of Pakistan, Canal 
Waters Dispute: Documents relating to Negotiations under the Good Offices of the International Bank 
for Reconstruction and Development (June 1958). 
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[ii] There would be consistent surpluses in Kharif, significant in quantity, duration 
and frequency. 
[iii] There would be consistent shortages in Rabi, occasionally beginning in late 
September of extending into early April (see [i] above), of a degree, duration and frequency 
which the Bank Group could not regard as “tolerable”. 
 
Paragraph 3 Uses 
7.  [a] Additional Requirements of Sukkur and Gudu Pakistan has claimed for Sukkur substantial 
additional uses both in Rabi and in Kharif, and for Gudu substantial additional uses during Kharif only. 
If the pre-partition regime of the six rivers were to continue undisturbed, no significant additional Rabi 
irrigation at Sukkur could be developed on any dependable basis, from flow alone. Consequently, none 
could be developed only from the flow of the Western Rivers. So far as Kharif uses at Sukkur and at 
Gudu are concerned, the Kharif surplus referred to in Paragraph 6[c] [ii] above is available to allocate 
to new Kharif uses at these two projects, and to employ as a substitute for “Sailab.” 
[b] Future Development in the State of Jammu and Kashmir India has claimed that some part 
of the flow of the Jhelum and Chenab should be reserved for future development in the State of Jammu 
and Kashmir. It has been stated by India that this development would involve “relatively insignificant 
consumptive uses.” This question should, in the Bank’s view, be postponed until the point has been 
reached when the provisions of an international water treaty might be under consideration. 
 
“Adjustments” to the Bank Proposal 
8.  [a] In the light of the conclusions at which the Bank has arrived, as set out in Paragraphs 6 and 
7 above, the Bank feels that an adjustment in its Proposal of February 1954 is called for. This 
adjustment should, in the Bank’s view, assure to Pakistan “timely” water sufficient to eliminate the 
shortage referred to in Paragraph 6[c] [iii]. 
[b] The adjustment referred to in [a] above might take any of the following forms, or a 
combination of any two or all of them:- 
[i] Supplies from tubewells. 
[ii] Continued deliveries to Pakistan of “timely” water from the Eastern Rivers. 
[iii] Construction of storage on the Western Rivers. 
[c] When the Bank made its proposal of February 1954, the possibility, both in India and in 
Pakistan, of supplementing flow by supplies from tube-wells, was realized. But this source of supply is 
not, in the Bank’s view, an appropriate means, over the long term, of eliminating any part of the 
disclosed shortage. Accordingly, and if the Division of Waters contemplated by the Bank Proposal is 
maintained, the adjustment should be in the form of storage on the Western Rivers. 
9. The system of works to implement the Bank Proposal, as adjusted, should, therefore, in the 
Bank’s view, be based on the principle that, for the purpose of meeting the “Paragraph 2 Uses,” flow of 
the Western Rivers (Indus, as well as Jhelum and Chenab) should be exploited to the maximum 
possible extent, and that the minimum inroads should be made on Pakistan’s limited storage capacity. 
In the Bank’s view, the cost of this system of works should be the basis of the calculation of India’s 
financial liability. 
10. The Bank now wishes to propose to the two Governments the following course of action:- 
[a] The completion of negotiations with the two Delegations of ad hoc amounts for Indian 
withdrawals from the Eastern Rivers during the period 1st April 1956 to 31st March 1957. 
[b] A continuance of the period of the cooperative work until 31st March 1957. 
[c] After the two Governments had agreed to [b] above, the conclusion of an inter-
Governmental Agreement to cover [a] above. 
[d] That the Bank should then proceed to use its good offices to bring about acceptance of an 
appropriate adjustment of the Bank Proposal of February 1954, along the lines indicated. 
11. The Bank feels that if, by 31st March 1957, the Bank should see no reasonable prospects for a 
settlement on the basis of the Bank Proposal, with an appropriate adjustment, the Bank would have to 
consider whether the employment of its good offices could make any further contribution to a solution. 
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APPENDIX 79 
The Indus Waters Treaty, 1960 
Preamble 
The Government of India and the Government of Pakistan, being equally desirous of attaining 
the most complete and satisfactory utilisation of the waters of the Indus system of rivers and 
recognising the need, therefore, of fixing and delimiting, in a spirit of goodwill and friendship, the 
rights and obligations of each in relation to the other concerning the use of these waters and of making 
provision for the settlement, in a cooperative spirit, of all such questions as may hereafter arise in 
regard to the interpretation or application of the provisions agreed upon herein, have resolved to 
conclude a Treaty in furtherance of these objectives, and for this purpose have named as their 
plenipotentiaries: 
The Government of India: 
Shri Jawaharlal Nehru, 
Prime Ministerof India, 
and 
The Government of Pakistan: 
Field Marshal Mohammad Ayub Khan, HP., H.J., 
President of Pakistan; 
who, having communicated to each other their respective Full Powers and having found them in good 
and due form, have agreed upon the following Articles and Annexures:- 
 
Article I 
Definitions 
As used in this Treaty: 
[1] The terms ‘Article’ and ‘Annexure’ mean respectively an Article of, and an Annexure to, this 
Treaty. Except as otherwise indicated, references to Paragraphs are to the paragraphs in the Article or 
in the Annexure in which the reference is made. 
[2] The term ‘Tributary’ of a river means any surface channel, whether in continuous or intermittent 
flow and by whatever name called, whose waters in the natural course would fall into that river, e.g. a 
tributary, a torrent, a natural drainage, an artificial drainage, a nadi, a nallah, a nai, a khad, a cho. The 
term also includes any sub-tributary or branch or subsidiary channel, by whatever name called, whose 
waters, in the natural course, would directly or otherwise flow into that surface channel. 
[3] The term ‘The Indus’, ‘The Jhelum’, ‘The Chenab’, ‘The Ravi’, ‘The Beas’ or ‘The Sutlej’ means 
the named river (including Connecting Lakes, if any) and all its Tributaries: Provided however that 
[i] none of the rivers named above shall be deemed to be a Tributary; 
[ii] The Chenab shall be deemed to include the river Panjnad; and 
[iii] the river Chandra and the river Bhaga shall be deemed to be Tributaries of The Chenab. 
[4] The term ‘Main’ added after Indus, Jhelum, Chenab, Sutlej, Beas or Ravi means the main stem of 
the named river excluding its Tributaries, but including all channels and creeks of the main stem of that 
river and such Connecting Lakes as form part of the main stem itself. The Jhelum Main shall be 
deemed to extend up to Verinag and the Chenab Main up to the confluence of the river Chandra and the 
river Bhaga. 
[5] The term ‘Eastern Rivers’ means The Sutlej, The Beas and The Ravi taken together. 
[6] The term ‘Western Rivers’ means The Indus, The Jhelum and The Chenab taken together. 
[7] The term ‘the Rivers’ means all the rivers, The Sutlej, The Beas, The Ravi, The Indus, The Jhelum 
and The Chenab. 
[8] The term ‘Connecting Lakes’ means any lake which receives water from, or yields water to, any of 
the Rivers; but any lake which occasionally and irregularly receives only the spill of any the Rivers and 
returns only the whole or part of that spill is not a Connecting Lake. 
[9] The term ‘Agricultural Use’ means the use of water for irrigation, except for irrigation of household 
gardens and public recreational gardens. 
[10] The term ‘Domestic Use’ means the use of water for: 
[a] drinking, washing, bathing, recreation, sanitation (including the conveyance and dilution of 
sewage and of industrial and other wastes), stock and poultry, and other like purposes: 
[b] household and municipal purposes (including use for household gardens and public 
recreational gardens); and 
[c] industrial purposes (including mining, milling and other like purposes); but the term does 
not include Agricultural Use or use for generation of hydroelectric power. 
                                                
9
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[11] The term ‘Non-Consumptive Use’ means any control or use of water for navigation, floating of 
timber or other property, flood protection or flood control, fishing or fish culture, wild life or other like 
beneficial purposes, provided that, exclusive of seepage and evaporation of water incidental to the 
control or use, the water (undiminished in volume within the practical range of measurement) remains 
in, or is returned to, the same river or its Tributaries; but the term does not include Agricultural Use or 
use for the generation of hydroelectric power. 
[12] The term Transitional Period’ means the period beginning and ending as provided in Article II [6]. 
[13] The term ‘Bank’ means the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development. 
[14] The term ‘Commissioner’ means either of the Commissioners appointed under the provisions of 
Article VIII [1] and the term ‘Commission’ means the Permanent Indus Commission constituted in 
accordance with Article VIII [3]. 
[15] The term ‘interference with the waters’ means: 
[a] Any act of withdrawal therefrom; or 
[b] Any man-made obstruction to their flow which causes a change in the volume (within the 
practical range of measurement) of the daily flow of the waters: Provided however that an obstruction 
which involves only an insignificant and incidental change in the volume of the daily flow, for 
example, fluctuations due to afflux caused by bridge piers or a temporary by-pass, etc., shall not be 
deemed to be an interference with the waters. 
[16] The term ‘Effective Date’ means the date on which this Treaty takes effect in accordance with the 
provisions of Article XII, that is, the first of April 1960. 
 
Article II 
Provisions Regarding Eastern Rivers 
[1] All the waters of the Eastern Rivers shall be available for the unrestricted use of India, except as 
otherwise expressly provided in this Article. 
[2] Except for Domestic Use and Non-Consumptive Use, Pakistan shall be under an obligation to let 
flow, and shall not permit any interference with, the waters of the Sutlej Main and the Ravi Main in the 
reaches where these rivers flow in Pakistan and have not yet finally crossed into Pakistan. The points of 
final crossing are the following: [a] near the new Hasta Bund upstream of Suleimanke in the case of the 
Sutlej Main, and [b] about one and a half miles upstream of the syphon for the B-R-BD Link in the 
case of the Ravi Main. 
[3] Except for Domestic Use, Non-Consumptive Use and Agricultural Use (as specified in Annexure 
B), Pakistan shall be under an obligation to let flow, and shall not permit any interference with, the 
waters (while flowing in Pakistan) of any Tributary which in its natural course joins the Sutlej Main or 
the Ravi Main before these rivers have finally crossed into Pakistan. 
[4] All the waters, while flowing in Pakistan, of any Tributary which, in its natural course, joins the 
Sutlej Main or the Ravi Main after these rivers have finally crossed into Pakistan shall be available for 
the unrestricted use of Pakistan: Provided however that this provision shall not be construed as giving 
Pakistan any claim or right to any releases by India in any such Tributary. If Pakistan should deliver 
any of the waters of any such Tributary, which on the Effective Date joins the Ravi Main after this river 
has finally crossed into Pakistan, into a reach of the Ravi Main upstream of this crossing, India shall 
not make use of these waters; each Party agrees to establish such discharge observation stations and 
make such observations as may be necessary for the determination of the component of water available 
for the use of Pakistan on account of the aforesaid deliveries by Pakistan, and Pakistan agrees to meet 
the cost of establishing the aforesaid discharge observation stations and making the aforesaid 
observations. 
[5] There shall be a Transition Period during which, to the extent specified in Annexure H, India shall 
[i] limit its withdrawal for Agricultural Use, 
[ii] limit abstractions for storages, and 
[iii] make deliveries to Pakistan from the Eastern Rivers. 
[6] The Transition Period shall begin on 1st April 1960 and it shall end on 31st March 1970, or, if 
extended under the provisions of Part 8 of Annexure H, on the date up to which it has been extended. In 
any event, whether or not the replacement referred to in Article IV [1] has been accomplished, the 
Transition Period shall end not later than 31st March 1973. 
[7] If the Transition Period is extended beyond 31st March 1970, the provisions of Article V [5] shall 
apply. 
[8] If the Transition Period is extended beyond 31st March 1970, the provisions of Article V [5] shall 
apply during the period of extension beyond 31st March 1970. 
[9] During the Transition Period, Pakistan shall receive for unrestricted use the waters of the Eastern 
Rivers which are to be released by India in accordance with the provisions of Annexure H. After the 
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end of the Transition Period, Pakistan shall have no claim or right to releases by India of any of the 
waters of the Eastern Rivers. In case there are any releases, Pakistan shall enjoy the unrestricted use of 
the waters so released after they have finally crossed into Pakistan: Provided that in the event that 
Pakistan makes any use of these waters, Pakistan shall not acquire any right whatsoever, by 
prescription or otherwise, to a continuance of such releases of such use. 
 
Article III 
Provisions Regarding Western Rivers 
[1] Pakistan shall receive for unrestricted use all those waters of the Western Rivers which India is 
under obligation to let flow under the provisions of Paragraph [2]. 
[2] India shall be under an obligation to let flow all the waters of the Western Rivers, and shall not 
permit any interference with these waters, except for the following uses, restricted (except as provided 
in item [c] [ii] of Paragraph 5 of Annexure C) in the case of each of the rivers, The Indus, The Jhelum 
and The Chenab, to the drainage basin thereof: 
[a] Domestic Use; 
[b] Non-Consumptive Use; 
[c] Agricultural Use, as set out in Annexure C; and 
[d] Generation of hydro-electric power, as set out in Annexure D. 
[3] Pakistan shall have the unrestricted use of all waters originating from sources other than the Eastern 
Rivers which are delivered by Pakistan into The Ravi or The Sutlej, and India shall not make use of 
these waters. Each Party agrees to establish such discharge observation stations and make such 
observations as may be considered necessary by the Commission for the determination of the 
component of water available for the use of Pakistan on account of the aforesaid deliveries by Pakistan. 
[4] Except as provided in Annexures D and E, India shall not store any water of, or construct any 
storage works on, the Western Rivers. 
 
Article IV 
Provisions Regarding Eastern Rivers and Western Rivers 
[1] Pakistan shall use its best endeavours to construct and bring into operation, with due regard to 
expedition and economy, that part of a system of works which will accomplish the replacement, from 
the Western Rivers and other sources, of water supplies for irrigation canals in Pakistan which, on 15th 
August 1947, were dependent on water supplies from the Eastern Rivers. 
[2] Each Party agrees that any Non-Consumptive Use made by it shall be so made as not to materially 
change, on account of such use, the flow in any channel to the prejudice of the uses on that channel by 
the other Party under the provisions of this Treaty. In executing any scheme of flood protection or flood 
control each Party will avoid, as far as practicable, any material damage to the other Party, and any 
such scheme carried out by India on the Western Rivers shall not involve any use of water or any 
storage in addition to that provided under Article III. 
[3] Nothing in this Treaty shall be construed as having the effect of preventing either Party from 
undertaking schemes of drainage, river training, conservation of soil against erosion and dredging, or 
from removal stones, gravel or sand from the beds of the Rivers: Provided that 
[a] in executing any of the schemes mentioned above, each Party will avoid, as far as 
practicable, any material damage to the other Party; 
[b] any such scheme carried out by India on the Western Rivers shall not involve any use of 
water or any storage in addition to that provided under Article III; 
[c] except as provided in Paragraph [5] and Article VII [1] [b], India shall not take any action 
to increase the catchment area, beyond the area on the Effective Date, of any natural or artificial 
drainage or drain which crosses into Pakistan, and shall not undertake such construction or remodelling 
of any drainage or drain which crosses or falls into a drainage or drain which crosses as might cause 
material damage in Pakistan or entail the construction of a new drain or enlargement of an existing 
drainage or drain in Pakistan; and 
[d] should Pakistan desire to increase the catchment area, beyond the area on the Effective 
Date, of any natural or artificial drainage or drain, which receives drainage waters from India, or, 
except in an emergency, to pour any waters into it in excess of the quantities received by it as on the 
Effective Date, Pakistan shall, before undertaking any work for these purposes, increase the capacity of 
that drainage or drain to the extent necessary so as not to impair its efficacy for dealing with drainage 
waters received from India as on the Effective Date. 
[4] Pakistan shall maintain in good order its portions of the drainage mentioned below with capacities 
not less than the capacities as on the Effective Date:- 
[i] Hudiara Drain 
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[ii] Kasur Nala 
[iii] Salimshah Drain 
[iv] Fazilka Drain. 
[5] If India finds it necessary that any of the drainages mentioned in Paragraph [4] should be deepened 
or widened in Pakistan, Pakistan agrees to undertake to do so as a work of public interest, provided 
India agrees to pay the cost of the deepening or widening. 
[6] Each Party will use its best endeavours to maintain the natural channels of the Rivers, as on the 
Effective Date, in such conditions as will avoid, as far as practicable, any obstruction to the flow in 
these channels likely to cause material damage to the other Party. 
[7] Neither Party will take any action which would have the effect of diverting the Ravi Main between 
Madhopur and Lahore, or the Sutlej Main between Harike and Sueimanke, from its natural channel 
between high banks. 
[8] The use of the natural channels of the Rivers for the discharge of flood or other excess waters shall 
be free and not subject to limitation by either Party, and neither Part shall have any claim against the 
other in respect of any damage caused by such use. Each Party agrees to communicate to the other 
Party, as far in advance as practicable, any information it may have in regard to such extraordinary 
discharges of water from reservoirs and flood flows as may affect the other Party. 
[9] Each Party declares its intention to operate its storage dams, barrages and irrigation canals in such 
manner, consistent with the normal operations of its hydraulic systems, as to avoid, as far as feasible, 
material damage to the other Party. 
[10] Each Party declares its intention to prevent, as far as practicable, undue pollution of the waters of 
the Rivers which might affect adversely uses similar in nature to those to which the waters were put on 
the Effective Date, and agrees to take all reasonable measures to ensure that, before any sewage or 
industrial waste is allowed to flow into the Rivers, it will be treated, where necessary, in such manner 
as not materially to affect those uses: Provided that the criterion of reasonableness shall be the 
customary practice in similar situations on the Rivers. 
[11] The Parties agree to adopt, as far as feasible, appropriate measures for the recovery, and 
restoration to owners, of timber and other property floated or floating down the Rivers, subject to 
appropriate charges being paid by the owners. 
[12] The use of water for industrial purposes under Articles II [2], II [3] and III [2] shall not exceed: 
[a] in the case of an industrial process known on the Effective Date, such quantum of use as 
was customary in that process on the Effective Date; 
[b] in the case of an industrial process not known on the Effective Date: 
[i] such quantum of use as was customary on the Effective Date in similar or in any 
way comparable industrial processes; or 
[ii] if there was no industrial process on the Effective Date similar of in any way 
comparable to the new process, such quantum of use as would not have a substantially adverse 
effect on the other Party. 
[13] Such part of any water withdrawn for Domestic Use under the provisions of Articles II [3] and III 
[2] as is subsequently applied to Agricultural Use shall be accounted for as part of the Agricultural Use 
specified in Annexure B and Annexure C respectively; each Party will use its best endeavours to return 
the same river (directly or through one of its Tributaries) all water withdrawn therefrom for industrial 
purposes and not consumed either in the industrial processes for which it was withdrawn or in some 
other Domestic Use. 
[14] In the event that either Party should develop a use of the waters of the Rivers which is not in 
accordance with the provisions of this Treaty, that Party shall not acquire by reason of such use any 
right, by prescription or otherwise, to a continuance of such use. 
[15] Except as otherwise required by the express provisions of this Treaty, nothing in this Treaty shall 
be construed as affecting existing territorial rights over the waters of any of the Rivers or the beds or 
banks thereof, or as affecting existing property rights under municipal law over such waters or beds or 
banks. 
Article IV 
Financial Provisions 
[1] In consideration of the fact that the purpose of part of the system of works referred to in Article IV 
[1] is the replacement, from the Western Rivers and other sources, of water supplies for irrigation 
canals in Pakistan which, on 15th August 1947, were dependent on water supplies from the Eastern 
Rivers, India agree to make a fixed contribution of Pounds Sterling 62,060,000 towards the costs of 
these works. The amount in Pounds Sterling of this contribution shall remain unchanged irrespective of 
any alteration in the par value of any currency. 
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[2] The sum of Pounds Sterling 62,060,000 specified in Paragraph [1] shall be paid in ten equal annual 
instalments on the 1st of November of each year. The first of such annual installments shall be paid on 
1st November 1960, or if the Treaty has not entered in to force by that date, then within one month 
after the Treaty enters into force. 
[3] Each of the instalments specified in Paragraph [2] shall be paid to the Bank for the credit of the 
Indus Basin Development Fund to be established and administered by the Bank, and payment shall be 
made in Pounds Sterling, or in such other currency or currencies as may from time to time be agreed 
between India and the Bank. 
[4] The payments provided for under the provisions of Paragraph [3] shall be made without deductions 
or set-off on account of any financial claims of India on Pakistan arising otherwise than under the 
provisions of this Treaty: Provided that this provision shall in no way absolve Pakistan from the 
necessity of paying in other ways debts to India which may be outstanding against Pakistan. 
[5] If, at the request of Pakistan, the Transition Period is extended in accordance with the provisions of 
Article II [6] and of Part 8 of Annexure H, the Bank shall thereupon pay to India out of the Indus Basin 
Development Fund the appropriate amount specified in the Table below:- 
 
Table 
Period of Aggregate Extension of Transition Period   Payment to India 
One year        £Stg. 3,125,000 
Two years        £Stg. 6,406,250 
Three years        £Stg. 9,850,000 
 
[6] The provisions of Article IV [1] and Article V [1] shall not be construed as conferring upon India 
any right to participate in the decisions as to the system of works which Pakistan constructs pursuant to 
Article IV [1] or as constituting an assumption of any responsibility by India or as an agreement by 
India in regard to such works. 
[7] Except for such payments as are specifically provided for in this Treaty, neither Party shall be 
entitled to claim any payment for observance of the provisions of this Treaty or to make any charge for 
water received from it by the other Party. 
 
Article VI 
Exchange of Data 
[1] The following data with respect to the flow in, and utilisation of the waters of, the Rivers shall be 
exchanged regularly between the Parties:- 
[a] Daily (or as observed or estimated less frequently) gauge and discharge data relating to 
flow of the Rivers at all observations sites. 
[b] Daily extractions for or releases from reservoirs. 
[c] Daily withdrawals at the heads of all canals operated by government or by a government 
agency (hereinafter in this Article called canals), including link canals. 
[d] Daily escapages from all canals, including link canals. 
[e] Daily deliveries from link canals. These data shall be transmitted monthly by each Party to 
the other as soon as the data for a calendar month have been collected and tabulated, but not later than 
three months after the end of the month to which they relate: Provided that such of the data specified 
above as are considered by either Party to be necessary for operational purposes shall be supplied daily 
or at less frequent intervals, as may be requested. Should one Party request the supply of any of these 
data by telegram, telephone, or wireless, it shall reimburse the other Party for the cost of transmission. 
[2] If, in addition to the data specified in Paragraph [1] of this Article, either Party requests the supply 
of any data relating to the hydrology of the Rivers, or to canal or reservoir operation connected with the 
Rivers, or to any provision of this Treaty, such data shall be supplied by the other Party to the extent 
that these available. 
 
Article VII 
Future Co-operation 
[1] The two Parties recognize that they have a common interest in the optimum development of the 
Rivers, and, to that end, they declare their intention to co-operate, by mutual agreement, to the fullest 
possible extent. In particular:- 
[a] Each Party, to the extent it considers practicable and on agreement by the other Party to 
pay the costs to be incurred, will, at the request of the other Party, set up or install such hydrologic 
observation stations within the drainage basins of the Rivers, and set up or install such meteorological 
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observation stations relating thereto and carry out such observations thereat, as may be requested, and 
will supply the data so obtained. 
[b] Each Party, to the extent it considers practicable and on agreement by the other Party to 
pay costs to be incurred, will, at the request of the other Party, carry out such new drainage works as 
may be required in connection with new drainage works of the other Party. 
[c] At the request of either Party, the two Parties may, by mutual agreement, cooperate in 
undertaking engineering works on the Rivers. The formal arrangements, in each case, shall be as agreed 
upon between the Parties. 
[2] If either Party plans to construct any engineering work which would cause interference with the 
waters of any of the Rivers and which, in its opinion, would affect the other Party materially, it shall 
notify the other Party of its plans and shall supply such data relating to the work as may be available 
and as would enable the other Party to inform itself of the nature, magnitude and effect of the work. If a 
work would cause interference with the waters of any of the Rivers but would not, in the opinion of the 
Party planning it, affect the other Party materially, nevertheless the Party planning the work shall, on 
request, supply the other Party with such data regarding the nature, magnitude an effect, if any, of the 
work as may be available. 
Article VIII 
Permanent Indus Commission 
[1] India and Pakistan shall each create a permanent post of Commissioner for Indus Waters, and shall 
appoint to this post, as often a vacancy occurs, a person who should ordinarily be a high-ranking 
engineer competent in the field of hydrology and wateruse. Unless either Government should decide to 
take up any particular question directly with the other Government, each Commissioner will be the 
representative of his Government for all matters arising out of this Treaty, and will serve as the regular 
channel of communication on all matters relating to the implementation of the Treaty, and, in 
particular, with respect to 
[a] the furnishing or exchange of information or data provided for in the Treaty, and 
[b] the giving of any notice provided for in the Treaty. 
[2] The status of each Commissioner and his duties and responsibilities towards his Government will 
be determined by that Government. 
[3] The two Commissioners shall together form the Permanent Indus Commission. 
[4] The purpose and maintain co-operative arrangements for the implementation of this Treaty, to 
promote co-operation between the Parties in the development of the waters of the Rivers and, in 
particular, 
[a] to study and report to the two Governments on any problem relating to the development of 
the waters of the Rivers which may be jointly referred to the Commission by the two Governments: in 
the event that a reference is made by one Government alone, the Commissioner of the other 
Government shall obtain the authorization of his Government before he proceeds t act on the reference; 
[b] to make every effort to settle promptly, in accordance with the provisions of Article IX [1], 
any question arising thereunder; 
[c] to undertake, once in every five years, a general tour of inspection of the Rivers for 
ascertaining the facts connected with various developments and works on the Rivers; 
[d] to undertake promptly, at the request of either Commissioner, a tour of inspection of such 
works or sites on the Rivers as may be considered necessary by him for ascertaining the facts 
connected with those works 
[e] to take, during the Transition Period, such steps as may be necessary or sites; and for the 
implementation of the provisions of Annexure H. 
[5] The Commission shall meet regularly at least once a year, alternately in India and Pakistan. This 
regular annual meeting shall be held in November or in such other month as may agreed upon between 
the Commissioners. The Commission shall also meet when requested by either Commissioner. 
[6] To enable the Commissioners to perform their functions in the Commission, each Government 
agrees to accord to the Commissioner of the other Government the same privileges and immunities as 
are accorded to representatives of member States to the principal and subsidiary organs of the United 
Nations under Sections 11, 12 and 13 of Article IV of the Convention on the Privileges and Immunities 
of the United Nations (dated 13th February, 1946) during the periods specified in those Sections. It is 
understood and agreed that these privileges and immunities are accorded to the Commissioners not for 
the personal benefit of the individuals themselves but in order to safeguard the independent exercise of 
their functions in connection with the Commission; consequently, the Government appointing the 
Commissioner not only has the right but is under a duty to waive the immunity of its Commissioner in 
any case where, in the opinion of the appointing Government, the immunity would impede the course 
of justice and can be waived without prejudice to the purpose for which the immunity is accorded. 
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[7] For the purposes of the inspections specified in Paragraph [4] [c] and [d], each Commissioner may 
be accompanied by two advisers or assistants to whom appropriate facilities will be accorded. 
[8] The Commission shall submit to the Government of India and to the Government of Pakistan, 
before the first of June of every year, a report on its work for the year ended on the preceding 31st 
March, and may submit to the two Governments other reports at such times as it may think desirable. 
[9] Each Government shall bear the expenses of its Commissioner and his ordinary staff. The cost of 
any special staff required in connection with the work mentioned in Article VII [1] shall be borne as 
provided therein. 
[10] The Commission shall determine its own procedures. 
 
Article IX 
Settlement of Differences and Disputes 
[1] Any question which arises between the Parties concerning the interpretation or application of this 
Treaty or the existence of any fact which, if established, might constitute a breach of this Treaty shall 
first be examined by the Commission, which will endeavour to resolve the question by agreement. 
[2] If the Commission does not reach agreement on any of the questions mentioned in Paragraph [1], 
then a difference will be deemed to have arisen, which shall be dealt with as follows: 
[a] Any difference which, in the opinion of either Commissioner, falls within the provisions of 
Part 1 of Annexure F shall, at the request of either Commissioner, be dealt with by a Neutral Expert in 
accordance with the provisions of Part 2 of Annexure F; 
[b] If the difference does not come within the provisions of Paragraph [2] [a], or if a Neutral 
Expert, in accordance with the provisions of Paragraph 7 of Annexure F, has informed the Commission 
that, in his opinion, the difference, or a part thereof, should be treated as a dispute, then a dispute will 
be deemed to have arisen which shall be settled in accordance with the provisions of Paragraph [3], [4] 
and [5]: Provided that, at the discretion of the Commission, any difference may either be dealt with by 
a Neutral Expert in accordance with the provisions of Part 2 of Annexure F or 
be deemed to be a dispute to be settled in accordance with the provisions of Paragraphs [3], [4] and [5], 
or may be settled in any other way agreed upon by the Commission. 
[3] As soon as a dispute to be settled in accordance with this and the succeeding paragraphs of this 
Article has arisen, the Commission shall, at the request of either Commissioner, report the fact to the 
two Governments, as early as practicable, stating in its report the points on which the Commission is in 
agreement and the issues in dispute, the views of each Commissioner on these issues and his reasons 
therefore. 
[4] Either Government may, following receipt of the report referred to in Paragraph [3], or if it comes 
to the conclusion that this report is being unduly delayed in the Commission, invite the other 
Government to resolve the dispute by agreement. In doing so it shall state the names of its negotiators 
and their readiness to meet with the negotiators to be appointed by the other Government at a time and 
place to be indicated by the other Government. To assist in these negotiations, the two Governments 
may agree to enlist the services of one of more mediators acceptable to them. 
[5] A Court of Arbitration shall be established to resolve the dispute in the manner provided by 
Annexure G 
[a] upon agreement between the Parties to do so; or 
[b] at the request of either Party, if, after negotiations have begun pursuant to Paragraph [4], in 
its opinion the dispute is not likely to be resolved by negotiation or mediation; or 
[c] at the request of either Party, if, after the expiry of one month following receipt by the 
other Government of the invitation referred to in Paragraph [4], that Party comes to the conclusion that 
the other Government is unduly delaying the negotiations. 
[6] The provisions of Paragraphs [3], [4] and [5] shall not apply to any difference while it is being dealt 
with by a Neutral Expert. 
 
Article X 
Emergency Provision 
If, any time prior to 31st March 1965, Pakistan should represent to the Bank that, because of 
the outbreak of large-scale international hostilities arising out of causes beyond the control of Pakistan, 
it is unable to obtain from abroad the materials and equipment necessary for the completion, by 31st 
March 1973, of that part of the system of works referred to in Article IV [1] which relates to the 
replacement referred to therein, (hereinafter referred to as the “replacement element”), and if, after 
consideration of this representation in consultation with India, the Bank is of the opinion that [a] these 
hostilities are on a scale of which the consequences is that Pakistan is unable to obtain in time such 
materials and equipment as must be procured from abroad for the completion, by 31st March 1973, of 
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the replacement element, and [b] since the Effective Date, Pakistan has taken all reasonable steps to 
obtain the said materials and equipment and, with such resources of materials and equipment as have 
been available to Pakistan both from within Pakistan and from abroad, has carried forward the 
construction of the replacement element with due diligence and all reasonable expedition, the Bank 
shall immediately notify each of the Parties accordingly. The Parties undertake, without prejudice to 
the provisions of Article XII [3] and [4], that, on being so notified, they will forthwith consult together 
and enlist the good offices of the Bank in their consultation, with a view to reaching mutual agreement 
as to whether or not, in the light of all the circumstances then prevailing, any modifications of the 
provisions of this Treaty are appropriate and advisable and, if so, the nature and the extent of the 
modifications. 
Article XI 
General Provisions 
[1] It is expressly understood that 
[a] this Treaty governs the rights and obligations of each Party in relation to the other with 
respect only to the use of the waters of the Rivers and matters incidental thereto; and 
[b] nothing contained in this Treaty, and nothing arising out of the execution thereof, shall be 
construed as constituting a recognition or waiver (whether tacit, by implication or otherwise) of any 
rights or claims whatsoever of either of the Parties other than those rights or claims which are expressly 
recognized or waived in this Treaty. Each of the Parties agrees that it will not invoke this Treaty, 
anything contained therein, or anything arising out of the execution thereof, in support of any of its 
own rights or claims whatsoever or in disputing any of the rights or claims whatsoever of the other 
Party, other than those rights or claims which are expressly recognized or waived in this Treaty. 
[2] Nothing in this Treaty shall be construed by the Parties as in any way establishing any general 
principle of law or any precedent. 
[3] The rights and obligations of each Party under this Treaty shall remain unaffected by any provisions 
contained in, or by anything arising out of the execution of, any agreement establishing the Indus Basin 
Development Fund. 
Article XII 
Final Provisions 
[1] This Treaty consists of the Preamble, the Articles hereof and Annexures A to H hereto, and may be 
cited as “The Indus Waters Treaty 1960.” 
[2] This Treaty shall be ratified and the ratifications thereof shall be exchanged in New Delhi. It shall 
enter into force upon the exchange of ratifications, and will then effect retrospectively from the first of 
April 1960. 
[3] The provisions of this Treaty may from time to time be modified by a duly ratified treaty concluded 
for that purpose between the two Governments. 
[4] The provisions of this Treaty, or the provisions of this Treaty as modified under the provisions of 
Paragraph [3], shall continue in force until terminated by a duly ratified treaty concluded for that 
purpose between the two Governments. 
 
IN WITNESS WHEREOF the respective Plenipotentiaries have signed this Treaty 
and have hereunto affixed their seals. 
Done in triplicate in English at Karachi on this Nineteenth day of September 1960. 
FOR THE GOVERNMENT OF INDIA: 
(Sd) Jawaharlal Nehru 
FOR THE GOVERNMENT OF PAKISTAN: 
(Sd) Mohammad Ayub Khan 
Field Marshall, H.P., H.J. 
FOR THE INTERNATIONAL BANK FOR RECONSTRUCTION AND 
DEVELOPMENT for the purposes specified in Articles V and X and Annexures F, G 
and H:  
Sd) W. A. B. Iliff 
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Annexure-810 
 
Chronology: Negotiating the Indus Basin Disputes 
 
1947 
Aug. 14: Pakistan got independence and the Arbitral Tribunal, dealing with the Partition of the Punjab, 
came into effect. 
Aug. 15: India got independence and also automatically inherited from British India membership of all 
international organisations. Indian states were obliged to accede to one dominion or the other by this 
date. 
Aug. 17: Radcliffe's Boundary Awards were published for the provinces of Punjab and Bengal, 
delineating the international boundary between India and Pakistan. 
Sept.: Pakistan became member of the United Nations. 
Oct. 26: Jammu and Kashmir was claimed acceded to India.  
Oct. 27: An undeclared war started on the issue of accession of Kashmir. 
Nov.: The province of Junagadh after having first acceded to Pakistan, joined India. 
Nov. 30: Five references were made to the Arbitral Tribunal to make financial adjustments arising out 
of Punjab’s partition. 
Dec. 20: A Standstill Agreement was signed by the Chief Engineers of divided Punjab. They agreed to 
continue the supply of water to UBDC and Dipalpur canals from Ferozepur Headworks, at per pre-
partition levels. (The Agreement was due to expire on 31 March 1948, the same day the Arbitral 
Tribunal also expired) 
Dec. 22: A sixth reference was made to the Arbitral Tribunal regarding West Punjab’s (Pakistan) claim 
to the Mandi hydroelectric scheme. 
 
1948 
March 17: Arbitral Tribunal announced its awards regarding all 6 referrals. 
March 29: East Punjab (India) notified to West Punjab (Pakistan) the expiry of Standstill Agreement on 
31 March 48. 
March 31: Arbitral Tribunal and Standstill Agreement cease to exist. 
April 1: East Punjab (India) stopped supply of water from the Ferozepur Headworks to the Dipalpur 
and Upper Bari Doab canals. 
April 15: Chief Engineers of West and East Punjab met in Simla to resolve the water problem. The 
Prime Minister of Pakistan, Liaquat Ali Khan, sent a telegram to the Prime Minister of India, 
Jawaharlal Nehru, requesting immediate action to restore the water supply; and expressed his regret 
that before India and Pakistan have had the time to settle their existing problems East Punjab has 
created new ones. 
April 16: Prime Minister Nehru sent a telegram to Prime Minister Liaquat Ali Khan, to say that he 
trusts the Simla conference between the Chief Engineers will reach a solution. 
April 17: In the meantime the West Punjab Government suspended the issuing of permits to remove 
valuables from bank lockers, and instructed the bank managers to stop any transfer of securities from 
West Punjab to India. 
April 18: Two Simla Agreements signed by the Chief Engineers of West and East Punjab, on the 
Dipalpur canals and CBDC. But the agreements were not ratified by West Punjab. 
April 24: Prime Minister Liaquat Ali Khan sent a telegram to Prime Minister Nehru saying that an 
Inter-Dominion conference was needed to discuss the Simla Agreements; so that he could fix a date 
and place as soon as possible. 
April 30: Prime Minister of India ordered the East Punjab Government to resume the supply of water to 
West Punjab on the basis of the Simla Agreements, subject to variations from the forthcoming Inter-
Dominion conference was to be held on 3 May 1948. 
May 3-4: Inter-Dominion Conference held in New Delhi. On May 4 Inter-Dominion Agreement was 
signed by Pakistan and India. 
July 21: Lahore Conference was held in which delegates of India and Pakistan met again to discuss 
water issue. 
                                                
10
 The Chronology is an updated version of author’s previous work published by the National 
Documentation Wing (previously known as National Documentation Cell), Cabinet Division, 
Government of Pakistan, Islamabad; Document No. 8069, dated 24 May 1997. 
 235
Sept.: The State of Hyderabad joined India after its decision to accede to Pakistan was thwarted by 
India. 
 
1949 
Jan. 1: UN ceasefire from midnight in Jammu and Kashmir. 
June 16: Pakistan wrote to India saying it was unhappy with the Delhi Agreement and wanted another 
Inter-Dominion Conference. If this conference fails to get agreement, then Pakistan would prefer to 
take the Sutlej water dispute to the International Court of Justice. India refused to countenance 
submitting the case to the ICJ. 
Aug. 4-6: The Indian proposed Inter-Dominion conference was held in New Delhi. 
 
1950 
Jan. 9: The World Bank told India that without resolving its water dispute with Pakistan over River 
Sutlej the Bank will not finance the Bhakra and Nangal dam projects. 
Feb. 14: The Prime Minister of Pakistan wrote to the Prime Minister of India stating that they have to 
settle the Canal Waters dispute (over use of water from the River Sutlej) before anything else could be 
done. 
March 27-29: The Inter-Dominion Conference which was proposed for August 1949, was held in 
Karachi. 
May 29-31: A second Inter-Dominion Conference which was proposed for August 1949, was held in 
New Delhi. 
May 10: India got registered the Delhi Agreement with the Secretariat of the United Nations, as Treaty 
No. 794. Pakistan objected to the Indian move by registering a certified statement disclaiming this 
treaty’s validity. 
June-July: Pakistan stopped paying disputed seignorage charges to India. 
Oct. 8: The Prime Minister of India wrote to the Prime Minister of Pakistan offering to set up a tribunal 
to settle the Canal Waters dispute comprising international tribunal of four judges, two each from 
Pakistan and India. Pakistan rejected the Indian proposal saying that it would only lead to stalemate and 
was a delaying tactics to gain time. 
 
1951 
Feb.: David Lilienthal visited the Indian Subcontinent. 
March 23: Pakistan indicated that it would take the Canal Waters dispute to UN’s Security Council. 
Aug. 4: Lilienthal’s article published in Colliers, entitled: “Another Korea in the Making?” 
Aug. 8: Lilienthal met with members of the World Bank Management: President Black, General 
Counsel Sommers and Assistant to the President Iliff. 
Sept. 6: The President of the World Bank wrote to the Prime Ministers of India and Pakistan offering 
its good offices in settling the Canal Waters dispute. 
Sept. 25: The Prime Ministers of India and Pakistan accepted the World Bank’s good offices, writing 
separately to President Black. 
Oct. 8: Lilienthal met again with members of the World Bank Management: Vice-President Garner, 
General Counsel Sommers and the Bank’s engineer General Wheeler. Lilienthal warned the 
Management against taking an engineering approach to the dispute before there as clear political 
agreement upon the principles to settle the dispute. 
Nov. 8: President Black wrote again to the Prime Ministers of India and Pakistan suggesting setting up 
a Working Party to suggest the procedure to start creating a comprehensive plan based on Lilienthal's 
principles. These principles, as Mr. Black outlined them were: 
[i] there is enough water for all existing and future needs in the Indus basin for both countries; 
[ii] unitary development is needed, therefore all the rivers in the basin are to be considered in finding a 
solution and not just the Sutlej alone; 
[iii] talks will be conducted on a functional plane in which past claims and disputes will be avoided. 
Black's Working Party was to have indigenous engineers from India and Pakistan who would be 
assisted by the World Bank’s Designee engineer. This latter engineer would only be available to advise 
the parties, not to arbitrate between them. Furthermore, the Bank’s engineer was also to ensure that the 
plans being suggested were financially viable. Once the Working Party had decided upon the initial 
procedures, it would implement them to start creating the comprehensive plan without the need for 
further authorization from the Indian and Pakistani Governments. 
 
1952 
India completed the Harike Barrage. 
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Jan-Feb.: President Black visited India and Pakistan, and tried to get complete commitment to the 
method outlined by the Bank. 
March 13: President Black wrote to the Prime Ministers of India and Pakistan outlining terms under 
which the agreed Working Party would proceed. Mr. Black also requested that for the duration of the 
Bank’s good offices, neither side would diminish supplies to existing uses. It was agreed that the 
shared objective would be to increase water to both countries substantially. Mr. Black invited India and 
Pakistan to send their Designee engineer and party to start discussions in Washington DC in May 1952. 
May 7: The Working Party held its first meeting in the World Bank’s headquarters in Washington DC. 
Nov.: The Working Party met again in Washington DC. 
Dec. 16: The Pakistani Foreign Minister and representative to the UN’s Security Council, Mohammad 
Zafrulla Khan, pointed out the Canal Waters dispute (Indus Basin Dispute) in the Security Council. 
 
1953 
Jan.: The Working Party met again in Washington DC. 
April 17: Pakistan's Governor General, Ghulam Mohammad, sacked Khwaja Nazimuddin and 
appointed Mohammad Ali Bogra as Prime Minister. 
April: India appointed GR Garg to ensure compliance with President Black’s stipulation in his letter of 
13 March 1952, not to diminish supplies to Pakistan. However, the initial title of this appointment 
causes some controversy with Pakistan as it referred to ensuring compliance with the disputed Delhi 
Agreement. The World Bank refused to endorse this appointment until India changed the title. The 
Bank explained that though the appointment was a good idea, the effect of this action was lost through 
reference to the disputed agreement. India changed the title to the "Special Commissioner for Canal 
Waters". 
May 13: Pakistan confirmed to the World Bank that it has appointed KA Ghafoor as its Irrigation 
Commissioner to partner India's Special Commissioner, and ensure compliance with President Black’s 
letter of 13 March 1952. 
May 21: India opened a new distributary system near the towns of Mudki and Golewala, drawing water 
from the Sutlej River above Ferozepur. The Pakistani Irrigation Commissioner protested against this to 
the Indian Special Commissioner for Canal Waters. 
June 27: ND Gulhati replaced Dr. Khosla as Indian Designee Engineer to the Working Party. 
Oct. 6: India and Pakistan submitted their proposals for the comprehensive plan to the World Bank. 
The Indian Plan calculated the total water supply in the Indus Basin to be 119 MAF and out of that 
allocated to Pakistan 90 MAF (93% of the western rivers), and to India 29 MAF (all of the eastern 
rivers and 7% of the western rivers). The Pakistani Plan calculated the total water to be 118 MAF and 
Pakistan allocated itself 102.5 MAF (all the western rivers and 30% of the eastern rivers), and to India 
15.5 MAF (70% of the eastern rivers). Neither party accepted the other’s plan. 
 
1954 
Feb. 5: The World Bank presented its own proposal in which the division of the Indus Basin that was 
implicit in the Indian and Pakistani plans was made explicit: Pakistan would get the entire Western 
rivers except for small uses in Jammu and Kashmir and India would get all the water in the Eastern 
rivers. Since India was the principle beneficiary, it would pay for the link canals taking water from the 
Western rivers to areas previously dependent upon the Eastern rivers. A transitional period was 
envisaged during which India could progressively withdraw water from the Eastern rivers as long as 
Pakistani existing uses were not reduced and the link canals were built according to the schedule. The 
World Bank was giving India its historical withdrawals, and surplus water for future development. 
Pakistan was getting its historic withdrawals; the Sutlej Valley Canals would be brought up to 
allocation in all but unusually bad years; enough water would be available to meet the planned Thal 
and Kotri projects off-taking the River Indus; and in an average year Pakistan would have enough 
surplus water to meet additional needs planned on the Indus at Sukkur and Gudu. 
Feb. 8: President Black wrote to the Prime Ministers of India and Pakistan putting forward the World 
Bank proposal. 
March 22-25: India accepted the World Bank proposal, and emphasised the need to protect existing 
uses within the State of Jammu and Kashmir, and future development which would probably involve 
small consumptive uses. Pakistan did not give a clear commitment to the Proposal. Pakistan demanded 
that the Sukkur and Gudu irrigation schemes should be taken into account, which would then show the 
Proposal to have significant shortages, unless Pakistan was guaranteed a substantial portion of the 
Eastern rivers. 
April 2: Pakistan opened the Balloki-Suleimanke Link canal. 
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May 10: India informed to Pakistan and the World Bank that it intended to open the Bhakra Main Line 
Canal in June 1954. 
May 14: The Prime Minister of Pakistan criticized the World Bank proposal as unfair, and sent 
Pakistani representatives to negotiate the necessary adjustments. Indian representatives interpreted this 
as Pakistan rejecting the Bank’s Proposal, whereas the Bank itself awaited for the clarification of 
Pakistan's message before passing judgment. 
May 21: The World Bank informed the Pakistani Government that its message has not been seen as 
acceptance of the Bank’s Proposal, nor can it be regarded as the basis for further joint discussion. It 
emphasized that Pakistan must accept the division of rivers as the starting point. If then during 
negotiations it become clear that Pakistan's envisaged irrigation uses would not be met by such 
division, then the World Bank would offer its good offices to bring about acceptable adjustments. 
May 27: The Pakistani Government proposed to hold discussions with the World Bank. 
June: Pakistan's new team arrived in Washington DC headed by Ghulam Mueenuddin and included 
Mohammad Shoaib (the World Bank Executive Director for Pakistan, and later the Minister of Finance 
under Ayub Khan). 
June 15: The World Bank started discussions with the Pakistani Foreign Minister Sir Zafrulla Khan 
who was visiting Washington DC, regarding Pakistan's acceptance of the World Bank proposal. 
July 28: The Pakistani Foreign Minister accepted the World Bank proposal in principle, as long as the 
plan that is worked out so that Pakistan's uses can be met from the Western rivers. 
Aug. 8: The Prime Minister of India wrote to the World Bank expressing reservations regarding 
Pakistan’s acceptance of the Proposal, and wanted to hold clarificatory talks with the Bank’s 
representatives, in a meeting to be held in the Indian Subcontinent. 
Aug. 13: President Black wrote to the Prime Minister of India and the Pakistani Foreign Minister 
suggesting that instead of holding clarificatory talks with either side in the Indian Subcontinent, their 
representatives should meet in Washington DC to resume work on creating a comprehensive plan. The 
starting point though should be the division of the rivers. And if Pakistani needs were not met by the 
Western rivers alone, then other means may be introduced. 
Aug. 19: The Prime Minister of India accepted President Black’s proposal with some qualifications but 
still wanted to hold talks, on transitional arrangements, in India. 
Aug. 24: The Pakistani Foreign Minister agreed to President Black’s proposal but also with some 
qualifications. 
Sept. 1-16: World Bank representatives, General Wheeler and General Counsel Sommers, went to India 
and Pakistan for discussions. 
Oct. 4: World Bank representatives held discussions with Indian representatives in Washington DC. 
Oct. 7: President Black wrote to the Prime Ministers of India and Pakistan that the Bank has taken note 
of the Indian and Pakistani comments. The bank will not consider either side to be bound by them, and 
is willing to resume cooperative work under the terms of reference already suggested. Mr. Black 
invited the Indian and Pakistani representatives back to Washington DC on that basis. Both 
Governments accepted the invitation. 
Dec. 6: Talks resumed to workout a comprehensive plan. 
 
1955 
June 2: The World Bank made interim arrangements to keep the situation in the Indus Basin under 
control while work to create a comprehensive plan continued. Pakistan and India entered ad hoc 
transitional agreement for 1 April-30 Sept 1955. The agreement allowed Pakistan to withdraw ad hoc 
amounts from the Eastern rivers during the agreed period, after that Pakistan has to transfer whatever 
amount of water it could from the Western rivers. Efforts in 1954 had failed to arrange such an 
agreement despite prolonged negotiations. 
Oct. 31: Another ad hoc transitional agreement covering the period 1 Oct 1955-31 March 1956, was 
signed by India and Pakistan. 
 
1956 
Discussions continue between the Indians and Pakistanis under the good offices of the World Bank. 
The issues involved were studied but no agreement reached on two points: [i] the amount of water 
needed for some uses specified in the terms of reference prescribed by the Bank; and [ii] certain 
technical considerations especially the effect of dividing the Basin’s water upon the gains and losses 
experienced in the rivers. The absence of agreement implied that the disputants still do not have a 
common approach to the actual engineering features of a comprehensive plan. 
May 21: Consultants, employed by the World Bank, decided that the Western rivers were not 
inadequate to meet Pakistan’s needs envisaged under the Bank’s Proposal of February 1954. The Bank, 
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based upon these studies, drawn up an Aide-Memoire. This amendment envisaged constructing storage 
facilities on the Western rivers to makeup any deficit. The Aide Memoire also offers the Bank’s good 
offices to get agreement upon any adjustments to the original proposal that might be required. 
June 1: The World Bank proposed the continuance of cooperative work until 31 March 1957. 
June 18: India agreed to the continuance, but asked Pakistan to accept the principle of division without 
any qualification before proceeding with negotiations. 
June 27: Pakistan agreed to continue cooperative work, but with provisions of any ultimate plan. 
June 30: The World Bank did not regard the Indian and Pakistani replies as adequate to continuing the 
cooperative work but recommended continuing work based upon the Bank’s 1954 Proposal and Aide 
Memoire. 
Sept.: India and Pakistan agreed to continue cooperative work on the proposed basis. 
Sept. 24: Another ad hoc transitional agreement, 1 April 1956-31 March 1957, was signed by India and 
Pakistan. 
Sept 56-March 57: Talks continued and the plans that emerged were vastly different in concept and 
cost. The Indian plan was too ‘tight’, since their main concern was the size of their financial liability to 
Pakistan to cover 
cost of the replacement works. By contrast the Pakistani plan was too grandiose, prompting the World 
Bank to urge Pakistan to look, seriously, into its irrigation planning. 
 
1957 
April 11: President Black wrote to the Prime Ministers of India and Pakistan proposing a formal 
extension of cooperative work until 30 Sept 1957. The Indian and Pakistani delegates were not needed 
in Washington DC for the duration. In the meantime, the World Bank reviewed the progress to date and 
determine what future action was needed. This proposal was agreed to by the two countries. 
May 13: The World Bank gave the delegations a draft of the “Heads of Agreement” as a basis to 
resolve the dispute on the international waters. The Agreement reiterated the division of rivers, a 
transitional period, and setting up a commission with responsibilities that include preparing the plan 
that was needed to implement the proposed water division. 
May 27: Vice-President Iliff discussed the Heads of Agreement with the Indian delegates. 
June 10: Vice-President Iliff held further discussions regarding the Heads of Agreement, in New Delhi, 
with representatives of the Indian Government. 
June 11-14: Iliff discussed with representatives of the Pakistani Government in Lahore, the Heads of 
Agreement. No tangible progress was made as Pakistan's main objections were based upon the absence 
of any agreed plan to implement the works arising out of the division of water, and the unsettled matter 
of financial liability for the works. 
June 24: The World Bank made the Heads of Agreement more general, and asked the delegates 
whether it was acceptable as the basis for further discussions. 
July 13: Pakistan submitted its view. 
July 25: India submitted its view. 
Aug. 21: Vice-President Iliff met separately with the representatives of the Indian and Pakistani 
Government. He suggested that each country should submit in writing its opinion on the Heads of 
Agreement and then to meet separately with the World Bank for oral discussions, and to give its 
opinion on the written views of the other Government. The purpose of this exercise was to allow the 
World Bank to make up its mind regarding its future involvement, if any, in the dispute. Iliff, also, 
suggested that the disputants attempt to negotiate another ad hoc agreement for the period from 1 
October 1957-30 September 1958. 
Nov-Dec.: Negotiations in Karachi and New Delhi failed to reach an ad hoc agreement. 
 
1958 
West Pakistan's Water and Power Development Authority (WAPDA) was established. India proposed 
Marhu Tunnel Plan: diverted water from Chenab for use in India and offered equivalent amount of 
water in fixed deliveries to Pakistan from the eastern rivers. Pakistan rejected plan because of: (i) 
Indian interference in Chenab waters; (ii) increase Pakistani dependence on India for water. Pakistan 
declared to present its own plan soon preserving its independence from India. 
April: The Marhu Tunnel Plan was discussed in Rome. No Pakistani alternative plan was discussed, but 
using information given by Pakistan for storage possibilities on Jhelum, the World Bank suggested 
using such storage to replace SVC supplies, this would be cheaper than link canal replacement from 
Indus. Pakistan agreed to the idea and prepared plan on this basis. 
July: Pakistan presented London Plan, in London. Proposing series of dams (i) Tarbela at Indus with 
600,000 kw power plant (ii) Mangla at Jhelum in Azad Kashmir with 300,000 kw power plant (iii) 3 
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subsidiary dams on Jhelum and 10 link canals. Discussions adjourned to allow India to study plan in 
detail. 
Oct.: The World Bank discussed with India the policy decisions needed to get agreement. 
Dec.: The World Bank held discussions with India and Pakistan in Washington, DC on the Pakistan’s 
London Plan, and the Indian Plan (which was in fact a revised Marhu Tunnel Plan). Pakistan rejected 
the Indian Plan, and India rejected the London Plan saying it was too big, too costly, and the 
transitional period was too long. 
Dec. 22: Pakistan accepted the World Bank's 1954 Proposal and Aide Memoire, unconditionally, as the 
basis upon which to continue cooperative work. 
 
1959 
March 26: The World Bank presented its Settlement Plan incorporating the principles of the 1954 
Proposal and Aide Memoire. The Plan provided for irrigation replacement in Pakistan and the 
development of irrigation and power in India and Pakistan. Regarding the financing of the Plan, the 
World Bank suggested the following guidelines to workout each country’s liability: 
[a] the replacement works should not be a financial burden upon Pakistan; 
[b] but the Indian contribution should reflect the real cost of implementation and its ability to pay; and 
[c] the country benefiting from a particular scheme should pay for its construction through loans. The 
Plan's implementation would see an international water treaty being signed by India and Pakistan. This 
treaty would in turn set up an Indus Development Commission which would exist for, at least, the 
transitional period. 
April 17: Another year long ad hoc agreement was signed for the period 1 April 1959-31 March 1960. 
May 13: President Black and Vice-President Iliff met the Prime Minister of India and other 
governmental representatives in New Delhi. Discussion focused upon India's possible financial 
contribution, the arrangements for the transitional period and the Indian Government’s opinion 
regarding the inclusion of a reservoir at Mangla as part of the replacement plan. Understanding was 
reached that the Indian liability to Pakistan would be limited to $175 million, the transitional period 
would last for 10 years, and Pakistan would incur financial penalties if it went beyond this time, though 
a 3-year extension had been envisaged. India would also get the foreign exchange costs of building the 
Beas dam in India. This dam and a 200,000 kw power plant would be part of the Settlement Plan’s 
projects in India. And finally Indian claim over Jammu and Kashmir would be protected by a suitable 
formula. 
May 18: World Bank representatives won Pakistan’s consent to amended works in Pakistan under the 
Bank's Settlement Plan. New works include 2 reservoirs at Tarbela and Mangla; 8 link canals 
transferring water from the Western rivers to the Sutlej Valley canals; a 300,000 kw hydroelectric 
power station at Mangla and tubewells to promote drainage. Pakistan agreed to absorb costs already 
incurred in constructing the existing link canals, and withdrawn any claims for compensation for 
operation and maintenance of these replacement works. The World Bank promised to seek funds from 
friendly Governments, to finance the amended works' system in Pakistan. Further negotiations were 
still needed for Indian uses on the Western rivers regarding additional consumptive uses, and 
hydroelectric uses. 
June: Pakistan established its Indus Basin Advisory Board (IBAB) and its first meeting held in Lahore. 
Aug. 5: Talks were held between the Bank, India and Pakistan in London regarding the transitional 
arrangements; Indian rights on the Western rivers; and drafting the Heads of Agreement for the 
international water treaty. These talks and others during September reached an agreement on the Heads 
of Agreement:  
[i] division of the Indus rivers’ water; 
[ii] transitional arrangements; 
[iii] Indian hydro-electric and non-consumptive uses on the Western rivers; [iv] financial provisions 
involving the Indian and Pakistani Governments; 
[v] exchange of hydrological data regarding the rivers; 
[vi] future cooperation; 
[vii] further discussion of proposals to establish a routine to resolve future disputes; and 
[viii] some general matters. 
Sept: IBAB's second meeting held in London. 
Oct.: Discussions were held in Washington DC regarding detailed transitional period arrangements, and 
Indian consumptive uses on western rivers. Drafting of the water treaty’s text was initiated. 
Dec. 9: The water treaty’s main text was drafted. The more important articles provided for: 
[a] allocation of the Eastern rivers to India after the transitional period; [b] Western rivers allocation to 
Pakistan with provision for Indian hydroelectric and non-consumptive uses; 
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[c] Indian payment into the Indus Basin Development Fund for the replacement works; 
[d] the exchange of hydrological data between India and Pakistan; 
[e] future cooperation between India and Pakistan; 
[f] the establishment of the Permanent Indus Commission who’s purpose and function was to establish 
and maintain a cooperative implementation of the Treaty, and promote cooperative development of 
rivers; 
[g] establish a procedure to resolve future differences and disputes. Still to be resolved were the 
annexes regarding the transitional period, and Indian consumptive uses on western rivers. Draft copies 
of the text were sent to the Indian and Pakistani Governments. 
 
1960 
Jan. 6: The Indus Basin Development Fund draft was completed, and copies were sent to the Pakistani 
Government and the contributing ‘friendly’ Governments. The Fund was to be administered by the 
World Bank, and all contributions will first be paid into the Fund from which the Bank would disburse 
upon receiving the receipts. 
Jan. 18-20: Engineering consultants met in Washington DC regarding the implementation of the 
Settlement Plan in Pakistan. 
Sept. 19: The Indus Water Treaty was signed in Karachi by the Pakistani President, Ayub Khan, the 
Indian Prime Minister, Jawaharlal Nehru, and the World Bank Vice-President, Iliff. 
 
1961 
Jan.: The Indus Waters Treaty was ratified by both countries, bringing into effect the Indus Basin 
Development Fund. 
 
Salal Dam Issue 
1974 
April 1974: Pakistan gets information through its intelligence agencies that India is constructing a dam 
at Dhinagarh site on River Chenab; India did not supply design data six months prior to the start of the 
plan, obligatory under the IWT. 
May 1974: Pakistan formally requests Indian government for providing detail design of the project. 
 
 
1975 
Jan. 1975: India supplies design data of Salal Dam project. 
April 1975: Pakistan raises four major objections to the design of the Salal Hydro-electric Plant. 
April 1975 to Sep. 1976: Several rounds of talks held between technical experts from both the states. 
 
1976 
Oct. 1976: Both the states discuss the issue at secretaries’ level and hold a number of meetings 
culminating into a draft accord in 1978. 
 
1978 
April 14, 1978: Both the states sign the Salal Dam accord stating that without prejudice to the 
provisions of the Indus Waters Treaty 1960 or to the rights and obligations of the parties, they have 
agreed that: “The Full Pondage level will not be higher than EL 1600 feet, Dead Storage Capacity not 
exceeding 230-303 acre feet and there will be no Operating Pool as such. The Spillway will not be 
more than30 feet below the Full Pondage level, spillway gates will be 12 in numbers with length not 
exceeding 50 feet and height at 30 feet. While the level of power intake will not be lower than 27.5 feet 
below the Full Pondage level. The Outlet Works six in numbers with sill level not below EL 1365 feet. 
These shall be permanently closed with concrete plugs within one year of the date of the first filling of 
the reservoir up to the Full Pondage level or within three years of the date of the first filling of the 
reservoir up to the crest of the spillway, whichever is earlier.” 
 
Wullar Barrage Issue 
1985 
Feb. 1985: Pakistan got information about the Indian plan through a tender notice published in the 
Indian press. 
President Ziaul Haq directed the Foreign Office to take up the issue immediately with India. 
Mar. 1985: Pakistan’s Ambassador in New Delhi lodged a formal protest to the Indian Government. 
A number of Secretary level talks were held without any result. 
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1986 
May 1986: Indian Indus Waters Commissioner argued that “Tulbul Navigational Project” was for 
“non-consumptive” uses which are allowed under the IWT 1960. 
 
1987 
Oct. 1987: A committee of British and American experts recommended to Prime Minister Mohammad 
Khan Junejo that Pakistan should approach ICJ. Meanwhile, the Indian government agreed to discuss 
the issue directly and suspended the construction work until an accord is reached. 
Dec. 1987: India changed its stance arguing that Wullar Lake was not a part of the river Jhelum thus 
India has every right to construct a “dam” or “barrage” on it. 
 
1988 
Jan. 6, 1988: Pakistan took up the issue at ministerial level and Minister for Water and Power wrote a 
letter to its counterpart in New Delhi stating that “The River ‘Jhelum Main’ starts from Verinag as 
clearly stated in the Treaty; India has no right to build any storage capacity, barrage or dam on the 
‘Jhelum Main’”. 
 
1989 
Feb. 1989: Indian Ambassador in Islamabad called on Prime Minister Benazir Bhutto and made a 
formal request for negotiation. 
Mar. 1989: First bilateral talks held between Pakistan’s envoy in New Delhi and the Indian 
representative but talks remain inconclusive. 
Mar. 1989 Pakistan’s delegation reportedly presented a draft agreement to the Indian government 
permitting construction of Tulbul Navigation Project but with a number of restrictions. Indian 
government disagreed to the contents of the draft saying it will soon inform about its position to 
Pakistan. 
Aug. 16, 1989: Pakistan’s government constituted a committee to review the “draft agreement”. 
Aug. 18, 1989: Punjab Chief Minster, Mian Nawaz Sharif, wrote letter to President Ghulam Ishaq 
Khan requesting him to “intercede in the Wullar Barrage issue”. Meanwhile, uprising started in Indian-
Occupied Kashmir overshadowing the issue. 
 
1991 
Oct. 1991: Both sides finalised draft agreement in Islamabad; Indian delegation wanted to visit 
Islamabad in Feb. 1994 “to conclude the agreement”.  
 
1992 
Aug. 1992: Efforts were made to break the impasse but both the parties reiterated their positions only. 
 
 
1994 
Jan. 1994: India resorted to informal diplomacy and circulated a Non-Paper No. 4, asking for 
resumption of talks. 
 
Composite and Integrated Dialogues 
1997 
June 23, 1997: Agenda for Composite and Integrated Dialogue was finalised and Working Groups were 
formed to investigate and discuss all the outstanding bilateral issues including the Wullar and Baglihar. 
 
1998 
Nov. 5, 1998: All the Working Groups met in New Delhi. Unfortunately, meeting scheduled for four 
hours ended just in 15 minutes. Parties reiterated to continue dialogue. Issued a joint statement saying 
to “finding a solution to the issue consistent with the provisions of the IWT”. 
 
Baglihar Dam Issue 
May 1999: Pakistan logged a formal objection to the design of Baglihar project: a two phased 450MW 
hydro-electric plant was conceived by India in 1992, approved in 1996, first phase to be completed by 
2004 and second in 2008. 
2000: Baglihar Dam issue become a topic of heated public debate. 
 242
Aug. 7, 2003: India sent a Note Verbal requesting to discuss the issue at the government level, under 
Article IV of the IWT. In response Pakistan imposed preconditions: immediate suspension of work, 
allow on-site inspection by 30 September 2003 and resolve the issue by 31 December 2003. 
 
Composite Dialogues (Jan. 2004–Aug. 2007) and the Water Disputes 
Jan. 2004: Composite Dialogue started after both the heads of governments agreed to discuss all the 
outstanding issues including Kashmir. 
June 21, 2004: Pakistan delegation called on Shri Priyaranjan Dasmunsi, Indian Minister of water 
Resources in New Delhi. 
June 26, 2004: First round of Secretary level talks between India and Pakistan held at New Delhi with 
good progress on other issues but could not produce any resolve of water issues.  
Jul. 29-30, 2004: 10th round of talks on Wullar issue: non-viability of Indian “Tulbal Navigational” 
project was realised highlighting the need to seek alternative solution for navigational problem. 
Nov. 29, 2004: Pakistan decided to send a reference to the World Bank on Baglihar issue. 
Jan. 4-6, 2005: Second secretary-level meeting under Composite Dialogue with progress on other 
issues but nothing agreed regarding water disputes. 
Jan. 11, 2005: Spokesman of Indian Ministry of External Affairs (MEA) said, 'If Pakistan still chooses 
to go the World Bank, then we will respond appropriately. 
Jan. 18, 2005 Pakistan referred the dispute of Baglihar Dam to the World Bank. Pakistan has raised 
three key sets of technical objections to the design of the dam: storage capacity, power intake tunnels 
and the spillways. Spokesman of Indian Ministry of External Affairs said: “we do not believe that the 
reference to the World Bank was justified.” 
Jan. 31, 2005, Indian-held Kashmir (J&K) assembly passed a resolution requesting “New Delhi to 
reconsider the Indus Water Treaty so as to safeguard the interest of the state”. 
April 20, 2005: World Bank shortlisted panel of experts to act one of them as Neutral Expert on 
Baglihar. 
May 12, 2005: World Bank appointed A Swiss Engineer, Professor Raymond Lafitte, as Neutral 
Expert. 
June 28-29, 2005: Third round of Secretary-Level Composite Dialogue was held, record of discussions 
were signed by the parties first time. 
Oct. 5, 2005: Prof. Lafitte visited the dam site and asked some technical questions on a performa to 
both the parties. 
April 2006: World Bank neutral expert called Indian and Pakistani officials to London to discuss the 
Baglihar dam issue. 
June 22-23, 2006: Fourth round of Secretary-Level Composite Dialogue was held. 
Feb. 12, 2007: Neutral Expert declared his verdict suggesting some changes in dam design, though in 
line Pakistan’s objections, but his verdict did not allay, even partially, Pakistan’s apprehensions. India 
created another issue, Kishenganga Dam: capable of producing 330-MW and diverting about 27 per 
cent of the river Neelum water through a 22-KM long tunnel into Wullar lake. 
June 30-31, 2007: Fifth round of Secretary-Level Composite Dialogue was held. 
Aug. 30-31, 2007: Delegations led by Mrs. Gauri Chatterji and Mr. Muhammad Ismail Qureshi, from 
India and Pakistan respectively produced and signed a Joint Statement saying nothing more than 
reiterating their respective positions and emphasizing “the need for an early and amicable resolution of 
the issue in accordance with the provisions of the Indus Waters Treaty of 1960 for the socio-economic 
development of the peoples of the two countries.”  
Nothing came out of the last 13 rounds of talks on water disputes. Virtually parties arrived at a 
diplomatic deadlock on all the outstanding water issues: Wullar, Baglihar and the Kishenganga. 
Pakistan started thinking to seek appropriate international arbitration preferably referring the Indus 
basin disputes to ICJ in order to secure its treaty rights. 
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